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Abstract
This thesis studies regional economic disparities both within individual countries as well 
as between countries. The main objective is to determine whether regional disparities 
converge automatically through time and, if this is not the rule, whether regional policies 
are needed. This thesis argues that disparities, far from converging automatically, can 
persist not only through time but also be affected by policies and external factors. The 
issue of convergence of regional incomes becomes significant when considering the case 
o f integrated areas. In this thesis I study the potential effects that the deepening of 
MERCOSUR will have on disparities both between as well as within the member 
countries by focusing on Argentina and Brazil, the two largest countries within the area, 
up until the late 1990s.
In order to analyse disparities within integrated areas, the European Union will be 
considered as a frame of reference. I show that although regional policies appear to have 
favoured convergence, this has not been as significant as expected, particularly within the 
regions. In addition, Argentina and Brazil will be analysed, and I trace the origin of 
national disparities to late colonial times. Further, regional disparities within both 
countries have not shown any major trends towards convergence over the centuries. 
Moreover, political and macroeconomic factors do seem to have an incidence in the 
process o f regional convergence within those countries. Also, different subperiods 
display convergence and divergence.
Both the European Union experience as well as that of Argentina and Brazil indicate that 
disparities were not reduced automatically as neo-classical economics predict. I also refer 
to macroeconomic and political factors having an impact in the process of convergence, 
diverting these regions away from their convergence paths. Another important factor in 
the automatic process o f convergence as described in neo-classical economics is the inter­
regional mobility of factors. However, this does not seem to have been the case for either 
the European Union or Argentina and Brazil.
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The thesis seeks to provide an insight into how disparities evolve through time and its 
conclusions will not only be useful in terms of regional policy planning in Argentina and 
Brazil but also in the process of deepening in MERCOSUR and a possible Latin American 
integration. The comparison with the European Union experience provides a more 
general frame o f reference for other integration schemes around the world. The 
conclusions should provide a better insight into the problem of unbalanced growth not 
only for individual countries but also for integrated areas.
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Part I
Theory and Methodology
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1Introduction
The objective of this thesis is to determine the impact o f regional integration on socio­
economic disparities. This thesis studies the origin and evolution of regional socio­
economic disparities and aims to provide a thorough analysis of the processes that shape 
regional convergence both within as between countries, focusing on both the European 
Union and MERCOSUR. The reason why I will be focusing on both areas is that regional 
policy constitutes one of the most important issues within the European Union at present, 
and this has significant similarities to the main problems that MERCOSUR will have to 
overcome if  integration is to be deepened in the near future. In the case of the European 
Union, the enlargement to the poorer countries such as Ireland, Greece, Portugal and 
Spain, followed by the prospects for further enlargement to the Eastern European 
countries have not only already created but will also continue to exacerbate significant 
regional imbalances within the Union. Similarly, within MERCOSUR, disparities between 
countries are already significant, with Brazil being the country with highest total GDP, 
followed by Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay. Disparities within countries, however, are 
more pronounced than those within Europe and therefore are expected to pose more 
difficult challenges in terms of policy formulation.
I will try to address four different issues in particular. First, to distinguish the 
mechanisms behind the creation of disparities. Secondly, whether automatic mechanisms 
of convergence exist in real world or, if  by contrast, they are merely a theoretical 
construct. Thirdly, the issue of different external factors that may affect the process of 
convergence will be considered. Finally, I will try to determine the importance of 
regional policies in the process of convergence.
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The problem of regional disparities is particularly significant in those countries 
characterised by historically determined internal differences such as Argentina and 
Brazil, with wide variety of factor endowments across the regions. In fact, these 
characteristics are present throughout Latin America and they are more significant than 
those in European countries. Indeed, Latin American development patterns have not only 
originated but also reinforced geographical, cultural and economic disparities and this 
will be one of the main points addressed throughout the thesis. By focusing on the 
external markets, the agro-export models predominant in Latin America until the middle 
of the twentieth century favoured the concentration of activities in certain regions in 
detriment of others. During the import substitution industrialisation stages in the fifties 
and sixties, this concentration was further reinforced because production was orientated 
towards the internal markets and located around the main consumption centres. Migration 
to those centres, far from decreasing disparities, accentuated the divergent trends. Taking 
these factors into account is therefore crucial in order to understand the potential 
outcomes of the current processes of integration in terms o f disparities in order to be able 
to formulate the necessary policies.
According to classical economic theory, disparities within countries should be 
automatically reduced through time. As will be seen in the following chapter, this kind of 
convergence would be achieved via factor mobility and decreasing marginal returns. In 
this thesis, I will try to test empirically this conclusion not only within countries but also 
by extending this self-regulating mechanism to test for convergence within economic 
areas. In the context of standard economic theory, and given that disparities will 
automatically be reduced through time, regional policies would therefore not be 
necessary. The present thesis will try to show that convergence, far from being an 
automatic process, needs strong and effective regional policies in order to close the gap 
between richer and poorer areas within as well as between countries.
The European Union will be taken as a case study for economically integrated areas in 
order to determine the rigidity in the process o f ‘automatic’ convergence as well as to 
rule out the ‘less-developed countries’ bias when analysing areas in Latin America. The
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role of regional policies in achieving a balanced development in the European Union will 
be analysed. As will be shown, the European Union still presents disparities not only 
between its member countries but most importantly within regions, contrary to neo­
classical economic conclusions, even though it was established fifty years ago. 
Integration by itself is manifestly not the solution to development problems. The regional 
policy institutional development process in the European Union will be addressed, and it 
will be shown that countries have displayed a converging trend, particularly in the last 
decades when regional policy became one of the pillars of the EU. This trend, however, 
cannot be seen for the regions. It will also be shown that even in the European Union, 
external shocks such as the oil crisis have affected the process of convergence. Having 
said this, external (and also internal) shocks in Latin American countries, particularly 
Argentina and Brazil, have exercised a significant impact on both countries’ regional 
disparities. This is of great importance given that the regions are characterised by 
instability in terms o f rates of growth, investment rates and macroeconomic crises.
The original idea for this thesis was to analyse disparities for the four member countries 
o f MERCOSUR at the regional level. However, due not only to data availability at the 
regional level but also in order to simplify the analysis, only Argentina and Brazil will be 
considered. Both the size of Brazil and Argentina relative to the other member countries; 
together with their huge diversity in regional incomes make them the perfect examples as 
a framework of analysis in order to draw conclusions for MERCOSUR as a whole. As can 
be seen in Figure 1.1 the population of both Argentina and Brazil are significantly higher 
than that of Uruguay and Paraguay. In fact, Argentina and Brazil account for 17 per cent 
and 79 per cent of MERCOSUR's population respectively; that is, together they comprise 
96 per cent o f the area’s total population, leaving Paraguay and Uruguay with only 4 per 
cent of MERCOSUR’s population. The same holds for the distribution o f total GDP, 
where again both Argentina and Brazil account for 96 per cent of total GDP as can be 
seen in Figure 1.2; with Argentina accounting for 25 per cent while Brazil 71 per cent of 
total GDP.
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Figure 1.1. Differences in Population Between the Four Members of MERCOSUR, 2000
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Source: Data from World Bank (see Appendix II, Table II.a on page 311)
Figure 1.2. Differences in Total GDP between the Four Members of MERCOSUR, 2000
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2%
Source: Data from World Bank, (see Appendix II, Table II.a on page 311)
Regarding disparities between countries, it would be interesting to test for any particular 
impacts derived from MERCOSUR. There is not a significant amount of data at the 
regional level, particularly for Argentina, as will be addressed in detail in both section 7.2 
and Appendix Ill.g. Since MERCOSUR is a fairly recent area that experienced stagnant
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development in the deepenirg process, it is effectively impossible at this stage to produce 
any reliable convergence andysis for the sub-region. Furthermore, it would be impossible 
to isolate the MERCOSUR e'fect from the stabilisation in Argentina in the early nineties 
and that o f Brazil in the mid-nineties that induced an increase in trade between the two 
countries. Nevertheless, a brief description of the disparities as well as convergence 
analysis between the four MERCOSUR countries has been performed for the period 1940- 
2000. As will be indicated ir Section 5.4, due to the reduced number of observations, the 
convergence analysis perfomed in Chapter 5 will only be indicative and not conclusive.
Figure 1.3. Real GDP per Capita in the MERCOSUR countries, 2000 (in 1970 US$, PPP 
adjusted)
PARAGUAY
URUGUAY
BRAZIL
ARGENTINA
0 200 430 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600
Source: World Bank, calculations from Tables Il.a and Il.b on page 311
Argentina and Brazil are not only the countries that account for most of the population 
and total GDP in MERCOSJR but also those that display most regional disparities. 
Regional disparities both witiin the Argentine provinces as well as within the Brazilian 
states are significant as can bj seen on Figures 1.4 and 1.5, where GDP per capita values 
for 1995 and 2000 respectively have been depicted to show how it varies according to 
different areas. For consisten;y (and in order to avoid excessive data manipulation), the 
data sets used in these Figures corresponds to those used in the convergence analyses of 
Chapters 7 and 9 for consistency and can also be found in Appendices III and IV. The
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reason why the main analysis for Argentina is performed from 1961 to 1995 while that 
for Brazil from 1970 to 2000 will be better explained in the methodological sections of 
Chapters 7 and 9 (pages 178 and 259 respectively) as well as in Appendix III p 319. 
Since the objective of this thesis is to study regional disparities I will be using the same 
data throughout, as mentioned above, given that the main concern is to show differences 
rather than values. Therefore, data for Argentina belings to the series from UNLP as on 
table Ilia on page 315 in constant 1986 prices per capita (the entire data set has been 
multiplied by 1,000 for presentation).
Figure 1.4. GDP per Capita in Argentina by Provinces, 2000 (in constant 1986 prices)
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Source: Data from Universidad de la Plata (1999)
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It is clear from Figure 1.4 that disparities among Argentine provinces are wide, with 
Capital Federal exhibiting the highest per capita income while Chaco has the lowest per 
capita income, almost seven times lower. In the case of Brazil, Figure 1.5 shows that 
Distrito Federal has more than seven times higher GDP per capita than the lowest income 
state, Maranhao. GDP data for Brazil was used from the IBGE databases as in table Ilia. 
The data on figure 1.5 is in constant 1986 prices as will be used in chapter 9. as will be 
explained in that chapter, the choice of base year for the analysis of convergence is 
irrelevant for this study since all the results that we will be focusing on will remain 
unaltered (see figure Vl.g on page 325 to compare with figure 1.5 in constant 1995 
prices). The analysis of convergence focuses on differences between regions rather than 
on values.
It will be shown in this thesis that, contrary to neo-classical theory, poorer and richer 
areas both in Argentina and Brazil have not converged significantly. In fact, disparities 
have continued from colonial times. The models of development undertaken after 
independence, instead o f providing the opportunity to change these inequality patterns, 
made them even worse. Moreover, policies destined to correct those imbalances have, in 
general, exercised limited influence or been entirely ineffective. The development 
processes in both countries, by focusing on export-led sectors, have but reinforced the 
existing gaps. In fact, between 1850 and 1940 the export-led model spread throughout 
Latin America, the emergence of exporting elites being linked to foreign markets and 
capital. Within this model, comparative advantages ought to be exploited by free trade. 
Both Argentina and Brazil were the two Latin American countries with the highest 
exports in that period (Bulmer-Thomas, 1994; Topik, 1987).
Moreover, it will also be seen that once the export-led model of development came to an 
end and countries followed an import substitution industrialisation model, disparities 
were reinforced. This model, by increasing industrial output, induced rural-urban 
migration and a resulting concentration in urban centres that helped to accentuate these
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Figure 1.5. GDP per Capita in Brazil by States, year 2000 (in constant 1995 prices)
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disparities between the already more developed centres and the rest of the country. It will 
then be empirically shown here that disparities have remained almost unaltered over the 
last forty years, only exhibiting decreasing or increasing trends in certain sub-periods that 
can be related to specific events. It will also be seen that when certain policies destined to 
correct imbalances have been in place, they appear to have made some difference.
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However, neither Argentina nor Brazil has implemented any coherent or efficient 
regional policy over a significant time.
The methodology of this thesis will go beyond the usual techniques for testing 
convergence and will aim to include other variables more appropriate for both Argentina 
and Brazil. These will not only be the standard socio-economic variables such as 
education and health but also those for political and economic stability. Furthermore, it is 
often stated that regional disparities tend to move counter-cyclically; that is, in times of 
recession disparities are reduced. This has been the case in the advanced countries of 
Europe, but it appears not to be the case in less developed countries, such as Greece as 
will be mentioned in the following chapter. It is, then, of interest to test such a 
proposition for the case of Argentina and Brazil as well as for the four MERCOSUR 
countries since the argument that disparities are pro-cyclical is reminiscent of ideas 
proposed by the regional disparity economists.
The evidence shown by the European Union and both Argentina and Brazil will provide 
solid arguments for redefining the role of efficient and consistent regional policies in 
achieving balanced regional development and growth, both nationally as well as within 
economic unions. In the light of these conclusions, it will be argued that MERCOSUR has 
not altered the divergence ‘map’ in any of the member countries and that it will probably 
reinforce those disparities as integration deepens. If MERCOSUR was to become a full 
operating economic area, a more balanced level of development between its regions will 
be essential and therefore a sound regional policy will be needed. It will then be essential 
to rethink the role of the state within economic areas, and not to associate national 
policies with inefficiency (as it is done in neoclassical theory). Instead, an active role of 
the states within an integrated area should be promoted. Furthermore, plans for a Free 
Trade Area o f the Americas (FTAA) must adresss a priori potential undesirable outcomes 
of integration, in particular regarding issues such as poverty and regional inequalities, 
which already constitute a significant problem in the region.
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This thesis is divided into two parts. P art I, of which this is the introductory chapter, 
includes theory and methodology regarding regional disparities and convergence as well 
as the case study o f the European Union. In C hapter 2, the theoretical framework for 
analysing regional disparities is presented, starting with the neo-classical model of 
growth and the automatic mechanisms through which convergence should be achieved. 
The chapter also reviews the theories that explain why regional disparities might persist 
over time and why those mechanisms described in the neo-classical framework might fail 
to achieve convergence. The chapter also addresses the extension of both neo-classical 
and regional theories to integrated areas as well as the more recent research in 
convergence studies that will later be referred to along this thesis. Further, a review of the 
Latin American school of thought is presented, highlighting the main theories that 
underpinned the industrialisation model followed in the post war period. Both the 
dependency as the structuralist schools will be briefly referred to in order to assess their 
contributions to development policies in the region and the effects on regional 
concentration.
In C hapter 3 the methodology that will be used in this thesis is described, covering the 
standard procedures for analysing convergence (beta and o-convergence) as well as more 
descriptive analysis. In addition, a review of the main studies in the field of convergence 
will be presented, covering different areas of the world but with an emphasis on Latin 
America. C hapter 4 attempts to provide some preliminary answers to the main questions 
posed here by analysing the case of the European Union over the last fifty years. The 
chapter describes briefly the history of the Union in terms of regional-related institutional 
developments and the impact of these in the process of convergence, particularly after the 
1988 Reform of the Structural Funds and the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. In addition, 
convergence analysis will be performed, and I will also refer to other studies. It will be 
shown that convergence was far from automatic and it was not until regional policies
became more important within the EU that convergence became stronger for the inter-
(
country analysis while had little impact among the regions. Moreover, it will be seen that 
macroeconomic conditions seem to have made an impact in the process of convergence.
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Part II of this thesis aims to relate the main conclusions of the first part to the empirical 
and historical chapters on MERCOSUR and those on Argentina and Brazil in particular. A 
brief history of the integration process of MERCOSUR is followed by a convergence 
analysis for the four MERCOSUR countries since 1940 in C hapter 5, although, as 
mentioned above, the MERCOSUR ‘effect’ as such will not be analysed fully mainly due 
to insufficient observations. Both Chapters 6 and 8 describe the history of Argentina and 
Brazil respectively from colonial times until 1960, focusing on the way that disparities 
were shaped and highlighting the implications of both the export-led and the import 
substitution development models for convergence dynamics. Both chapters include a 
brief descriptive account of some of the regional policies applied in both countries. 
Chapters 7 and 9 analyse the data for Argentina and Brazil to test the hypothesis of 
convergence within regions in each of the countries over the last decades. The findings in 
both chapters are related to specific periods and areas in which regional policies were 
implemented as well as macroeconomic crises in order to determine whether any links 
can be made. It is shown that disparities have not decreased significantly and that more 
efficient regional policies than those applied in the past should be considered. Also, I 
present some evidence linking high inflation periods and political instability with low 
convergence.
Although extensive research has been performed regarding disparities in the European 
Union and some for Argentina and Brazil, this thesis goes further by extending the 
analysis o f the theoretical framework of neo-classical economics (automatic 
convergence) to economic areas. Taking Argentina and Brazil as representative of 
MERCOSUR as well as considering the EU, some interesting conclusions can be drawn 
regarding economically integrated areas and the evolution of disparities. The conclusions 
can be applied not only to individual countries but also to the EU and MERCOSUR. 
Moreover, the link between macroeconomic and political variables is relatively recent in 
the literature and it has never been tested for Argentina and Brazil before.
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2Theoretical Framework
1. Introduction
In this chapter the main literature regarding regional economic disparities will be 
addressed. As mentioned in the introduction, this thesis intends to understand how 
disparities are created; whether these are automatically reduced or alternatively regional 
policies are needed; what happens when countries form economic unions and how 
political and macroeconomic variables affect the process of convergence. The analysis of 
how regional disparities originate and develop through time has been long neglected in 
economic theory. As will be seen in this chapter, the first attempts to include disparities 
into economic models by neo-classical economists concluded that convergence between 
poorer and richer areas would be the rule. This statement was derived from the neo­
classical models in which there were no frictions in the economy; models in which the 
assumptions of perfect competition, full employment and perfect factor mobility held as 
well as no transport costs and perfect information. That neo-classical framework was 
later extended to the analysis of regional disparities in economic areas and customs 
unions, as will also be seen later in this chapter. Nevertheless, interest in regional 
economics has been growing from a part of the economic geography literature to having 
become one of the most studied topics over the last few years, being applied to numerous 
areas in the world. Examples of these studies will be commented on both in the present 
and the following chapter.
The following section of this chapter provides a brief summary of the main neo-classical 
models of growth and their implications for the issue o f regional disparities. The third 
section focuses on departures from neo-classical economics and the growing importance 
o f regional economics in the literature. The fourth section aims to explain why there may
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or may not be convergence between poorer and richer areas belonging to an economic 
union. The last section includes two related issues. The first one refers to the role of trade 
in the development process of Latin America and the Latin American School of thought 
that constitutes the theoretical framework of the import substitution industrialisation 
process. Finally, the most recent line of research within regional economics, namely the 
relationship between macroeconomic conditions and disparities and the link between 
institutions and growth will be addressed.
2. Regional Disparities in Classical Economics
Until the 1960s, growth theory focused mainly on the neo-classical model, as developed 
by Ramsey (1928), Solow (1956), Swan (1956), Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965), 
generally referred to as the Solow model. In this model, a standard neo-classical 
production function with decreasing returns to capital is assumed. The Solow model 
emphasises the role o f labour supply and the capital stock in the growth process. Both the 
saving and population growth rates enter the model as exogenous variables and determine 
the steady state level o f income per capita. Therefore, the higher the rate of savings the 
higher the rates of growth; whereas the higher the rate of population growth, the poorer 
the country (Barro, 1998). An important implication of this model is that of convergence, 
since it predicts that those countries with initial lower levels of domestic product will 
achieve higher growth rates, as will be discussed later in this section.
A simple description o f the Solow model follows. The aggregate production function in 
neo-classical models with no technical progress determines that the level of output will 
be given by both labour and capital inputs.
The production function can be expressed as follows:
(1) Yt=F(Kt,Lt)
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Where:
Y: real output 
K: capital stock 
L: labour force 
t: the time
The Cobb-Douglas production function, assuming constant returns to scale is:
(2) Yt=ktaLtl'a
Assuming a one-sector perfectly competitive economy with flexible prices and full 
employment, the output growth will then be determined by:
(3) yt= akt + (1- a)lt
Where:
y: output growth
k: growth of the capital stock
1: growth of the labour force
By subtracting the growth of the labour force from both sides the rate of output per 
worker is obtained:
(4) yr  lt= a(kr  lt)
The output per worker will only increase if the capital-labour ratio increases. There is 
then a positive relationship between capital per worker and output per worker. However, 
since there is no technical progress in this simple model, and given that both labour and 
capital suffer from diminishing marginal returns, output per worker will increase at a 
diminishing rate. Capital-labour ratio will be at its long-term equilibrium (the steady-state 
capital stock) when net investment is zero, i.e. when the marginal product is low enough
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and gross investment sufficient to maintain the existing stock (Armstrong and Taylor, 
1993).
The neo-classical economic assumptions of the Solow model, such as perfect 
competition, full employment, perfect factor mobility (labour and capital) and no 
transport costs imply that theories of ‘balanced growth’ (Nurkse, 1962) operate through 
automatic classical mechanisms of marginal productivity of capital and labour without 
intervention o f any kind. According to this view, imbalances would be levelled out 
automatically. Given two regions with identical conditions, if any one region had a higher 
marginal productivity o f labour (or higher real wages), labour - being mobile - would 
migrate to that region. The resulting increase in labour supply would, in turn, reduce its 
marginal productivity and therefore real wages would decrease. Conversely, in the other 
region, as a consequence of migration outflows, labour would decrease and marginal 
productivity increase. This increase in marginal productivity and the subsequent increase 
in real wages will then attract more workers and this process will continue until the 
differences in both regions are equalised.
Since the deficiencies o f the Solow model without technical progress were recognised
early in the sixties, technological progress was included and assumed to occur
exogenously. This addition can combine the theory with a positive and constant per 
capita growth rate in the long run, while still maintaining conditional convergence. 
Within this model, the long run per capita growth will be determined by the rate of 
technological progress (Barro, 1998).
If technical progress is included in the equation as a separate element in the production 
function, both the aggregate production function and the Cobb Douglas function can be 
extended to allow for a constant growth of this variable, as follows:
(5) Yt= F(At, IQ, Lt)
Where A is technical knowledge
31
(6) Y=A eg,K,“ Lt1-°
Where g is the constant rate o f technical progress
The resulting growth equation would then be determined by:
(7) yt= g + akt + (1 -  a) lt
The result o f this inclusion is that technical progress shifts the function upwards and 
therefore there will be an increase in the output per worker at every level of the capital- 
labour ratio. In this model, even if the capital stock and the labour force grow at the same 
rate, output per worker will only increase if the rate of technical progress is positive. In 
long-run equilibrium both the output growth and the growth of the capital stock are 
assumed to be equal (Armstrong and Taylor, 1993).
The main conclusions of this simple one-sector neo-classical model with technical 
progress are that regional disparities can exist because of differences between regions in 
either technical progress, the growth of the capital stock or the growth o f the labour force. 
Following these conclusions, in a neo-classical world where economies differed only in 
their initial levels of capital intensity, there would be convergence among them. This 
convergence would be absolute, i.e. in per capita terms; poorer areas would grow faster 
than richer ones. However, if  economies differ, then the convergence would apply only in 
a conditional way, meaning that the growth rate would tend to be higher if the initial level 
of income is low relatively to its long-run equilibrium (or steady state level) (Barro, 
1998).
The failure o f the Solow model to account for international differences in income 
stimulated work on endogenous growth theory. While the steady state levels of capital 
and output per worker depend in the neo-classical model on the propensity to save, the 
rate of population growth and the production function; new extensions to this' model 
suggest the inclusion o f other variables. In a number of models of endogenous growth
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such as Romer (1986), Lucas (1988), Romer (1990), Barro (1991), Caballe & Santos 
(1993) and Barro (1998) human capital is included and it can be further enlarged to 
include education, experience and health.
The endogenous growth models of Romer (1986), Lucas (1988) and Rebelo (1991) based 
their research on the previous works of Arrow (1962), Uzawa (1965) and Sheshinki 
(1967). Endogenous models are characterised by the assumption of non-decreasing 
returns to capital and labour. The implication of this model is that countries which save 
more will grow faster and indefinitely. Therefore, convergence in incomes per capita will 
not necessarily be the rule, even with equal preferences and technology. Growth may go 
on indefinitely because the return to investment in a broad class of capital goods 
including human capital does not necessarily diminish as the economies develop. The 
acquisition o f knowledge (or learning) will enter the production function and this may 
grow indefinitely. Arrow (1962) uses cumulative gross investment (cumulative 
production of capital goods) as a proxy for experience. The economy tends to a steady 
state ratio of human to physical capital, but the ratio may depart from its long-run value 
in an initial state given the inclusion of the “learning by doing” variables that 
continuously affect the returns on human capital. The extent of this departure will in turn 
alter the rate at which the income per capita approaches its steady state value. Therefore, 
given any two economies that only differ in their initial capital stocks, these will have the 
same growth rate and therefore will not converge (Sala-i-Martin, 1996).
Mankiw et al (1992) argue that the predictions of the Solow model are consistent and that 
both the saving and population growth do affect income in the way that Solow predicted. 
However, they admit that the Solow model does not provide a complete theory of growth 
since population growth, saving and technical change are treated as exogenous. On the 
other hand, they do not dismiss the endogenous models entirely, since they agree that 
these models provide an explanation of technological change. Further, they provide an 
“augmented” Solow model in which they maintain the assumption of decreasing marginal 
returns but include accumulation of human and physical capital to make the predictions 
more accurate. They conclude that convergence should not be expected and instead
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countries will reach different steady states. Therefore, in this augmented Solow model, 
differences in saving, education and population growth should explain cross-country 
variations in income per capita. In particular, this model shows that after controlling for 
those variables, there is convergence of incomes per capita in the Solow model.
By allowing for increasing returns due to the inclusion of variables such as education (i.e. 
implying non-decreasing growth rates), both endogenous growth models and the 
“augmented” Solow model explain why richer countries may not converge to poorer 
ones. However, they still fail to explain what prevents poorer regions (or countries) from 
catching up with richer ones. The following section reviews a different perspective of the 
regional problem by lifting some of the neo-classical assumptions and introducing further 
restrictions and structural imbalances that work at the regional level.
3. Departures from Classical Economics
The main difference between the models seen in the previous section and those reviewed 
in this one is that while the former are interested in automatic processes of convergence 
that would lead economies to their steady state equilibrium, the latter are concerned with 
imbalances. That is, regional economics acknowledges the existence of factors that 
prevent economies from achieving the desired growth rates. As will be seen below, some 
authors conclude that differences will gradually disappear while others assume they are 
of a structural nature and therefore government intervention would be necessary in order 
to achieve convergence.
The first steps towards a theory of regional economics started with geographical 
economics and theories that questioned the assumption of negligible transport costs in 
particular. Location models go as far back as von Thunen’s (1826) model for agriculture 
with concentrical belts around an isolated town, followed by Weber’s (1929) model for 
industrial location, models for the location of economic activity (Hoover, 1948) and 
agricultural models (Losch, 1954). Although these were first considered in models of 
industrial organisation, they have been neglected in general economic models.
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In economics, theories of ‘unbalanced growth’ (Nurkse, 1962) are linked to market 
failures or departures from classical assumptions. That is to say, they incorporate 
assumptions such as economies of scale, imperfect competition, labour rigidities and 
transport costs. Perroux (1955) introduced the term ‘pole de croissance’ (or development 
poles) which describes regional growth differentials. This was followed by the 
polarisation effects illustrated by Hirschman (1958) through which the richer became 
richer and the poorer, poorer.
Myrdal (1957) introduced the concepts of backwash and spread effects, as well as that of 
cumulative causation, in which initial differing conditions can perpetuate through time. 
The cumulative process includes both economic and non-economic factors, which can be 
generated by changes in terms of trade in a region if  these are persistent enough or have 
significant impact on the economic variables such as demand, purchasing power, 
incomes, investment and production. The concept of cumulative causation is similar to 
that of the vicious circle of poverty introduced by Nurkse (1953) where poverty itself is 
the reason why a particular country remains poor. He also referred to non-economic 
factors such as poor infrastructure, health care and education. According to Kaldor (1970) 
cumulative causation is essential for understanding the differences in development 
between regions. Cumulative causation then explains the unequal regional incidence of 
industrial development resulting from endogenous factors in the development process 
itself. In other words, differences in income are the “cumulative result of persistent 
differences in growth rates” (Kaldor, 1970: 337).
For Myrdal, the backwash effects are those that the expansion of one area has on another, 
particularly regarding labour, capital, goods and services. Centres of expansion will 
attract investment and this will have a multiplier effect on that region to the detriment of 
other areas. For instance, those regions that are expanding will be recipients of migration 
from other areas; hence there will be a drain of labour and capital from those areas 
towards the centres o f expansion. The spread effects, on the other hand, refer to 
movements originating in the centres of expansion, which positively affect other areas.
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This refers to the multiplier effect on the neighbouring areas that the centre will generate 
in terms of employment, investment and services. These two effects will balance each 
other and, in the marginal case, will have a stagnating effect for the region. In any case, 
this is not a stable equilibrium since any changes will trigger a cumulative process either 
upwards or downwards. According to Myrdal (1957), these forces will tend to increase 
rather than decrease the inequalities between regions. Balassa (1961) adds low 
investment and productivity growth rates as two other factors that can in fact act like a 
vicious circle in perpetuating differences.
Hirschman (1958) criticises Myrdal’s approach on the grounds that his concern with 
cumulative causation makes him fail to recognise that after an initial phase in which 
polarisation accentuates differences, there will be a turning point after which this trend 
will be reverted. Although initially differences in development between regions will be 
created, this will later be reversed by the emergence of strong forces or growing points, 
which will stimulate further growth.
Williamson (1965) explains spatial inequality within a country by arguing that internal 
factor flows do not occur with enough speed and quantity in order to offset the conditions 
that cause these disparities and that economic interdependence between regions of a 
country is not significantly strong. Williamson expects that the elements causing 
divergence (or North-South income differentials as he refers to them) will diminish over 
time through automatic equilibrating factors as interdependence among regions grows. 
Therefore, in the later stages of development, convergence o f interregional levels of 
development would become the rule.
Friedmann (1966) in his case study for Venezuela postulated a similar pattern with regard 
to the spatial dispersion of economic activities during the process of national 
development. He assumed an increasing polarisation of population and output during the 
early phase, a spatial transformation towards greater balance at a more advanced stage 
and a continuous dispersion in highly developed economies. Richardson (1980) initiated
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a new debate called ‘polarisation reversal’, namely the move from concentration to 
deconcentration, reaching very similar conclusions to those of Friedmann (1966).
Both Myrdal and Hirschman agree that migration is selective, at least with respect to age, 
and thus will prejudice some communities while favouring others. Myrdal compares this 
to capital movements since expansion in demand will increase investment and this will 
have multiplier effects. Williamson also refers to capital migration to richer regions and 
the resulting exacerbating effects on differences. Finally, Myrdal argues that trade 
operates with that same bias in favour of booming regions through competitive 
advantages. Therefore, richer areas will specialise in manufactured goods while backward 
regions would remain mostly agricultural, thus hindering any industrialisation process.
Williamson’s hypothesis can also be seen in the context of the paradigm of 
modernisation, which dominated development theory and policy after Second World 
War. The main critique was made by the Latin American school, pointing to a possible 
systematic difference of conditions of economic development between the backward 
countries of the time and the developed countries at the beginning of the industrialisation 
process, as will be studied later in this chapter.
While Hirschman (1958) believes that only the intervention of the government in the 
field of regional development will remove structural disequilibria; Myrdal (1957), on the 
other hand, believed that government action will be long delayed and, if  taken at all, will 
tend to strenghthen the existing process of divergence. Dependency school theorists, as 
will be seen in section 5.1 o f this chapter, agree with Myrdal in this point.
Regional growth differences can also be explained by regional differences in the growth 
of a region’s exports. The export-led model traces the initial development stimulus in a 
region to the exploitation and export of its natural resources. Thus, the geographical 
distribution of natural resources may explain, at least partially, why regions grow at 
different rates. This growth process can be cumulative since the demand for exports has a 
multiplier effect on regional income. These regions will then have a competitive
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advantage, which, in turn, reinforce regional specialisation. This can also be linked to 
external economies and the proximity of related activities, such as localisation and 
agglomeration economies (Armstrong and Taylor, 1993). The role of regional exports in 
the process of development will be expanded later in both this and following chapters 
when the historical development of disparities in Argentina (chapter 6) and Brazil 
(chapter 8) will be reviewed. In both countries, the export-led strategies of development 
favoured certain regions in detriment of others and when the industrialisation process 
started it only reinforced the supremacy of those already more developed regions.
This section has provided a review of the main attempts in economic theory to explain 
why poorer regions fail to converge towards richer ones. Such theories include structural 
imbalances that are present, with more or less significance, in most backward regions and 
countries and prevent those areas from achieving higher growth rates. In the following 
section, the analysis o f convergence of regional economic disparities is expanded to 
include economic integration in an attempt to determine what happens in terms of 
regional differences when countries eliminate trade barriers between them.
4. Economic Integration and Regional Disparities
Within the neo-classical model, integration was considered as being a move towards free 
trade and therefore welfare enhancing. The removal o f trade barriers under classical 
assumptions would imply that any existing regional imbalances between countries would 
be levelled out in the same way as within countries. Further, integration would imply 
several gains. Among these, increased specialisation - as a result o f the law of 
comparative advantages; increased market size and production - linked to economies of 
scale; improved international bargaining position; enhanced competition and economic 
efficiency; and technological advances- affecting both the amount and quality of the 
factors of production (El-Agraa, 1984).
It was not until Viner (1950) introduced the concepts of trade diversion and trade creation 
that customs unions were regarded as a combination of free trade and protectionism.
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However, welfare was addressed from a general rather than regional perspective, in terms 
o f trade creation and diversion. Trade creation is the replacement of expensive domestic 
production by cheaper imports from a partner country. Conversely, trade diversion is the 
replacement of cheaper initial imports from the outside world by more expensive imports 
from a partner. It is then the relative strength of these two effects that determines whether 
customs union formation is beneficial. Nevertheless, it was still assumed that if the net 
effects were welfare enhancing, then the benefits would be evenly spread.
A better understanding of regional problems allowed the same arguments to be applied to 
integration and it became clearer that the benefits of free trade would not be evenly 
distributed. Balassa (1961) indicated that integration would not only affect economic 
welfare through changes in the quantity o f commodities produced and the degree of 
discrimination between domestic and foreign goods; but also through two other channels, 
namely the redistribution of income between nationals o f different countries and 
redistribution within individual countries.
According to Camagni (1992) there are five elements that hamper opportunities for easy 
convergence. The first is that in an economically integrated area, backward regions have 
to compete with an exchange rate level that is relatively overvalued with respect to their 
production capabilities. Thus, within a monetary union, in the absence of wage and price 
flexibility among regions the theorem of comparative advantage no longer holds. The 
second element is that since regions within a country compete on the basis o f an absolute 
advantage, inefficient areas will be forced out of the competitive arena. The third element 
refers to the reduction and disappearance of original advantages given-by labour costs 
due to initial lower productivity and efficiency and a later convergence of wages and 
prices. A fourth element is the presence of non-linearities and cumulative processes in 
economic development, such as scale economies, agglomeration economies and technical 
progress. This last factor can be linked to both economic and trade dependence.
Camagni (1992) also lists the advantages of an integrated market for those regions in the 
process of catching-up. These include integrated market and technology potential, capital
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availability and infrastructure provision resulting from regional policies. However, he 
stresses the importance of evaluating the conditions of the backward regions in order to 
assess whether they will be able to reap these benefits. El-Agraa (1984) highlights that 
although the introduction o f factor mobility may enhance efficiency through a more 
efficient allocation of resources, it may also create or aggravate regional problems and 
imbalances in depressed areas.
Following Perroux (1954), economic integration will only be beneficial for those regions 
with development poles; regions with higher development that can create linkages. Since 
the development of backward regions and integration are incompatible, the most likely 
outcome of integration will be an increase in regional disparities. The impact upon the 
less developed regions will be indirectly through the effect on the more developed ones 
given that both had already achieved some sort of coexistence within the national market 
(Robertson, 1962). This is reminiscent of the structuralist approach o f the previous 
section, in which there was not only a dualism domestically but also another 
internationally.
Towns and regions that had artificial advantages due to the national pattern of 
agglomeration would suffer from integration as a consequence of a new reallocation at 
the international level. This will reinforce the attractiveness of those highly industrialised 
centres for both capital and labour. Conversely, national borders that had suffered from 
barriers imposed by national agglomeration forces would develop after the abolition of 
those barriers (Giersch, 1950).
More recent theoretical and empirical research has drawn attention to the importance of 
geographical factors such as adjacency and proximity for international trade. Barriers to 
trade between countries including tariffs, language and cultural differences, lack of factor 
mobility are usually enough to block the expansion of an industrial centre beyond its 
domestic market. As integration proceeds, it is then expected for some industries to serve 
the market from a single local agglomeration rather than from several (Krugman, 1991; 
Krugman and Venables, 1995). The performance of surrounding regions can help predict
40
that of a particular region and this, in turn, would favour an understanding of inequalities. 
Both physical location and geographical spillovers matter more than national macro 
factors for regional distribution dynamics (Quah, 1996; 1996b).
In the case o f neighbouring regions belonging to different countries, both the 
geographical as well as economic proximity will favour trade once the barriers are 
removed. This will be particularly strong if  both are backward regions. In the case of one 
developed region and one lagging one, the removal of trade barriers will increase trade 
but benefits will be unequally distributed (Auvemy-Bennetot, 1975). In the case of 
Greece the ‘missing neighbours factor’ in the trade relations seems to have played a key 
role limiting the country’s export markets and the potential for export-led growth 
(Petrakos, 1997; Sachs, 1997).
Although distance from the world major markets is always a disadvantage, proximity can 
be considered an advantage only under certain conditions. Following Krugman and 
Venables (1995) proximity to large markets (or metropolitan regions) facilitates growth 
only if differences in development levels and structures are not too pronounced. 
Otherwise, it leads to a penetration of product markets by the more dynamic enterprises 
of the more advanced region. Lack of spatial and sectoral integration of the economy at 
the regional and national level appears also to be hampering performance because of the 
poor linkage effects between the centre and the periphery.
A key issue for any region is the degree of protection it currently obtains from the 
barriers that will be removed by a common market, in particular relative to other regions 
with which competitiveness is possible due to barriers to trade. The effect o f the removal 
of restrictions on a particular region will then depend on two factors. The first is the 
growth in the whole region, which will have a trickle down effect on individual regions 
belonging to the union and the second is the reallocation of resources within the newly 
enhanced internal market. The process of integration may therefore trigger cumulative 
processes both ways and will clearly produce winners and losers (Begg, 1989).
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Increased integration leads to more clusters. Given several final consumption and 
intermediate good industries and countries with similar resources and technology, if  
transport costs are initially high, each country will maintain its hill range of industries. 
However, if  transport costs fall, each industry will tend to concentrate in one of the 
countries, as producers of final goods will realise that countries with a higher 
intermediate industrial base will imply lower export costs to other markets.
Similarly, producers of intermediate goods will find that it is better to concentrate their 
production near the large final goods industry. Then agglomeration depends on how 
strong forward and backward linkages are. In addition to the usual gains of integration, at 
the end of the process incomes will be higher. However, there may be adjustment 
problems in the short-run, such as workers in each particular industry that will suffer loss 
of real wages and probably a rise in unemployment (Krugman and Venables, 1995).
‘Economic integration may or may not imply a tendency towards per capita [income] 
equalisation’ (Bertola, 1999:289). However, even if disparities grow larger, there is little 
evidence to suggest that economic integration has itself contributed to the widening of 
disparities, as it is virtually impossible to isolate the effect statistically (Tsoukalis, 1991). 
According to Romer (1990) free international trade can speed up growth. He also 
suggests that low levels of human capital might explain the lack of growth in 
underdeveloped and closed economies and that a less developed economy with a large 
population can still benefit from economic integration with the rest of the world. Andres 
et al (1996) found correlation between growth and exports growth in accordance with 
Williamson (1995), who concluded that convergence across the world has taken place in 
periods of free trade and increases in international trade.
As seen in this section, although integration has many beneficial outcomes, these may not 
be evenly distributed. In the same way as regional disparities persist within a country 
given the existing patterns of agglomeration within national borders, when countries form 
an economic union a new agglomeration pattern will develop, which will be the result of 
the interaction o f both national and international factors. The integrated area will create
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new relatively poorer areas, posing a problem for the previously backward regions as 
well as for the new relatively poorer areas when competing with richer regions. 
Therefore, the degree of national protection they were granted before is important, as 
well as the linkages that will develop as a consequence of integration. Given that the 
automatic mechanisms mentioned in classical economics do not seem to operate due to 
persistent rigidities, policies in order to correct distortions will be needed. Further 
integration might also help in reducing these disparities by creating more linkages and 
increasing mobility. The more evenly spread the distribution of benefits within an 
economic union, the higher the gains for each member and for the union as a whole, since 
no country would be willing to join or continue to be a member of an economic union if it 
meant being worse off.
The next section addresses two issues of significance that are mentioned in the literature 
regarding convergence and will become relevant in following chapters. The first is the 
role of international trade in the development process of backward countries, which will 
be addressed later when reviewing the origin of disparities in both Argentina and Brazil 
and the development models that both countries followed - export-led and import 
substitution industrialisation -  and the effects of these on regional imbalances. Both 
dependency and structuralism will be briefly referred to as they constitute the theoretical 
framework o f the ISI development strategy. The other issue analysed is the link between 
regional growth and both macroeconomic and political stability, which will be further 
expanded in the following chapter when explaining the methodology used in this thesis 
and will later be empirically tested for the case of Argentina and Brazil.
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5. Related Issues in Growth Theory
5.1. The Role of International Trade in the Development Process and the 
Latin American School of Thought
General background
Developing countries were often confronted with the dilemma as whether to specialise 
along lines o f comparative advantage internationally or to diversify in order to provide 
markets for each other locally. Historically, regions of temperate climate followed a 
process of growth through trade in the nineteenth century. These countries received 
considerable migration flows from Europe, but the main trigger for their expansion was 
the impressive rate of growth in western Europe, particularly in Great Britain, which 
determined a growing demand for food stuffs and raw materials. Therefore, growth 
through trade in the periphery was induced by growth in the industrial centre (Nurkse, 
1962). According to Robertson (1962) trade in the nineteenth century was not a device 
for the optimum allocation o f a given stock of resources but above all it was an engine of 
growth.
This pattern of development has, in many cases, had undesirable effects, particularly for 
tropical areas, given that while the export sector was aided by foreign capital, the 
domestic economy remained backward. This dual economy will often show a lack of 
internal social and economic integration as well as poor linkages since foreign investment 
was directed mainly to the extraction and export of raw materials -  but not their 
manufacturing (Nurkse, 1962). Kaldor (1970) argued that unequal regional development 
within a country poses more serious intellectual challenges for policy than unequal 
development internationally.
Further, export activities are subject to cyclical instability and changes in demand as well 
as the substitution of natural products by synthetic ones and this pattern of development 
may therefore result in an unbalanced and unsteady growth. However, Nurkse (1962) 
argued that the prospects for this kind of export-led growth were no longer as promising 
as they used to be. His argument was that in the nineteenth century, the centres were
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experiencing a sustained period of growth and this translated into a sustained and 
growing demand in the less developed areas. However, in the twentieth century, there 
was no longer a guarantee for this, particularly when the demand was generally inelastic 
with respect to price and showed a low rate of increase in total volume. Given these 
prospects, the possibility of stagnation and bottlenecks arises. “The case for specialisation 
as such is just as strong as ever, but the forces making for the transmission of growth 
from advanced to less developed countries may not be as powerful as they were a 
hundred years ago” (Nurkse, 1962: 254).
Up until the end of the 1920s, and despite recurrent changes in commodities prices and 
balance of payments problems, Latin American countries had followed the above- 
mentioned export-led economic model of growth that relied on primary-product exports 
and international capital inflows. Within this outward-oriented model, countries such as 
Argentina and Brazil also received significant amounts of external migration. During the 
20th century, however, Latin America was subject to three major external shocks that 
would result in significant policy changes. The First World War followed by the 
economic depression o f 1929 and later by the Second World War would present Latin 
America with both prospects as well as threats. In fact, it is only over this period of the 
20th century (1914-1945) that Latin America as a region grew more rapidly that the world 
average. Between 1913 and 1929, the rate of growth in world trade slowed down and the 
reduction in the Net Barter Terms of Trade (NBTT) for most countries (except for Brazil 
and Uruguay) provided fewer incentives to exports - the NBTT being calculated as the 
ratio o f the prices of a country’s exports to the prices of its imports that can be exchanged 
for a unit o f exports. In the years between both wars, while the demand for a few Latin 
American products increased, imports were seriously affected. During this period the 
British trade hegemony was broken and the United States became a key international 
player. The reliance on primary export products in addition to the external shocks 
affecting the region translated in a generalised sense of vulnerability. Moreover, domestic 
factors such as population growth, increasing rural-urban migration and the resulting 
expansion of urban conglomerates together with a growing sense of nationalism resulted
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in an increase support for the need to carry out industrialisation policies in the forties 
(Thorp, 1998: 98).
According to Nurkse (1962), the solution for less developed countries would consist of 
diversified growth by following a balanced pattern of investment in a number of different 
industries, to enlarge the size of the market and fill the vacuum in the domestic economy 
of low income areas. Then, there would be a pattern of mutually supporting investments 
over a range o f industries wide enough in order to create growth. He also discussed the 
risks of following an import substitution industrialisation policy, its main disadvantage 
being the resulting costly production of import substitutes. Filling this vacuum in the 
domestic market would, in turn, increase the productivity and real purchasing power.
At the time o f First World War, a few manufacturing industries had already been 
established in some Latin American countries, mainly in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Mexico, Peru and Uruguay. In those countries, the basis for manufacturing industries had 
been provided by the export-led model, in terms of better infrastructure, increasing the 
domestic demand and urban concentration. With imports reduced as a consequence of the 
war, local industries faced no competitors and this acted in favour of the establishment of 
more industries. In addition, the declining position of Britain in world trade in favour of 
the United States would translate in unbalanced trade relations for certain Latin American 
countries. In the case o f Argentina, although still having trading and investment relations 
with Britain, most of its imports -  particularly agricultural capital goods -  were from the 
United States. By 1929, countries like Argentina were exporting to Britain while most of 
its imports originated in the United States, resulting in a trade surplus with the former and 
a trade deficit with the latter. For Brazil, however, this was the opposite, with imports 
from the United States almost doubling exports to it. After the First World War the gold 
standard system came to an end and international capital flows followed suit, inducing a 
decline not only in capital inflows but also in export incomes as well as the demand for 
imports (Bulmer-Thomas, 1994).
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The Wall Street financial crisis in 1929 reduced consumer demand and the sharp decrease 
in prices for primary products had a significant effect for Latin American countries. 
Import prices also fell but not as much as export prices and therefore the net barter terms 
of trade NBTTworsened for most countries. Latin American countries were facing both 
the decline in capital flows and export income, and the resulting deficit was being 
financed with international reserves. Once the reserves ran out, the countries had to use 
their own currencies as a means of financing their imports. In addition, governments 
printed money in order to back their internal imbalances, which were the result of 
decreases in government revenues that could no longer be financed abroad. The persistent 
crisis in export markets following the 1929 crash, as well as the increase in the price of 
imported goods, due to both the deterioration of the terms o f trade and the devaluated 
exchange rate, favoured the non-export sector and was thus an incentive for substituting 
foreign for domestic manufactures. Another feature that characterised this decade was the 
re-emergence o f nationalism and protectionism, which translated into an increased state 
intervention in the economy with industrial groups demanding subsidies, credits and tariff 
protections from the state. Those countries that already had industries had an advantage, 
such as Argentina and Brazil, since production could be adjusted in response to changes 
in both relative prices and domestic demand. However, it was not until the recovery of 
the NBTT after 1932, that the export sector also received an incentive, which in turn 
favoured an increase of certain imports allowing an easier and more successful transition 
to import substitution industrialisation (ISI). The Second World War was another major 
disruption for Latin American countries in terms o f import supply; export demand, 
shipping and credit. This was, in fact, the most significant of all shocks to affect Latin 
America. The combination of an increasingly distorted world trade by a number of non­
tariff barriers, together with the increased nationalism and export pessimism in many 
Latin American countries, resulted in a number of governments following inward looking 
development policies and placing import restrictions (Love, 1996: 212; Thorp, 1998).
Therefore, import substitution industrialisation became the model followed in Latin 
America after the Second World War and by the first half of the fifties industry was the 
most important sector in many countries, particularly Argentina and Brazil. As will be
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seen later, the main problem with the ISI model was its inability to solve the balance of 
payments constraint and the ever-present vulnerability to external factors as it depended 
on foreign imports to deepen the industrialisation process while at the same time, while 
favouring the industrial sector, neglecting the export one and the main source of foreign 
exchange. In the decade of the seventies, the flaws of this model became relevant and the 
debt crisis of the eighties signalled the end o f the ISI model in favour of a renewed 
export-led payment o f the debt.
In addition, urbanisation had already been steadily increasing in several Latin American 
countries during the export-led phase (as will be seen in the historical chapters 6 and 8) 
but the inward looking policies after the thirties and the encouragement of urban 
activities further aggravated urban-rural migration. This process of urban concentration 
has often been the result of industrialisation in many Latin American countries, 
contributing to the accentuation of both national regional disparities and the worsening of 
income distribution. In the case of Mexico, the ISI process that began in the thirties was 
highly successful in promoting domestic industry. Between 1930 and 1970, the share of 
manufacturing in Mexico’s GDP doubled. However, this industrialisation process was 
concentrated in Mexico City. In the same period, the city grew at an average of almost 
6.7 per cent annually, compared with only 2.4 per cent in the rest of the country. Since 
1980, following the increased openness of the Mexican economy and the NAFTA 
agreement, industrial activity has shifted to those states neighbouring the United States, 
implying a relocation of population as well (Hanson, 1998). It must be added, however, 
that the case o f Mexico is unique since given its proximity to the United States; trade 
liberalisation also implied economic integration between both countries.
As will be seen in the second part of this thesis, the processes of industrialisation in both 
Argentina and Brazil also contributed to unequal urbanisation rates. In the case of 
Argentina, the growing importance of the port of Buenos Aires in the colony, together 
with the agro-export model located mainly in the pampa, contributed to create an 
asymmetry between urbanisation in Buenos Aires and the rest of the country. The 
industrialisation process reinforced this trend and migration flows from the interior to
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urban centres enlarged the gap between Buenos Aires and its surroundings and the rest of 
the country. This process of urbanisation as a result of industrialisation will be referred to 
in more detail in section 2.3 in chapter 6. In the case of Brazil, the industrialisation 
process located around Sao Paulo and the migration flows, particularly from the 
northeast, also reinforced the urbanisation trends aggravating the already existing 
disparities that were a legacy of the colonial period -  this will also be addressed later 
(chapter 8, section 2.3).
The urbanisation trend can also be found in other regions of the world. Ioannides and 
Petrakos (2000) say that in the case of Greece the process of industrialisation has been 
mostly responsible for urban concentration. Although some industrial activity moved to 
the periphery in the seventies and eighties de-concentration never really took place. The 
reason for this is that the relative importance of industry in the economy declined in the 
eighties and the rising tertiary sector of the economy exhibited a preference for location 
in the metropolis, which is not incompatible with other European countries.
Latin American economists
In the period after 1930, but most importantly after the Second World War, and up until 
the debt crisis of the eighties, significant contributions to development theory came from 
Latin America. The import substitution industrialisation process followed in some 
countries in the region manifestly contradicted the neoclassical theory of international 
division of labour. Up until 1949 industrialisation took place without a theory that 
underpinned the model. The theory that later explained the already ongoing process of 
inward looking development was structuralism, which was developed at ECLA (United 
Nations Economic Commission for Latin America) and later by the dependency theory. It 
was in the period between the thirties and the eighties that structuralism and dependency 
emerged and later declined, followed by the neo-liberalism of the eighties and the 
Washington Consensus (Love, 1996: 208).
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The failure o f the traditional export-led model of growth in the decade of the thirties, as 
mentioned above, paved the way for the Prebisch theory of 1949 and a completely 
different way in which to analyse and formulate Latin American development strategies. 
The subsequent failure of the ISI model to generate sustained and independent 
development in the following years -  mostly due to persistent inflation pressures and the 
persistent reliance on capital imports - in turn, gave rise to the dependency school. The 
subsequent criticisms to both structuralism and dependency theories, coupled by the debt 
crisis o f the eighties, would then result in a yet another swing towards the export sector as 
income generator and the liberalisation and privatisation policies of the last decade.
In 1948, ECLA was created and most of its works at the time reflect the export 
pessimism o f that period and trying to understand the declining terms of trade after the 
30s. In 1949, Prebisch (1949) published his thesis in which his main argument was that 
there was a centre (which specialised in primary products) and a periphery (specialising 
in industrial products). In addition, agricultural production was inelastic relative to 
industrial production. Therefore, the gains in productivity in any given period were 
greater for industrial than for primary products. Moreover, productivity gains derived 
from technical progress were retained at the centre, rather than transferred into lower 
prices. In the periphery, though, productivity gains would be translated into labour 
surpluses but wages were kept low -mainly due to lack of organisation of the agricultural 
workers and the surplus of labour supply. Prebisch identified two sources of deterioration 
of the terms o f trade, one at the centre and the other at the periphery. The centre’s gains 
would be greater and provided the system worked properly, these would be spread to the 
periphery and therefore over the long run the terms of trade of the centre would 
deteriorate and those in the periphery improve. If the terms of trade in the periphery 
declined, that would indicate that not only it was not sharing the centre’s gains but also 
transferring some of its own productivity gains to the centre. In the upward part of the 
cycle, the centre (Britain in his argument) generated the cycles and gold flows from the 
centre towards the periphery; however, on the downwards of the cycle gold would flow 
back to the centre. In this way, monetary stability was at the cost of the contraction of the
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periphery. Therefore, the protection of industry was a necessary condition to prevent the 
concentration of technological progress in the centre.
Prebisch considered that both primary exports and industrial development were possible 
provided the composition of imports was changed from consumer to capital goods. He 
considered that solely relying on export-led growth was not the path to a long-term 
sustainable economic development. Moreover, industrialisation was seen not only as a 
way of generating economic development but also as a means of absorbing the labour 
surplus in the agricultural sector (Love, 1996: 228). According to ECLA, the main 
negative characteristics of Latin American economies such as declining NBTT, structural 
unemployment and external imbalances would be possible to eliminate by following an 
inward-looking development. In order to achieve this industrialisation, import barriers 
were increasingly needed and a shortage of foreign exchange was another argument in 
favour o f these restrictions. Countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay 
adopted the model, whereas other Latin American countries, such as Colombia and 
Mexico, combined it with export promotion (Thorp, 1998). ECLA’s view was, therefore, 
concluded that deliberate government promotion of industrialisation should be pursued.
The fall in primary product prices relative to manufactures prices and the decline in the 
NBTT provided evidence to those that supported CEPAL. In addition, the discrimination 
of exports in the developed countries in favour of their former colonies as well as the 
establishment o f the Common Agricultural Policy in the then European Community in 
1957 reinforced this argument. During the fifties, Latin American economies had the 
choice to intensify ISI or revert to export led growth strategy. CEPAL identified several 
phases within the import substitution process. The first one involved the ‘easy’ phase; in 
which domestically produced consumer goods substituted previously imported ones. The 
second stage involved the production of intermediate goods and consumer durables, 
while a final phase referred to the production of capital goods. For those countries that 
already had a significant industrial base such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico and Uruguay, the easy stage of ISI was already completed by then (the share of 
consumer goods in total imports had been reduced) and there were no incentives to go
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back to an export led strategy. The industrial sector in those countries either already was 
or was in its way to being one of the leading sectors. In addition, CEPAL still defended 
inward looking policies, particularly after the deterioration o f the NBTT following the 
Korean War in 1953. However, the protection granted to industrial sectors was not 
always consistent and, in addition to tariffs, multiple exchange rates, import quotas and 
licenses were often used. The IMF insisted on the elimination of multiple exchange rates 
and quotas and in the long run protection relied merely on orthodox instruments such as 
tariffs. For domestic producers, however, the effective rate of protection (ERP) was the 
significant variable -  ERP refers to the change in value added per unit o f output as a 
result of protection not only from nominal tariffs to imported goods but also tariffs and 
other forms of protection on the cost of inputs. This measure is a much better indication 
of the incentives offered to industry (Bulmer-Thomas, 1994).
However, and as mentioned in the introduction of this section, the main problem in the 
fifties was the lack o f finance in order to support the industrialisation effort, particularly 
once the “easy” stage had been done. In that first stage the replacement of imported 
consumer goods for domestically produced ones represented no major capital 
investments. However, when moving to the second phase of industrialisation, the 
necessary technology was not always available due to the lack of private funding, the 
government established several companies. Still, the dependency on imports continued, 
as industry was import intensive and intermediate and capital goods were required in 
order to further the industrialisation effort. Industrialisation was successful in terms of the 
increased share of manufactures in total GDP as well as the industries established in the 
period -  as will be mentioned in following chapters -  but these industries were 
sometimes high cost and lacking in efficiency since they faced no international 
competition, and thus ruling out the possibility of engaging in international trade with 
domestic manufactures. The increasing rural-urban migration that will be referred to 
again later in chapters 6 and 8 and the inability of industry to absorb it would also 
accentuate income disparities.
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The above mentioned factors such as the dependency on foreign imports, the increasing 
concentration of income, balance of payments problems, together with the decline in the 
rate of growth, high inflation rates, political instability (the military coup in Brazil in 
1964, which put an end to the development plan followed by Goulart, as well as the 
military coup in Argentina in 1966) of the mid and late sixties, led to a sense of failure of 
the structuralist programme for national development, which led to the theory being 
reworked and the emergence of the dependency school (Love, 1996).
The dependency school argues that spatial inequality and the marginality of the 
peripheral populations are inevitable consequences of the position of poorer regions in 
the development process. Dependency school economists, such as Frank (1967), 
Gonzalez (1964-5) and Sunkel (1969) argue that regions are linked to dynamic national 
centres, which, in turn, are linked to dynamic foreign centres in an international 
dependency relationship. Backward regions in a particular country are therefore 
dependent on the domestic economic centre, creating an asymmetry in the national 
economic structure that in turn affects the process of national development. Similarly, the 
dual economy present at a national level is replicated between the domestic and foreign 
economic centres. This, in turn, affects the insertion of the domestic centre into a 
dynamic and competitive world economy. Therefore, there are two coexisting structural 
imbalances; one can be found within the national boundaries and the other at the 
international level.
While for structuralism the state had a key role in the process o f national development; 
the dependency school regarded the state as autonomous but insert within a social 
structure. Prebisch (1949) thought that state intervention and the national bourgeoisies 
would achieve industrialisation; however, as mentioned before dependency school 
theorists - such as Frank (1967), Gonzalez (1964-5) and Sunkel (1969) - agree that the 
ability of governments to remove inequalities is limited, and given that the local political 
and socio-economic elites are also benefiting from this dependency relationship, little 
action is expected from national governments. Therefore, for the dependency theorists the 
reasons for economies (or regions) not converging towards each other is to be found in
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the existing social and political barriers that are part of these societies (Gilbert and 
Goodman, 1976).
While Sunkel (1969) considered the above mentioned international dependency 
relationship as given for the periphery’s own structure; Cardoso and Faletto (1969) refer 
to a the internal and external sub-systems, and emphasised that the international capitalist 
system was not solely determining since the dependency is possible through a network of 
interests across various social groups (page 162). They analyse the development of the 
populist coalition of national and foreign capital with the working class -  corresponding 
to the successful phase of ISI -  and linked the failure of ISI with the fall of populism. The 
“masses” (page 108) are a necessary condition for the industrialisation process not only 
as a supplier o f labour but also given that it constituted the domestic market and became a 
powerful political player. Cardoso and Faletto (1969) saw development and 
underdevelopment not as stages but as “functions” or “positions” (page 23) within the 
same international economic system determined by the “historical process” (page 18). 
According to Furtado, the main difference between industrialisation in Europe and that in 
Latin America was that for the latter technology was exogenous to the regional economy 
and designed for the requirements of the developed countries (Love, 1996: 247).
The dependency school became influential outside Latin America in the 1970s. 
Structuralism during the eighties developed into ‘neo-structuralism’, in which the 
mistakes from ISI would be avoided and incorporate lessons from neo-liberalism seeking 
export opportunities in a flexible policy aiming at helping both the internal as external 
market. ‘Inward directed development’ was then replaced by ‘development from within’ 
(Sunkel, 1993).
Theories aside, the weakest point of the inward model since it was first applied was the 
balance of payments constraint and the inability to finance further imported inputs to 
continue with the industrialisation process. The first stage of ISI or the ‘easy’ stage, by 
replacing previously imported products by locally manufactured ones, allows rapid 
growth of output independently of income levels and the growth in final demand since
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the size of the market is somewhat fixed, as the substitution is carried out based on 
existing patterns of demand. Once this market is satisfied, further industrial production 
can only occur if additional imported manufactured goods can be substituted by local 
production and this is where the dependency on imported machinery became a crucial 
flaw in the ISI model. With the adoption of the floating currencies following the collapse 
of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 and the further strain derived from the oil shocks in 
1973 and 1978, the inability of the ISI model to generate sustained development was 
blatant. Moreover, debt and inflation spiralled and the debt crisis of the 1980s put a 
definitive end to the ISI and signalled a return to the agro-export sector as a main source 
of resources needed to service the debts which culminated in the liberalisation of the last 
decade.
Inspired by the European integration, CEPAL also encouraged Latin American 
integration as a means of enlarging the market and allowing for economies of scale and 
lowering unit costs while maintaining protection against imports from third countries 
(Prebisch, 1971). It was in this context that LAFTA was created in 1960 as will be 
mentioned in chapter 5 (page 128).
5.2. Macroeconomic and Political Stability and their Impact on Growth and 
Inequalities
Another issue that has increasingly been referred to in growth theory is the link between 
macroeconomic conditions and disparities. Increasing urban concentration and the 
preferred industrial location in the metropolis is linked with increasing GDP per capita, 
and therefore an expansion cycle usually starts at the metropolis while a recession hits the 
metropolis harder than the periphery. Berry (1988) has argued that business cycles are 
associated with cycles of spatial concentration. This hypothesis links rapid economic 
growth with increased regional inequalities and it is reminiscent of the growth poles 
theory o f Perroux (1955, 1970) and of the cumulative causation theory of Myrdal (1957). 
In this context, economic cycles begin at the major poles of concentration of economic 
activity intensifying inequalities since its effects are not spread out immediately.
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Conversely, in times o f recession, the metropolitan regions would be hit harder that the 
peripheral ones and thus inequalities reduced.
This topic is relatively new in the literature and there are not many empirical studies, 
particularly for Latin America. The link between macroeconomic conditions and 
disparities is included in this thesis and will be empirically tested for Argentina and 
Brazil in chapters 7 and 9. Andres et al (1996) present evidence of macroeconomic 
variables having a significant impact on growth in the short, medium and long run. They 
claim that the importance of macro variables is higher in periods of slow growth and 
turbulence, helping to explain the slowdown of growth in OECD countries in the 
seventies. They also conclude that growth seems to be positively correlated with exports 
and monetary growth and negatively with inflation and the variability of money and 
inflation.
There is some evidence presented by Dunford (1993) for Europe that is in line with the 
view of the European Commission (Commission of the European Communities, 1991), 
indicating that regional disparities tend to move counter-cyclically by increasing during 
recessions and diminishing in periods of strong economic growth. On the other hand, 
Petrakos and Tsoukalas (1999) test the hypothesis of positive correlation between 
regional inequalities and macroeconomic performance for Greece. Their conclusion is the 
opposite and disparities in Greece seem to be pro-cyclical.
A possible reconciliation of these two findings according to Ioannides and Petrakos 
(2000) is that economic expansion is more likely to lead to regional convergence in 
advanced countries with a spatially integrated economic base. Conversely, in less 
advanced countries, it is more likely to lead to regional divergence, since these usually 
present strong spatial fragmentation and imbalances as well as a dual economic base. It 
is, then, interesting to consider the evidence from Argentina and Brazil and determine 
whether disparities in these countries are pro-cyclical, as in the case of Greece, or 
counter-cyclical, as the other countries in the European Union. In the following chapter,
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some of the empirical studies in this area will be discussed in more detail together with 
the methodological aspects of the thesis.
Another line of research that has received much attention in the recent literature is based 
on the proposition that the security of property and contractual rights as well as 
government policies are significant for the speed in which countries grow. Then, 
countries where public investment and economic policies are inefficient are expected to 
have lower rates of growth (Knack and Keefer, 1995). Within a classical economics 
context, security of rights affects their value. If there is uncertainty regarding the rule of 
law, transaction costs are higher and therefore affect the rates of capital accumulation 
(Scully, 1988). In this section, the main theoretical elements will be presented, while in 
the following chapter the empirical results will be further discussed.
Testing for political instability and property rights have not been widely undertaken in 
the literature. Barro (1991) tests convergence for a series of countries for the period 
1960-1985, including variables that proxy for political instability, the number of 
revolutions and coups per year and the number per million inhabitants of political 
assassinations per year. He shows that each of these variables has a significant negative 
impact on property rights as well as on investment and growth.
Economic freedoms are usually thought to encourage economic growth. Kormendi and 
Meguire (1985), Scully (1988) and Barro (1998) have used the Gastil index of civil 
liberty. They all found a relationship between increases in liberty and growth,, through 
investment. Knack and Keefer (1995) consider this index to be too aggregate, and 
therefore use further variables to account for property rights and the efficiency of public 
goods allocation. These include expropriation risk, rule of law, repudiation of contracts, 
corruption in government, quality of bureaucracy, contract enforceability, infrastructure 
quality, nationalisation potential and bureaucratic delays. All these researches found that 
the variables included had a significant impact on growth. In the same line of analysis, 
Rebelo (1991) studied the link between low growth rate in countries with high income tax 
and poor property rights enforcement.
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According to Lipset (1959), prosperity stimulates democracy (this is often referred to as 
the Lipset hypothesis). He noted an increased education and a large middle class as 
elements that expand “receptivity to democratic political tolerance norms” (p.83). 
Empirical studies show that the Lipset hypothesis holds, and that increases in measures of 
standards of living tend to generate a gradual rise in democracy. By contrast, democracies 
arising without prior economic development tend not to last (Barro, 1998).
Barro (1998) uses an indicator of political rights, finding that there is a positive 
relationship between an increase in democracy and growth when political freedoms were 
initially weak. However, further democracy tends to depress growth once a moderate 
amount of freedom is already established. He concludes that the positive relation between 
democracy and prior measures of prosperity -  the Lipset hypothesis - is indeed an 
empirical regularity.
6. Conclusions
Throughout this chapter it has been shown that neo-classical models assume that 
convergence would be a natural outcome of growth. Models of regional economics, by 
contrast, focus on the constraints that prevent those automatic mechanisms from 
achieving their long-term equilibrium. These include transport costs, economies of scale, 
agglomeration economies and geographical differences among others. Such observations 
can also be extended to integrated areas, and therefore convergence of incomes across 
countries and regions may not be the natural outcome.
When other considerations, such as the role of specialisation in the process of 
development, macroeconomic conditions and institutional factors are also included in the 
analysis, convergence is far from being automatic since all these are forces that contribute 
to create and accentuate imbalances. When thinking of less developed countries as 
Argentina and Brazil, or even in the case of the poorer countries of the European Union 
such as Greece, the implications are more significant. In such countries, characterised by
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dual economies as a result of export-led models of development, with weak institutions, 
non-democratic periods and significant macroeconomic crises, the simple Solow model is 
not useful in explaining differences in income. This does not mean that the predictions of 
the Solow model are wrong, but that the equalising mechanism with decreasing marginal 
productivity and full mobility o f resources does not operate in the way described by the 
theory. It is therefore essential to take into account structural imbalances that affect the 
process of convergence.
In countries such as Argentina and Brazil that began their development process much 
later that the advanced nations, models of growth have historically been imposed from 
abroad. After independence the existing patterns of trade and distribution were changed 
to accommodate the needs of the external sector. In the export led phase, Latin American 
countries exported raw materials in return for manufactured products from the developed 
countries, certain areas where developed more than others in order to satisfy export 
demand and the countries as a whole did not achieve a long term development. When that 
model came to an end and Latin America was left in an unfavourable international 
position, import substitution gained momentum.
Import substitution industrialisation, and the theories that underpinned it, were the most 
significant attempt in the region to understand historically determined models of 
development as well as providing correcting policies in order to achieve a balanced 
growth. The role of the government as an efficient provider of resources and policy 
formulation was revived -  as opposed to the automatic non-governmental policies 
embraced by neoclassical economics. However, Latin American countries were still 
dependent on imports in order to continue their industrialisation effort and therefore -  
and as will be seen later in chapters 6 and 8 -  these countries were still dependent on 
developed countries. The increasing balance of payments problems and debt gave rise to 
another dependent phase in which Latin America has been following the economic 
guidelines dictated by the Washington Consensus. Over the last decade, liberalisation and 
deregulation followed, which, again had a negative impact on regional disparities since
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the role of the government as redistributing agent was again -  like in the export led model 
-  neglected.
Once again, Latin America’s major problem is timing. Following the Second World War, 
when Latin America followed an inward looking strategy, world trade was expanding 
rapidly. Industrialisation was undoubtedly the right policy given the market situation but 
the reliance on imported technology to further indsutrialisation and the not enough export 
earnings contributed to the failure of the model and the return to liberal policies.
The next chapter will review the methodology used for analysing inequalities and 
regional convergence in particular. It will address the main methodology for testing the 
theoretical models reviewed in this chapter and the debate regarding its applicability. 
Empirical studies carried out for several areas in the world will be discussed, with an 
emphasis on Latin America. The methodology that will be later used in the empirical 
chapters to analyse the European Union (chapter 4), the MERCOSUR countries (chapter 
5) and Argentina and Brazil in particular (chapters 7 and 9) will also be explained and 
evaluated.
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3Methodology 
1. Introduction
This chapter discusses the main methodological tools used in the literature in order to 
analyse disparities and test for convergence of regional incomes both within and between 
countries, highlighting the advantages and disadvantages of each of them. It is therefore 
the methodological basis for the empirical chapters on the European Union, the 
MERCOSUR countries and particularly Argentina and Brazil.
The most simple distinction when measuring regional economic disparities is that they 
can be measured either at any given period of time by the use of straightforward formulas 
or within a dynamic framework with the aid of econometric models. Section 2 will 
review the former. Most of these models will not be used in the rest of the thesis but 
deserve mention. In Section 3 the shift-share analysis is explained. Again, this 
methodology will not be used for Argentina and Brazil (mainly because of lack of 
accurate data) but will be briefly mentioned later since it has been used for the European 
Union by other authors. Section 4 describes the econometric methods most often used for 
testing convergence, and that will be used for the analysis in Argentina and Brazil in 
chapters 7 and 9 respectively. Finally, Section 5 reports the main relevant empirical 
findings in the literature when using the methods described.
2. Measurement of Disparities
There is a wide variety of techniques to calculate disparities, but they can effectively be 
divided into two groups, those that apply ratios between indicators and those that use 
comparisons o f area distribution. The first group consists of simple, straightforward
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methods; while the second group comprises specific measures used in the studies of 
income distribution and regional development.
Dispersion of values in a series
Within this subgroup there is a further distinction between those indicators in which the 
dispersion can either be analysed by the extreme values (or groups of extreme values) and 
those indicators that account for the distance of each observation to the mean of the 
series.
The indicators that analyse extreme values include the range of variation, the ratio of 
variation, the ratio o f extreme quantiles, the range between the means of upper and lower 
quantiles and the divergence of the extreme values from the population mean. The two 
measures most widely used are the range of variation and the ratio of variation. The range 
o f variation, which is the simplest of all coefficients, is defined as the difference between 
the extreme values o f a series. The ratio of variation is given by the ratio between the 
extreme values, and it makes the coefficient less vulnerable to extreme values.
In another group, those indicators that refer to a general mean can be listed, such as the 
mean deviation, the relative mean deviation, the variance, the standard deviation, the 
coefficient of deviation, the coefficient of variation, the weighted coefficient of variation 
and the coefficient of variation logarithms. The standard deviation is usually preferred, 
given that it is not influenced by extreme values as the variance. In this thesis the 
standard deviation will be used.
Comparing elements of two series
This subgroup can also be further divided into two subsets; the simple (or ‘one-effect’) 
coefficients and the more sophisticated analytical devices (or ‘decomposable 
coefficients’). Within the one-effect coefficients’ group, the mean deviation between 
elements o f two sets can be calculated. Also, coefficients that measure inequality such as 
the coefficient of geographic association (or coefficient of Florence) and the coefficient 
o f correlation around zero, where 1 means maximum equality and 0 maximum inequality.
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Finally, another measure of inequality widely used in development economics is the Gini 
coefficient; where 0 and 1 mean maximum equality and inequality respectively. A way of 
looking at this coefficient is with the Lorenz curve whereby the percentages of population 
from the poorest to the richest are depicted in the horizontal axis and percentages of 
income in the vertical one. A Lorenz curve runs from one comer to the opposite one. If 
everyone enjoys the same income, then the curve will be diagonal. In the absence of 
perfect equality the bottom income groups receive a proportionately lower share of 
income and therefore a Lorenz curve will lie below the diagonal.
The second sub-group refers to decomposable coefficients. The T-coefficient of Theil 
measures inequality, in which 0 corresponds to maximum equality and log N to 
maximum inequality. The Dalton measure, on the other hand, is based on a comparison 
between actual levels of aggregate utility and the level of total utility that would be 
obtained if  income were equally divided. Finally, Atkinson’s measure; which defines the 
‘equally distributed equivalent income’ as the level of per capita income which if  
received by everyone would make total welfare equal to total welfare generated by the 
actual income distribution. If income were equally distributed, the value would be 0.
Main drawbacks of the measures for the regional analysis
Molle (1980) points out that not all these indicators may be suitable for regional analysis. 
He particularly considers that the range and ratio of variation as well as the ratio of 
extreme quantiles are not very useful because extreme values can be incidental and 
influenced by the regional division chosen. Further, the range of variation does not 
differentiate between real and nominal changes, therefore distorting the results. The ratio 
o f extreme quantiles, although it does not have any of the drawbacks of the previous 
ones, is not suitable for small samples (less than a hundred).
The average mean is not appropriate for comparisons through time, and the relative mean 
deviation would be better in this case. The coefficient of variation is more adequate than 
the variance, since it is not affected by changes in average values and it is more 
appropriate for comparisons through time. The rest of the coefficients o f variation are
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also suitable for the regional analysis. The Lorenz curve will be referred to later to 
illustrate the differential impact that regional policies in the European Union had for 
different products.
3. Shift- Share Analysis
In order to assess the growth difference between two regions or between a particular 
region and the country, Molle (1980) refers to the multi-level and shift-share analysis. 
The difference in growth between a region of an integrated area and the whole area, or 
the difference in growth between two regions, can be decomposed into the sum of 
structural effects between the region and its country, and the differential effects between 
the country and the community.
The growth difference between a region and the nation, or as in this case between two 
regions can be seen as stemming from two effects, one structural and the other 
differential. The structural effect is due to a difference in sectorial composition between 
the individual region and the total of all regions. The differential effect refers to those 
activities in particular sectors that do not increase or decrease in all regions at the same 
rate. The differential effect is sometimes referred to as the location effect given that 
higher growth rates in particular regions might be a consequence of location advantages. 
These two effects can be measured using the shift share analysis as follows:
(1) ig- j 8 = Sy +  gjj
Where,
ig, j 8 " the rates of growth of the economy Of regions i and j respectively
Sij = the structural effect comparing region i with region j
gij = the differential effect comparing region i and j
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By definition,
(2) ig = S kgikfik
j 8 = 2k gjk fjk
in which,
gik and gjk = rates of growth of sector k in regions i and j, respectively
fjk and fik = fractions of sector k in the regions i and j respectively
Thus,
(3) fiic eoc / Ek e,k
fjk — 6jk / £k Gjk
where,
e* = persons in employment in sector k in regions i and j respectively.
Then (1) may be rewritten as:
(4) ig -  j g =Xk gik fik -  Lk gjk fjk
=  S k gik fik-  £ k  gik fjk +  2 k gik fjk -  2 k gjk fjk
=  2 k gik (fik - fjk) +  2 k (gjk -  gjk) fjk
=  Sij +  gij
Therefore, the structural effect is a weighted mean of the differences between the 
economic structures o f both regions weighted by the growth rates of the sectors in region 
i. The differential effect is measured as the weighted sum of the differences in the 
growth rates of the sectors of both regions, weighted by the sectoral fractions in region j.
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As an example, shift-share analysis can be applied to regions of the European 
Community comparing each individual region with its country and the community as a 
whole. For each region, the procedure can be expressed in symbols as follows.
( 5 )  ig- n g = Sjn + g in
(6 )  n g - C g — Snc "t* gnc
(7) ,ng = Cg +  Snc +  g n c
where,
ig = growth rate of region i of country n
ng = growth rate of country n
Sin = growth rate of the European Community
gin = structural effect between region i and country n
cg = structural effect between country n and the EC
snc = differential effect between region i and country n
gnc = differential effect between country n and the EC
Substituting (7) into (5)
(8 )  ig — Cg — Sin g in  Snc g nc
That is, the difference in growth between a region i and the European Community is the 
result of the sum of the structural effects between the region and its country; the 
structural effects of the country and the Community; the differential effects between the 
region and its country; and the differential effects between the country and the 
Community.
According to the positive or negative sign of the structural and differential effects, four 
cases can be distinguished, both at the national and regional level (Figure 3.1).
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I. The region shows both a positive structural and differential effect. This implies 
that although the economic structure in the region favours growth, this was higher 
than expected.
II. Despite a high proportion of negative growth sectors in the regional economy, the 
region either succeeded in catching up with the country (A, positive net effect) or 
made some improvements (B, negative net effect)
III. The region shows two negative effects, thus is heavily economically dependent on 
declining sectors and the decline is sharper that what its economic structure would 
have determined.
IV. Although the regional economy would grow if all sectors grew at the same rate in 
the region as in the nation, other factors have retarded growth (A) or caused 
decline (B)
Figure 3.1. Shift-Share Analysis: Structural and Differential Effects
TOTAL EFFECT POSITIVE
DIFFERENTIAL EFFECTS
IIA
IIB
STRUCT.■STRUCT.
EFFECTS EFFECTSIVA
IVB
DIFFERENT AL EFFECTS
TOTAL EFFECT NEGATIVE
Source: Molle (1980)
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In Armstrong and Taylor (1993), shift-share analysis has been used to explain regional 
disparities in employment growth. Although this technique has been heavily criticised 
(Richardson, 1978), it continues to be employed mainly because it is easy to understand 
and requires few data. It is useful in explaining the regional growth differences since it 
accounts for the industry mix of a particular region in its growth performance.
However, the technique has also several disadvantages that limit its use. The main 
problem is that of aggregation and the definition of industry that it is used. Further, for 
the case of less developed countries, data availability is a main drawback for the use of 
this method; whether it is data on industry mix or even employment. Therefore, this 
methodology will not be used in the analysis for Argentina and Brazil.
3. Convergence Analysis
The convergence hypothesis has been a matter of empirical controversy over the last few 
years. There are basically three main hypotheses. The first one is the absolute 
convergence hypothesis in which per capita incomes of countries converge in the long 
run to each other independently of their starting levels. Secondly, the conditional 
convergence hypothesis that tests for convergence of incomes per capita for countries 
with identical structural characteristics. Lastly, the club convergence hypothesis, which 
includes polarisation, persistence and clustering, tests for countries that are identical in 
their structural characteristics and converge to each other in the long-run if their initial 
conditions are also similar (Galor, 1996).
The use o f convergence analysis is accepted as the main tool in order to differentiate 
between the different growth models seen in the previous chapter. As was mentioned 
before, the conclusion of the neo-classical model of economic growth is that poorer 
regions (or countries) will grow faster than richer ones. Therefore, if  the conclusions of 
the neo-classical model hold, there would be absolute convergence. Romer (1986), Lucas 
(1988) and Barro (1991) argue that this is not the case and reject the neo-classical model 
in favour of endogenous models of growth.
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Supporting evidence for the conditional convergence hypothesis can be found in Barro 
(1991), Mankiw et al (1992) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995). Finally, Quah (1996) 
supports the existence of convergence clubs against the other two hypotheses. As will be 
seen below, the club convergence and conditional convergence hypotheses can be 
reconciled. Following Galor (1996), it will be seen that those two hypotheses are 
consistent with the neo-classical growth model, in contradiction to prevailing ideas. 
Moreover, Galor also concludes that the absolute convergence hypothesis, contrary to 
what is generally tested, is not derived from the neo-classical model of growth. Mankiw 
et al (1992) also conclude that the Solow model predicts that countries will generally 
reach different steady states. The convergence club hypothesis is nevertheless very useful 
when comparing very poor and very rich countries - or regions - in order to determine the 
dynamics o f the groupings.
Convergence analysis is often carried out with the beta (p) and sigma (a) analyses, which 
were introduced by Sala-i-Martin (1990), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) and Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (1992). The a-convergence analyses how the dispersion of real per capita 
income (in logs) across certain groups of economies (or regions) tends to decrease over 
time. In other words, how the distribution evolves over time. As has been seen in Section 
1, the dispersion of the variables for different countries - or regions - can be examined by 
the variance. There is a-convergence if the dispersion, as measured by the variance of 
income per capita (in logarithms), decreases over time (Tavera, 1999).
It is measured by:
( 9 )  a (t)>
where,
(10) o2t = (l/n) S(ln(yi>t)-U t)2
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Ui is the sample mean
n is the number of observations
yijtis the income per capita in each period
(Villaverde, 1999; Utrera and Koroch, 1998)
There is p-convergence in a cross section of economies (regions) if  there is a negative 
relation between the growth rates o f income per capita and the initial level of income; in 
other words, p-convergence studies the mobility of income within a certain distribution. 
The existence o f p-convergence means that poorer regions or countries would be growing 
faster than richer ones (for the definitions of convergence and divergence used 
throughout this thesis see point 5 in Appendix Va). Therefore, if  P-convergence proves to 
be the case, it is said that the neo-classical model of growth holds. However, this model 
assumes that the only difference across countries is their initial levels of capital. In the 
real world, however, the neo-classical model would predict not that all economies tend to 
the same steady state but that each economy will tend to their own steady states (Sala-i- 
Martin, 1996). This is the reason why Galor (1996) also says that the neo-classical model 
does not generate the absolute but the conditional convergence hypothesis and therefore a 
rejection o f the absolute convergence does not imply a rejection of the neo-classical 
model.
In order to test the absolute p-convergence the following equation will have to be 
estimated:
(11) In (yi,t/yi,t-i) = a  + p In (yj, t-i) + ui)t
Barro (1991), Baro and Salai-Martin (1991, 1992), Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) and 
Knack and Keefer (1995) assume that the problem of omitted variables is not serious 
enough in order to abandon the use of ordinary least squares (OLS). Although this is a 
strong assumption, if  any o f the omitted variables were correlated to the included
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explanatory variables, the coefficients on the included ones would be biased (Knack and 
Keefer, 1995).
In the case of conditional p-convergence, the incomes per capita of the economies (or 
regions) that have identical structural characteristics converge in the long run (as 
opposed to the absolute case, where the incomes converge in the long run regardless of 
their initial conditions). Thus, there is conditional p-convergence when the partial 
correlation between growth and initial income is negative. The conditional p- 
convergence explains why the absolute convergence might not take place, since it allows 
for other factors such as institutional or economic policy issues to be considered. Then, 
the trend towards convergence determined by the marginal productivity of capital can be 
counterbalanced by institutional factors or economic policy issues that prevent certain 
regions from reaching higher growth or trigger more advanced areas to grow faster than 
less developed ones.
According to Sala-i-Martin (1996), in order to test for conditional convergence, the 
steady state value of each economy has to be held constant. There are two ways of doing 
this. Firstly, by introducing variables that can act as proxies for the steady state. The 
second approach is to study sets of economies for which we can safely assume similar 
steady states. As will be seen in Section 4 this has been performed for OECD countries 
(Sala-i-Martin, 1996, 1996b; Andres et al, 1996) and the European regions (Sala-i- 
Martin, 1996, 1996b). Studies within a country have also been performed under the 
hypothesis of similar steady states for the states of the United States, Japanese prefectures 
(Sala-i-Martin, 1996, 1996b) and Sweden (Persson, 1997), among others as will be later 
discussed in Section 4.
The equation to be estimated will then be:
(12) In (yi,t/yi.t-i) = a  + p ln(yi,t-i) + y Xj + ui>t
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The vector of auxiliary variables, X j, is a vector of proxy variables o f steady state for the 
economy (region) i (Villaverde, 1999).
If the coefficient on initial income is negative, the economies (regions) under study 
display conditional convergence. Several variables can be considered in the conditional 
beta analysis, such as education, fertility, infrastructure or the share of the agricultural 
sector or industry in regional income. In the case of the share of the agricultural sector, 
presumably this sector is characterised by a relatively lower level of productivity growth. 
Therefore, the higher the share of this sector in the regional economy the lower the 
steady-state level of per capita income and the lower the expected growth rate given the 
initial income. In fact, omitting this variable can lead to a biased estimation of the speed 
of convergence. Conversely, regions with a higher share of industry and technical 
progress can be benefited by scale economies or learning by doing. In this case a higher 
share of industry in regional GDP will be expected to increase the rate of growth given an 
initial level o f income.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, recent studies on convergence expanded to include 
other variables in the analysis of conditional convergence, such as political instability 
(Barro, 1991); rule o f law and inflation (Barro, 1998); corruption and quality of 
bureaucracy (Knack and Keefer, 1995) and civil liberties (Kormendi and Maguire, 
1985). This will also be referred to again later in this chapter when empirical studies are 
discussed.
In order to obtain the speed o f convergence (X), it is necessary to do the following 
transformation after estimating the equation by ordinary least squares:
(13) X= -ln(l-Pn)/n
where n is the time period
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It is possible to compare both beta and sigma concepts of convergence. The P- 
convergence examines the presence of a mechanism o f adjustment of economies towards 
their long-term equilibrium, while the a-convergence shows the effect of convergence 
between the economies without any explicit theoretical reference (Tavera, 1999). 
Therefore, although these two concepts of convergence are not equivalent, they are 
related. In Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) and Sala-i-Martin (1996) the relation between 
both the beta and the a-convergence has been derived, and it was shown that the 
existence o f P-convergence is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a-convergence. 
Sala-i-Martin (1996b) intuitively explains that if  the GDP levels of two economies 
become more similar over time, it must be the case that the poor economy is growing 
faster. Moreover, if  there is P-convergence then the dispersion at the end of the period 
considered is smaller that at the beginning of the period, therefore a-convergence must 
exist as well. Alternatively, ‘the existence of P-convergence will tend to generate a- 
convergence’ (Sala-i-Martin, 1996b: 1021). Thus, p-convergence analysis usually follows 
a first approximation with the a-convergence analysis.
However, as Quah (1996) points out, even when p-convergence is observed, the 
separation between regions as measured by the spread sigma may not be decreasing and 
therefore the poorer regions are not catching up. He then focuses on a-convergence and 
presents various extreme scenarios to exemplify the potential shortcomings of sigma 
analysis. In the first one, sigma remains unchanged while some economies grow and 
others decrease but in such amounts that the indicator remains unchanged. Therefore it 
will not be possible to see intra-distribution dynamics. In the second scenario, sigma also 
remains unchanged; the reason being that the poorer stay poorer and the richer remain 
richer, therefore there is persistent inequality. Based on these ‘extreme and unrealistic’ 
examples, Quah (1996: 1366) concluded that neither sigma or beta analyses are able to 
provide a convincing answer for the analysis of convergence.
Quah (1996b) argues that a negative correlation between growth rates and levels says 
nothing about the poor catching up with the richer. Quah criticises the conditional 
convergence since he says its only use is to show whether a country is converging to its
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own steady state, different from that of other countries. He adds that ‘it is a complete 
puzzle to me how this can be interesting for whether the poor are catching up with the 
rich’ (Quah, 1996b: 1048). According to Quah (1996), using panel data, that is 
combining cross section with dynamic variations, will not solve the problem since it will 
again fail to capture the dynamics o f the entire distribution. Since a phenomenon such as 
twin-peakedness will not be seen by any of the standard methods for studying 
convergence, Quah suggests a way of analysing that can capture intra-distribution 
dynamics and which includes information on switches in ranks as well as the distance 
when those changes happen. Convergence dynamics can include situations such as 
convergence in clubs, which include polarisation, stratification and overtaking and 
difference. Polarisation refers to situations in which the poor get poorer and the rich 
richer with middle-classes disappearing. In the case of stratification, there are not two 
resulting clubs but several. Lastly, when referring to overtaking and difference this would 
be represented by two economies that initially were similar and over time one becomes 
richer that the other.
As mentioned earlier in this section, Galor (1996) reconciles the Solow model with the 
existence not only o f conditional but also club convergence. He reinforces Quah (1996b) 
since countries that exhibit club convergence will also show conditional convergence in 
the data. Countries with similar conditions will be converging to each other’s steady state 
levels and, given their similarities, these will be generating clubs. The inclusion of 
variables such as human capital, fertility and so on will strengthen the possibility of 
multiple steady-state equilibria and therefore makes club convergence compatible with 
conditional convergence and thus with the neo-classical model.
4. Empirical Studies
Over the last decade, a number of studies focused on convergence analysis. These studies 
can usefully be divided into two groups. On the one hand, there is a group that tried to 
determine the viability o f either the Solow or the endogenous models. These models test 
whether poorer countries grow faster than richer ones and therefore include larger
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samples. On the other hand, a second group studies regions within a particular country or 
similar regions in the world (an example was already mentioned on page 57, with 
reference to convergence studies for the OECD countries). Since their main focus is not 
the validity o f any particular theoretical model but, rather, an analysis of the evolution of 
disparities, the latter provide more useful insight for this thesis. Unfortunately very few 
studies of this kind have been performed for countries in Latin America (those carried out 
for Argentina and Brazil will be discussed later). A separate group may be distinguished 
to include the most recent literature in growth theory, namely the effect o f macro and 
political variables. However, this has so far only been tested for a large sample of 
countries, given the nature of the data and the very recent applications o f these models. In 
this section, all o f these groups will be discussed in order to assess the importance of each 
methodology used.
Within the more general empirical studies, Barro (1991) studied the relationship between 
per capita growth in the period 1960-1985 and the initial (1960) level of GDP per capita 
for 98 countries. When performing absolute P-convergence the correlation is close to 
zero, therefore seeming inconsistent with the hypothesis that poor countries grow faster 
than richer ones. However, when performing a conditional p-convergence analysis and 
including measures of human capital, this relationship becomes significant. In particular, 
he measures human capital with the rates o f secondary and primary school enrolment. A 
positive relationship with the per capita growth is found when holding the initial human 
capital levels constant. He mentions that school enrolment could be measuring a flow of 
investment and not a stock of human capital, in which case literacy rates seem to be a 
more appropriate indicator. However, he points out that literacy rates appear to be 
measured distinctly in different countries and, in particular, these are quite inaccurate in 
the case o f less developed countries. So, although enrolment rates might be referring to a 
flow instead of a stock of human capital, they might provide more accurate and consistent 
proxies, in particular when performing a cross-section analysis (Barro, 1991).
Regarding any possible measurement errors, as noted by Romer (1989), if  there were a 
temporary measurement error, future growth rates of GDP would automatically have a
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negative correlation with the starting level. For this to hold though, the measurement 
error would have to be very large, as well as temporary. If it were short-lived, no 
estimation problems would arise. Then, measurement errors, or business-cycle effects, 
can only be important for the results if  they persist over periods longer than ten years. 
Again, he mentions that the measurement error is expected to be larger in less developed 
countries (Barro, 1991).
Sala-i-Martin (1996) reports the results of convergence tests across regions of the United 
States (48 States), Japan (47 prefectures), Europe (90 regions), and Canada (10 
provinces). The time period differs among them, commencing in 1880 for the United 
States, 1950 for Europe, 1955 for Japan and 1961 for Canada. They all end in 1990 
(except for Canada, in 1991). Data on Europe was expanded to include 17 Spanish 
autonomous communities for the period 1955-1987. He estimated the speed of P- 
convergence with a non-linear equation. He uses a non-linear estimator as opposed to the 
OLS because the estimated speed of convergence beta can be directly compared across 
samples with different length without the use of any transformations. His results show 
both beta and o-convergence across all regions. The betas obtained are ‘extraordinarily 
similar across countries’ (p. 1339), about 2 per cent per year, this estimate being very 
robust and always significant.
Despite the fact that Sala-i-Martin (1996) refers to specific countries in this analysis, his 
aim is to prove the validity of the neo-classical model and the robustness o f the 2 per cent 
rate of growth across the samples. He mentions that the measurement error in the initial 
level o f income might lead to a negative bias in the least squares estimation of the 
convergence coefficient and the results can therefore exaggerate the estimated 
convergence. However, he argues that classical measurement error is an unlikely 
explanation o f this phenomenon. If temporary measurement error were important, the 
finding would have been a much smaller convergence coefficient when the lagged 
income was used. Nevertheless, even when the measurement error would show 
convergence when there was none, the sigma analysis would be unaffected by any
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measurement errors since the measures of dispersion cannot be biased (unless one argues 
that the variance of the error falls over time, Salai-i-Martin, 1996: 1340).
On the other hand, Quah (1996) argues that the evidence of the 2 per cent convergence 
might be, at least in part, related to a statistical uniformity, namely the small sample 
downward bias in unit root processes. By generating a number of Monte Carlo 
simulations of cross-sectionally independent random walks and running cross sectional 
regressions, as in Sala-i-Martin (1996), he shows that the speed of convergence of 2 per 
cent a year can be estimated quite consistently when sample sizes are close to those used 
by Sala-i-Martin (1996). Secondly, he points out that findings on convergence using both 
beta and sigma might be misleading since they fail to identify the existence of different 
convergence dynamics, as seen in the previous section.
Bernard and Jones (1996) make an important point in indicating that from the initial 
concern about how poorer nations grew, convergence analysis has derived into a mere 
debate as to the annual convergence rate is 2 per cent and how robust or not this estimate 
is. Even if  one wanted to enter the 2 per cent debate it should be noted that when 
considering studies such as Sala-i-Martin (1996); Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) - the 
United States and Japan; Dolado, et al (1994) - Spain; Cardenas and Ponton (1995) - 
Colombia; Persson (1997) -  Sweden - Jian, Sachs and Warner (1996) and Zhao and Tong 
(2000) - China; the results fluctuate between 1 and 4.2 per cent. These results, therefore, 
do not validate the 2 per cent so-called ‘iron rule o f convergence’.
Among the studies that focused on income differentials within countries a few can be 
named, such as the ones for Spain, Sweden and China mentioned above, as well as 
Andres et al (1996) for the OECD countries, Coulombe and Lee (1993) for Canada, 
Tsionas (2000) for the United States, Tavera (1999) for Europe, Petrakos (2000) for 
Greece, Nagaraj et al (2000) and Bandyopadhayay (2000) both for the Indian regions. 
Amongst Latin American examples worth mentioning are those by Esquivel (1999) for 
Mexico, Cardenas and Ponton (1993) for Colombia, Caceres and Sandoval (1999) and 
Dobson and Ramlogan (2002).
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Esquivel (1999) studies the convergence between the Mexican regions and states for the 
period 1940-1995. There is evidence of absolute convergence among Mexican states for 
the period 1940-1995. However, when performing sigma analysis his findings reveal that 
there have been two different trends; first a reduction in the dispersion of the per capita 
GDP between 1940 and 1960 and in the period that followed, convergence stopped and 
remained mostly unchanged. Unfortunately, he does not perform p-convergence for the 
different sub-periods. In the case of regions instead of states, he finds again evidence of 
absolute convergence for the period, and sigma is quite similar except for the fact that 
there is an increase in regional disparities for the fifties, which was reversed in the 
seventies, remaining relatively constant until 1995. Esquivel then included education 
levels (percentage of population over 15 with post-primary education) and concluded that 
the reason for non-convergence in the sub-period 1960-1995 might be found in the 
growing divergence o f human capital formation across Mexican regions and states. He 
also concluded that the low sensitivity of migration to income differentials could be 
another factor that slowed convergence.
Cardenas and Ponton (1995) analyse Colombia for the period 1950-1989, finding 
absolute convergence for the 22 departments. They also calculate the ratio between the 
highest - and lowest - income departments, and find that this fell consistently from 10 in 
1950 to 3.1 in 1989. However, they also discover that when dividing into sub-periods 
there is a lot of mobility, and departamental growth is an unstable process. The decade of 
the sixties is characterised by a stronger convergence than during the fifties, whereas the 
seventies are characterised by a very low convergence. The estimated rate o f convergence 
for the whole period is 4.2 per cent. They also use regional dummies and find that this 
inclusion increases all the coefficients except in the eighties. They have also tested for 
the effects of migration on growth and found a positive but small effect. Cardenas and 
Ponton (1995) include variables for human capital and find that the only significant one is 
illiteracy rates; the others (years of schooling and school enrolment) are not equally 
robust. They conclude that Colombia is a success story in terms of regional convergence 
with a speed of convergence twice as much as that for developed countries. There is also
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evidence of o-convergence, although this is highly irregular, exhibiting upward jumps in 
the mid-sixties, early seventies and again in the second half of the eighties.
Caceres and Sandoval (1999) study the convergence of 17 Latin American countries for 
the period 1950-90. They find no conclusive evidence of absolute p-convergence. 
However, when looking at the a-convergence, they find that the standard deviation has 
increased from 1953 until 1957 and then a decrease until 1978. In 1990 the value of 
dispersion was that of the beginning of the fifties but less than the peak o f 1957. When 
analysing sub-regions the results become clearer. In particular, for the Andean countries 
there has been convergence from 1957 until 1987, when it increases, but the final value is 
still lower than that of the initial year. This is attributed to the high growth of Colombia 
in the sixties and seventies, of Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia in the seventies, and of the low 
growth rates o f Venezuela (the country with the highest per capita income at the 
beginning of the period) in the seventies and eighties.
In the case of the Central American countries, Caceres and Sandoval (1999) find a 
noticeable increase in dispersion. This is due to the high growth rates of the country with 
highest per capita income, Costa Rica, and the collapse of the economies of El Salvador 
and Nicaragua in the eighties. When considering the case of the four countries that 
constitute MERCOSUR, they point out that there was a strong decreasing trend from 1952 
to 1982, which halved the dispersion value. This was due to the high growth of Brazil and 
of Paraguay in the sixties and seventies, while Argentina and Uruguay exhibited low 
growth rates. They then conclude that the decreasing dispersion found for all 17 Latin 
American countries reflect that of the Andean and MERCOSUR region while say nothing 
about what was happening in Central America.
Dobson and Ramlogan (2002) find evidence of absolute p-convergence between 1960- 
1990 in Latin America, but they also point out that stronger convergence as well as 
divergence may be present during shorter time periods. In particular, p-convergence was 
highest in the seventies and mid-eighties. This convergence then disappeared in the late
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eighties due to the economic crisis and did not occur again in the nineties despite 
moderate growth.
In the case of European countries, I will here note only the study by Persson (1997) since 
Sweden joined the European Union in 1993 and so will not be considered later. He 
analyses convergence among the twenty-four Swedish counties from 1911 to 1993. His 
findings reveal stronger and more robust evidence of convergence in per capita income 
than for cross-country studies. The o-convergence also shows a steady decline throughout 
the period with only two stagnating periods, 1920-1940 and from 1980 onwards. As in 
the case of Mexico (Esquivel, 1999), Persson does not perform beta analysis for the 
different sub-periods.
Convergence studies have been carried out for other areas of the world, and some should 
be mentioned from the perspective of comparing Brazil and Argentina with other less 
developed countries. For the case of India, Nagaraj et al (2000) study inter-state 
disparities in the period 1970-1994. They find evidence of conditional convergence 
across regions, once allowing for the impact of literacy (particularly strong), primary 
education, health conditions, roads, irrigation, power capacities and financial 
development. When considering the share of agriculture in regional GDP, a significant 
coefficient was found and the predominantly agricultural states had a lower level of 
steady-state per capita income. However, when performing o-convergence they found 
evidence o f growing disparities as measured by the standard deviation. Although it 
decreased slightly at the beginning of the sixties, it increased sharply in the seventies and 
although less markedly, it persisted throughout the period. Bandyopadhyay (2000) has 
also studied the Indian regions in the period 1965-1988 and found a decline in disparities 
in the sixties, an increase in the seventies and eighties and a clear emergence of two 
convergence clubs. One of these clubs is located at around 130 per cent of national 
average, while the other at 50 per cent. Nevertheless, he finds a weakening of the 
polarisation trend in income distribution.
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Jian, Sachs and Werner (1996) very interesting paper on regional disparities in China, 
performs both sigma and beta for the sub-periods. They analyse convergence among 
Chinese provinces for the period 1952-1993, finding that convergence has been a 
relatively recent phenomenon, in particular after the reforms in 1978. During the initial 
central planning phase, until 1965, only weak convergence is observed. In the period of 
the Cultural Revolution (1965-1978), there is strong divergence among the Chinese 
provinces. By contrast, after 1978, there is evidence o f convergence; in particular 
associated with rural reforms and coastal areas, the latter associated with the trade 
liberalisation and investment flows. Finally, since 1990, regional incomes seem to have 
been diverging, and Jian and Sachs explain this by the existing gap between the coastal 
and interior provinces rather than a general increase in disparities. It seems that after 
1990 the emergence of a two-speed China can be observed, with fast-growing coastal 
areas and interior regions lagging behind.
Zhao and Tong (2000) also blame the “coastal development strategy” for worsening 
disparities by switching national development priorities from the interior to the coastal 
regions. When looking at the a-convergence analysis, Jian et al show a slight decrease 
until 1957, followed by a clear increase and a subsequent decrease until 1965, a sharp 
increase until 1970 and a further jump until 1978 (the highest indicator of the period). 
Thereafter, a steady decline is seen until the beginning of the nineties, when after 
reaching the lowest deviation of the period starts to increase again. In terms of the beta 
analysis, when dividing into sub-periods, it can be seen that a small though statistically 
insignificant convergence for 1952-65 is found, followed by a positive and significant 
value of beta (divergence) and during the reform period after 1978 evidence of p- 
convergence. Jian et al therefore conclude that regional convergence in China is strongly 
associated with the degree o f openness in the economy. The authors, however, did not 
test formally for the link between the sub-period characterised by divergence 
corresponding to that of the Cultural Revolution, a period of great instability in China and 
the absence of the rule o f law as mentioned in the previous chapter.
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The recent empirical research on political and macroeconomic variables affecting growth, 
though still at an exploratory stage, may be summarised in the following terms. Barro 
(1991) has included variables that account for political instability in his study of 98 
countries for the period 1960- 1985. In particular, when taking into account the number 
of coups per year and a variable that accounts for the number of political assassinations 
per million of inhabitants per year, his findings reveal that these had a significant impact 
on growth. He also includes a proxy for price distortions and finds it to be negatively 
linked to growth. In Barro (1998) other variables apart from the democracy index have 
been included, such as the rule of law and the inflation rate. All these variables showed 
the expected signs in relation to their impact on economic growth. He includes a 
‘dummy’ variable in order to capture any effects when considering Latin American 
countries into the analysis. This dummy variable was negative and significant with 
respect to growth for the whole period and significantly positive for a variable that 
accounts for the number of children per woman that will live beyond the age of four. 
Regarding investment ratios, the estimates are negative but not significant. However, 
Barro concludes that this analysis leaves unexplained a good deal of the weak growth 
performance o f Latin America. The Latin America dummy is again included in Barro 
(1998) for the period 1960-1990. In this analysis, however, he finds that the variable is 
individually insignificant, and the slow growth of the region can be mostly attributed to 
the explanatory variables. By including the inflation rate, the Latin American variable 
becomes insignificant. Besides, if  the fertility rate or government consumption ratio is 
omitted, the Latin American variable becomes significant.
Knack and Keefer (1995) consider that both political violence and political and civil 
liberties are insufficient proxies for the quality of institutions and that more direct 
indicators should also be included. They consider variables such as expropriation risk, 
rule of law, of contracts by governments, corruption, the quality o f bureaucracy, contract 
enforceability and infrastructure quality. They find that there is an increase in both the 
magnitude of the repudiation and statistical significance of the convergence coefficients 
when institutional variables are included in the equations. These coefficients were lower 
once investment was included in the equations, since this effect was captured by the
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coefficient of investment itself, signalling the expected relations between higher 
instability as a deterrent of investment.
Kormendi and Meguire (1985) also carry out an “exploratory empirical study” in their 
sample of 47 countries in the period 1950-77. They use the Gastil index of civil liberty, 
where 1 means most free and 7 least free. A negative, though marginally significant, 
effect o f civil liberty on economic growth is found. However, the impact of civil liberties 
on investment was highly significant. They follow the hypothesis that the variability of 
monetary shocks adversely affects growth and they find strong support for this 
hypothesis. They estimate that an increase of 10 per cent in the standard deviation of 
money supply shocks is associated with almost 3 per cent lower economic growth. For a 
country like Chile, they estimate that the apparent cost o f monetary variation in terms of 
lost economic growth is on the order of 4.9 per cent. In the case of Uruguay, the country 
with slowest growth in the sample, this could be explained mainly by the mean growth of 
the rate of inflation, the standard deviation of the money supply and the level of initial 
per capita output. There is a negative coefficient when including inflation in the equation 
to be estimated contrary to the Tobin-Mundell hypothesis that states that there will be a 
shift away from real money balances towards real capital as a consequence of expected 
inflation. Hence, the higher the anticipated inflation growth, the larger the shift towards 
capital and therefore higher economic growth.
Finally, Scully (1988) tests 115 market economies over the period 1960-1980 in which 
GDP per capita and a measure of economic efficiency are compared to measures of 
political, civil and economic liberty. His results show that the choice of institutional 
framework had a significant impact on the efficiency and growth of the economies. In 
particular, politically open societies grow more than those in which freedoms are limited. 
Unfortunately he does not report conclusions for any particular country or region.
The European Union will be analysed in more detail in the following chapter, but 
mention should be made here of studies specifically on the impact of political systems on 
disparities for both Greece and Spain. Petrakos and Tsoukalas (1999) included the recent
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theoretical literature in their model and found that increases in spatial concentration in 
Greece have been associated with the country’s deviation from democratic politics. 
Tavera (1999) mentions that the poor growth of the Spanish economy between 1970- 
1975 can be associated with the political instability in the country in that period.
Rodrik (1998) argues that the decrease in growth rates in Latin America after 1980 is 
proportional to the magnitude o f both the external shocks as well as to the institutional 
ability to deal with conflicts. Unfortunately, this new literature on growth has not yet 
been tested empirically for Latin American countries and these observations are 
descriptive rather than analytical.
5. Conclusions
In this chapter, the main methodology used for analysing disparities and testing for 
convergence has been reviewed, from the simplest measures of dispersion to absolute and 
conditional P-convergence analyses. The latter are the two most widely used methods for 
analysing convergence, despite some controversy as to which theoretical model each one 
validates as well as the two per cent convergence growth rate. The criterion in this thesis 
follows Bernard and Jones (1996) in that the debate should be focused somewhere else. 
This thesis is not a theoretical discussion and it is therefore not aiming to validate any 
growth model in particular; but simply to determine whether convergence is automatic, to 
show the evolution of disparities and to study what variables affect the process of 
convergence as will be studied in Part II of this thesis.
Simple measures of disparities, such as percentages of national averages, rankings and o- 
convergence are useful in order to draw some simple descriptive observations. They can 
be used as a first approximation as well as to complement more specific analyses. It has 
been also seen in this chapter that the results of the P-convergence analysis can vary 
throughout the different sub-periods under study. Most authors work on the longer 
periods and do not analyse short-term variations in the evolution of disparities. With 
results varying according to the period under consideration, this seems to be an important
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point to be taken into account for further research. Also, variables such as education, 
regional share o f agriculture and industry are particularly relevant for the case of less 
developed countries and should also be included in the analysis. Moreover, accounting 
for macroeconomic factors, political violence and political and civil liberties also seems 
to be a significant addition for analysing the factors that may hinder convergence, 
particularly in less developed countries. The approach followed here is to try and use 
different methods, since each has its advantages - as well as disadvantages -  and allows 
gaining a different perspective. Diverse and useful results can be reached by applying 
each o f them, without getting into an a priori debate about their theoretical usefulness.
The following chapter o f this thesis will focus on the European Union, which is the case 
study chosen in order to provide a better insight not only in terms of disparities within a 
particular country but also in order to draw conclusions for integration schemes. This will 
be relevant for the analysis of the second part of this thesis, and in particular for 
Argentina and Brazil in terms of future integration if MERCOSUR is deepened and for a 
possible FTAA (Free Trade Area of the Americas).
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4Integration and Disparities: The European Union Experience
1. Objectives
The main objective o f this chapter is to study regional economic disparities in the EU 
since the late fifties, focusing on whether the removal of trade barriers across European 
countries has contributed to a decrease in disparities not only between but also within 
countries. The structure of the chapter is as follows. First, a brief history of the process of 
deepening in the EU since 1957 to present times is undertaken, emphasising the process 
o f institution building regarding regional disparities. Then, Section 3 empirically analyses 
the development of disparities for the whole period, stressing the growing importance of 
regional concern in the EU. Lastly, in Section 4, the effects of particular regional policies 
that have been implemented in the EU will be reviewed, in order to determine not only 
whether these have been successful but also to identify policies that could have been 
working against income redistribution.
In order to study the development of disparities in Section 3, both sigma and beta 
analyses have been performed with data from Eurostat. Although in the case of the 
European Union both the political and economic conditions are not as relevant as will be 
in the cases of Argentina and Brazil; links to these two topics will be made when 
relevant.
2. The European Integration Experience
The European integration process provides a unique framework of analysis in that it 
constitutes the most successful and important economic area in the world. The EU 
produces 20.2 per cent of total world GDP and comprises 6.4 per cent of total world
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population (Eurostat, Statistics in Focus, 1999). The EU-15 is the largest exporter in the 
world, with a share of 20.3 per cent of world trade, while it is the second largest importer, 
after the United States, with a share of 19.1 per cent of world imports (WTO). Besides, it 
has undergone several distinct stages in its fifty years of existence that provide a unique 
insight into regional issues.
The growing concern for regional policies can also be seen from the percentage of the EU 
budget allocated to structural policies. While in 1985 the amount accounted for 3.7 
billion ECXJ (European Currency Unit), this had increased to 18.3 billion by 1992 (House 
o f Lords, 1996/1997). This amount reached 36 billion ECU in 1999, and in Agenda 2000 
it was agreed to be maintained at this level, which accounts for 0.46 per cent of the 
Union’s GDP for the programming period 2000-2006 (Commission of the European 
Communities- CEC, 1997b). A brief outline of the process of institution building from 
the regional perspective is given below.
2.1. The European Coal and Steel Community
The origins of the European Union can be traced to the aftermath of the Second World 
War. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was established by the Treaty of 
Paris in 1951 with the purpose of creating a free market for those products. Although this 
was expected to generate benefits, it was also recognised that such an initiative would 
imply structural changes, such as loss or interruption of employment. Re-adaptation 
assistance was designed to deal mainly with structural but not cyclical unemployment. 
Provisions were taken during a five-year transitional period. In order to assist workers, an 
innovative supranational agency, the High Authority, was created (Robertson, 1962).
The High Authority had the right to raise levies on coal and steel production within the 
Community and the government of each member state would make an equal contribution 
to the costs of re-adaptation (Tsoukalis, 1991). However, only a few workers affected by 
the re-conversion were reallocated, and the objective of re-employment of displaced 
labour was only partially achieved (Romus, 1979). During the first years of the ECSC, re­
adaptation aid was mainly characterised by the reluctance and inhibitions of national
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governments to apply for it, due to internal political tensions. Besides, there was strong 
social resistance of workers to migrate from one region to another. On the side of the 
High Authority, criticisms were mainly directed to delays and lack of information 
regarding aid schemes (Robertson, 1962).
The ECSC was subsequently incorporated in the Treaty o f Rome, and today it is 
concerned with making loans to coal, iron and steel and associated industries for 
investment purposes. It also provides conversion loans to other industries in order to 
create jobs and absorb redundant coal and steel workers as well as providing grants for 
retraining and resettling those workers (Armstrong and Taylor, 1993).
2.2. Treaty of Rome and the Creation of the European Economic 
Community
The Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957, creating the European Economic Community 
(EEC). The original members - referred to as the EEC-6 - included the Benelux countries 
(Belgium, Luxembourg and Holland), West-Germany, France and Italy. The countries of 
the EEC-6 had similar levels of development, the extreme cases being Luxembourg, 
which was 40 per cent above the average EEC-6 income level and Italy, which was 18 per 
cent below this average. However, the case of Italy was due less to a generalised 
underdevelopment problem than to her regional problem in the Mezzogiomo region in 
the south, as will be discussed in the following section (Kennedy, 1994).
One of the objectives of the European Economic Union was achieving a ‘harmonious 
development by reducing the differences existing between the various regions and the 
backwardness o f the less favoured regions’ (Preamble, Treaty of Rome). In Article 2 of 
the Treaty of Rome, the need for more equilibrium between regions is again referred to. 
However, Article 92 states that any aid granted which might distort or threaten 
competition is incompatible with the common market. Consequently, there are no 
mechanisms for regional policy outlined in the original Treaty. Regional economic policy 
is otherwise treated as exceptional, as in Article 80.2 where regional considerations are
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made as an exception to achieve convergence in transport policy (Lopes Porto, 1997; 
Treaty o f Rome).
This apparent contradiction in the Treaty corresponds to the widespread belief at that 
time that the creation of a single market would lead to the alignment of incomes per 
capita and would promote economic growth (Sutherland, 1986). That view is in line with 
classical economics, as seen in previous chapters, whereby differences would be levelled 
out through automatic mechanisms operating in the economy. Moreover, as the existent 
disparities in the EEC-6 were predominantly within rather than between countries, 
Community regional policy was slow to develop and therefore responsibility for 
conducting regional policies was mainly left to national authorities (Tsoukalis, 1991).
Nevertheless, few institutions were created and some Community policies, which offered 
specific financial help in different areas, were implemented. These included support for 
agriculture - through the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP), the labour market - the 
European Social Fund (ESF) - and assistance for depressed areas - the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) (Glockler et. al., 1998). The Common Agricultural Policy was 
outlined in the Treaty o f Rome, Article 3 of which states that the Community will include 
‘a common policy in the sphere of agriculture and fisheries’. This is reinforced by Article 
38 that extends the common market to agricultural products and provides for the creation 
of a common agricultural policy among the Member States. The objectives were to 
increase agricultural productivity, to ensure a fair standard o f living for the agricultural 
population, to stabilise markets, assure availability of supplies and ensure reasonable 
consumer prices (Article 39). It also provided for the creation of agricultural guidance 
and guarantee financial instruments (Article 40:4, Treaty of Rome). The main objectives 
were to promote agriculture and to guarantee the income of agriculture population.
The European Social Fund, established in Articles 123-125 of the Treaty of Rome as an 
agency o f the Commission, was intended to overcome structural unemployment by 
encouraging geographical and occupational mobility to those workers affected by re­
conversion schemes. Initially, the ESF paid 50 per cent of the costs of re-employing
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workers by retraining and resettlement and also granted aid to workers during the re­
conversion period. However, there was no explicit reference to regional problems. 
Nowadays, the ESF is the second largest structural fund, and since the 1988 reform 
focuses more on regional problems in depressed regions and youth employment (Treaty 
of Rome; Armstrong and Taylor, 1993).
The European Investment Bank, established in former Articles 129 and 130 (now Articles 
198d and 198e) as an independent institution, was given the task of granting loans and 
giving guarantees in order to help financing projects in less favoured regions. The EIB 
was the only mechanism in the original Treaty of Rome directly linked with promoting 
regional development within the Community (Sutherland, 1986; Treaty of Rome). Over 
the years, the EIB has become a more significant contributor to regional policy, and since 
1979 loans have been made available through the New Community Instrument. The latter 
was established in order to speed up the integration of poorer member states and includes 
specific loans to small and medium sized enterprises (Armstrong and Taylor, 1993).
In 1965, the First Report on Regional Policy was issued, and in 1967 the Commission 
submitted a proposal for Community action regarding regional development and a 
communication on EC regional policy. As a result, the Directorate General for Regional 
Policies (DG-XVI) was created in 1968, nowadays the Regional Policy Directorate- 
General.
2.3. Regional Policy Reconsidered: the Creation of the European Regional 
Development Fund
The EEC-6 became the EEC-9 with the enlargement towards the United Kingdom, Ireland 
and Denmark in 1973. At this stage, income levels became more heterogeneous. 
Although the UK and Denmark had income levels close to those of the Community 
average, Ireland’s was three-fifths of that average (Kennedy, 1994). The real income 
level of Luxembourg, the richest nation, more than doubled that of Ireland, the poorest 
(Sutherland, 1986).
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‘Enlargements have proved to be the catalyst for movement towards developing policies 
directly aimed at reducing differences between regions’ and thus this first enlargement 
resulted in ‘a new dynamism in the search for regional policy instruments’ (Sutherland, 
1986: 373). However, enlargement was not the only reason for a growing concern about 
regional disparities. From the beginning of the European integration process until the 
seventies, member countries were experiencing rapid economic growth, high 
employment rates and relative monetary stability. However, in the seventies, growth 
stagnated, the fixed exchange rate system was dropped and the first oil crisis took place 
(Tsoukalis, 1991). Thus, both enlargement and the economic slowdown led to regional 
policy to be reconsidered. This will be further examined in the following section.
In 1973, the Thompson Report on the regional problems of an enlarged Community 
reaffirmed that the long-term prospect of a monetary union would not be possible unless 
an effective regional policy was implemented (MacDonald and Dearden, 1994). The 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) was established in 1975, and a Regional 
Policy Committee was created in order to monitor, access and advise on the development 
o f regions. Another reason for the creation of the European Regional Development Fund 
was to compensate Britain financially for the negligible benefit that it derived from the 
Common Agricultural Policy (Glockler, G. et al, 1998). Together with the creation of the 
ERDF, a more accurate definition of a region, criteria for eligibility and characteristics of 
the policies were outlined. The ERDF was later modified in 1979 and 1984 but the most 
important reform was not attained until 1988.
2.4. The Single European Act and the Creation of the Single Market
The second and third enlargements that included Greece (1981) and later Spain and 
Portugal (1986) situated the EEC at a ‘turning point in the development of policies to 
promote convergence’ (Sutherland, 1986:377). The enlargements resulted not only in an 
increase in heterogeneity within the Community but also posed a major challenge for the 
CAP. The three new members increased the Community’s population by 22 per cent and 
surface by 48 per cent but only added 15 per cent to GDP (See Table in Appendix I.f). 
Besides, these countries were characterised by their high proportion of labour force
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engaged in agriculture, representing 36 per cent in Greece, 28 per cent in Portugal and 22 
per cent in Spain, while the average of the EEC was 8 per cent. The enlargements resulted 
in a 50 per cent increase in the Community’s agricultural population (Romus, 1979).
The approval of the Single European Act (1986) and the objective of creating the Internal 
Market for 1992 signaled the most challenging task yet faced by the EC, generating 
expectations on two fronts. On the one hand, an increase in economic growth in the 
Community was predicted, providing the opportunity for less advanced regions to catch 
up with the rest. On the other hand, it was recognised that the increase in competition 
resulting from the single market could undermine the competitiveness of less favoured 
regions and thus lead to a widening of disparities in Europe. The latter argument 
resembles that of the dependency school in Latin America in the way in which poorer 
countries insert into international trade, and even within the EU the impact of the SEA 
was recognised not to be uniform for all regions. The White Paper, presented in 1985, 
admitted there would be risks given that labour and capital would be able to move freely 
to areas of greatest economic advantage. It was recognised that the discrepancies between 
the regions could be exacerbated as a result of the creation of the Single Market, and this 
in turn would jeopardise convergence (Begg, 1989).
As a consequence, the Commission launched a programme of research - ‘The cost of 
non-Europe’ - in order to assess the spatial distribution of benefits of the completion of 
the internal market and adjustment costs and several vulnerable sectors were identified. 
These included sectors with high non-tariff barriers that would need to operate at a larger 
scale; those with high non-tariff barriers, low import penetration and price dispersion 
where rationalisation and restructuring was expected; and sectors subject to greater 
import penetration but where economies of scale were still possible (Hart and Roberts,
1994).
As a result o f acknowledging the potential risks for less advanced regions, the Single 
European Act consolidated the aspiration vaguely mentioned in the Treaty of Rome by 
devoting a whole section to economic and social cohesion. The First Periodic Report on
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the Development of the Regions was published in 1981, the Second in 1984 and the Third 
in 1987. In 1988, the reform of the Structural Funds was carried out and regional policy 
was included in the Treaty. On 1 January 1989, the reforms became effective and the 
criteria for eligibility was divided into five objectives.
2.5. The Treaty on the European Union and the Importance of Cohesion
In 1991 the Treaty of Maastricht -  or Treaty on the European Union - introduced 
cohesion as one of the ‘pillars’ of the new European Union. This was accomplished by 
strengthening the articles relating to it, annexing a specific protocol and by the creation of 
the Cohesion Fund, which constituted the major innovation (Hall, 1994). Despite the 
Structural Funds being the main community instrument for regional policy, the Cohesion 
Fund is a highly significant instrument of regional policy in the Union. It constitutes the 
first attempt to establish a budget-transfer mechanism related to economic performance 
and it is directed towards member states rather than regions (Cristophersen, 1994). 
Member states whose per capita GDP is less than 90 per cent o f community average are 
eligible and the Fund’s main objective is to ‘provide a financial contribution to projects in 
the fields of environment and trans-European networks in the area of transport 
infrastructure’ (Treaty o f Maastricht, Article 130d).
In addition, the Treaty on the European Union created the Committee of the Regions 
(CoR) (Articles 198a-198c). CoR is an advisory body with 222 representatives among 
local and regional authorities, who are chosen by the Member States, and it is intended to 
comply with the subsidiarity principle, i.e. that decisions should be taken at the level that 
can act most effectively for the issue concerned. This is a major step from the first days 
of the Community where the decisions were to be taken only at the national level. The 
Committee of the Regions is responsible for providing the regional and local insight to 
the institutions and keeping their citizens informed of community policies. The CoR acts 
on five areas: economic and social cohesion; trans-European networks; public health; 
education and youth; and culture. In 1997, the Amsterdam Treaty expanded the areas of 
interest to employment and environment among others. Article 130b establishes that the 
Commission will submit a report to the Parliament, the Council, the ESC and the CoR
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every three years on economic and social cohesion progress (Treaty of Maastricht; 
Glockler, G. et al, 1998).
2.5. Agenda 2000: the Prospects of Further Enlargement and the Challenge 
for Regional Policies
Following the fall o f the Berlin Wall in 1989, the European Community re-established 
diplomatic relations with the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) and after 
the collapse o f the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) trade was directed 
westwards, primarily to the EC. The transition process initiated a different period in 
European-CEEC relationships by removing quotas on several products, instituting 
Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), and reaching various Trade and Co-operation 
agreements as well as Co-operation Agreements with CEECs (Jovanovic, 1998).
The Phare Programme, created in 1989, initially including Hungary and Poland, was later 
extended to most o f the transition countries. It was intended to provide subsequent 
financial support in the process o f reforming the economies, improving market access, 
promoting investment, transferring know-how, adjusting the farm sector, food aid, 
environment protection and vocational training. At a later stage, this will also include the 
adoption and application of the acquis communautaire, which comprises the whole of 
primary and secondary instruments which makes the EU and to which each Member State 
is bound (Jovanovid, 1998).
During the 1990s Europe (or Association) Agreements were signed to provide the legal 
basis for bilateral relations between the EECs and the EU. These agreements offer the 
possibility of full membership in the future. In 1993, the deepening of enlargement was 
agreed at the Copenhagen European Council. The Copenhagen Criteria defined the 
economic and political conditions that the applicant countries are required to satisfy in 
order to be able to join the Union: a market economy, democratic political system and the 
acceptance of the full acquis communautaire. A fourth implicit requirement is that entry 
should neither jeopardise the EU’s financial resources or enlargement endanger the 
deepening of the integration process (Jovanovic, 1998).
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In 1997, the Commission presented Agenda 2000 in which future developments of the EU 
including enlargement, its impact and the financial framework beyond 2000 were 
addressed. The EU institutional reform would allow for the accession of the first countries 
that fulfil the criteria. In 1998, the EU launched the process to make enlargement 
possible. There were thirteen applicant countries: Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia and Turkey.
This enlargement (not considering the special cases of Cyprus and Turkey) constituted 
the major challenge for the EU so far. The eleven CEECs represented an increase in 
surface of 34 per cent, in population of 29 per cent - more than a hundred million people, 
but they only imply an increase in total GDP of 9 per cent (See Table in Appendix I.f). 
The most striking feature is that enlargement will imply a reduction in the average per 
capita GDP the Community as a whole, of larger proportions than for other enlargements 
before. The overall per capita GDP of the eleven CEECs is estimated at 38 per cent of the 
Community average- while that of the four less favoured Member countries of the EU15 
is at 74 per cent of Community average (See Figures in Appendix I.e).
Despite the potential economic benefits that enlargement will bring, the Commission 
recognised that these would not be immediate or evenly spread, and so an adjustment 
period will take place in order to deflate to economic, social and political tensions. 
Several problematic areas have been identified: the low per capita incomes of the 
applicant countries; the heavy bias towards agriculture in most of them; inadequate 
infrastructure and networks; weak administrative capacity and high unemployment (the 
latter present in both applicant and member countries).
There are several benefits for Eastern European economies from joining the EU; 
membership will provide access to the Structural Funds and 
to other EU funds. However, the austerity measures required by EMU pose a question as 
to where will the funds come from. Further, the loss of jobs and business in industries and
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agriculture due to eastern exports will put pressure on policy makers (Jovanovic, 1998). 
Agenda 2000 also addressed the issue of the Structural Funds and proposed modifications 
aiming at improving effectiveness by increasing concentration, simplification and 
decentralisation of its management.
3. Development of Disparities
3.1. Methodology
In this section, I empirically analyse the evolution of disparities between and within 
countries of the EU, based on GDP data from Eurostat reports (1972, 1981, 1988, 1993, 
1998). The period o f study comprises the period 1960-1995 since this was the last year 
for which data was available at the time of the writing of this chapter and it will suffice 
for the case study of an integrated area over a long period o f time. It should be noted, 
however, that this analysis will not be as in depth as that for Argentina and Brazil. The 
period of study 1960-1995 will be divided into three sub-periods, following the 
institutional developments in the EU. Each sub-period (1960^-1973; 1973-1988 and 1988-
1995) will include the countries that belonged to the EU at that time (namely the EEC-6, 
EEC-9 and EEC-12) with the exception of Greece, which despite having joined in 1981, is 
only considered in the third sub-period. The data used is the NUTS 1 (Statistical 
Nomenclature for Territorial Units); which is used to determine the distribution of 
structural funds and for statistical data. NUTS 1 corresponds to a higher aggregational 
level while NUTS 2 has more detailed information on smaller regions. Both the French 
Departements d ’Outre Mer as well as the Netherlands Antilles have not been considered 
given the irregularity of the series and also because they do not belong to the EU 
geographically. Moreover, the five German lander that were included in the territory 
after unification will not be considered. Finally, Austria, Sweden and Finland have been 
excluded from this analysis given that they joined the EU at a later stage.
In the case of countries with no regions at NUTS 1 (Luxembourg, Ireland and Denmark) 
these countries have been omitted for regional analyses and only considered when 
analysing disparities between countries. There were some gaps in the data, such as
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Hamburg (1972-1975), France (1970), Netherlands (1967-1970 and 1972), Belgium 
(1969), Denmark (1985) and Greece (1989-1991). In those cases, intrapolation was used 
in order to fill in the gaps since they did not extend for long periods. In other cases, such 
as for the period 1960-1970, where GDP was in local currencies instead of in million 
ECU, data from different series had to be merged using exchange rates, ratios and 
logarithms when necessary. For other periods, although the data was in million ECU, 
merging different series was also done in order to apply sigma and beta analyses. In the 
case of Portugal, even though Continente, Madeira and A9ores are defined as NUTS 1, 
there is no regular data for the last two prior 1995 and therefore only Continente will be 
considered. The data used in this analysis is in Appendix Lb.
For the first sub-period (1960-1970), the countries and regions considered are as follows. 
Germany (11 regions): Schleswig-Holstein; Hamburg; Niedersachsen; Bremen; 
Nordrehein-Westfalen; Hessen; Rheinland-Pfalz; Baden-Wurttemberg; Bayem; Saarland 
and Berlin (West). France (8 regions'): Ile-de-France; Bassin Parisien; Nord-Pas-de- 
Calais; Est; Ouest; Sud-Ouest; Centre-Est; Mediterranee. Italy (11 regions): Nord-Ovest; 
Lombardia; Nord-Est; Emilia-Romagna; Centro; Lazio; Campania; Abruzzi-Molise; Sud; 
Sicilia; Sardegna. Netherlands (4 regions): Noord-Nederland; Oost-Nederland; West- 
Nederland; Zuid-Nederland. Belgium (3 regions): Vlaams Gewest (Region Flamande); 
Region Wallonne (Waals Gewest); Region Bruxelloise (Brussels Gewest). Luxembourg 
(1 region)
In the case o f the sub-period 1973-1988, the above-mentioned countries were included 
plus the following. United Kingdom (11 regions): North; Yorkshire and Humberside; 
East Midlands; East Anglia; South-East; South-West; West Midlands; North-West; 
Wales; Scotland; Northern Ireland. Ireland (1 region). Denmark (1 region).
Finally, from 1988-1995, the new member countries and their respective NUTS 1 regions 
are: Spain (7 regions): Noroeste, Noreste, Madrid, Centro, Este, Sur, Canarias. Greece (4 
regions!: Voreia Ellada; Kentriki Ellada; Attiki, Nisia Aigaiou and Kriti. Portugal O 
region!: Continente
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3.2. From the Treaty of Rome to the First Enlargement (1958-1973)
The main argument regarding disparities in the literature that covers this period is that 
while there was convergence between the six member countries, disparities among 
regions remained mostly unchanged. According to Tsoukalis (1981), there was a marked 
convergence between the original six members o f the Community. Sutherland (1986) 
agrees that over the period 1960-73 there was convergence o f income levels, but he also 
points out that the increase in free trade and growth was not only attributable to the EEC, 
but also coincided with a period characterised by high growth rates in Europe. This 
would seem to indicate that, at least in this sub-period, disparities between countries were 
counter-cyclical (i.e. decreasing when macroeconomic conditions are favourable).
I have depicted each country’s percentage of average EEC-6 GDP in Figure 1.4, where the 
evolution of GDP per capita for the six member countries can be seen. It is clear that 
except from Luxembourg and Italy, there were no major differences in income levels in 
Europe at the beginning of the period. In fact, Italy, the lowest per capita income country 
in the EEC-6, had 72 per cent of Community average. Luxembourg, on the other hand, 
was 40 per cent above the EEC-6 average GDP per capita in 1958. The rest of the 
countries had a GDP per capita between 8 per cent below- Belgium- and 2 per cent above- 
Germany- o f Community average.
At the end of the period, all countries except Luxembourg had increased their percentages 
of EU average GDP. This increase was less than 1 per cent in the case of Germany and 3, 
4 and 7 per cent for Belgium, the Netherlands and France respectively. The country that 
had the largest increase in GDP per capita in this period was Italy, which reached almost 
81 per cent of Community average GDP by 1973. Luxembourg was the only country in 
the EEC-6 to have a lower percentage o f average GDP in 1973 (17 per cent above EEC-6 
average) than at the beginning of the period.
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Figure 4.1. GDP per Capita as Percentage of EEC-6 Average
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Therefore, disparities between countries seem to have been reduced in this period. When 
performing sigma analysis for the period, it can be seen in Figure 4.2 that the dispersion 
of income between countries almost halved, decreasing until 1971 and increasing later in 
1972 and 1973.
Additionally, I have performed absolute P-convergence. As it can be seen in Table 4.1, 
there is absolute p-convergence between the six European countries belonging to the 
EEC-6 between 1960 and 1973, with a negative and highly significant coefficient on 
initial income and a high R- squared. Full readout for Tables 4.1 to 4.4 are found on the 
Econometric Appendix V (pages 327 onwards).
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Figure 4.2. Sigma Convergence between the EEC-6 Countries
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Table 4.1. Absolute Beta Convergence in the EEC-6 Countries 1960-1973
1973-1960 Countries
Coefficient Std.Error t-statistic
Constant 1.12 0.06 19.10
In (1973) -0.45 0.14 -3.33
R-squared 0.73
1973-1960 Regions
Coefficient Std.Error t-statistic
Constant 0.85 0.090 9.54
In (1973) -0.10 0.04 -2.84
R-squared 0.18
Source: own calculations
At the regional level, however, disparities were not reduced as much as between 
countries. Romus (1979) attributes this to the lack of Community regional policy and 
insufficient number of purely regional projects. The Thompson Report for the period 
1959-70 recognised that economic activity in the community did not develop evenly and 
the gaps between regions did not show any noticeable changes (Robson, 1987). Kiljunen 
(1980: 206) shows that on the whole, the share of the developed and less developed 
regions of each country’s total GDP remained roughly the same throughout the period 
1957-75 (Table 4.2).
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Table 4.2. Share of Developed and Less-Developed Regions in each EEC-6 Country
1957 1975
West Germany 100 100
Dr 74 74
Ldr 26 26
France 100 100
Dr (a) 68 71
Ldr 32 29
Italy 100 100
Dr 77 76
Ldr 23 24
Netherlands 100 100
Dr (b) 90 89
Ldr 10 11
Belgium 100 100
Dr 69 73
Ldr 31 27
Luxembourg 100 100
dr: developed regions 
ldr: less developed regions 
(a) 1962; (b) 1960
I have performed a sigma analysis for the regions and it can be seen that over the period, 
disparities have decreased and in fact follow a similar pattern as that of the sigma 
analysis between countries. However, while the reduction in the sigma indicator for the 
countries represents a 50 per cent decrease; this amounts to only 10 per cent for the 
regions. When doing an absolute beta analysis, the existence of weak convergence is 
revealed (see Figure 4.3 and Table 4.1) with a significant though smaller coefficient on 
initial GDP and lower R-squared than for the countries.
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Figure 4.3. Sigma Convergence between the EEC-6 Regions
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As mentioned in the previous section, the main regional problem in the original EEC-6 
was located in the Italian Mezzogiomo. In Italy, the difference between the richest and 
poorest regions was larger than in other member states. In the region of Calabria, GDP 
per capita was 26.8 per cent of Community average in 1960 and it had risen to 33.2 per 
cent in 1969. For the region of Basilicata, this index rose from 25.5 per cent to 38.2 per 
cent. The region with highest GDP per capita in 1960, Lazio, slightly decreased from 72.1 
per cent to 71.6 per cent. These data is in NUTS 2 classification, which as mentioned 
above, is more disaggregated than NUTS 1 (CEC, 1971). This convergence is due to the 
lower growth in richer areas than to faster growth in poorer ones. Besides, the slow 
growth registered in some poor areas is linked to emigration and the subsequent slower 
population increases. The continuous migration from the Mezzogiomo region is 
considered to be the reason for the reduction in per capita differences in Italy during this 
period (Gianola and Imbriani, 1984; Kiljunen, 1980). Emigration was mainly 
concentrated in the South o f Italy and it was in fact ‘the only main area in the Community 
to have a substantial net outflow during the period 1960-1967’ (Commission of the 
European Communities, 1971: 25). Moreover, even though emigration from Southern 
Italy was present throughout the century, it was particularly strong after 1951. 
Nevertheless, this emigration was not directed to other member countries and integration 
of the Community population and labour was very limited at this time.
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Cuadrado Roura (1991) explains the reduction in disparities between the EEC-6 countries 
between the late sixties and the first half of the seventies by saying that GDP per capita of 
several countries increased from below the average (UK, France, Belgium and the 
Netherlands). This, in turn, coincided with moderate increases in the less developed 
countries. While during the sixties and early seventies the process of regional 
convergence had accelerated, this was both because o f the growth in less favoured 
regions but also as a consequence of migration flows. This constitutes a good example of 
an increase in incomes per capita due to out-migration that does not mean that disparities 
are reduced by factor mobility within the region. As seen for Italy, at this stage 
interregional mobility was limited and most of Italian out-migration was not directed to 
other member countries.
Despite the fact that convergence between countries was taking place at a faster pace that 
convergence among regions, the Community was still reluctant to address regional policy 
issues in this period. During this period, as discussed in the previous section, regional 
policy planning and implementation was left mainly to national governments (Molle, 
1980).
3.3. The Creation of Regional Institutions until the Reform of the Structural 
Funds (1973-1988)
It is generally agreed that while convergence had predominated prior to 1975, the mid- 
1970s marked a turning point and gave way to a less clear situation. It was not until the 
late eighties that convergence became a stronger trend, probably partly due to the reforms 
of the Structural Funds in 1988 and the move towards the Single Market in the following 
years. During the seventies, trade imbalances, divergent price trends and exchange rate 
instability were present in the Community and the weaker countries and regions were the 
ones mostly affected (Sutherland, 1986). Therefore, the slackening of growth in Europe 
coincided with an increase in disparities (Kennedy, 1994). This, again, suggests that 
disparities in Europe were counter-cyclical at least regarding countries. Despite that, it is 
effectively impossible to assess to what extent this trend was attributable to Community 
membership per se (Kiljunen, 1980). Cuadrado Roura (1991) says that the crisis in the
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seventies affected unequally all the countries, interrupting the convergence process and 
increasing inter-country differences. According to him, in the second half of the eighties, 
what can be seen is not a return to convergence but a stability o f the global position 
reached within the EEC, with disparities staying mostly unchanged.
When looking at the percentages o f EEC average, between 1973 and 1988 non­
convergence between countries was mainly due to the case of Ireland (Figure 4.4). When 
enlargement took place, Ireland was 40 per cent below the average GDP per capita and 
stayed at this level throughout the whole period. The other countries show some 
convergence, particularly Italy that still shows a trend towards the average, rising from 84 
to 94 per cent o f EEC-9 average GDP. The other two new members- the UK and 
Denmark, joined the Community with almost Community average GDP (4 per cent below 
for the UK and 13 per cent above in the case of Denmark).
Figure 4.4. Percentages of EEC-9 average GDP
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Greece, which was more than 40 per cent below the Community average GDP when it 
joined in 1981, showed no convergence at all in the period 1981-1988. That is, it had the 
same problems in order to catch up as Ireland, and in fact both countries showed very 
similar patterns as can be seen in Figure 4.5. In this Figure, Ireland and Greece are
104
depicted (the two lowest income countries at that time with similar patterns); Italy and 
two of the richest countries, Luxembourg and Denmark (the reason for Greece not being 
included in Figure 4.4 is that it did not join the EEC until 1981).
Figure 4.5. Share of European GDP: Selected Countries
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The sigma analysis performed on the nine countries reveals that the dispersion between 
countries does not exhibit a clear trend. It remains stable throughout the seventies, 
decreases in the early eighties and increases later on. It then decreases sharply in 1988 
(Figure 4.6). However, when I analysed absolute p-convergence, a strong convergence 
can be found, as seen in Table 4.3, which could be reflecting the sharp drop found for 
1988 when performing the sigma analysis.
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Figure 4.6. Sigma Analysis in the EEC-9 Countries
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Table 4.3. Absolute Beta Convergence in the EEC-9 (1973-1988)
1988-1973 Countries
Constant 
In (1973)
Coefficient
1.67
-0.28
Std.Error
0.06
0.05
t-statistic
25.79
-5.27
R-squared 0.82
1988-1973 Regions
Constant 
In (1973)
Coefficient
1.28
-0.04
Std.Error
0.060
0.04
t-statistic
20.78
-0.97
R-squared 0.02
Source: own calculations
Regarding the regions within the community, the First Report on the Regions partly 
explained the divergent trends in regional disparities by migration trends. The effect of 
the economic crisis in the seventies was to increase the levels of unemployment in all 
Community regions leading to widening of regional disparities. Further, the report says 
that over the period 1970-1977, interregional differences in employment rates explained 
between half and two thirds o f regional disparities in GDP per capita. It is then 
productivity differences within sectors that best explain regional output divergences,
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possibly as a consequence of the relative openness o f the regional economies and the 
increasing competition in world markets (CEC, 1980).
When analysing o-convergence for the regions, it can be seen in Figure 4.7 that 
dispersion remained stable throughout the seventies and early eighties and increased in 
1984, declining in the late eighties. A further beta analysis confirms that there was no 
convergence within the regions (Table 4.3) with a negative though not significant 
coefficient on initial income at either 5 or 10 per cent. Again, it is clear that convergence 
is harder to achieve for the regions than for the countries.
Figure 4.7. Sigma Convergence for the EEC-9 Regions
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In the case o f Spain, regional per capita GDP from 1980 until 1988 remained almost 
unchanged. In Figure 4.8 the regional GDP as percentage of national GDP of four selected 
Spanish regions is depicted. Both Cataluna and Pais Vasco have been chosen as 
representative o f high-income level regions, while Extremadura and Galicia represent 
poorer regions. Even though Spain joined the Community in 1986, and so its non­
convergence cannot be taken as representative of other European regions, it is still 
interesting to see how membership did not make any noticeable changes.
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Figure 4.8. Regional GDP as Percentage of National GDP in Four Spanish Regions
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In Italy, Gianola and Imbriani (1984) investigated inequalities during the seventies with 
the ratio o f the per capita GDP in the Mezzogiomo to the national average and by 
calculating the Theil index. The later not only showed that overall inequality had 
worsened, but also that the ‘North-South gap’ factor accounted for 85 per cent of the 
overall inequality index during the seventies.
Although the European Regional Development Fund was created in 1975, from 1975 to 
1980 expenditure was marginal compared with national regional assistance, accounting 
for 4.5 per cent of Community budget. Kiljunen (1980) mentions that in 1978, the British 
government spent internally on regional policy double the amount spread throughout the 
EEC-9 by the ERDF. The measures undertaken in this period consisted of sectoral 
policies, support for certain industries (such as steel) or important sectors (agriculture) 
instead of a regional development policy (Gianola and Imbriani, 1984). In fact, some of 
these policies might have worked against the equalisation of disparities. Marques Mendes 
(1990) estimated that even in the 1970s the EC would have contributed to reduction in 
disparities among members had it not been for the distortions that the CAP introduced.
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3.4. The G row ing Significance of Regional Policies (1988- Agenda 2000)
In this period, there was a boost to regional policies. The result was a reduction of 
disparities between member states. Although the emergence of a two speed Europe can 
be seen in Figure 4.9, particularly until 1992; the rapid growth of Ireland in the last five 
or six years is remarkable, increasing from 64 per cent o f the Community average in 1983 
to 80 per cent in 1993 and 90 per cent in 1995. In 1997, Ireland reached EU average GDP 
per capita and continued to increase until 1999 when it was 10 per cent above EU 
average, at the same level of the Netherlands and Belgium (EC, 1997).
Figure 4.9. Share of European Average GDP 1988-1995
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The Spanish economy grew until 1991 and then GDP per capita decreased until 1995. 
After 1997, the Spanish economy grew markedly and reached almost 82 per cent of EU 
average GDP per capita. Greece and Portugal had similar percentages of GDP per capita 
in 1988 and 1995 (58 and 64 per cent for Greece and 58 and 68 per cent for Portugal).
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However, while Portugal increased its GDP steadily throughout the period, Greece 
experienced a reduction in the per capita GDP as percentage of EU average in 1990 and 
1991. Economic growth has been accelerating in Greece since the economic recovery 
began in 1994.
When looking at Figure 4.10, it can be seen that the sigma indicator has decreased in the 
period, but specially after 1993. In Table 4.4, the results o f the p-convergence analysis 
are reported. In this period there was convergence between the twelve member countries 
o f the EU with negative and significant coefficient, though convergence is weaker than 
for the previous sub-period.
Figure 4.10. Sigma Analysis for the EEC-12
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On the other hand, disparities between regions still remained almost unaltered (Cuadrado 
Roura, 1998) and the poorest 25 regions in the EU increased their per capita income only 
by 2 per cent in the period (CEC, 1997c). Cuadrado Roura (1998) attributes this 
stagnation to two factors, both because regional migration stopped but most importantly 
because o f the re-adaptation and re-structuring of the regional economies to international 
competition. The evolution of GDP per capita of some of the poorer and the richer 
regions in Spain and Italy over the period 1988-1995 is shown in Figures 4.11 and 4.12 
respectively. The four Spanish regions selected are the ones of the previous section.
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Regional differences show no strong convergence for the entire period 1988-1995, in 
spite o f having received funds after joining the Community in 1986. According to 
Villaverde Castro (1993) all Spanish regions experienced growth from 1985 to 1992, 
albeit not at the same rate. In fact, comparing 1985 with 1992 this shows a slight increase 
in disparities. By depicting a Lorenz curve he concludes that EC aid has always helped to 
reduce regional disparities in Spain, although the reform of the structural funds in 1989 
has made no further impact. He points out that most investments were in infrastructure 
works, mainly in relation to the transport network. In the case of Italy, again four regions 
have been chosen on the basis of providing four extreme examples (Piemonte and 
Lombardia the richer regions and Basilicata and Calabria for the poor regions). Similarly, 
no convergence can be seen here and it is clear that the North-South divide in Italy 
present since 1958 still persists.
Table 4.4. Absolute Beta Convergence (1988-1995)
1995-1988 Countries
Coefficient Std.Error t-statistic
Constant 1.15 0.19 5.95
In (1988) -0.24 0.08 -3.09
R-squared 0.49
1995-1988 Regions
Coefficient Std.Error t-statistic
Constant 0.52 0.06 8.49
Ln (1988) -0.15 0.07 -2.87
R-squared 0.08
Source: own calculations
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Figure 4.11. GDP Per Capita as Percentage of National GDP in Spain
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Figure 4.12. GDP Per Capita as Percentage of National GDP in Italy
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I also tested for o-convergence in this period and, as Figure 4.13 shows, a constant trend 
can be seen between the regions. Further, an absolute beta test reinforces this argument 
showing no convergence for the period (Table 4.4) with a negative though not significant 
coefficient on initial income and a low R-squared. Once again, even when there is a clear 
trend towards convergence among the countries, the regions lag behind, despite policy 
efforts.
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Figure 4.13. Sigma Analysis between the Regions
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3.5. O ther Studies
As mentioned above, several authors have studied disparities within the European Union. 
An interesting study was performed by Tavera (1999), who tried to determine the 
convergence in Europe for the period 1965-1990. He used the rate of growth of 
production per labour unit in logs. When analysing the whole period it can be seen that 
there has been P-convergence among the European countries (Tavera includes the 15 EU 
members, regardless of their membership status at the time). However, when analysing 
different sub-periods, he shows that periods of convergence coexist with periods of non­
convergence. In particular, he shows a clear trend towards P-convergence in the period 
1965-75, while during 1975-1980 and 1980-1985 this appears no longer to be the case 
and finally converging again in 1985-1990. When analysing the speed of convergence he 
finds a decrease in this indicator following the oil shocks between 1973 and 1977. 
Another reduction in the speed of convergence is seen from 1982 to 1986 following the 
second oil shock. The average speed for the whole period 1970-1990 is 2.4 per cent. He 
emphasises that even for the whole period there seems to be convergence - as most long 
term studies as will be seen later in the thesis - when analysing sub-periods major 
differences can be found (Tavera, 1999). Figures from Tavera, 1999 are presented in 
Appendix I.c, page 304. Again, as mentioned in the previous chapter, when comparing p- 
convergence results for the whole period versus different sub-periods differences are
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found. However, Tavera only analyses convergence between countries and does not 
consider those within countries.
Ioannides and Petrakos (2000) show that there was a reduction in inequalities in Greece 
in the seventies and eighties using a-convergence for a number o f welfare indicators. 
Petrakos and Tsoukalas (1999) test the hypothesis proposed by Berry (1988), whereby 
there would be a positive correlation between regional inequalities and macro-economic 
performance and their findings indicate that this seems to be pro-cyclical. This seems to 
be in contradiction with the evidence for Europe (Dunford, 1993), as seen in the literature 
review (page 56). The link between macro performance and growth in the European 
Union has also been mentioned by Tavera (1999), and as mentioned above, he shows that 
periods o f economic crises - such as the oil crisis - seem to be associated with a slowing 
down of the process of convergence. According to Tavera (1999), when performing 
sigma analysis there seems to be no major changes in the period, and, in fact, there 
appears to be an increase after 1985. Another interesting study that has already been 
mentioned in chapter 3 (page 83) considered the impact of politics in Greece and Spain. 
Petrakos and Tsoukalas (1999) found that increases in spatial concentration in Greece 
could be associated with the country’s deviation from democracy. Moreover, Tavera 
(1999) attributed the poor growth of the Spanish economy in the sub-period 1970-1975 to 
the major political changes that caused significant internal and external imbalances.
Villaverde Castro (1993) applied shift-share analysis to the Spanish regions for the period 
1985-1989. He finds that, overall, regional economic structure did not play an important 
role in relation to the rate of growth attained by the different regions. On the other hand, 
there was no clear direct correlation between regional productive structure and regional 
growth. His findings show that infrastructure of transport and communications 
(particularly the latter) are the ones with higher impact on economic development while 
the most important effects within the social infrastructure indicator are education and 
health care. Villaverde Castro (1993) then tests whether differences in infrastructure 
endowments are relevant in explaining the level and evolution of inter-regional 
disparities within the Spanish regions in the same period. He concludes that the inter­
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regional dispersion of the general infrastructure indicator is quite pronounced and in fact 
this dispersion is greater than in the case of per capita income.
Overall, European regional policy has been rather successful, with a real catching up 
between countries. All cohesion countries, except Greece, qualified for joining the 
Monetary Union, which shows a certain nominal degree of convergence. However, 
regarding the regions, income gaps remained mostly unaltered and in some cases 
worsened within member states, despite regional policy efforts (Glockler, G. et al, 1998).
This section has shown that achieving convergence is not easy. It may take many years 
(Ireland) and GDP can be extremely reluctant to converge (Greece); but above all is by no 
means an automatic process. However, the gap between the entrant countries and the 
average GDP together with the general economic conditions present at each period can 
determine success in terms of convergence. At the regional level, things are more 
complicated, with backward regions lagging behind in spite of the implementation of 
several regional policies. In the following section, the effect that Certain EU policies had 
on disparities will be addressed.
4. Effects of Policies on Disparities
It is worth considering the regional policies that had been put into practice in the EU in 
order to draw conclusions that might be useful for MERCOSUR. Therefore, the main 
objective of this section is to study certain policies introduced in Europe and investigate 
whether they contributed to an increase or decrease in disparities. The Structural Fund is 
the main instrument for reducing regional disparities and the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) is the most controversial and far reaching of all Community policies; 
therefore particular attention will be given to these two policies.
4.1. Common Agricultural Policy
The objectives of the CAP were to increase efficiency, reduce prices for consumers and 
sustain high living standards for the agricultural population. Given that those objectives
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were in conflict with each other, since the beginning a clear orientation towards 
maintaining agricultural incomes prevailed over the efficiency and price objectives 
(Lopes Porto, 1997).
The financial instrument or European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund 
(EAGGF) is divided into two sections, Guidance and Guarantee. The former represents a 
small part o f the whole Agricultural Fund and is part of the Structural Funds. It supports 
restructuring o f agriculture in the poor areas of the Union through several methods such 
as subsidies for land consolidation, investment aid and direct subsidies. After the 1988 
reform of the Structural Funds, more emphasis on regionality was given to this section 
(Armstrong and Taylor, 1993).
The Guarantee section expenditure covers price policies, stocks and export subsidies. 
This section has the higher percentage of EU budget and is the most controversial of EU 
policies. Although it has been reduced over the years, the EAGGF-Guarantee reached 
91.8 per cent of EC budget in 1971; 71.2 per cent in 1980; 61.5 per cent in 1990 and still 
50.5 per cent in 1996 (Lopes Porto, 1997). In Agenda 2000, the percentage of the budget 
allocated to the CAP for the period 2000-2006 is still 40 per cent (CEC, 1997a).
The CAP set prices that were above international ones, thus creating a distortion for 
consumers. The price was put increasingly higher in order to fulfil the objective of 
sustaining agriculture income. This led to fixing prices that were well above those that 
equilibrated the market, which resulted in excess production. However - unlike 
competitive economies where producers would adjust by reducing production - producers 
continued output at higher than equilibrium prices since community preference and 
financial solidarity would intervene by buying the excess production. It is not surprising, 
then, that production expanded more rapidly than consumption. On the one hand, the 
result was an excess production while on the other; a higher proportion of poor families’ 
income was spent on food products. This implied significant costs not only in terms of 
production but also in consumption distortion. Industries linked with agricultural 
products were also damaged since the price of their raw materials increased. Furthermore,
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accumulated stocks grew constantly and given the lack of competitiveness of European 
products in international markets, exports began to be subsided (Lopes Porto, 1997).
The first step towards reforming the CAP was taken in 1984, in order to introduce 
incentives to reduce overproduction by applying the co-responsibility principle. Two 
types o f instruments were used, production quotas and stabilisers or thresholds beyond 
which farmers would either not receive any benefits from the guaranteed price scheme; 
they would have to pay a co-responsibility levy or would not be able to sell the surplus to 
the intervention authorities. Structural policies were also introduced as well as a tighter 
budgetary discipline (Glockler, G. et al, 1998). However, it was not until the 1992 
MacSharry reform, that a significant change was made, to some extent as a consequence 
of the complaints filed during the Uruguay Round but also due to future enlargements 
and the limited results of the previous reforms. Prices had not fallen enough to have an 
impact on production and stabilisers and quotas had not been sufficient to reduce 
expenditure in the long run.
The 1992 reform included several items: a significant reduction in several products’ 
prices (particularly cereals and meat) to converge to world prices - which are 
compensated with direct payments to farmers; the extension of the set-aside mechanism; 
programmes for reconverting land into forestry production; early retirement scheme; 
productivity incentives and greater concern for the environment (Lopes Porto, 1997; 
Glockler, G. et al, 1998). This reform was successful regarding excess production, 
although the objective of reducing the cost of the CAP was not entirely accomplished. By 
1999, less than half of the community budget was assigned to the CAP; while in Agenda 
2000 more than 40 per cent of the budget for the period 2000-2006 is allocated to the 
agricultural sector (Lopes Porto, 1997). The main achievements o f the 1992 reform were 
the reduction o f stocks and greater flexibility of the CAP. Given the enlargement towards 
the Eastern European Countries, a further reform of the CAP will have to take place. The 
agricultural sector in the CEEC’s is larger both in terms of percentage of GDP and 
employment than the EU’s and the agricultural surface is two thirds as big as the EU’s.
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With internal CEECs agricultural prices well below those of the EU, an unreformed CAP 
will be an incentive to increase production in those countries (Glockler, G. et al, 1998).
The regions with lowest incomes per head within the Community are by and large those 
in which agriculture is the predominant occupation, with incomes lower than in the 
industrial sector and little opportunity of local alternative employment. Therefore, the re­
distributive regional role of the agricultural policy is crucial (Robertson, 1962).
The precise impact of certain policies is often difficult to assess, because it involves 
comparison with a hypothetical situation. However, the Common Agricultural Policy, 
despite being the only policy with a major structural impact, has not helped in reducing or 
eliminating regional inequalities since regional policy remained outside the CAP. After an 
initial phase, there was awareness that policies should not only aim at reducing 
historically given disparities but should also be careful to prevent regional inequalities 
arising or worsening as a result o f Community policies (Giannola and Imbriani, 1984).
It is clear that the CAP has not met expectations regarding its re-distributive role. This is 
not only because income differentials in agriculture remained large, but also because the 
CAP has worsened the regional and income inequalities inside the Community 
(Tsoukalis, 1991). Given that the CAP does not take adequate account of specific regional 
needs, it has in some cases exacerbated regional disparities in agricultural incomes 
(Sutherland, 1986). In fact, differences in productivity and income between the poor and 
rich agricultural regions were larger in 1980 than before the Community was created 
(Gianola and Imbriani, 1984).
Seidel (1994) analysed the effect of several regional policies on the widening of 
disparities. He ranked regions according to their per capita income. The percentages of 
population are represented along the horizontal axis, while the percentages of payments 
received from Community policies appear on the vertical axis. Each point along the 
resulting curve indicates the cumulative percentage of payments received by the 
corresponding percentages of population. In this way he is able to show to what extent
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payments are concentrated on the population of the least favoured regions. In order to 
determine whether the policies are working against the elimination of disparities the 
resulting curve can be compared with a 45° line that would imply equal per capita 
distribution.
If the curve is always above (below) the diagonal line, then backward regions are 
receiving a more (less) advantageous treatment, therefore contributing to reducing 
(increasing) existing disparities. However, even if the curve is to the left o f the 45° line it 
is not clear how strong the re-distribution is working in favour of reducing disparities 
since this will depend on the size of the payments involved and the convexity of the 
curve. When the curve is above the diagonal, the steeper its slope for the lower income 
percentages the higher will be the re-distributive effect of the policies. Whenever the 
curve intersects the diagonal, there is a shift in the accumulated financial flows from less 
than proportional to more than proportional (European Parliament, 1997).
In order to investigate the effects of agricultural payments over the period 1986-1989, 
Seidel (1994) differentiated among the products. The findings reveal that regional 
distribution varied according to specific products. In general, agricultural policy was 
tailored more to the needs of the richer regions of the north and only some of the poorest 
regions benefited from the Guarantee payments. In the case of sugar, the richer regions 
benefit, as well as in the case of cereals and rice, sugar, milk, oilseeds, beef, poultry and 
diary products. The richer regions in Northern European countries were favoured since 
those products accounted for about 70 per cent of all guarantee payments in the period 
1986-1989.
The European Parliament, using the same methodology as Seidel (1994) compared the 
distribution curves for the EC 12 with those for the EC 10 (before the enlargement to Spain 
and Portugal). It concludes that guarantee payments made in the EC 10 seem to have had a 
more substantial effect on regional income distribution while no such effect is observed 
in the EC 12. The curves for tobacco, beef and veal have remained unchanged when 
compared to the Community before enlargement (European Parliament, 1997).
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Therefore, the richest producers reaped more benefits and about 70 per cent of EAGGF- 
Guarantee (or 40 per cent of the entire Community budget) was destined to the richest 20 
per cent and was thus working against Community regional policy objectives. 
Considering that the CAP accounts for almost half of the whole EU budget, the effects are 
more significant. Only for tobacco, olive oil, sheep and goat meat and to a lesser extent 
wine, fruit and vegetables are the poorer regions benefited. But these products received 
less than 20 per cent of the guaranteed payments (Seidel, 1994; Lopes Porto, 1997).
4.2. Regional Impact of Structural Funds
The three structural funds in the EU are the European Regional Development Fund 
(ERDF), the European Social Fund and the EAGGF-Guidance section. The ERDF is 
intended to ‘help to redress the main regional imbalances in the Community through 
participation in the development and structural adjustment of regions whose development 
is lagging behind and in the conversion of declining industrial regions’ (Article 130c, 
Treaty o f Maastricht).
The ERDF grants are the main factor in reducing the regional disparities within the 
Community, and this effect has been growing throughout the years. In 1989-1990, an 
average of 80 per cent of investment support grants went towards the 20 per cent of the 
population in the most disadvantageous regions. Seidel (1994) decomposed the ERDF 
investment grants into infrastructure and industry for the years 1986-1987. There is a 
marked difference between the two, since most of the regional assistance has been 
directed to infrastructure measures. For industry, the poorer regions with 10 per cent of 
Community population received less than 5 per cent of investment subsidies to trade and 
industry while the highest 40 per cent received 20 per cent. By contrast, in the case of 
infrastructure, the poorest 20 per cent received about 70 per cent of infrastructure 
investment grants, while the richest segments of the population received negligible 
amounts.
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Using a similar procedure, Villaverde Castro (1993) analyses the impact of the ERDF on 
Spanish regions over the period 1986-1991. Most of these regions were classified as 
Objective 1, which includes lagging regions with a GDP per capita less than 75 per cent 
o f Community average, and Objective 2, comprising those regions affected by industrial 
decline and restructuring. He reaches two conclusions. The first one is that ERDF 
subsidies have contributed to reducing regional disparities in Spain given that the less 
developed regions are the ones that received the highest per capita subsidies, with the 
poorest 50 per cent of the population living in those regions receiving more than 80 per 
cent of the grants. On the other hand, by comparing the concentration of ERDF funds for 
the period 1986-1988 (Figure 2 in Appendix I.d) to that of the period 1989-1991 (Figure 
3 in Appendix I.d) he concludes that there is no evidence of any major improvements 
after the 1988 reform of the Structural Funds since both curves are almost identical.
As in the case of the ERDF, the ESF is a significant mechanism in reducing disparities. 
The most striking feature of these curves is that they are less steep than those 
corresponding to the structural funds. The reason is that both long-term as well as youth 
unemployment are not just regional problems but they affect the whole Community. 
Seidel (1994) draws three curves for the period 1986-1989, and it is observed that almost 
half of the subsidies went to the lowest fifth of the Community’s population and the top 
40 per cent o f the population received 20 per cent of the investment grants.
Regarding the EAGGF Guidance section, it is oriented to the improvement of agricultural 
structures and granting investment subsidies. In 1986 and 1987 almost half of the these 
grants went to the poorest 20 per cent while the top 40 per cent received only 20 per cent 
of the subsidies.
4.3. Impact of Other Policies
The loans granted by the European Investment Bank (EIB) have had an equalising effect 
in regional income distribution. Nevertheless, in the poverty area the curve is below the 
45° line for the period 1986-1987. But this could be linked to the fact that the EIB credits
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involve both spending in industrial credits as well as infrastructure, the former being less 
significant in terms of reducing disparities.
Regarding the ECSC credits and aids, data for the years 1986-1987 for the EEC-12, show 
that ECSC credits exacerbated regional inequalities and that the lowest 15 per cent of the 
population derived no benefit from them, particularly in Spain and Portugal (Seidel, 
1994). In the case of ECSC aid, the exacerbating effects are even more pronounced than 
in the case of ECSC loans. The reason is that this sectoral aid favours companies and 
workers in regions dominated by coal and steel production, which are not necessarily 
among those with the lowest income per capita within the Community. Therefore, the 
poorest regions derive no benefit from these schemes. However, both the credits and the 
aid are not very significant in size and do not surpass a 5 per cent of the Union’s 
expenditure.
Although the amounts granted by the EC for Research and Development projects are 
small, these subsidies benefit developed regions more than less developed ones. The 
report on the regional impact of Community Policies (European Parliament, 1991) 
attributes this to several reasons. Firstly, highly skilled staff is required to carry out R&D, 
and such qualifications are not usually available in underdeveloped areas. Secondly, 
businesses tend to either locate their research operations within reasonable distance from 
the headquarters or to employ local research institutes. Finally, as long as the economic 
structure within the Community remains regionally unbalanced, the effect of R&D 
operations will continue to be concentrated in the more developed regions. Over the 
period 1983-1990, more than 40 per cent of the resources were channelled to the top 20 
per cent o f the population, whereas the lowest 20 per cent of population received less 
than 10 per cent of R&D contracts (Seidel, 1994).
In brief, it can be said that the ERDF, the ESF and the EAGGF-Guidance section work in 
favour o f the elimination of disparities. Nevertheless, it should be noted that in the 
example provided by Villaverde Castro, there was no evidence of further improvements 
after the 1988 reforms. It can be seen in Figure 1 in Appendix I.d that the Structural
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Funds have altogether an equalising effect on disparities. When the other structural 
interventions are considered, a reduction in the equalising effects is evident. This is partly 
attributed to the ECSC credits and aid and R&D expenditure, that although small in size 
have an adverse affect, and partly to the EIB credits that are more dispersed regionally 
throughout the Community. However, when the Guarantee section of the EAGGF is taken 
into account there is a marked effect against the equalising effects of the Structural Funds 
and the curve approaches the diagonal.
4. Concluding Remarks
In this chapter the evolution of disparities within the European Union has been analysed. 
According to neo-classical models prediction as seen in section 2.4, the creation of an 
economic area is expected to generate several benefits for the countries involved, mainly 
because the migration barriers will be removed and agents will be able to move freely 
within the boundaries of the area. It is indisputable that an economic union will bring 
benefits. However, the way in which these benefits will be distributed between the 
member countries is not clear. When not only states but also regions are included in the 
analysis, the issue of equal re-distribution of the benefits becomes crucial.
Following the interpretation of regional economics, balanced growth is not likely to be 
the outcome and, in fact, regional disparities might tend to persist through time 
depending on forces other than those advocated by free trade. Indeed, unbalanced growth 
might be the result when some of the assumptions of classical economics are removed 
and other factors such as agglomeration and location economies are allowed into the 
analysis as the main critiques to neo-classical economics suggested.
As seen in this chapter, the European Community was initially reluctant to create 
supranational institutions for regional policy. However, these have developed over the 
years and now economic and social cohesion constitutes one of the pillars of the 
European Union. This growing concern for regional policies highlights that these policies 
would not be in place if  it had not been recognised by the European Commission that
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convergence was not the rule within the Union. The European experience shows that 
convergence between countries was easier when the differences in income levels were 
not very pronounced and economic conditions were favourable, which is significant when 
considering countries in Latin America, characterised by differing incomes and unstable 
economic environments. In the case where new member countries in the EU had a GDP 
well below the average, such as Greece and Ireland, convergence was harder to achieve. 
Regarding disparities within countries, these did not show significant improvements 
either, even when disparities became one of the pillars of the European Union. In fact, 
disparities between regions persist to a large extent despite policy efforts, which is 
another interesting conclusion for less developed areas such as MERCOSUR.
Moreover, disparities have seemed to be dependent not only on the economic and social 
situation of new entrant countries, but also on the general macroeconomic conditions and 
external shocks to the economic area. This follows what was already mentioned in 
previous chapters, and it is an interesting first result that even in the European Union, 
external shocks such as the oil crisis seems to have made an impact on the dynamics of 
disparities and the period that shows strongest convergence is the seventies. Besides, both 
my own calculations as well as those performed by Tavera (1999) for different sub­
periods show that convergence varied according to the periods analysed and one should 
not make a strong statement over the whole period without a closer examination of the 
sub-period as well.
This chapter concludes Part I of this thesis. As summary of this first part it can be said 
that convergence does not seem to be automatic in contrast to neo-classical models of 
economic growth. Therefore, a strong institutional framework for regional policies 
becomes evident in order to provide a more equitable distribution and to achieve 
cohesion within the single market. However, the European Union has not been entirely 
successful in closing the gap between poorer and richer regions though this seemed to 
have happened for countries. Further, a tentative conclusion regarding macro and 
political variables seems to indicate that there is a link between them. Nevertheless, it is 
difficult to draw conclusions regarding macro and growth in the seventies, because the
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enlargements also created large disparities. In the light of these significant findings for an 
integrated area among -  mostly -  developed countries, in Part II of this thesis I will 
further investigate disparities in Argentina and Brazil in order to draw conclusions for 
MERCOSUR and other Latin American integration schemes.
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Part II
MERCOSUR 
Case Studies: Argentina and Brazil
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5Economic Disparities in MERCOSUR
1. Introduction
The second part of this thesis studies regional disparities within MERCOSUR. As noted in 
the general introduction to this thesis, the main objective is to determine how disparities 
originated and whether these will decrease through time without any government 
intervention or whether, by contrast, policies targeted to correcting imbalances should be 
implemented. Further, would integration schemes favour convergence or on the other 
hand would worsen disparities between poor and rich areas? This issues will be of prime 
importance in a region as MERCOSUR, where disparities between countries is significant 
-  as seen in Figures 1.1 to 1.3 in the Introduction to this thesis. In the previous chapter, I 
discussed the development of disparities in the European Union, both between as within 
member countries. Given the results obtained using both sigma and P-convergence 
analyses, convergence was not automatic, particularly between regions and, most 
importantly, external factors do seem to lead countries and regions away from the 
convergence path. As observed in Part I of this thesis, convergence was present for the 
longer periods but when dividing into sub-periods, it was shown that convergence and 
divergence alternate.
Created by the Treaty of Asuncion in 1991, the member countries of MERCOSUR are 
Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay (Bolivia and Chile are associate members). In 
the following section, a brief review of the process of integration in MERCOSUR is 
presented, followed by a descriptive analysis of the data and both sigma and P- 
convergence analyses. In the following chapters of Part II, I will study in greater detail 
disparities within Argentina and Brazil. For each country, a historical chapter discussing 
the origin and evolution of disparities since colonial times is presented, followed by a
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more detailed analysis of the process of convergence over the last fifty years, using 
mainly sigma and beta analyses. I will try to assess the impact not only of external factors 
but also macroeconomic and political ones. As noted earlier, I have decided to focus on 
Argentina and Brazil because they are the largest countries within MERCOSUR, both in 
size and population but also in terms of income. Besides, neither Uruguay nor Paraguay 
present as much reliable data, and, given that they are smaller, disparities are not as 
pronounced as in the case of the larger ones.
2. The Evolution of MERCOSUR
Economic integration in Latin America has gone through different stages. During the 
sixties and early seventies, there was extensive state intervention. Integration efforts at 
this stage were linked to the ISI model as discussed in chapter 2, since regional 
integration was regarded as a way of providing the basis for a more efficient industry and 
creating economies o f scale by enlarging the domestic markets. The Latin American Free 
Trade Area (LAFTA) was created in 1960 with the objective of abolishing all tariffs by 
1971. Although some progress was experienced in eliminating intra-regional trade 
barriers and establishing a Common External Tariff (CET), by the beginning of the 
seventies there was a sense of frustration at the modest progress of LAFTA. In addition, 
the continent was going through the debt crisis and countries had to generate surpluses to 
service the debts. As a result, imports were cut. In 1980, LAFTA was replaced by the 
Latin American Integration Association (LAIA) and countries abandoned earlier 
objectives by focusing more on bilateral trade agreements and private sector initiatives 
(Bulmer-Thomas, 1994; Campos Filho, 1999).
In the nineties, economic integration gained an important boost as a result of international 
trade conditions. At this stage, Latin American ‘new’ regionalism was not regarded as a 
protective measure against foreign competition or as a way of promoting ISI strategy but, 
rather, as a way o f increasing Latin American exports internationally and insert the 
economies into the world markets. The Free Trade Area for the Americas (FTAA) 
initiative launched in June 1990 in the same period as the North American Free Trade 
Area (NAFTA) and MERCOSUR. There was an increase in the signing of bilateral
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agreements and the revitalisation of old integration schemes such as the Central 
American Common Market (CACM) and the Andean Pact. The new integration schemes 
in Latin America aimed to attain specialisation in order to gain a better insertion in the 
world economy. Among these new integrated areas, MERCOSUR stands out in 
importance. This relevance stems from the fact that the four countries that form 
MERCOSUR account for more than half the GDP, almost one third of population - 200 
million - and 70 per cent of total land of South America. In addition, MERCOSUR enables 
the four countries to insert themselves into international trading areas as a bloc, as well as 
(at least in theory, if  integration deepened) a way of providing a political and institutional 
stability to the region (French Davis, 1995; Campos Filho, 1999).
In the mid-eighties, with the return to democracy in both Argentina and Brazil, attempts 
began to increase cooperation between the two countries. In 1986, the Economic 
Integration and Co-operation Programme (PICE) between Argentina and Brazil was 
signed, with the objective of fostering the creation of a common economic region. 
Selective opening of both economies as well as a stimulus towards complementing some 
sectors was accorded by negotiations on a product-by-product basis. The adaptation of 
the sectors would be accomplished according to the principles of gradual adjustment, 
flexibility and equilibrium. Bilateral trade, basic food production, industrial investment 
and energy were first included, and with the additional protocols, this was extended to 
cover transport, communications and monetary co-operation (Behar, 1991). The most 
important aspect of the PICE was the protocol that dealt with capital goods, given that the 
creation o f a customs union in this sector was a main objective o f the PICE. However, 
several conflicts arised and the recurrent economic instability of the countries worsened 
these problems.
In 1989, both countries signed the Treaty of Integration, Co-operation and Development 
by which they agreed to the formation of a regional integration scheme within ten years. 
This included both tariff and non-tariff reductions in goods and services as well as the 
harmonisation of macroeconomic policies. The future inclusion of other Latin American 
countries was also considered. At this stage, there was a shift from a product-by-product
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negotiation to tariff reductions of a general, linear and automatic nature (Campos Filho, 
1999).
In 1990, the integration process was accelerated with the signing of the Buenos Aires Act 
whereby the creation of a bilateral common market between Argentina and Brazil was 
agreed for 1994. This included free movement of goods, services and factors o f 
production. In the meantime, a list o f excepted products from the tariff reduction process 
was contemplated. It started from a general preference of 40 per cent that would be 
reduced automatically by 7 per cent each semester. As this aimed to include most of the 
products, the integration process was given a new dynamism. Before this, only products 
that were already involved in trade had been promoted.
MERCOSUR was formally constituted when the Asuncion Treaty was signed in March 
1991, which also incorporated Uruguay and Paraguay. The deadlines and the 
mechanisms with which to attain the customs union were similar to those proposed by the 
Buenos Aires Act and were of fundamental importance in the increasing trade flows 
between the countries. A  schedule for a progressive programme of tariff reductions was 
agreed between the four member countries. A preference of 40 per cent was granted for 
intra- MERCOSUR tariffs and a further 7 per cent would be granted every semester until 
1994 with a final 11 per cent reduction to complete the elimination o f tariffs. In 
December 1991, the Brasilia Protocol was signed, which dealt with the solution of 
potential controversies within MERCOSUR.
By 1994, an “imperfect” customs union was reached. MERCOSUR embarked on the 
second stage o f the integration process, by moving towards a customs union under the 
Ouro Preto Protocol. The protocol refers to the institutional structure during the period of 
consolidation o f the customs union and gave legal status to MERCOSUR according to 
international law. Moreover, a CET was agreed for 85 per cent of imports from other 
countries. A large group of items was excluded from this and a progressive convergence 
o f tariffs was agreed upon. Brazil had high tariffs on capital goods while Argentina, 
Uruguay and Paraguay had low ones on these goods. In addition, some special
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concessions were made to allow for particular situations such as Plan Real in Brazil and 
the effects of the Mexican crisis on Argentina’s economy. Free intra-regional trade for 
goods was accomplished, with some exceptions that included about 20 per cent of all 
products, which was to be eliminated by 1999 in Argentina and Brazil and a year later for 
the two other member countries. In 1995, MERCOSUR agreed a five-year programme in 
which to perfect the free trade area and customs union (Campos Filho, 1999).
MERCOSUR has increased trade flows between its member countries, in particular 
Argentina and Brazil. The main problem in MERCOSUR is that the macro conditions of 
the two largest countries determine the trade flows and foster doubts about the viability of 
the integration deepening effort. Moreover, there is a serious lack of coordination on 
macro-policy. There is also a marked lack of regional institutions and supra-national 
entities. The Treaty o f Asuncion concentrated the power of decision-making in the 
foreign affairs and finance ministries while the other sectors involved were only 
consulted. The dynamism of the integration process will therefore be significantly 
dependent on the political will to reach agreements (Campos Filho, 1999; Hurrel, 2001).
3. Socio-Economic Comparisons Between the Member Countries
Disparities between the member countries of MERCOSUR are wide and extend not only 
to levels of GDP (Figures 1.2 and 1.3 on pages 20 and 21 respectively) and population 
(Figure 1.1 on page 20) but also education, infant mortality, life expectancy, urbanisation 
rates and variables such as density o f railroads, telephone lines and vehicles per capita. 
The most straightforward picture of disparities is that regarding the distribution of the 
population among the four countries. When looking at Figures 5.1 and 5.2, it can be seen 
that Brazil’s population comprised a 69 per cent of the MERCOSUR’s population in 1930 
and a further 79 per cent by 2000. Argentina and Uruguay, on the other hand, decreased 
their percentages in the same period from 25 to 17 per cent and 4 to 2 per cent 
respectively. All data used in this section is from Astorga and FitzGerald (1998) and the 
World Bank Website and can be seen in Appendix II.
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Figure 5.1. Distribution o f  Population in the Four MERCOSUR Countries in 1930
□  ARGENTINA ■  BRAZIL □  URUGUAY □  PARAGUAY
Source: own calculations
Figure 5.2. Distribution of Population in the Four MERCOSUR Countries in 2000
Source: own calculations with data from World Bank website
When performing sigma analysis to illliteracy rates between the four member countries, it 
can be seen in Figure 5.3 that there has been a reduction in the variability between the 
MERCOSUR countries over the last century in terms of illiteracy rates. The same results 
can be found in the case of life expectancy, as seen in Figure 5.4.
79%
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Figure 5.3. Sigma Analysis for Illiteracy Rates in the MERCOSUR Countries, 1900-95
14
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Source: own calculations
Figure 5.4. Sigma Analysis for Life Expectancy Rates in the MERCOSUR Countries, 
1920-1995
1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 1995
Source: own calculations
Figures 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7 show figures with data regarding vehicles per capita, density of 
railways and telephone lines per thousand inhabitants as proxies of development levels 
between the countries.
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Figure 5.5. Vehicles per thousand persons in the MERCOSUR Countries, 1929-1990
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Source: own calculations
Figure 5.6. Density o f Railway Lines in the MERCOSUR Countries, 1900-1995 (Km of 
Tracks per Thousand Square Km)
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Source: own calculations
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Figure 5.7. Telephone Lines per thousand inhabitants in the MERCOSUR Countries, 
1913-1990
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Source: own calculations
Figure 5.8 shows each country’s GDP as percentage of MERCOSUR average. It can be 
seen that both Argentina and Uruguay are always above 100 per cent, which can be 
compared with the case o f Luxembourg in the EU (compare with Figure 4.1, page 99). 
After 1970 and 1980 both countries follow the same declining trend. In the case of 
Paraguay and Brazil, both are below the average GDP per capita in MERCOSUR and can 
be compared to Italy in the fifties, Ireland in the seventies and Portugal and Greece in the 
period 1988-1995 (compare with Figures 4.1 and 4.9, pages 99 and 109). In Brazil, the 
level o f GDP per capita increased specially after 1970 while in Paraguay it decreased in 
1960 and 1970.
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Figure 5.8. GDP per Capita as Percentage o f MERCOSUR Average, 1940-2000
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In the following section, the sigma and beta analyses that have been performed in the 
previous chapter for the European Union will be used here for the countries of 
MERCOSUR.
4. S igm a a n d  A b so lu te  B eta  C o n v erg en ce  A nalyses
In this section, I have performed both beta and o-convergence to the four countries of 
MERCOSUR for the period 1940-2000. As mentioned in the introduction to this thesis 
(page 21) the MERCOSUR ‘effect’ cannot be captured accurately at this stage since it is a 
short period and due to the countries’economic volatility but most importantly due to the 
very small sample. Therefore, the conclusions of this section should only be taken as 
preliminary. The data on GDP per capita in real 1970 US$ was obtained from Astorga and 
Fitzgerald (1998) and the World Bank website (Appendix Il.a). As for the EU on the 
previous chapter, full readout of tables 5.1 to 5.3 can be found on Appendix V (pages 333 
to 338).
As can be seen in Figure 5.9, the sigma indicator decreases slowly until 1970, there is a 
sharp decrease in the 1970s, remains stagnant in the eighties and finally exhibits a slight
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increase in the first half of nineties while it remains almost unaltered for the rest of the 
decade. This strong o-convergence in the seventies can be associated to both Argentina 
and Uruguay’s (the two countries with highest per capita income) decrease in average 
MERCOSUR GDP per capita; while Paraguay and Brazil both increased their average GDP 
in the seventies and eighties (see Figure 5.8).
Figure 5.9. Sigma Analysis for the MERCOSUR Countries, 1940-2000
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Source: own calculations
The paper by Caceres and Sandoval (1999) mentioned in Chapter 3 (page 79) found a 
decrease in the period 1952-1982 of the standard deviation of income per capita, and 
particularly in the seventies. According to the authors this decreasing trend corresponds 
to the high growth of Brazil during the fifties, sixties and seventies; Paraguay in the 
sixties and seventies and for the low growth rates of both Argentina and Uruguay, the 
countries with higher incomes at the beginning of the period (See Appendix II.h).
When performing absolute P-convergence analysis for the four countries o f MERCOSUR, 
it can be seen in both Table 5.1 and appendix V, that for the period 1940-2000, there was 
a high R-squared and a not significant F statistic, and the coefficient is negative but only 
significant at the 10 per cent level. Note that when doing the regression only until 1995, 
the results remain unaltered and therefore in the last 5 years there were no major changes 
regarding convergence between the four countries. The weak convergence found in this 
period implies that the lowest income countries have in average increased their GDP more
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that the richest, probably due to Paraguay and Brazil increasing their GDP per capita 
during the seventies and eighties, as mentioned above.
Table 5.1. Absolute Beta Convergence between the MERCOSUR Countries 1940-2000
2000-1940
Coefficient S td .E rro r t-statistic
C onstant -1.43 1.07 -1.34
ln(1940) -0.55 0.31 -1.77
R -squared 0.61
Source: own calculations, for more details see page 339
Following the results presented on the European Union, sub-periods were considered for 
this analysis. Firstly, I divided the sample into two sub-periods: from 1940 to 1970 and 
from 1970 until 2000. Following the preliminary results of the sigma analysis, 1970 was 
considered the breaking point since the seventies seem to exhibit a converging trend. 
According to Rodrik (1998) -  as mentioned above in page 84 - the slowdown in 
economic growth in the eighties in the MERCOSUR countries and in Latin America in 
general, can be associated to weak institutions that could not successfully deal with 
external shocks. He explains stagnation as being directly associated to the size of the 
external shock and the institutions’ ability to solve conflicts. The results can be seen in 
Table 5.2, where both beta coefficients have the right sign, showing convergence, 
although for the first regression (1940-1970) the coefficient on initial income is not 
significant. For the sub-period 1970-2000 the coefficient is marginally significant at the 5 
per cent level therefore indicating that convergence occurred after 1970.
In order to examine what happened in that sub-period, I have examined the behaviour of 
disparities in six sub-periods from 1940 to 2000. The results are presented in Table 5.3 
and also explained in Appendix V, where it can be seen that periods of convergence are 
followed by periods o f non-convergence. In particular, there is strong convergence only 
in the decade o f the seventies and strong divergence in the last sub-period 1990-2000. 
Once again (as seen for the EU above), absolute p-convergence is observed for the longer
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period but once sub-periods are considered, both convergence as well as divergence can 
be clearly identified.
Table 5.2. Absolute Beta Convergence between the MERCOSUR Countries, Sub-Periods 
1940-1970 and 1970-2000
1970-1940
Coefficient S td .E rro r t-statistic
C onstant -0.65 1.06 -0.61
ln(1940) -0.26 0.31 -0.85
R-squared 0.27
2000-1970
Coefficient S td .E rro r t-statistic
constant -0.74 0.46 -1.59
n(1970) -0.30 0.15 -2.03
R-squared 0.67
Source: own calculations, for more details see pages 344-345
This strong convergence in the seventies can be explained, as already mentioned, by the 
growth of Brazilian per capita GDP in the decade (and to some extent Paraguay’s) while 
the divergence in the nineties seems to be in accordance with the increase in Argentina’s 
GDP during that decade. Dobson and Ramlogan (2002) also found evidence of 
convergence for the seventies for Latin America as a whole. MERCOSUR seems to have 
followed the same pattern as the rest of Latin America since the results for the eighties 
are not significant and again in the nineties while Dobson and Ramlogan (2002) find no 
strong evidence o f convergence, in the case o f MERCOSUR there clear evidence o f 
divergence.
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Table 5.3. Absolute Beta Convergence, Sub-Periods by Decades
Coefficient Std.Error t-statistic 
Constant 0.93 0.13 7.25
Ln(1990) 0.28 0.04 6.58
R-squared 0.96
1990-1980
Coefficient Std.Error t-statistic 
Constant -0.40 0.49 -0.82
Ln(1980) -0.12 0.16 -0.73
R-squared________ 0.21__________________
1980-1970
Coefficient Std.Error t-statistic 
Constant -1.04 0.23 -4.59
ln(1970) -0.38 0.07 -5.32
R-squared________ 0.93__________
1970-1960
Coefficient Std.Error t-statistic 
Constant -0.07 0.46 -0.14
Ln(1960) -0.05 0.14 -0.36
R-squared_________ 0.06_________________
1960-1950
Coefficient Std.Error t-statistic 
Constant -0.41 0.49 -0.84
Ln (1950) -0.14 0.15 -0.98
R-squared 0.32
i ™ > ______________
Coefficient Std.Error t-statistic 
Constant 0.03 0.48 0.06
Ln (1940) -0.02 0.14 -0.12
R-squared________ 0.01__________________
Source: own calculations, for more details see pages 340-344
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5. Conclusions
It has been seen in this chapter that, even with the small data set, when looking at the 
entire period 1940-2000, absolute p-convergence appears to be present among the four 
countries of MERCOSUR. However, when further sub-periods are distinguished, more 
differences can be found and periods of convergence are followed by periods of non­
convergence, which was also mentioned for the European Union, in particular by Tavera 
(1999)- pages 113 and 304.
In the case of MERCOSUR, the decade of the sixties shows no convergence, while the 
seventies show strong convergence. In fact, the seventies were the decade in which 
convergence was strongest. As mentioned earlier, and due to the few observations, we 
cannot draw strong econometric conclusions based on these data. However, the results 
can be taken as indicative. Moreover, these results coincide with similar studies 
performed for the area such as Dobson and Ramlogan (2002) and Caceres and Sandoval 
(1999), where due to the low growth of Argentina and Uruguay and the relatively high 
growth of Brazil convergence was present in the seventies.
The findings of convergence for whole periods, while divergence and convergence are 
found for sub-periods is significant, as will be mentioned throughout the thesis since this 
highlights the lack of automatic convergence and the presence of other variables. These 
variables can then either lower convergence or prevent it from taking place. As 
mentioned in previous chapters, political and macro variables may affect the process of 
convergence and this will try to be determined empirically for Argentina and Brazil in the 
following chapters. If subperiods of convergence and divergence are found for all areas 
under study, the case for external factors affecting convergence becomes stronger, and so 
does the case for regional policies and institutions that deal with disparities.
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6Argentina: Origin of Disparities
1. Introduction
The objective of this chapter is to analyse the development of regional economic 
disparities in Argentina from a historical viewpoint in the light of the theoretical 
framework described in Part I of this thesis. The dichotomy between the interior and 
Buenos Aires in Argentina was not present in colonial times and, in fact, Buenos Aires 
and its surroundings only gained importance after independence. The differences in 
income within the country at that time, therefore, were much different that the ones seen 
in Figure 1.4 in the introductory chapter of this thesis. The concentration of income 
around the Buenos Aires area after independence was aggravated by the export-led 
development model and later deepened by the import substitution industrialisation 
strategy that followed.
Although the economies of the interior had been the centre of trade during colonial times, 
they became increasingly isolated after independence and failed to achieve a self- 
sustainable status. In colonial times the north of the present territory of Argentina acted 
as a satellite economy for the mining centre in Potosi, its prosperity stemming from the 
role as commercial and trade centres. However, after independence, the balance of power 
shifted towards Buenos Aires and the littoral. With Buenos Aires becoming the main 
trading and commercial port, the north-east no longer was at the centre of any important 
commercial route, therefore propelling the decline of the economies of the interior.
The lack o f regional development planning in the country together with the natural 
position of Buenos Aires as a port and commercial centre would accentuate these 
differences and gave the process a self-reinforcing nature. At the beginning of the
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twentieth century, the agricultural, export model gave the country a striking unequal 
development pattern with both the international port of Buenos Aires and the pampa at its 
core. The industrialisation process, by focusing on the substitution of imported 
consumption goods, privileged the domestic market and therefore reinforced this 
concentration trend. The shift of the economic centre from the interior to the littoral was 
of a permanent nature reinforced by large migration flows and disparities between these 
two areas far from converging are still significant.
The second section o f this chapter provides a historical account o f the process that shaped 
the balance o f power between Buenos Aires and the provinces from early colonial times, 
highlighting the origins as well as the reinforcement of the concentration process. Section 
3 of this chapter will briefly mention regional development policies that were put into 
practice in Argentina in the second half of last century and the effects they had, which 
will also be relevant for the analysis in the following chapter.
2. From Colony to Nation
2.1. The interior in colonial times (1516-1810)
The interior and littoral developed at different times in the viceroyalty of the River Plate. 
The littoral did not develop until the nineteenth century because o f the patterns of 
international trade oriented to metal extracting industries. The centre of colonisation was 
in Potosi (Cortes Conde and Gallo, 1967). During the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, the territories of the River Plate were among the least developed of all Spanish 
settlements and belonged to the viceroyalty of the Upper Peru. The most important 
settlements in the present territory o f Argentina lay along a route that stretched from 
Buenos Aires towards the mining city of Potosi in the Upper Peru through the provinces 
of Santa Fe, Cordoba, Santiago del Estero, San Miguel de Tucuman, Salta and Jujuy (see 
Map of Colonial Argentina, p. 402). The silver mines, which had been discovered as 
early as 1545, had been producing a significant output since the last quarter of the 
sixteenth century, linking Potosi with the ports in the River Plate - both in Buenos Aires 
and in Santa Fe. Although the main settlements were founded along this route, there were
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other minor ones. One of them was further west to La Rioja and Catamarca; another 
northward from Buenos Aires to Asuncion del Paraguay along the Parana River passing 
through the city o f Corrientes; and a third in the Cuyo region, comprising Mendoza, San 
Luis and San Juan. Apart from those settlements, the rest of the territory was uninhabited 
(Rock, 1986).
The interior towns* economic structure developed as a supplier of the mining region of 
Upper Peru. The Andean region provided animals, food and textiles. Santiago del Estero 
not only traded mules but was also a significant exporter of cloth; Tucuman replaced 
Santiago as a major link on the route to Potosi, producing rice, cotton, mules and oxcarts. 
Cordoba’s central location on the trade routes between Cuyo, Buenos Aires and the 
northwest, ensured commercial prosperity and it soon displaced Santiago del Estero as 
Argentina’s main urban centre. La Rioja produced wines, wheat, textiles and mules, 
while Salta and Jujuy were focal points for trade. By contrast to these economies, the 
urban settlements o f the coast lagged several decades behind those o f the interior (Scobie, 
1971; Halperin Donghi, 1975).
The second founding of the city of Buenos Aires in 1580 responded to the objective of 
establishing a military settlement rather than as an effort to exploit its potential as an 
Atlantic port. The city was not allowed to practise free trade since the Spanish Crown 
feared that non-Spanish goods would invade the markets in Peru and that untaxed silver 
exported through Buenos Aires would end up in the hands of Spain’s enemies. Trade 
between Buenos Aires and Brazil was first authorised in 1587, but a few years later all 
trade was forbidden except that in Spanish ships authorised by the Crown.
In 1601 trade with the Portuguese was re-established, but Buenos Aires was only 
exporting cattle and importing some manufactured products. However, both slave and 
silver trade were still forbidden, which led to some traders to abandon Buenos Aires. 
Since it was still considered a key point of defence, in 1617 the area was divided into 
two; which gave Buenos Aires an administrative control over Paraguay. A new set of 
regulations was issued whereby two licensed Spanish ships were allowed to enter the port
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each year. Nevertheless, dealings in silver and slave trade remained forbidden. Therefore, 
in order to prevent the exchange of slaves and silver the ships stopped at Brazil only on 
their way back.
This also failed and in an effort to control the flow of silver reaching the port of Buenos 
Aires, the Spanish set a tariff line in 1622 in Cordoba, named Aduana Seca. A 50 per cent 
ad valorem tax was imposed on goods passing through Cordoba, halfway in the route 
from Buenos Aires and Tucuman. Spain only allowed the exports of cattle from the port 
of Buenos Aires, and the import of European goods was to remain a Spanish monopoly. 
Overall, this system persisted for another 150 years, but the tariff line was moved from 
Cordoba to Jujuy in 1696. That move helped to bring Tucuman closer to the commercial 
influence of Buenos Aires. However, the Aduana Seca was not enough to stop silver from 
Potosi reaching Buenos Aires (Burgin, 1971).
The economy o f the Upper Peru entered a period of decline that was partly stemmed in 
the 1730s, when a series o f reforms were introduced. Taxes were raised to give incentives 
to production, and a more flexible labour system was introduced. As a result, between 
1740 and 1790 the production doubled to reach that of the earlier century. This recovery 
had an impact on the southern areas of Upper Peru (Bolivia). In the case of Salta, the 
development of the mule trade was impressive, and it is estimated that between 1740 and 
1810 up to 70,000 mules per year were traded in the market. Trade routes through 
Santiago del Estero, Salta and Jujuy recommenced (Rock, 1986).
By the 1770s, Tucuman and the provinces of Cuyo had increased their population 
dramatically. Mendoza, a town with only 1,000 inhabitants in 1724, had increased its 
population to 4,000 by 1754 and to 7,000 in 1770. In Santiago del Estero the population 
reached 15,000 in 1778 and in both La Rioja and Catamarca about 9,000. By 1809, 
population had expanded to 40,000 in Santiago del Estero and to 24,000 in Catamarca. 
The population of both Tucuman and Cuyo together reached about 250,000 in 1809. By 
1750, Tucuman was the source of textiles, while Cuyo produced wines and liquors and 
the northeast sugar, cotton, yerba mate and tobacco. These communities were more o f a
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competitive than complementary nature, with the result of scarce trade between them. 
The main objective was to trade in exchange for silver to be able to buy imported goods 
from abroad. Tucuman became a trade centre linking the coast with the interior, while in 
Cuyo the main trading links were with Chile rather than with the coastal areas. The end 
of the Spanish commercial system contributed to the decline in both regions and it was 
not until the following century that these economies would recover. However, this 
recovery was not accompanied by changes in the system of production and did not foster 
any local economic integration. Therefore, these economies still remained static and 
relatively backward and subject to a series of crises (Rock, 1986).
Until 1776, the present Argentine territory was under the political and administrative 
control of Lima. However, the Bourbon reforms conferred upon the region a separate 
viceroyalty o f the River Plate. As a consequence of this reform, Buenos Aires flourished 
as the capital o f the viceroyalty, and its port became the centre o f the trade between Spain 
and the newly constituted viceroyalty. In 1777 the Aduana Seca was abolished and 
coined silver from Potosi would be sent to Buenos Aires instead of Lima. It was also 
determined that the former would be the official port o f access for supplies of Spanish 
mercury for the mines in Potosi (Burgin, 1971).
In the interior, and unlike Buenos Aires, the regions remained as satellite economies, 
changing the political and economic dominance of the Upper Peru for that of Buenos 
Aires. The main difference now was that before they were part of the trading route from 
Potosi to Buenos Aires, where silver would now be shipped to Europe. However, at this 
stage, Buenos Aires was free to trade directly with Spain without prior approval of Lima 
and so the trading route declined in favour of other manufactured products.
The Bourbon reforms constituted an attempt to diversify the colonial economies and 
export a wider range of colonial products, especially raw materials in need for the 
Spanish industry. The main objective was that the empire should be self-sufficient with 
the manufacturing industries located in Spain. Thus, competing products manufactured in 
the colonies, such as wines and textiles, were discouraged. In 1778, ‘free trade* was
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proclaimed in the port o f Buenos Aires. This concept of ‘free trade’ meant that it was still 
a Spanish monopoly and any foreign goods imported by the colony would pay a duty 
double or more than that of Spanish goods. As a consequence of the favoured treatment 
received by the Spanish goods, wines and textiles from the interior were damaged after 
1776 (Brown, 1979; Burgin, 1971).
Originally intended to strengthen the power of the crown, the Bourbon reforms had the 
opposite effect. ‘Free trade’, far from being entirely directed to Spain, was mostly 
conducted with foreigners. The wars in Spain and subsequent disruption o f trade, 
particularly the imported supplies of mercury used in the Potosi mines, decreased silver 
production. The shortage of money induced economic depression and resulted in 
complaints from the interior. In the area of Cuyo, in the provinces of San Juan, Mendoza 
and San Luis, the proximity to the Chilean market had outstripped trading with the 
coastal areas. However, the increasing administrative control exercised by Buenos Aires 
weakened the links with Chile and after independence, trade between both nations 
became ever scarcer. With the exception of cattle, products at both sides of the Andes 
became more competitive and Mendoza lost its importance as a commercial centre. As in 
the case of Tucuman, it was only the railroads of the 1860s that would bring a certain 
recovery, providing Mendoza the opportunity for its wines o f reaching the coastal areas. 
Neither o f the other two provinces, San Juan and San Luis, experienced such recovery 
(Scobie, 1971).
In the 1760s, the Jesuits were expelled from the territory, and the Indian agricultural 
settlements along the Parana River disintegrated. Their influence had been at its highest 
in the decades after 1680. Besides their supremacy in Cordoba and Buenos Aires 
particularly in the field of education, they had established thirty colonies in the Upper 
Parana, and by 1700 the missions included 50,000 Indians. They subsisted on pasturing 
and agriculture. However, these missions were weaker than they seemed and ceased 
growing after 1730. Besides, the Jesuits’ power within the Church began to decline. 
Conflicts escalated culminating in the expulsion from the territories. The area turned into 
a pastoral economy since the Crown lost all interest in it due to the lack of gold or silver.
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The wars of independence led to a further decline of the missions. It was not until the 
following century with immigration flows and specialisation in yerba mate, tea, tobacco, 
rice and cotton that the area recovered from its decline (Scobie, 1971; Rock, 1986).
While the interior was facing economic difficulties as a result o f the creation of the new 
viceroyalty, from the late 1770s onwards the city of Buenos Aires expanded at an 
accelerated rate. With only 5,000 inhabitants in 1680, the population rose from 20,000 in 
1766 to 27,000 in 1780 and a further 42,000 by 1810. Besides, between the 1770s and the 
late 1790s, the volume of shipping in the port of Buenos Aires doubled. The city also saw 
improvements in paving, lighting and hygiene. Hospitals and schools were created and 
cultural activities developed (Rock, 1986).
2.2. Independence and the increasing importance of Buenos Aires 
(1810-1900)
Independence, supported by commercial and cattle interests in Buenos Aires, accentuated 
the economic pre-eminence of the coast and accelerated the interior’s decline. It 
determined the isolation of the provinces and acted as a trigger to the expansion of 
Argentina’s coastal area. The port of Buenos Aires became the centre of trade between 
Europe and the pampa. Not only was it the point of contact with the outside world but it 
also absorbed almost all investment, technology and immigration. Moreover, the 
livestock expanded due to the external demand and therefore the number of imports 
increased. These goods from the interior could not compete with European ones, both in 
terms of prices and quality (Cortes Conde and Gallo, 1967).
tV»The Revolution of May 25 1810 established a ‘first’ provisional government (Primera 
Junta) that would govern mainly as a reaction to the French invasion of Spain in 1808. In 
order to legitimise its power as well as to enhance it, representatives from the interior 
were invited to a congress that would determine the position of the viceroyalty towards 
the events in Spain. In many areas of the interior, such as Santa Fe, Corrientes, Cuyo and 
Salta, the revolution received immediate support particularly due to the crisis in trade that 
had been severely affecting those territories in the previous years. The secretary to the
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Junta, Moreno, was in favour o f a declaration of independence and the proclamation of a 
republic. Moreover, he insisted on full control of the revolutionary movement from 
Buenos Aires. Through this, he sought to enhance political centralisation and to allow 
Buenos Aires to maintain its free trade privileges. Rock (1986) considers this to be the 
first manifestation of the regional issue in Argentina. However, Saavedra, president of the 
Junta, was in favour of governing on behalf of the Spanish king and advocated for a 
shared government with the provinces. As a consequence, political tensions between the 
two erupted, which ended in the departure of Moreno. Saavedra then enlarged the Junta 
to include representatives from the interior as well as allowing the creation of provincial 
Juntas.
Economic disruption in the interior was more severe after 1810 since as the British 
increased their trade with Buenos Aires, cheap manufactures reached the markets, which 
meant more competition for the already fragile economies of the interior. At the same 
time, independence meant for the economies of the interior isolation from areas that 
during the colonial period had been integrated. Moreover, after 1810, markets and silver 
contracted even further and the economies of the interior collapsed. In addition, the wars 
of independence brought further strain to these economies. Thus, at this point, the 
provinces not only supported independence from Spain but also from Buenos Aires. The 
struggle of the interior against the centralist power of Buenos Aires would shape the 
relations between both areas for several decades (Burgin, 1971).
The ‘enlarged’ Junta - or Junta Grande - was dissolved and was replaced by a 
triumvirate government, which was insensitive to provincial interests. The provincial 
Juntas were dissolved and issued a provisional statute creating an assembly with limited 
powers. Although this was supposed to represent the interior, most o f the delegates were 
from Buenos Aires. The triumvirate initiated aggressive efforts to enhance and defend the 
political primacy of Buenos Aires. These included the promotion of trade from the port of 
Buenos Aires, the appointment o f officials, the strengthening of the city’s financial 
activities, the creation of meat salt plants (saladeros) and land colonisation by European 
immigrants.
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The triumvirate adopted an unprecedented free trade policy, which intensified the 
economic crisis throughout the interior. In 1811, a proposal for internal free trade by 
eliminating all provincial tariffs, excises and transit taxes was met by strong opposition 
by the interior. In 1813, a second triumvirate organised the congress that had been 
planned earlier for 1810. Even though it did not provide a full declaration of 
independence, it declared the newly named Provincias Unidas del Rio de la Plata 
(United Provinces of the River Plate) making significant efforts to include the provinces 
in the interior.
The congress dismantled the intendencies of Cordoba and Salta, and these cities, as well 
as Corrientes, were granted self-government. By the end of 1814, most of the cities in the 
interior and the surrounding regions had been granted the status of provinces and 
governors had been appointed. However, regional tensions persisted with a growing 
division between centralists -  unitarios - in Buenos Aires and federalists in the interior. 
Most o f the conflicts lay in whether the revenues from the customs duties at the port of 
Buenos Aires would have to be shared among the provinces. As a result of the costly war 
against Spain, the triumvirate adopted a free-trade policy, which intensified economic 
crises in the interior (Rock, 1986).
The disruption of colonial trading system placed the northern provinces at the end of an 
extremely expensive trading route instead of being major trading links. For instance, by 
1830, the cost of moving a ton of goods from Salta to Buenos Aires was thirteen times 
more expensive than moving it from Liverpool to Buenos Aires. Freight costs were the 
factor that prevented the products from the interior reaching the market and being able to 
compete with overseas imports. In the case of Mendoza’s wine, half of its selling price in 
Buenos Aires was to cover transport costs. The only export products that reached the 
coast in competitive terms were dry hides, wool and horsehair. Since most trade went 
through Buenos Aires and provinces were free to apply levies, Buenos Aires collected the 
largest revenues. Each province charged whenever goods crossed its boundaries.
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Therefore, provinces such as Salta and Jujuy had negligible revenues and made the 
interior even more dependent on Buenos Aires (Scobie, 1971; Burgin, 1971).
In 1816, independence was officially declared on July 9th in Tucuman. The congress 
moved to Buenos Aires and produced a centralist Constitution in 1819 reaffirming the 
supremacy of Buenos Aires that was repudiated by all the provinces. A new crisis then 
erupted and most provinces met in cabildos abiertos to proclaim self-rule. Provincial 
warlords (caudillos) formally took power. In 1820, Santa Fe, Corrientes and Entre Rios 
defeated Buenos Aires. The Constitution of 1819 was eliminated, and Buenos Aires had 
to accept the principle of federalism through the election of its governor and legislature, 
free navigation of rivers and no further interference with the commerce of the littoral 
(Burgin, 1971; Scobie, 1971).
The dictatorial government of Rosas (1835-1851) placed Buenos Aires ahead of the rest 
of the country and deepened the gap between the two. The constitution of 1853, finally 
accepted by Buenos Aires in 1861, established a federal regime, an elected bicameral 
legislature and an independent judiciary. It also committed the state to increasing 
population through immigration, the development o f communications and the promotion 
of new industry. The constitution banned all restraints to internal trade and provided for a 
national senate where the interior would be represented. In 1880, with the appointment of 
Buenos Aires as capital of the republic, the political struggle between Buenos Aires and 
the provinces was at least formally over (Burgin, 1971; Rock, 1986).
At the same time and throughout the interior, the pattern of local production still 
resembled that o f a century earlier. Textiles had survived in Catamarca and Corrientes; 
Tucuman remained specialised in ox carts while in La Rioja, where silver mining had 
been a failure, cattle herding was combined with fruit farming. In Corrientes, yerba mate, 
tobacco, and fruits were cultivated besides the textile production. Through this period, the 
provinces had managed to maintain some of their colonial commercial links with 
neighbouring regions in an effort to protect from Buenos Aires. In the 1850s, Salta still
151
exported mules to the north and Cuyo subsisted by exporting cattle to Chile (Burgin, 
1971).
The pre-eminence of Buenos Aires became more evident after 1860, as the nodal point of 
the new railroad system. The construction of the first railroad began in 1854, the 
Ferrocarril del Oeste (Western Railway) and a second rail line (Central Argentina 
Railway) linked Rosario and Cordoba. The former was mainly financed by local capital 
but the latter was owned and mostly financed by British capital. A second British 
railway, the Buenos Aires Great Southern, began its service in 1864. Other British 
railroad companies followed, and by 1880 there were seven of them covering a total 
1,600-mile network. In fact, by 1870, more than half of the railways were owned by 
foreigners. At the end of the 1860s, the Central Argentine Railroad from Rosario to 
Cordoba was nearing completion. Colonies were established alongside the railroad. By 
1880, the limits to southern expansion were removed after the “Conquest o f the Desert” 
led by Roca, whereby indigenous settlements south of the Rio Negro valley were 
destroyed. As a result, at the end of the 1890s the railways system was extended to 
Patagonia (Scobie, 1971; Randall, 1978).
Railroads provided the most effective force in focusing the Argentine economy towards 
the coast and city of Buenos Aires. The Argentine system, in contrast with Europe or the 
United States, was developed without any feeder lines or connecting links and its ‘fan­
like’ shape with centre in Buenos Aires prolonged the isolation of the interior. Despite 
the railway mostly favouring the concentration in Buenos Aires, it also proved a 
significant change for some provinces. The most dramatic impact was in Tucuman and 
Mendoza. In Tucuman, as early as the 18th century, sugar was grown but it was 
overshadowed by the output of Brazil sugar. Once the railroad arrived in Tucuman in 
1876, sugar could finally be transported in competitive terms to the coast and could serve 
the domestic demand. In the late 19th century Tucuman became the centre of sugar 
production with its best period being between 1890 and 1895 with output increasing by 
ten-fold. However, sugar failed to secure a balanced source of growth for the province; 
rural population was highly concentrated and seasonal work was attracted from
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neighbouring areas. An overproduction crisis in 1896 followed by a five-year crisis 
translated in the closing down of several small businesses (Brown, 1979; Bethell, 1993).
The expansion of the railroad also changed Mendoza, where the production of grapes 
dated from colonial times. In the mid-17th century, wine was already being transported to 
Buenos Aires and during the 19th century continued to be the main export o f Mendoza 
and San Juan, despite facing competition from Europe and the United States. After 1885, 
both the railroads and the tariff protection stimulated Mendoza’s vineyards. For the other 
provinces, though, the railroads were not so beneficial since products not only imported 
but also produced in the coastal areas reached the interior. This competition ruined many 
of the interior’s industries and accentuated the difference between both areas. The 
railway also facilitated the spread of an agricultural economy throughout Argentina. By 
1880, Argentina was becoming a major world producer o f temperate cereals. Between 
1872 and 1895 the cultivated acreage in the pampa increased by fifteen times with cereals 
that had a negligible share o f exports in 1870 increasing to a 50 per cent of export values 
by 1900. Argentina became a major producer of wheat. The sharp increase in the volume 
of exports of wheat can be seen in Table 6.1, where in only twenty years, from 1870 to 
1890, exports increased dramatically (Scobie, 1971).
Table 6.1. The Wheat Trade, 1870-1895 (in Metric Tons, Five-Year Averages)
EXPORTS IMPORTS
1870-1874 77 2,110
1875-1879 5,700 1,200
1880-1884 34,400 6,100
1885-1889 115,200 600
1890-1894 782,000 300
Source: Rock (1986)
The country’s population increased from an estimated half million in 1816 to 1.7 million 
in 1869 and reached almost 4 million by 1895 (Table 6.2). However, the rate o f growth 
was much faster in the littoral than in the interior. Between the first and second national
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census (in 1869 and 1895), the population of the province of Buenos Aires almost 
trebled; that of Santa Fe had increased more than fourfold, in Cordoba more than doubled 
and in Entre Rios and Corrientes almost doubled. In Tucuman and Mendoza, the major 
growth centres o f the interior apart from the littoral, population doubled between 1869 
and 1895. By contrast, in Catamarca, population in the period only increased by 13 per 
cent and in Salta 30 per cent. Buenos Aires and Cordoba grew faster than ever before, the 
former becoming the largest city in Latin America. While in 1854 the population was 
90,000, by 1869 it had increased to 187,000 and to a further 663,000 by 1895. Similarly, 
the people living in the city o f Buenos Aires as a percentage of total population grew 
from 10 per cent in 1869 to 16 per cent by 1895. In 1869, 53 per cent o f the national 
population lived in the provinces of Buenos Aires, Entre Rios, Santa Fe and Cordoba but 
in 1895 this proportion had increased to 67 per cent (Rock, 1986).
Table 6.2. Population by Provinces, 1869- 1895
1869 1895 Growth
Bs.As 308,000 921,000 199%
Capital Federal 187,100 663,000 254%
Catamarca 80,000 90,000 13%
Cordoba 210,000 351,000 67%
Corrientes 129,000 239,000 85%
Entre Rios 134,000 292,000 118%
La Rioja 48,000 69,000 44%
Mendoza 65,000 116,000 78%
Salta 88,000 118,000 34%
San Juan 60,000 84,000 40%
San Luis 53,000 81,000 53%
Santa Fe 89,000 397,000 346%
Tucuman 108,000 215,000 99%
TOTAL 1,731,300 3,926,178 127%
Average 119,931 279,692 133%
Standard Dev. 75,416 257,249 98%
Source: Vazquez Presedo (1971)
The large differences between the rates of growth of population in certain provinces can 
be seen in Table 6.2, which are more impressive given the lapse o f 26 years. While in
Capital Federal this accounts for 254 per cent, in Catamarca this is only 13 per cent. It 
can be seen that all the provinces in the pampa and the littoral have increased their 
population dramatically while the provinces in the north are those with lower growth 
rates. In particular, Santa Fe registers a higher growth than Capital Federal, followed by 
Buenos Aires province and Entre Rios. The lowest growth is for Catamarca, as already 
mentioned, followed by Salta, San Juan and La Rioja. Tucuman, although having a lower 
than average growth in the period, increases its population more than any other province 
in the north because of the sugar production, with most of the population increase 
concentrated in the last few years (mainly from 1890 to 1895, when sugar production was 
at its peak) Moreover, according to Mulhall (1876) one eight of the population was 
foreigner, with a marked predominance of Italians, Spanish, French and English.
2.3. The Early Twentieth Century
From 1860 to 1930, Argentina grew at a rate that has few parallels in modem global 
economic history. After 1840, wool exports gave a new stimulus to the economy. 
Between 1880 and 1900, grain exports rose from practically nothing to several millions 
o f tons; after 1900, chilled and frozen beef exports became significant and rose very 
rapidly. The dynamism arising from exports of rural origin and the capital inflow 
associated with it spread to other sectors of the economy. The high propensity to import 
manufactures undoubtedly decreased potential backward linkages (Diaz Alejandro, 
1970).
During the period 1890-1930, Argentina remained a producer of raw materials and food, 
living from the pampa and failing to diversify into manufacturing. The pampa was, after 
Buenos Aires, the most advanced in the country. A network of railroads covered the area 
and it was the richest and fastest-expanding region in Latin America. Economic 
expansion was led by agriculture, particularly wheat. By 1904, wheat had surpassed wool 
to become the country’s largest export, and the disparities between the littoral and the 
interior became even more pronounced. The east was the centre of investment and 
consumption while most o f the rest of the country remained backward (Rock, 1986).
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In 1914, the population of Patagonia, a region which comprises about one third o f the 
country’s total territory, accounted for just over 1 per cent of the population, most of it 
settled around the Rio Negro region and much of it of British or Irish origin. Although 
Entre Rios had railroad connections with the Parana ports, the northeast remained a small 
cattle region. Most of Corrientes was similar although some Guarani peasant agriculture 
persisted and tobacco was also grown. Misiones, almost empty since the expulsion of the 
Jesuits, showed more progress. This area had begun to attract immigrants, mainly from 
Polish and German origin that established new yerba mate plantations.
Between 1900 and 1914, sugar output increased by three-fold in Tucuman. For a short 
period, sugar was exported but this came to an end when Europe prohibited imports of 
sugar that was subsidised. In the 1920s, Salta and Jujuy joined Tucuman as producers of 
sugar. However, sugar continued to be a mix of modem and old production methods, 
with minifundios being the rule. The manipulation of stocks was widespread and the 
sugar industry gained a bad reputation. In 1920 the two provinces contributed to about 16 
per cent of the national sugar output but by 1930 their share had risen to almost 26 per 
cent (Bethell, 1993).
There was also growth in fruit production in the Rio Negro valley, in cotton, rice, 
peanuts, fruits and yerba mate in Misiones. In the eastern part o f Chaco, cotton crops had 
begun to be cultivated. In the north o f Santiago del Estero, Santa Fe, and parts of 
Corrientes and the Chaco were devoted to the extraction of quebracho hardwood. In the 
region o f Cuyo, viticulture continued to develop and between 1895 and 1910 the area 
devoted to wine quintupled. By 1914, the annual output was approaching 4 million litres, 
which exceeded Chile’s production and doubled that of California. In Tucuman, sugar 
also prospered. Between 1900 and 1914, production had increased by threefold and this 
region was one of the few apart from the pampa to attract foreign investment (Rock,
1986).
Argentina had 1,800,000 inhabitants in 1869 and on the following half century received 
an injection o f 2,500,000 Europeans. While in 1850s the annual balance of arrivals over
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departures was about 4,000; by the 1880s it had increased to 50,000, and at its 19th 
century peak in 1889 net immigration exceeded 200,000. Except for Tucuman and 
Mendoza, the proportion of foreigners in the interior was negligible: population growth in 
the provinces was determined by natural increases. By contrast, in 1910, three out of four 
adults in the city of Buenos Aires were European-born. By 1914, Argentina had increased 
its population to almost 8 million of which 1,500,000 lived in Buenos Aires (18.75% of 
total population); 200,000 in Rosario (2.5%); 90,000 in La Plata (1.13%) and 60,000 in 
Santa Fe and Bahia Blanca (0.75% respectively) (Scobie, 1971).
Some of the provinces with lowest rates of growth in Table 6.2, such as Catamarca and 
La Rioja, present even lower growth rates for the period 1895-1914 (Table 6.3). The 
littoral, by contrast, still received strong migration flows, though not as strong as in the 
case of Capital Federal. On the other hand, the new territories- such as the provinces in 
Patagonia, as well as Chaco and Formosa- register high growth rates, but this is due not 
to significant quantities but to the importance of migration in previously uninhabited 
areas such as the expansion of the southern frontier after 1880. The most remarkable 
case in this period is that of the province of La Pampa, which registers an extremely high 
growth rate.
The strong immigration was accompanied by a drastic change in the population 
distribution over the territory. Urban centres, which in 1869 accounted for 28 per cent of 
the population, increased to 37 per cent in 1895 and to a further 53 per cent in 1914. The 
four largest provinces in the pampa (Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, Entre Rios, and Cordoba), 
which accounted for 54 per cent of the population in 1869 and 67 per cent in 1895, 
reached 73 per cent in 1914. Taking into account only the province o f Buenos Aires plus 
Capital Federal, in 1869 accounted for 29 per cent of the population while by 1914 
included 46 per cent o f the total population. By contrast, the provinces of the Northwest- 
Catamarca, Tucuman, Santiago del Estero, La Rioja, Salta and Jujuy- the richest and 
most populated during the Spanish period, saw their population share decline from 29 per 
cent in 1869 to 12 per cent in 1914. The provinces with lowest urbanisation rates were 
Neuquen and Rio Negro, both with 8 per cent (Vazquez Presedo, 1971).
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Table 6.3. Population by Provinces, 1895- 1914
1895 1914 Rate of growth
Bs. As 921,000 2,066,000 124%
Cap. Federal 663,000 1,575,000 138%
Catamarca 90,000 100,000 11%
Cdrdoba 351,000 735,000 109%
Corrientes 239,000 347,000 45%
Chaco 10,400 46,300 345%
Chubut 3,700 23,100 524%
Entre Rios 292,000 425,000 46%
Formosa 4,800 19,300 302%
Jujuy 49,000 76,000 55%
La Pampa 2,778 101,000 3,536%
La Rioja 69,000 79,000 14%
Mendoza 116,000 277,000 139%
Misiones 33,200 53,600 61%
Neuqu6n 14,500 28,900 99%
Rio Negro 9,200 42,000 357%
Salta 118,000 140,000 195%
San Juan 84,000 119,000 42%
San Luis 81,000 116,000 43%
Sta Cruz 1,100 9,900 800%
Santa F6 397,000 899,000 126%
S. del Estero 161,000 261,000 62%
T. del Fuego 500 2,500 400%
Tucum&n 215,000 332,000 54%
TOTAL 3,926,178 7,873,600 101%
Average 163,591 328,067 311%
Standard Dev. 228,290 517,457 714%
Source: Vazquez Presedo (1971)
The rest of the country remained mostly unchanged, and the railroads had failed to induce 
a general, rather than regional, development. Conditions in the interior were distinctly 
poor and infant mortality rates often doubled or almost trebled those of Buenos Aires. 
While illiteracy rate in Buenos Aires was only 2.5 per cent, in provinces such as 
Corrientes, San Juan and Misiones it was above 40 per cent. By 1914, Argentina had thus 
evolved into an extremely mixed and diverse society where development and modernity 
only affected the littoral while the interior remained as backward as a century earlier
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(Rock, 1986). By 1914, only 48 per cent of school-age children attended school in Salta 
and Jujuy and 44 per cent in Santiago del Estero in contrast with 61 per cent in the city 
and province of Buenos Aires (Diaz Alejandro, 1970).
Table 6.4. Socio-Economic Indicators at the Beginning of the 20th Century, by Province
Mortality rate Infant m.rate Illiteracy rate
1925-30 1925-29 1914
Bs. As 11.20 98.60 30.80
Capital Federal 13.20 77.90 20.40
Catamarca 10.50 113.20 50.10
Cordoba 16.10 134.70 37.50
Corrientes 10.80 101.70 56.80
Chaco n/a n/a 48.40
Chubut n/a n/a 34.40
Entre Rios 13.20 117.10 40.70
Formosa n/a n/a 54.50
Jujuy 30.10 219.80 65.90
La Pampa n/a n/a 37.00
La Rioja 10.70 n/a 48.70
Mendoza 16.70 156.90 40.80
Misiones n/a n/a 56.10
Neuquen n/a n/a 61.80
Rio Negro n/a n/a 50.90
Salta 26.80 197.70 55.00
San Juan 21.60 229.10 44.10
San Luis 13.20 123.80 36.00
Santa Cruz n/a n/a 21.60
Santa Fe 11.80 114.10 33.80
Sgo. Del Estero 12.00 n/a 65.60
Tierra del Fuego n/a n/a 25.00
Tucuman 22.50 169.90 56.10
Average 16.03 142.65 44.67
Standard Deviation 6.30 48.27 13.24
Source: Diaz Alejandro (1970); V. Presedo (1988)
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3. Modern Disparities and Regional Policies
3.1. Argentina after 1930
The following sub-sections will focus on the national policies undertaken in Argentina 
after 1930 and their impact on industrial concentration, imbalances between regions, 
interregional migration and urbanisation. The first sub-section is a summary of the 
national policies followed after 1930, while the second one addresses some of the 
consequences of these national policies in specific areas. Finally, in Section 2.3 industrial 
promotion policies are summarised with particular emphasis on Tierra del Fuego since, as 
will be seen in the next Chapter, this particular industrial promotion scheme had an 
impact on regional disparities -  see Figures 7.8 and 7.13 in Chapter 7 and the dummy 
analysis for Tierra del Fuego on Table 7.7 on page 209.
The period extending from the post-war and until the mid-eighties was characterised in 
Argentina by both economic and political instability. The industrialisation process in 
Argentina, which had started in the late nineteenth century, developed together with the 
agro-export model until the recession of the 1930’s. At that stage the primary export-led 
model came to an end and industry became a more prominent sector in the economy 
through the process of import-substitution industrialisation (Kosacoff, 2000: 37). 
Kosacoff argues that 1930 is the end of the first of three periods that define Argentine 
industrialisation process, after a period from 1880 when the country integrated into the 
world economy as an agro-export economy (p 39).
Kosacoff identifies a second period for Argentina’s industrialisation process, which 
extends from 1930 to the late 1970 and is associated to the ISI strategy in which foreign 
trade became less and less important in terms of GDP share. The first (easy) stage of 
industrialisation, therefore, developed under these conditions. In the following period 
(1946-58) industrialisation deepened under Peron by expanding the existing activities and 
the intensive use of labour and the expansion of the domestic market. The active role of 
the state in both production and policy such as quotas, financing of industrial activities 
(thought the Industrial Bank) and the promotion of certain economic sectors (Kosacoff, 
2000: 42).
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At the time that Peron got to power, the economy was still mainly relying on beef and 
grain exports. The industrial sector that had developed after First World War and again 
during the 30s when all imports were limited, developed largely without any government 
support. The European immigration plus the internal urbanisation following the 
depression o f the 30s, had developed into a major urban poverty problem. Therefore, 
Peron’s solution was to redistribute wealth from agro export sectors to subsidised 
industry so that industrial workers would be benefited. He relied on several mechanisms 
for this. The first one was an institution (IAPI), which replaced the marketing boards in 
hands o f agro exporters and exported at high process while paying the producers prices 
below world market. The difference would then be applied to governmental subsidies to 
new industrial enterprises. He also concentrated in significant public work programmes 
and established a wage setting apparatus and a social security tax system (Ascher, 1984: 
54).
Peron initially outlined two five-year plans. However, in practise, these plans consisted 
more on exceptions of tariffs, taxes rather than a coherent plan. A massive public works 
program was launched. His wage setting mechanism was differentiated, that is not all 
workers had the same wages and this depended on each union’s bargaining power 
(Ascher, 1984: 56).
The economic structure changed considerably. While agriculture decreased from 20per 
cent of GNP in 1946, it accounted for 11-12 per cent in 1983. Industry, on the other hand, 
increased from 20 per cent to 37 per cent in 1974 and since then a slow process of de 
industrialisation has been taken place. It can be seen in Table 6.5 that the share of 
manufacturing industry in the period 1900-1990 by decades. There was a continuous 
growth with a peak in the period 1960-9 and in the following period a process of de 
industrialisation begins. The decline was such that for the last sub period on the table the 
share of manufacturing industry in GDP is comparable to that of the 1940s.
161
Table 6.5. Manufacturing industry’s share o f GDP (at factor cost)
Period Share (%)
1900-1909 15.35
1910-1919 16.54
1920-1929 18.65
1930-1939 21.06
1940-1949 24.22
1950-1959 24.80
1960-1969 28.18
1970-1979 27.23
1980-1990 23.60
Source: Kosacoff (2000:28]
As Di Telia and Dombusch (1989:6) say it is the asymmetry between the export 
contribution o f the smaller agricultural sector and that of industry that constitutes one of 
the striking structural imbalances in the economy.
The third period of ISI in Argentina began in 1958 and continued until the mid 70s. this 
was based on the petrochemical industry and on the complex metal products and 
machinery. This period corresponds to the most significant one in terms of industrial 
share in the total economy, as seen in the previous table. Industry then became the 
“engine of growth” for the whole economy as well as for job creation. However, as 
foreign technologies were being adapted to local production, the industry’s own trade 
deficit restricted the possibilities of achieving industrial growth without endangering the 
balance of payments. Solutions within the framework of ISI were sought. Among these, 
programmes o f incentives to export manufactured goods were introduced as well as other 
attempts to deepen the ISI by reducing the country’s dependency on imports of basic 
industrial goods. This led to the promotion of some major industrial projects in order to 
produce these inputs locally (Kosacoff, 2000: 43).
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Argentine’s national policies have been quite frequently short-term, sometimes due to 
their inherent failures and others due to political interruptions. There seems to be a 
consistent lack o f national development policies, and the only exception is the 
development plan carried out by Frondizi between 1958 and 1962. After the brief military 
government of 1955-58, Frondizi came to power and attempted a comprehensive 
development plan. This plan intended to accelerate the growth rate o f the Argentine 
economy through and increase in investment and by concentrating on a few import- 
substituting sectors of the economy (Petrecolla in Di Telia & Dombusch, 1989:108) His 
objective was to strengthen the industrialisation process initiated by Peron but without 
some of the distortions and the strong state intervention.
At the time, Argentina’s position was deteriorating relative to other countries. The 
industrialisation had not been enough in order to break from the agro export structure and 
the growth rate was not enough when compared to Brazil. The growth rate was limited by 
its capacity to import which, in turn, depended mostly on agricultural exports. The 
objective was then to move from the light industry substitution towards basic industries. 
Given the country’s lack of domestic savings -  both for the private and state sectors -  and 
the inability to supply the resources as well as the technology, foreign investors were 
granted incentives. A list of prioritised industries was made, which included petroleum 
and gas, chemical and petrochemical industries, steel, coal and iron and automobiles. The 
main idea behind this was the creation of linkages that would, in turn, foster development 
(Petrecolla: 109).
However, this was not enough in order to create the stimulus needed. A stabilisation 
programme was agreed with the IMF. However, the demand for imports was still high. 
The policy against agriculture in place since the 30s was aggravated in this period given 
the incentives granted to industrial activities (Petrecolla, 122).
In 1962 Frondizi was overthrown an a year later Illia was elected. His government was 
characterised by a lack of support as well as uncertainty during the period. The 
administrations objective was to promote rapid expansion and rectify imbalances in the
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economy. The economic team in the government had been trained at ECLA and were 
thus under structuralist influence. Therefore, an active role of the state was carried out 
together with planning of the economy. The planning agency was formed -  CONADE -  
and was directed to develop a five-year plan in order to coordinate all economic sectors. 
However, the growing opposition to Illia ended in his downfall in 1966 and the five-year 
plan came into effect only in 1965 (Ascher, 1984: 193).
After 1976, the Argentine economy began a process of liberalisation, with more openness 
and the reliability on market forces for resource allocation. In 1978 the policy applied 
was that o f the monetary school. The main objective was to bring the inflation rate down 
by controlling the exchange rate so a pre-set exchange rate changes (tablita) was 
implemented. However, adjustment was very slow and the overvaluation of the peso 
together with an increasing openness resulted in an increase in imports. An unrestricted 
inflow of capital that served to compensate for the current account deficits derived in a 
strong level o f foreign indebtedness in the economy. The combination o f a low demand 
for locally produced goods (affected by foreign competition) and the damaging effect of 
the overvaluation on the export sector led to the worst crisis to hit the industrial sector 
(Kosacoff, 2000: 45).
The debt crisis was the turning point in the application of the ISI model, and it signalled a 
decade of economic instability and “stabilisation” programmes that ended in 1991 after 
the hyperinflationary periods of 1989 and 1990. Within this period, three economic plans 
aimed at stabilisation, control inflation and generate trade surpluses were implemented -  
Austral Plan, Spring Plan and Bunge and Bom Plan. None of them achieved the desired 
results. The 1991 Convertibility Plan was passed, successfully achieving between 1991 
and 1994 an increase in economic activity, a decrease in the rate of inflation and an 
expansion of international financing (Kosacoff, 2000: 47-57).
3.2. Effects of national policies
The import substitution industrialisation strategy that replaced the export led model 
accentuated the differences between rural and urban Argentina even further. The growth of
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manufacturing in Buenos Aires, together with the contraction o f agriculture from the late 
1930s, attracted internal migration from rural areas, which constituted a large proportion of 
the new urban industrial working class. Between 1914 and 1935, 5 per cent of the growth 
of Greater Buenos Aires was due to migration from the hinterland; while between 1937 
and 1947 that rate had increased to 37 per cent. As industrial growth accelerated, annual 
migration increased from an average of 70,000 in the period 1937-1943 to 117,000 in the 
following five years. This internal migration increased the population o f the city o f Buenos 
Aires from some 1.5 million in 1914 to 3.4 million in 1935 and a further 4.7 million by 
1947. Altogether, between 1937 and 1947, some 750,000 migrants arrived in Greater 
Buenos Aires. An estimated two-thirds of migrants came from the pampas and about 40 
per cent of them from the province of Buenos Aires. It can be seen in Table 6.5 that almost 
60 per cent of migrants to Greater Buenos Aires by 1947 were from the littoral, comprising 
the provinces of Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, Entre Rios, Corrientes and Cordoba (Rock, 
1993).
Table 6.6. Migration to Greater Buenos Aires by 1947 from Places of Origin
Migrants Percentage of total
Littoral 1,016,000 59.6
Northwest 117,000 6.8
Centre-west 61,000 3.5
Northeast 17,000 0.9
South 53,000 3.1
Note: Littoral includes provinces of Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, Entre Rios, Corrientes, Cordoba; Northwest: Catamarca, 
Tucuman, Santiago del Estero, La Rioja, Salta, Jujuy; Centre-west: San Luis, San Juan, Mendoza; northeast: Chaco, 
Formosa, Misiones; South: La Pampa, Neuquen, Rio Negro, Chubut, Santa Cruz, Tierra del Fuego.
Source: Rock (1986)
Regarding the concentration of population, at the time of the fourth national census, in 
1947, the population was twice the figure registered in 1914, reaching 15,800,000 people. 
The level of urbanisation achieved in Argentina in the 40s was remarkable. While at the 
end of the 19th century 1,500,000 people lived in urban centres; fifty years later this had 
increased to 10,000,000, representing 60 per cent of the total population. Urban growth 
had generated employment opportunities and salaried employment increased within the
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economically active population. While at the end of the century salaried workers 
represented 36 per cent of the economically active population, by 1947 this had almost 
doubled. In addition, the creation of a vast middle class was also significant (Golbert and 
Fanfani, 1994).
The expansion of Greater Buenos Aires continued throughout the 1950s. While in 1947, a 
29.7 per cent o f the national population lived in Greater Buenos Aires, this reached 33.8 
per cent in 1960. In 1947, the Federal District plus the provinces o f Buenos Aires, 
Cordoba, Entre Rios and Santa Fe accounted for 70.7 per cent o f the total population. 
However, after 1960, this share remained mostly the same (Diaz Alejandro, 1970).
Figure 6.1. Distribution of Population by Region (1869-1960)
100%
1869 1895 1914 1947 1960
□  PAMPEANA ■  NORDESTE □  NOROES7E □  CUYANA ■  PATAGONICA 
Source: INDEC, own calculations
The importance of internal migrations was considerable until 1960-70 and then it 
decreased. It is estimated that from 1895 onwards some 7 million people moved 
provinces (Velazquez and Morina, 1996). Lattes (1975) shows that until 1914 the 
migratory flows that predominate in Argentina are those among neighbouring provinces, 
while between 1914 and 1947 there is a transition period after which the main destination 
for migrants is Greater Buenos Aires regardless of the distance from to originating 
province.
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This process o f urbanisation and concentration aggravated already present interregional 
disparities. While Capital Federal was 100 per cent urban followed by Buenos Aires 
province (with almost 85 per cent in 1960), Formosa does not even reach 30 per cent by 
1960. In the 60s and 70s four-fifths of internal trade was being conducted between the 
cities of Buenos Aires, Santa Fe and Cordoba. Although the growth of the oil industry 
and the development o f temperate fruit production induced some migration towards the 
south, particularly Rio Negro and Neuquen; Patagonia at large remained almost 
uninhabited. Demographic decline was also a feature of the north, and it is estimated that 
in the 1960s, 164,000 people left Tucuman; 100,000 left Santiago del Estero; and another 
100,000 migrated from Corrientes. Some three-quarters of a million migrants settled in 
Greater Buenos Aires in the 60s (Rock, 1986).
As can be seen on Table 6.6, the highest rates of net migration are for the first two 
periods, in particular to the then newly constituted so-called territorios nacionales 
(national territories) that had to be populated via migration flows. In the period 1947-60 
the highest rates correspond to Greater Buenos Aires as it is the main destination of most 
inter-provincial flows. Also Santa Cruz and Tierra del Fuego have high rates, although 
these, in practice, correspond to small volumes. In the first two periods 11 provinces lost 
population via migration flows, and this corresponds mainly to natives; while in the third 
and fourth periods the number of provinces losing population rises to 13 and 19 
respectively. Conversely, net foreign migration was almost always positive (except for 
La Pampa in the last period, with a small negative number). However, these rates 
decrease in the last two periods. In the last two periods it is noticeable the loss of 
population in the provinces of La Pampa, Tucuman and Cordoba. Buenos Aires, on the 
other hand, continuously increased its rate of migration in the four periods.
In order to see the growing importance of the flows of native migration, Figure 6.2 shows 
the different factors that contribute to the provincial distribution of the population in the 
period 1869-1960. The importance o f foreign migration, which accounted for more than 
70 per cent at the end o f the nineteenth century, decreased continuously until reaching
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almost 20 per cent. This is counteracted by the flows of native migration that initially 
accounted for only 15 per cent of population distribution but became increasingly 
important until the end of this period in which it became the main determinant in the 
distribution of population. In the case of population growth, it was relatively small in the 
first two sub-periods considered and although in 1947-60 it accounts for over 20 per cent, 
it was particularly important in the period 1914-1947.
Table 6.7. Average Annual Rates of Net Total (Natives + Foreigners) Migration,
by Provinces 1869-1960
Provinces 1869-95 1895-1914 1914-47 1947-60
Buenos Aires 29 27 10 14
Catamarca -11 -10 -7 -14
Cordoba 5 21 1 -2
Corrientes 0 -6 -10 -13
Chaco 43 53 23 -9
Chubut 59 63 17 7
Entre Rios 11 0 -7 -18
Formosa 77 55 22 8
Jujuy 9 21 9 6
La Pampa 81 47 -13 -22
La Rioja -5 -10 -8 -13
Mendoza 11 31 4 5
Misiones 75 15 17 3
Neuquen 74 16 8 -3
Rio Negro 47 48 11 10
Salta 1 1 5 5
San Juan -4 3 1 1
San Luis -6 -1 -11 -15
Santa Cruz y T.del Fuego 80 85 22 39
Santa Fe 44 21 1 -4
Sgo del Estero -2 0 -10 -18
Tucuman 13 8 -3 -2
Source: INDEC (1999)
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Figure 6.2. Factors Contributing to the Provincial Distribution o f  Population (1869-1960)
1947-60
1914-47
m Population Growth ■  Foreign Migration □  Native Mgration
Source: INDEC, own calculations
Although the period after 1960 will be analysed more fully in the next chapter, it is worth 
noting some figures here. While 24.7 per cent of the national population lived in Buenos 
Aires in 1930, by 1980 this proportion had risen to 34.3 per cent; the Greater Buenos 
Aires being the third largest conurbation in Latin America. The city’s population density 
also increased as high-rise apartments were built. Half the country’s manufacturing 
industry was concentrated in the capital, employing a million people by 1980. Shanty­
towns began to emerge, with an estimated 1.7 million people living in them by 1970. In 
these, 70 per cent o f the population had not completed school. The only countervailing 
force against Buenos Aires was Cordoba, which from late 1950s grew as an automobile- 
manufacturing centre. Between 1947 and 1970, Cordoba’s population rose from 383,000 
to 800,000. In the 60s, immigration from Paraguay was estimated at 400,000.
The second half of the seventies marked a significant change in terms of industrial 
development in Argentina. The process o f dismantling the ISI model that began in 1978 
started a period (until 1990) in which political interests determined the model to be 
followed and open economies policies as well as ISI models coexisted (Kosacoff, 2002: 
190). The nineties, on the other hand, saw the reversal of the neoliberal doctrines and 
privatisations and openness became the rule.
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3.3. Regional Development Policies
The geographical concentration of population in Argentina seen in the previous section 
was also accompanied by an industrial concentration of activities. By mid-40s, 
industrialisation became a hig priority goal for the government of Peron. Immediately 
following the war, exports had fallen below the lowest point of the depression and 
imports followed suit. During the government of Peron (1945-1955), a strong 
concentration of economic activity in the city of Buenos Aires was fostered by a policy 
that taxed agriculture -  the traditional export sector -  in order to build up industry and 
also stimulated a disproportionate growth of the bureaucracy in the capital (Morris, 
1975). This policy was done mainly through the creation of the Instituto Argentino de 
Promotion Industrial (IAPI- Argentine Institute for Industrial Promotion).
The industrial survey of 1947 showed that 85 per cent of industrial value-added was 
produced in the city of Buenos Aires and three provinces, namely Buenos Aires, Cordoba 
and Santa Fe. The rest of the country, with a population of 34 per cent only accounted for 
14.5 per cent of industrial value added. Most of it was concentrated in a few ‘poles’, such 
as Tucuman and Cuyo for its production of sugar and wines respectively. In 1974, the 
industrial survey revealed that there had not been major changes. The four ‘advanced 
regions’ accounted for 84.5 per cent of the value added and the rest of the country, 
comprising a 32 per cent of the national population, had increased only one percentage 
point. In 1984, still more than 80 per cent of the industrial activity was concentrated in 
the mentioned four regions (Schvarzer, 1987).
Prior to 1960, there was no regional policy as such and regional incentives to industry 
were only in force in order to induce some decongestion of Buenos Aires or to populate 
distant deserted regions. Most of these incentives had little effect in inducing movement 
o f existing firms since the benefits of the incentives would be counterbalanced by the 
disadvantages o f provincial isolation. In the sixties, however, there was an international 
concern for regional disparities and national economic development, with planning 
playing a more significant role in national policies. The federal government 
acknowledged responsibility for improving physical infrastructure, transport and
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communications, social infrastructure and the develppment of agricultural, mining and 
water resources. A fund for the regions, Fondo de Integration Territorial (Fund for 
Territorial Integration) was planned in 1965 and established in 1968 (Morris, 1975).
Industrial development in Argentina can be understood in two groups. On the one hand, 
the location o f certain industries in strategic sites that paved the way for the 
industrialisation o f specific cities, and, on the other hand, regional promotion of 
industries aimed at relocating firms in the interior. Among the first group of polarised 
development were the proposals to build industrial parks at Cordoba and San Nicolas; the 
development of new petrochemical plants in Buenos Aires province and Santa Fe; and for 
meat-packing plants (frigoriflcos). In addition, the oil and petrochemical ‘pole’ in 
Ensenada, the petrochemical complex in Bahia Blanca, the aluminium plant in Puerto 
Madryn on a maritime port and close to the electrical supplier, and the paper plants in the 
cultivated forests in Misiones.
With respect to the second group, industrial promotional regimes have been present in 
Argentina’s legislation since the 40s. In particular, in 1944, decree number 14,630 
stipulated that industries of national interest would be those in which national inputs were 
used and its production directed to the local market, as well as those that produced goods 
related to national security. The first measures of regional promotion date from 1956. In 
that year, Law 10,991 declared ‘zona franca’ that below the 42° parallel, commencing 
with a series o f promotional legislation tending to favour Patagonia. A series of decrees 
extending the favoured zones within this law started in 1961, and within a year two-thirds 
o f the national territory were covered under different protection schemes. This gives a 
clear indication of the lack of organisation and priorities and the resulting lack of success 
o f these schemes (Schvarzer, 1987; Azpiazu, 1989).
There was a relocation o f firms to Chubut, with its centre in Trelew, which is the closest 
city to parallel 42°. Patagonia will only be benefited in Chubut, while the rest o f the 
region remained outside of the regime following a pattern that would be present in all 
regional promotion schemes, the location as close as possible to Buenos Aires. Trelew,
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though still far from Buenos Aires, was the closest city to parallel 42° -  and Buenos 
Aires. In spite of a number of firms opening between 1956 and 1974, a significant 
proportion closed due to their small size. About half of the firms corresponded to 
relocations of existing plants from Buenos Aires rather than new investments. This 
suggests that the incentives were not great enough to plan long-term locations. Moreover, 
the large number o f firms that withdrew entirely from the market indicates the short-term 
profit strategy that prevailed. There was, then, a distinct lack o f integrated development. 
Instead, at a high cost, this policy set isolated industrial enclaves that did not integrate to 
the local environment and did not generate any dynamics or linkages in the medium-term 
(Schvarzer, 1987).
In 1966, the first localised and specific promotional regime was approved, the 'Operative* 
Tucuman\  This had the objective of smoothing the social crisis in that province, which 
was the result o f the closing of sugar mills taken under government control with a 
subsequent lay-off o f workers. The plan had the objective o f promoting new industrial 
activity, which the military government considered necessary to avoid deepening social 
problems since a guerrilla movement had started operations. However, in the short-run, 
the credit and tax incentives offered did not succeed in attracting enough interested firms. 
In 1972, the law enhanced the benefits offered, and in 1974 additional benefits were 
considered. Many of the projects were approved at a very high speed and often neglecting 
proper controls, with a high percentage of firms being granted benefits. Again, in this 
case, many o f the firms result from transfers from Buenos Aires (Schvarzer, 1987). 
Morris (1975) mentions Tucuman as an evidence of the failure of regional policy since it 
is a province that was a focus of regional poverty in both 1961 and 1971. The main 
problem was the over-concentration of sugar cane, which could only survive under 
barrier protections.
A definite regional orientation was sought in the 1971 Plan that involved a set of poles. 
Growth poles were to be set up in several groups of towns comprising the northwest, 
northeast and Patagonia. Besides, Tucuman and Comodoro Rivadavia were made areas 
de promocion prioritaria. Three of the poles were in Patagonia; which is likely to be
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more related to military objectives than regional needs. Apart from Corrientes- 
Resistencia, those poles were sited around small towns, none of them large enough to 
absorb major industrial development without a preliminary expansion o f infrastructure. 
Their economic development and growth poles were to be found on energy production (at 
Posadas, Obera, Salta and Zapala-Neuquen), on primary metal or ore production (Puerto 
Madryn for aluminium, Sierra Grande for iron ore, Rio Turbio with coal). Such activities 
did not have much multiplier effects on regional economies, since they employ few and 
have mostly forward linkages, which were extra-regional. Besides, there was little 
commitment of public money to the regions.
In 1970, 44 per cent o f all federal and provincial public investment was in Buenos Aires 
City and province and a further 19.6 per cent in the provinces of Entre Rios, Cordoba and 
Santa Fe. Private investment, on the other hand, was given little inducement to redress 
this imbalance with no efficient tax and credit incentive schemes that would push firms to 
re-locate in the provinces. When growth poles were dropped by Peron in 1974, given 
their initial limited investment, this scarcely represented a change.
In 1972, Law 19,640, gave Tierra del Fuego a special promotional status, which would 
have surprising results at the end of the decade. At that stage, there was a population of 
less than 15,000 inhabitants and there were sixty industrial plants. Through most of the 
decade, this remained little altered. However, in 1978, several exogenous factors at the 
national level resulted in dramatic changes for the province. First, the opening of imports 
affected the electronic domestic companies. Second, the promotion of the colour 
television sets was established by a special law and national firms found that the 
deadlines were not enough in order to design and produce the sets while the increasing 
competition was damaging their businesses (Schvarzer, 1987).
Tierra del Fuego became then an attractive place to locate firms, because its promotional 
status meant it could import parts from abroad. There was an enormous exodus of firms 
towards Tierra del Fuego, and by 1984 more than 150 firms were operating. The number 
of people employed rose from 581 in 1974 to 6,294 in 1984, and the population of the
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island increased from 23,000 in 1980 to 40,000 in 1987. The increase in labour was 
concentrated in the electronic industry for consumption, which accounted for 76 per cent 
o f the rise in workers between 1980 and 1984 in twenty specialised firms. The special 
customs area, created in 1972, that excepted from all national taxes and import duties 
those goods entering through Tierra del Fuego and allowing its re-exports to the rest of 
the country, started to operate in 1979. However, this system was unsuccessful in terms 
of productive efficiency and local integration. In 1985, the share of local sales was 10.9 
per cent, while those to the rest of the country accounted for 88.8 per cent (Azpiazu, 
1989; Schvarzer, 1987). Tierra del Fuego will be mentioned again in the next chapter.
In 1972, the establishment of new firms in the city of Buenos Aires was forbidden, and a 
distance o f 60km from the city was agreed as ‘green belt’. This was further modified in 
1973, 1977 and again in 1979. However, the trend of reducing the industrial size of 
Buenos Aires seems to be more linked to lessening the social risks derived from the 
number o f waged workers among the population rather than concerns regarding the 
disproportionate distribution of wealth between the provinces and the capital (Schvarzer,
1987) and therefore cannot be considered as intended to favour convergence.
In 1973, the country was divided into two areas with different intensity of socio­
economic benefits. The most important covered Patagonia, the Northwest and the 
Mesopotamia; while the second comprised part of Mendoza, Cordoba, Santa Fe and 
Buenos Aires. Both Tucuman and San Juan, still favoured by the special regimes, were 
initially excluded. By 1974 this covered most of the territory, and a decree established the 
'Acta de Reparation Historical a special regime for Catamarca, La Rioja and San Luis. 
In 1979, the benefit o f VAT exception was granted to those who settled in La Rioja. In 
1982, the promotional benefits were extended to the firms in Catamarca and San Luis 
consolidating the proposals o f the 'Acta de Reparation Historical. (Schvarzer, 1987).
By 1988, two characteristics of industrial promotion in the country had become evident. 
The first was the multiplicity, overlapping and lack of articulation o f specific regimes of 
promotion and its application depending upon a number of authorities. The national
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regime depends upon the secretariat of industry and foreign trade (SICE) while in Tierra 
del Fuego, La Rioja, San Luis, Catamarca and San Juan the provincial governments have 
the authority to approve projects (Azpiazu, 1989). Finally, another attempt to move 
activities away from Buenos Aires was in 1987, when Law 23,512 approved the moving 
of the capital to the area o f Viedma (Rio Negro) and its neighbouring city Carmen de 
Patagones (Buenos Aires). However, this law was declared invalidated by a presidential 
decree in November 1989.
Industrial promotion in Argentina has been generally ineffective and failed to develop 
linkages in the local economies. Growth poles were scarcely real in terms of effective 
planning and conscious planning for the regions has in general had little impact. 
Economic arguments against growth poles in underdeveloped countries include their non­
applicability because o f the lack of an urban network to allow the spread of the effects. 
Further, the reduced size of the local market is a severe constraint to the development of 
new industries. According to Morris (1975), there is a very significant regional 
component to national planning and it may be called ‘unconscious regional planning’, 
which favoured the metropolitan region with the resulting promotion of centripetal rather 
than centrifugal development processes. Thus, it can be said that the failure of regional 
planning contributed to further reinforce the position of Buenos Aires.
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4. Conclusions
Contrary to the prescriptions of neo-classical economics, this chapter shows that regional 
differences in Argentina have been accentuating rather than decreasing since 
independence. In early colonial times, priority was given to the silver economy in Potosi. 
During that era, the regions of the present Argentine Republic that were most dynamic, 
populated and wealthy were those that served as satellites from the Upper Peru. The north 
of Argentina prospered in this period since it produced ox carts, textiles and basic goods 
to be sold in the Upper Peru. It is precisely those provinces in the north that now display 
the lowest levels of GDP, as seen in Figure 1.4 in the Introduction to this thesis. By 
contrast, the littoral was scarcely populated. The centre of cultural activity and one o f the 
most important cities at this time was Cordoba, whereas Buenos Aires was no more than 
a village.
When the viceroyalty of the River Plate was created, the importance o f Buenos Aires rose 
as its port flourished as the direct link with Spain. The economies of the interior were 
now satellite economies of the central authority of Buenos Aires, but with poor 
infrastructure and specialised artcraft economy, the interior entered a period of sharp 
decline. This became even worse when independence was declared and the links with the 
Upper Peru and Chile ended.
Meanwhile, the geographic location of Buenos Aires together with the productivity of the 
pampa became a natural attraction not only for foreign migrants but also for those from 
the rest of the country. As Felix Luna (1999) put it, although Argentina has a varied 
geography and climate that allows for all kinds of production, there is only one entrance 
to this vast territory, and this is the port of Buenos Aires. Whoever controls it has 
complete power over the rest of the country.
This imbalance not only persisted but also grew worse and deepened over time, 
particularly with the import substitution industrialisation model. Migration flows, far 
from triggering the balancing mechanisms prescribed by classical economics, contributed 
to worsening the concentration in Buenos Aires and its surroundings where the
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industrialisation effort was mostly located. The lack of serious public policies to develop 
other areas of the country and induce an efficient and long-lasting desentralisation 
process, together with the end of the import substitution industrialisation model and the 
subsequent liberal policies that followed, determined a situation that has endured to the 
present and constitutes one of the most dramatic features of 21st- century Argentina.
In the following chapter, the disparities in Argentina from 1960 onwards will be 
analysed. I will try to determine empirically if there has been convergence among the 
provinces and whether macro and political factors had any impact on the process of 
convergence. Further, I will try to determine empirically whether any of the regional 
policies applied in Argentina had any effects on convergence.
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7Convergence Analysis in Argentina 
1. Introduction
This chapter intends to test for the dynamic of economic disparities in Argentina 
following the previous analysis of the history of the development of disparities from 
colonial times. Convergence among the twenty-four Argentine provinces in the period 
1961-1995 will be empirically tested here. The main objective is to determine whether 
the dual economy present since the sixties is still the case in Argentina 30 years later (as 
seen in Figure 1.3 in the introduction) or whether the neo-classical model predictions 
holds and convergence has been the rule. Further, particular emphasis will be placed on 
the impact of industrial promotion regimes as well as macro and political imbalances.
The following section will explain the problems encountered with the data sets used in 
this chapter. In section 3, a more descriptive analysis of a-convergence using social 
variables as well as the percentage of national average income is done, as performed in 
previous chapters. In Sections 4 and 5 of this chapter, both beta and a-convergence 
analyses will be performed, though in a more extensive way than for both the EU and 
MERCOSUR. The P-convergence analysis included here will include both absolute as 
well as conditional, with extensions to test for the effect of macro and political variables.
2. Data Availability and Methodology
For the main sigma and beta analyses performed in this thesis, the data set published by 
Universidad de la Plata (1999) covering the period 1961-1995 was used. These data 
presented some gaps, however, for the provinces of Salta, Santa Cruz, Chubut and 
Tucuman until 1970 and it was available in total GDP in constant 1986 prices. By contrast
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to the Brazilian case (as will be seen in Chapter 9), for Argentina data availability 
represented a problem. In addition to the UNLP (1999) data set, other (shorter) data sets 
were found. Data for the years 1953,1958 and 1959 (first years for which provincial GDP 
is available) in current prices was available from CFI- Di Telia, 1965. Also, for the period 
1965-1969, INDEC published data on provincial GDP in current prices, and for the period 
1970-1985 information was available in constant 1970 prices for all provinces except 
Entre Rios, Mendoza, Misiones and San Luis from CFI (1988). Data for those provinces 
except for San Luis was completed with CFI (1983). When calculating the series in 
constant 1986 prices and comparing with that of Universidad de la Plata, both series 
coincide. Another series for the period 1980-1991 was found in Argentina, Ministerio del 
Interior (1995), with series of provincial GDP in constant 1986 prices except for the 
provinces of La Pampa and Buenos Aires, which were in constant 1970 prices. This data 
is also quite consistent with that of Universidad de la Plata. For the period 1990-1995, 
there is data in both constant 1986 and current prices for all provinces. Again, when 
comparing with the data from Universidad de la Plata, the numbers coincide, particularly 
for the last two years. Finally, data for 1998 in current prices is also available from 
Centro de Estudios Regionales (2000) that will be used in the Appendix V- see 
methodological notes in that Appendix and in section Ve. There was a project by CFI in 
order to produce provincial GDP data every five years; according to this, the next series 
published would comprise the period 1995-2000. However, this has not yet been 
published. In fact, over the last decade, CFI has been restructured and data collection has 
suffered a loss of quality (see further explanation on Appendix Ill.g.). Data for the period 
1996-2000 is not available from CFI, Ministerio de Economia or INDEC. Data for this 
period was found in a paper by Escudero et al (2002) - see Appendix Ill.g. - but given 
that the source is not mentioned and given that the main results are not significantly 
affected (see Appendix Ve) these data will only be considered as complementary and not 
part o f the main analysis in this chapter.
Given the lack o f continuity in all the above-described series, I have therefore decided to 
use for this analysis the data provided by UNLP (1999) after checking for consistency 
with bits provided from the other various sources, which mostly coincided. Given the
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series for 1998 in current prices and the availability of the series including the year 1959, 
a regression has also been performed using both years in current prices, and this is also 
presented in the Appendix as a supplementary regression to this analysis, as mentioned 
above.
Therefore, in this chapter, the analysis will be performed with the data from Universidad 
de la Plata for the period 1961 to 1995, since not only is it the longest series available but 
it is also fairly consistent with the bits provided by other sources and thus I preferred to 
use the longest available series for this analysis. However, as mentioned above, even for 
the series from UNLP for some provinces data was only available since 1970. The 
following method was used in order to complete the gaps in the series. First, the data on 
GDP for 1958, 1959 and 1965-69 in current prices was interpolated in logarithms. 
Secondly, pairs o f provinces (one for which data from UNLP was available and one that 
was not) were selected on the basis of similarities between them and a ratio of current 
prices (antilogarithms of the intrapolated data) was calculated. Once this ratio was 
obtained, it was multiplied by the provincial GDP in constant prices from UNLP of the 
known province in order to obtain the GDP of the missing one. This procedure was 
undertaken not only for the missing years 1961 to 1969, but also for the rest of the series 
to check for consistency. Furthermore, it was performed with different pair of provinces 
for which data was known to check the consistency of the method. The resulting series 
matched the data from UNLP from 1970 onwards with extremely high levels of accuracy 
(99 per cent). As mentioned before several pairs of provinces were tried, but the ones that 
were used (the ones with high levels of accuracy) were the following: Chubut and 
Neuquen; Neuquen and Santa Cruz; Santiago del Estero and Salta; Tucuman and Jujuy. 
Since the data is in total GDP (in thousands), GDP per capita (in thousands) was 
calculated using population data from INDEC. In order to calculate sigma and p- 
convergence, logarithms of these values were taken. The GDP data used in this chapter is 
given in Appendix Ill.a.
Other data was used in this chapter both for the conditional beta analysis of Section 5 as 
well as the descriptive analysis in Section 3. Literacy rates are available from 1914 from
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Vazquez Presedo (1991) and those for 1947, 1960, 1970 and 1991 from INDEC. The 
former considers illiterate population out o f population over fourteen and the latter over 
total provincial population; therefore only data from INDEC will be considered in the 
analysis. The illiteracy rate for each province will then be defined by the ratio between 
illiterate population and total population. Infant mortality rates were taken from INDEC 
and Vazquez Presedo (1991). Information is available from 1938 onwards. Finally, data 
on the percentage of urban population is available from INDEC from 1869 onwards. 
Section 3 includes sigma analysis on those variables as well as a similar analysis as that 
done for both the EU and MERCOSUR with percentages of national average GDP since 
this is considered to be an important addition to both sigma and beta analyses. These data 
sets are also in Appendix III. Further, in Section 5, the hypotheses mentioned in this 
thesis referring to the impact of both macroeconomic as well as political factors in the 
process o f convergence will be analysed. As a proxy for macroeconomic stability, the 
rate o f growth of inflation was considered (data from INDEC). In the case of political 
instability, information on military coups and military periods will be considered.
A final methodological consideration is that of the grouping of provinces into regions that 
will be used along the chapter. Five regions will be considered as follows,
• Cuyo: San Luis, San Juan and Mendoza
• Nordeste'. Formosa, Misiones, Chaco, Corrientes
• Noroeste: Salta, Jujuy, Tucuman, Santiago del Estero, La Rioja, Catamarca
• Pampeana: Buenos Aires, Capital Federal, Entre Rios, Santa Fe, Cordoba, La Pampa
• Patagonia: Neuquen, Rio Negro, Tierra del Fuego, Chubut and Santa Cruz
2. Socio- economic indicators
Sigma analysis is not restricted to analysing the convergence of GDP and other indicators 
can also be used. In this section, some selected indicators will be presented as well as the 
main findings by Marina (1998). Additional research was done for those cases in which 
data was available in longer series than those used by Marina (1998). The data used in
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this section are own calculations from INDEC and they are also presented in Appendix
m .
Regarding demographic indicators, life expectancy, infant mortality and masculinity rates 
can be included. Marina (1998) found convergence for all o f them. Her analysis was done 
for the seventies onwards but given that data on infant mortality was available from 1938, 
I have depicted the deviation of these rates across the provinces in Figure 7.1. It can be 
seen that infant mortality rates show a strong o-convergence for the period 1938-1997.
Figure 7.1. Convergence on Infant Mortality Rates (1938-1997)
40
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Source: own calculations
Health indicators can also be used. In this case, only the data reported by Marina (1998) 
will be referred to. The indicators considered were beds per 1,000 inhabitants, medical 
appointments per capita, patients per 10 inhabitants, doctors per 1,000 inhabitants and 
hospitals per 100,000 inhabitants. Sigma convergence was found in the period (1970- 
1990) for all indicators except for that of patients per 10 inhabitants and hospitals per 
100,000 inhabitants.
When considering educational variables, and given that there is available data on 
illiteracy rates earlier than those analysed by Marina (1998) and therefore additional 
sigma analysis has been carried out. The analysis performed by Marina (1998) included
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primary, secondary and tertiary school enrolment, personnel working in those three 
sectors, illiteracy rates, newspapers per 1,000 inhabitants, primary and secondary students 
per 100 inhabitants and primary and secondary students per teacher. Sigma convergence 
was found for enrolment at the three levels and also the gap decreased. For the other 
indicators, there is a-convergence. Illiteracy rates show a constant a-convergence for the 
period 1970-1991 with the average rates per province and the gap decreasing. Although 
the sigma indicator is almost constant after 1970, it can be seen in Figure 7.2 that when 
extending the period with the data from 1947, a strong convergence can be found.
Figure 7.2. Convergence o f Illiteracy Rates (1970-1991)
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Urbanisation indicators have also been used, since the ratio of urbanisation is taken as an 
indicator o f development. In the analysis performed by Marina (1998), the average 
percentage o f population in urban areas increased from 1949 onwards and the gap as well 
as the coefficient o f variation decreased considerably. This can also be seen in Figure 7.3, 
where the percentage of population living in urban areas covers the period 1869-1991 has 
been analysed. It can be seen that the dispersion halved during the period and that the 
trend shows a steady decline.
Marina (1998) uses labour force indicators, finding a significant decrease in the sigma 
coefficient for the activity rates; as well as consumption indicators (commercial and
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residential energy per 1,000 inhabitants and cars and telephones per 1,000 inhabitants). 
There is convergence for electricity use but the most interesting result is that there is a 
significant gap between both groups of provinces that does not decrease. Regarding 
public spending, the findings reveal that for public employment per employee and for the 
expenditure per capita, the gap increased and the sigma indicator is constant. For public 
employment per 1,000 inhabitants the indicator decreased.
Figure 7.3. Convergence of Urbanisation Rates (1869-1991)
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Source: own calculations
As a welfare indicator, Marina (1998) uses a development index calculated with the 
quality o f living, level o f education and number o f cars per person. This indicator shows 
that the gap decreases and that there is o-convergence. Here data from INDEC on the 
index of basic needs (NBI) has been analysed. Unfortunately, the last data available 
correspond to 1991. The most recent national census was carried out in November 2001 
but the information has not yet been published. It can be seen in Figure 7.4 that the 
indicator has decreased for all provinces, i.e. poverty levels have been decreased between 
1980 and 1991. Nevertheless, disparities have remained significant. The highest index, 
corresponding to the province of Formosa, followed by the provinces o f Santiago del 
Estero, Chaco, Salta, Corrientes and Misiones in 1980. In 1991, the highest index still 
corresponds to Formosa and it is followed by the provinces of Salta, Santiago del Estero, 
Jujuy, Chaco, Misiones and Corrientes. The index for the city of Buenos Aires is 7, while
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that corresponding to Formosa is 34.3 in 1991.The index for Formosa is for both years 
twice as much as the national average.
Figure 7.4. Indicator o f Basic Needs, by Province (1980 and 1991)
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Regarding data on GDP, the following conclusions can be made. When looking at Figure 
7.5 it can be seen that while the minimum percentage of national GDP remained mostly 
unchanged in the period 1961-1995 around 40 per cent; the maximum exhibits a constant 
trend in the late sixties and seventies and an increase at the beginning of the eighties with 
a later decrease in the late eighties and early nineties. Therefore, the ratio of extreme
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values followed the same trend, as can be seen in Figure 7.6, with a significant increase 
in the eighties that peaks in 1987.
Figure 7.5. Maximum and Minimum GDP values, by province as percentage of national 
GDP (1961-1995)
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Figure 7.6. Ratio o f Extreme provincial GDP Values in percentage of national 
GDP(1961-1995)
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When depicting the percentage o f average national GDP per regions, a clearer picture 
begins to emerge. As can be seen in Figure 7.7, the Nordeste and Noreste regions remain 
mostly unchanged, with an average of 50 and 80 per cent below the national average. 
Regarding the Pampeana region, it remains around 20 per cent above the national 
average, with a slight decline at the end of the eighties and small increase in the early 
nineties. Patagonia displays the same behaviour as seen in the maximum value curve. 
Cuyo, on the other hand, remains stable until mid eighties and then increases.
Figure 7.7. Percentage o f Average National GDP per Regions
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A closer inspection o f both Patagonia and Cuyo region reveal that in the case of 
Patagonia (Figure 7.8) the five provinces display a different behaviour. While Rio Negro 
and Santa Cruz remained mostly stable, Chubut exhibits an increasing trend in the sixties 
and seventies, decreasing in the eighties. In the case of Neuquen, the behaviour is more 
irregular but it an increase can be seen from the early seventies. The case of Tierra del 
Fuego explains the behaviour of the maximum indicator as well as the whole percentage 
o f national average o f the Patagonia region. In fact, Tierra del Fuego was not only above 
but had the highest percentage of national average GDP from 1981 to 1989. This is linked 
to the industrial promotion regimes referred to in the previous chapter and will be seen in 
the following sections o f this chapter.
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In the case of Cuyo, it can be seen in Figure 7.9 that while San Juan remained stable 
around 50 per cent of national GDP, and Mendoza- with above 100 per cent at the 
beginning of the period- declined slowly, specially in the eighties. San Luis, by contrast, 
started with 50 per cent and increased dramatically in the late eighties to reach 200 per 
cent of national average GDP peaking in 1989 and 1990 and, although slightly decreasing 
afterwards, remained high for the rest of the period. This can also be related to the 
promotion derived from the Acta de Reparation Historica as seen previously.
Figure 7.8. Percentage of National GDP in Patagonia
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Figure 7.9. Percentage o f National GDP in Cuyo
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4. Sigma Analysis
As mentioned before, sigma analysis is a good preliminary approximation to 
convergence, and is usually followed by the p-convergence. The dispersion of the 
logarithm of per capita GDP for the completed data set from Universidad de la Plata is 
shown in Figure 7.10. Two preliminary remarks can be made. First, when comparing the 
dispersion for the first and final years, 1961 against 1995, it can be seen that the 
dispersion has decreased from above 0.3 to 0.24. Secondly, although the indicator varies 
within a small range, a closer inspection shows that three main trends can be 
differentiated along the forty-year period.
The first one comprises the sub-period that expands until 1973, in which disparities 
decreased from a maximum level o f 0.3 in 1961 to 0.21 in 1973; representing a 42 per 
cent decrease for the sub-period. Although irregular, this was a period characterised by 
convergence among the provinces, with an average annual decrease in the indicator o f 3.2 
per cent. There were two significant increases, one in 1968 and the other in 1970-72. The 
lowest indicator corresponds to 1973, which is also the lowest indicator for the forty- 
year-period.
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The second main trend is a steady increase that continues until 1989. The indicator 
increased by 30 per cent between 1973 and 1989 with an average annual growth o f  2 per 
cent and only two years o f  slight decline, 1985 and 1986, which coincide with the 
implementation o f  the Plan Austral (also 1988 shows a slight decline, after the Plan 
Primavera was launched). The increase takes place at a slower and steady pace until 
1980, at an average o f  1 per cent each year, but increases by 8 per cent in 1981. After 
this, the slower and steady trend continues until 1983, with a sharper increase o f  6 per 
cent in 1984, followed by a decline until 1986, and a new increase o f  5 per cent in 1987. 
Disparities were at a maximum between 1987 and 1989, reaching the maximum value for 
the entire period (0.28). The seventies and eighties were clearly a period o f  increasing 
disparities. This was also a period in which the Argentine econom y was highly unstable. 
Finally, the third period starts with a sharp reduction in disparities in 1990, with a 
significant decrease o f  14 per cent, representing the largest change in the whole forty- 
year period. After this year, the indicator remains mostly stable, oscillating with 
decreasing amplitude towards 0.24.
Figure 7.10. Sigma Convergence among the Argentine Provinces (1961-1995)
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When comparing to the sigma analysis calculated with the additional data (1996-2000) -  
see Figure Vel in Appendix V.e. it can be seen that for the last years the indicator 
decreases steadily, in particular until 1999.
Other authors have also performed a sigma analysis for the Argentine provinces. 
According to Willington (1998), the variance of GDP increases over the period, but as 
Utrera and Koroch (1998) point out, he calculates the variance using the gross per capita 
products of the provinces instead of applying logarithms. Therefore, the growth of the 
variance includes the effect of the growth of the variable considered. When analysing the 
period 1960-1995 with data from CFI and INDEC, Willington (1998) concludes that there 
is a steady increase in the sigma coefficient throughout the whole period.
Utrera and Koroch calculated the dispersion of GDP across Argentine provinces over the 
period 1953-1994 (Utrera and Koroch, 1998) and for 1961-1994 (Utrera and Koroch, 
1999). They used the data provided by INDEC and CFI and converted it into constant 
1986 prices. They also find an overall decreasing trend with three main break points. 
There is a resemblance of Utrera and Koroch (1999) and the findings presented above, 
particularly regarding the existence of three break points with a declining trend in the 
sixties and an increasing one in the eighties (See Figure 7.11).
Figure 7.11. Sigma Convergence in Argentina according to Utrera and Koroch (1999)
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However, there is a strong decreasing trend for them that goes well into the seventies, 
reaching its minimum level in 1976 and increasing again until 1990. The declining trend 
in the sixties is more noticeable in Utrera and Koroch (1999) than for the data of 
Universidad de La Plata. Utrera and Koroch conclude that there is an overall decreasing 
trend with their minimum indicator for 1976 being 0.61 and its maximum corresponding 
to 1963 (0.77).
Utrera and Koroch (1999) emphasize the distortionary effect that the provinces of Tierra 
del Fuego and San Luis have since, according to them, these provinces show breaks in 
the level of income that coincide with the implementation o f industrial promotion 
regimes and their later reversal. When eliminating these provinces from the analysis, they 
observe a smoother trend and the three break points are no longer noticeable. In fact, it 
can be seen that there is an irregular but clear convergence until 1976 (See Figure 7.12). 
It then grows smoothly until 1981 when there is a jump. It then decreases until 1989 and 
in 1990 returns to its 1988 level and from then onwards it steadily increases. When 
comparing Figures 7.12 and 7.11, it can be seen that the trends diverge mostly in the 
eighties and at the beginning of the sixties, but the main difference is in the period after 
1981.
Following their results, I have eliminated those two provinces from the data from 
Universidad de La Plata it can be seen that the trend smoothens and the three sub-periods 
can no longer be recognised either. The results presented in Figure 7.13 show an overall 
decrease as well, with the same initial and final sigma indicator. The main divergence 
between both curves is for the first half of the sixties but mainly throughout the eighties.
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Figure 7.12. Sigma Convergence in Argentina according to Utrera and Koroch (1999) 
without Tierra del Fuego and San Luis
Figure 7.13. Sigma Convergence without Tierra del Fuego and San Luis
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A further analysis was carried out here, and will also be performed for Brazil (see 
methodological notes in Appendix V). Instead of only eliminating the above-mentioned 
provinces, each of the 24 provinces was excluded, one at the time, in order to see what 
impact each o f them had on the variability of the indicator. Figures 7.14 to 7.18 
correspond to the five different regions as defined in the methodological section. Each 
Figure depicts a curve including the 24 provinces and one for each of the provinces in the
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region. These curves include 23 provinces and each of the curves is labelled with the 
name of the omitted province. In Figure 7.19, the curve with the 24 provinces as well as 
each of the other 24 individual curves has been depicted.
In Figures 7.14 and 7.15, corresponding to Noroeste and Nordeste regions respectively, it 
can been seen that there is no difference between the national trend and when omitting 
each o f the provinces o f those regions. In Figure 7.16, a slight difference can be seen 
when eliminating Capital Federal. However, this difference is in terms not of shape but of 
magnitude. The curve without Capital Federal is consistently much lower that the other, 
but particularly in the seventies and nineties. Therefore, although the Capital follows the 
behaviour of the rest o f the country, it accentuates the pattern. The events of the seventies 
and nineties in terms o f relative instability and stability respectively seem to have 
affected Capital Federal more than other provinces in the country.
Figure 7.14. Sigma Convergence in the Noroeste Region
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Figure 7.15. Sigma Convergence in the Nordeste Region
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Figure 7.16. Sigma Convergence in the Pampeana Region
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The most surprising results however, are found when looking at Figure 7.17, which 
contradict the conclusions of Utrera and Koroch (1999). For the Cuyo region, the same 
pattern as in Figures 7.14 and 7.15 can be seen: no significant difference when omitting 
each of the provinces. In particular, the province of San Luis does not alter the pattern of 
the sigma analysis at all. This is a very interesting result given what was seen in the 
previous section that San Luis dramatically increased the percentage of average GDP in
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the late eighties. According to the sigma analysis, however, there is only a slight change 
and it is only in magnitude, but the dispersion of all provinces without San Luis does not 
show any major changes.
Figure 7.17. Sigma Convergence in the Cuyo Region
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However, it is clear from Figure 7.18, that when omitting Tierra del Fuego, there is a 
significant change in the shape of the curve. In fact, we get a curve like the one in Figure 
7.4 that replicated the analysis done by Utrera and Koroch (1999), but this effect is only 
achieved by excluding Tierra del Fuego (the province of Santa Cruz also shows a 
magnitude difference at the beginning of the period). Furthermore, Figure 7.19 depicts 
the curve for the 24 provinces plus each of the 24 curves that exclude one province at the 
time (for reasons o f simplicity, I have ommitted all labels). It can be clearly seen that 
despite minor differences o f magnitude, particularly for Capital Federal and Santa Cruz, 
the only province that significantly affects the a-convergence is Tierra del Fuego.
In 1972, Tierra del Fuego obtained a special promotional status whereby exception from 
all national taxes was granted alongside with import duties for those goods entering 
through Tierra del Fuego and allowing its re-exports to the rest o f the country. This only 
started to operate in 1979 and resulted in a massive exodus of firms towards Tierra del
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Fuego. The number o f employed people rose from 581 in 1974 to 6,294 in 1984 and the 
population o f the island increased from 23,000 in 1980 to 40,000 in 1987. That increase 
was concentrated in the electronic industry for consumption, which accounted for 76 per 
cent o f the labour increase during 1980 and 1984 in twenty specialised firms.
Figure 7.18. Sigma Convergence in the Patagonia Region
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Marina (1999) depicts the coefficients of variation for different periods and different 
provinces according to data availability and this also allows confirmation of the above 
results. For the period 1970-1990 she includes 18 provinces (without La Pampa, 
Cordoba, Corrientes, San Juan, Entre Rios and Corrientes) and for 1970-1985 she 
calculates the deviation for 22 provinces (excluding the provinces Entre Rios and 
Formosa (See Figure 7.20). The curve showing the a-convergence for 22 provinces from 
1970 to 1990 is consistent with the one calculated here from the data o f Universidad de 
La Plata. The main difference, however, is that the decrease in 1990 is small as opposed 
to the sharp drop found here, which was the sharpest change in the whole 40 years and 
meant that disparities were reduced to the levels of 1965.
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Figure 7.19. Sigma Convergence by Provinces when Omitting One at the Time
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Figure 7.20. Sigma Convergence According to Marina (1999), Selected Provinces
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In Figure 7.21 additional curves were calculated. The curve for 1970-1995 includes 21 
provinces (Misiones, Entre Rios and Rio Negro are excluded) and for 1970-1985 
(omitting not only those three but also Tucuman, Formosa, Jujuy and Mendoza). Both 
curves coincide perfectly and also are consistent with that in Figure 7.10. This also 
follows when comparing with the curve for 1980-1991 (that excludes Misiones, La 
Pampa, Corrientes, San Juan, Neuquen, La Rioja, Mendoza and Cordoba).
198
It is interesting to look at the decrease for 1990, which is more pronounced in the 1970- 
1995 curve that includes 21 provinces than for the 1980-1991 curve including all 
provinces. The sharp decrease in the former is consistent with the results in Figure 7.10 
and therefore it is interesting to note that the three provinces o f Misiones, Entre Rios and 
Rio Negro, accounted for a sharper decrease as seen in Figure 7.21.
Figure 7.21. Sigma Convergence According to Marina (1999), Selected Provinces
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Marina (2000) describes the development o f Argentine provinces, as characterised by a 
marked level o f inequality in which the process of convergence is practically non-existent 
among the provinces and the growth pattern is highly unequal. She concludes that 
according to the coefficient of variation there is a noticeable increase in disparities from 
1953 until 1989, with a significant change afterwards, associated to the better functioning 
of economic institutions. The author also mentions the industrial promotion regimes since 
there is an increase o f the coefficient of variation from 1984 to 1992 corresponding to the 
implementation o f the mentioned regimes in the provinces of Tierra del Fuego and San 
Luis. This result is in accordance with what was shown here, although she also includes 
San Luis.
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5 Beta Convergence
5.1. Absolute Beta Convergence
In this section absolute p-convergence has been calculated not only for the period 1961- 
1995 but also for different sub-periods, first by decades and then for the sub-periods 
1961-1973, 1973-1983, 1983-1990 and 1990-1995. The study of sub-periods will also be 
performed for Brazil, as explained on page 331 on Appendix V and the methodological 
section o f Chapter 9. The latter correspond to the main break points found in the sigma 
analysis o f the previous section with the additional break in 1983 to allow for the 
differences in economic policy with the return to democracy in that year. For this analysis 
the data from Universidad de La Plata was also used with the missing data for the 
provinces o f Salta, Tucuman, Santa Cruz and Chubut calculated as explained in Section 
1. The reason for including the analysis of the sub-periods is, as was seen before, that 
when calculating convergence over a long period the results usually favour the hypothesis 
of convergence; while when considering sub-periods divergence and convergence appear 
as seen for both the European Union and MERCOSUR in previous chapters. As in the 
previous section, the additional data for 1996-2000, given the unknown source, will be 
used only as a reference and it is therefore not part of the main analysis but can be seen in 
Appendix V.e. In the same Appendix, results for the regression between 1998 and 1959 
are presented. Also, the full econometric readouts and explanations for the P-convergence 
analysis (Tables 7.1 to 7.9) are in the Econometric Appendix V.
Table 7.1. Absolute Beta Convergence among Argentine Provinces
1995-1961
Coefficient Std.Error t-statistic
Constant 0.06 -0.24 -0.23
In (1961) -0.26 0.14 -1.81
R-squared 0.13
Source: own calculations, for more details see page 346
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It can be seen from Table 7.1 that the hypothesis of p-convergence cannot be rejected. 
This result is consistent with other studies referred to before for long-term data. The 
coefficient for the independent variable (logarithm in GDP in 1961) is negative and 
marginally significant. Comparing this equation with that for containing the additional 
data for 1996-2000, it can be seen (page 368-369) that the R-squared is lower and the F 
statistic is less significant while the t- statistics are all not significant. When comparing to 
the regression in current terms for the period 1959-1998 (as shown in Appendix V.e, page 
370) the coefficient on initial income remains unchanged but it is now highly significant 
(the R-squared is better and the F-statistic is significant) showing a strong convergence 
for that period.
When dividing the period into decades, it can be seen that none is significant (Table 7.2), 
even when considering the regression with the additional data 1990-2000, it is still not 
significant (as can be seen in Appendix V)- However, when looking at the different sub­
periods related to the sigma analysis, significant differences can be found (Table 7.3). 
Convergence is found for the first sub-period, which extends from 1961 to 1973. In fact, 
the results are similar to those for the whole period and even though the beta coefficient 
is lower the R-squared is higher and the level of significance has improved. For the 
second sub-period (1973-1983), however, no p-convergence is found. There is a positive 
- though marginally significant coefficient at 10 per cent - and the R-squared is very low. 
These results coincide with that of the sigma analysis of the previous section, confirming 
that the seventies were a decade of non-convergence both regarding the mobility within a 
given distribution (beta) and the variability of the distribution (sigma). For the period 
1983-1989, there is a negative but not significant coefficient. Again, these results 
coincide with the preliminary a-convergence ones seen in the previous section, as well as 
the ratio of extreme values depicted in Figure 7.6. Finally, the period 1995-1989 is one of 
no convergence, with a negative and significant coefficient and a highly significant F 
statistic. Again, all these results were tested to check for heteroskedasticity and there was 
no correlation between the dependent variables and the error terms.
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T a b le  7 .2 . Absolute Beta Convergence, by Decades
1980-1970
Coefficient Std.Error t-statistic
Constant 0.22 0.09 2.44
In (1970) -0.02 0.06 -0.31
R-squared 0.004
1990-1980
Coefficient Std.Error t-statistic
Constant 0.24 0.13 2.44
In (1980) -0.10 0.11 -0.97
R-squared 0.04
Source: own calculations, for more details see pages 351-352
Table 7.3. Absolute Beta Convergence, in Sub-Periods According to Sigma Analysis
1973-1961
Constant 
In (1961)
Coefficient
0.03
-0.17
Std.Error
0.13
0.08
t-statistic
0.20
-2.26
R-squared 0.19
1983-1973
Constant 
In (1973)
Coefficient
0.29
0.13
Std.Error
0.13
0.09
t-statistic
2.27
1.45
R-squared 0.09
1989-1983
Constant 
In (1983)
Coefficient
-0.06
-0.01
Std.Error
0.13
0.09
t-statistic
-0.49
-0.13
R-squared 0.00
1995-1989
Constant 
In (1983)
Coefficient
-0.16
-0.21
Std.Error
0.09
0.07
t-statistic
-1.81
-3.26
R-squared 0.33
Source: own calculations, for more details see pages 347-350
202
Several authors have also analysed p-convergence. Utrera and Koroch (1998) perform a 
regression analysis for the period 1953-1994, in constant 1986 prices. As can be seen in 
Table 7.4, their results indicate that there is no P-convergence for the period 1953-1994 
(these results are only presented in this chapter and not in the Appendix). They find a 
positive and marginally significant coefficient. The same regression was replicated for 
the same period (with data from INDEC and SAREP and CFI), and the results were very 
similar to theirs. However, when analysing the period 1961-1994, Utrera and Koroch 
(1999) find evidence o f absolute P-convergence.
On the other hand, Willington (1998) concludes that there is convergence among the 
Argentine provinces for the period 1960-1995, although very low, at a speed of almost 1 
per cent. His results are also shown in Table 7.2. When comparing his results to those 
obtained here it can be said that although both results coincide in that there is overall 
convergence for the period, for Willington this is only weak while the results presented 
here indicate a stronger convergence. Marina (1999) calculated p-convergence for two 
sub-periods, 1970-1985 and 1970-1990. Her regressions include 21 and 18 provinces 
respectively, the same ones as in her sigma analysis. Her results indicate the lack o f P- 
convergence for both periods, with very low values of R-squared and not significant 
coefficients. Her findings for the period 1970-1985 are fairly similar to the ones obtained 
here for the period 1973-1983. Marina (2000) also tested for the period 1953-1994 and 
found no evidence of absolute p-convergence.
It is clear from what has been analysed here that the difference in the base year changes 
the conclusions drastically. When taking 1960 (Willington) and 1961 as base years, there 
is evidence of weak and stronger convergence respectively. However, if the base year is 
1953 (as in Utrera and Koroch, 1998 and Marina, 2000 and the results presented here), 
there seems to be no convergence. The sixties were a period of convergence, as seen not 
only in this p-convergence analysis but also in the sigma analysis of the previous section. 
In fact, most of the convergence for the whole period 1961-1995 can be explained by the 
sub-period 1961-1973. As seen in the previous chapter, during the sixties there was more 
concern for regional policies and several industrial promotion regimes were on place. The
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period comprising the seventies and early eighties seems of clear divergence, as stated in 
Marina (1999) and the results presented here (both beta and sigma analyses). Again, this 
seems to point out to a link with both political and macroeconomic factors, since the 
seventies and eighties were characterised by instability.
Table 7.4. Absolute Beta Convergence, Other Studies
1994-1953 Utrera and Koroch (1998)
Ln (1953)
Coefficient S td .E rror
0.01 0.02
t-statistic
1.73
R -squared 0.14
1994-1953 Data from CFI/INDEC
Ln (1953)
Coefficient S td .E rro r
0.01 0.02
t-statistic
1.70
R -squared 0.12
1995-1960 Willington (1998)
Ln (1960)
Coefficient S td .E rro r
-0.01 0.01
t-statistic
-1.85
R -squared 0.14
1985-1970 Marina (1999)
Ln (1970)
Coefficient S td .E rro r
-0.01 0.00
t-statistic
-0.97
R -squared 0.04
1990-1970 Marina (1999)
Ln (1970)
Coefficient S td .E rro r
-0.0005 0.0000
t-statistic
-0.0440
R -squared 0.0001
5.2. C onditional B eta Convergence
In this section, conditional convergence has been performed. Several variables were used, 
such as literacy rates, each region’s share of industry and agriculture and a dummy 
variable to test for the behaviour of Tierra del Fuego. The main findings when adding 
literacy rates and the participation of industry and agriculture are shown in Table 7.5.
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(Full econometric readouts and explanations can be found in Appendix V, pages 355 
onwards). The first variable considered were the literacy rates corresponding to 1960. It 
can be seen that there is a stronger conditional convergence when comparing these results 
to the ones from Table 7.1, not only the R-squared has slightly increased but also the 
levels of significance of the coefficients. The coefficient for the literacy rate is positive, 
so that those provinces with higher initial levels o f education had an average higher 
growth rate in the period and this coefficient is marginally significant at the 10 per cent. 
When doing the same regression but with the literacy rates corresponding to 1947, the 
results do not indicate an improvement in the fit when comparing with the original 
regression in  Table 7.1, and thus the impact is not as significant as when adding the 
literacy rates for 1960.
When adding the participation of each province’s agriculture and industry the results 
show that although the coefficent on initial income is significant, both agriculture and 
industry are marginally significant, the former only at a 10 per cent level. They also have 
both negative signs. Finally, when considering the literacy rates of 1960 together with the 
participation in agriculture and industry in 1970, the results indicate an even better fit, 
with an increase in R-squared and when comparing with the regression in Table 7.1 the 
coefficient for the initial year is higher and more significant. The significance of both 
agriculture and industry remains unchanged from the previous case while the education 
variables become significant only at 10 per cent. However, F statistic is still not 
significant (see page 356 on Appendix V).
Utrera and Koroch (1998) performed their regression for the period 1953-1994 including 
the literacy rates corresponding to 1947. They find convergence with a positive speed of 
convergence and the coefficient for education is positive and highly significant. The R- 
squared has also increased considerably. They test the sensitivity o f their results by 
changing the period of analysis and estimate several periods (1953-70,1953-75,1953-80, 
1953-85,1953-90) and find their results to be consistent. Other variables such as the rates 
of population growth, distance from the capital cities to the nearest port, regional
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dummies and total exports per capita were also introduced but without obtaining any 
significant results.
Table 7.5. Conditional Beta Convergence
1995-1961 Literacy rates (1960)
Coefficient S td .E rro r t-statistic
C onstan t -3.72 3.00 -1.24
ln (1961) -0.39 0.18 -2.22
lit (1960) 0.04 0.03 1.26
R -squared 0.19
1995-1961 Literacy rates (1947)
Coefficient S td .E rro r t-statistic
C onstan t -0.27 0.95 -0.29
ln (1961) -0.28 0.16 -1.76
lit (1947) 0.00 0.01 0.36
R -squared 0.13
1995-1961 Agriculture and Industry (1970)
Coefficient S td .E rro r t-statistic
C onstan t 0.34 0.28 1.18
ln (1961) -0.34 0.15 -2.20
ag r (1970) -0.01 0.01 -1.26
ind (1970) -0.01 0.01 -1.57
R -squared 0.25
1995-1961 Lit (1960), Agr (1970) and Ind (1970)
Coefficient S td .E rro r t-statistic
C onstant -3.66 2.92 -1.25
ln (1961) -0.47 0.18 -2.63
lit (1960) 0.04 0.03 1.30
ag r (1970) -0.01 0.01 -1.17
ind (1970) -0.01 0.01 -1.73
R -squared 0.32
Source: own calculations, for more details see pages 355-356
In Utrera and Koroch (1999) the literacy rates for 1960 have been included in their 
regression for 1961-1994, obtaining a higher R-squared though no changes in the 
coefficient or the level o f significance. When public works and current spending are
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considered, both papers differ. In Utrera and Koroch (1998) there is a positive effect in 
the case of public works and negative for current spending with significant coefficients. 
Then, those provinces with a higher initial expenditure on public works had a higher 
average growth in the period and conversely with those provinces with an initial higher 
current government spending. When including these two variables the R-squared (and 
also the adjusted R-squared) also improved considerably. In Utrera and Koroch (1999), 
both public works and current spending were not significant.
Willington (1998) also investigates the conditional p-convergence between the provinces 
for the period 1960-1995 including secondary enrolment data corresponding to 1960. He 
also considered the average public sector investment as percentage of the product, current 
public sector expenditure and the percentage of the product represented by the 
agricultural and mining sectors as a proxy of the endowment o f natural resources. The 
coefficient for the income in 1960 has increased, as well as the t-values and the R- 
squared. The coefficients for education and real investment are both positive and 
significant, and that corresponding to public spending is negative and significant. 
Willington then concludes that there is conditional p-convergence for the provinces for 
the period 1960-1995.
Utrera and Koroch (1999) performed another regression eliminating the provinces of 
Tierra del Fuego and San Luis. When doing this, the beta coefficients became not 
significant but the remaining coefficients for the conditional variables increased their 
significance. Marina (2000) introduced the levels of education and provincial per capita 
public spending and found that there were no significant changes and there was still no 
convergence for the period 1953-1994.
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T a b le  7.6. Conditional Beta Convergence, Different Studies
1994-1953 Utrera and Koroch (1998)
Coefficient Std.Error t-statistic
Ln (1953) 0.03 0.07 2.33
lit (1947) 0.12 0.49 4.10
R-squared 0.50
1994-1953 Utrera and Koroch (1998)
Coefficient Std.Error t-statistic
ln (1953) 0.04 0.10 2.47
lit (1947) 0.21 1.16 5.54
P.Works 0.02 0.06 3.17
C.Expend. -0.02 0.04 -2.19
R-squared 0.70
1994-1961 Utrera and Koroch (1999)
Coefficient Std.Error t-statistic
In (1961) 0.02 0.06 2.90
literacy 0.12 0.56 4.70
R-squared 0.67
1994-1961 Utrera and Koroch (1999)
Coefficient Std.Error t-statistic
In (1961) 0.02 0.09 4.37
literacy 0.15 0.72 4.77
P.Works -0.34 0.24 -0.71
C.Expend. 0.01 0.00 0.03
R-squared 0.72
1995-1960 Willington (195
Coefficient Std.Error t-statistic 
ln (1960) -0.02 0.08 -3.40
Sec. Ed. 0.03 0.11 3.86
Real I. 0.03 0.09 3.50
P.Spend. -0.04 0.10 -2.80
R-squared_________0.58_________________
T a b le  7.7. Conditional Beta Convergence, Dummy Variables
1995-1961
Constant 
Dummy 1 
Ln(1961)
Coefficient
0.22
-0.43
-0.17
Std.Error
0.30
0.46
0.17
t-statistic
0.73
-0.95
-1.02
R-squared 0.17
1973-1961
Constant 
Dummy 1 
Ln(1961)
Coefficient
0.44
0.08
-0.67
Std.Error
0.12
0.08
0.20
t-statistic
3.67
0.94
-3.27
R-squared 0.34
1983-1973
Constant 
Dummy 1 
In (1973)
Coefficient
0.28
0.45
0.15
Std.Error
0.09
0.20
0.07
t-statistic
3.07
0.94
-3.27
R-squared 0.50
1990-1983
Constant 
Dummy 1 
Ln (1983)
Coefficient
0.16
-0.04
0.16
Std.Error
0.14
0.32
0.10
t-statistic
1.13
-0.13
1.65
R-squared 0.15
1995-1990
Constant 
Dummy 1 
Ln (1990)
Coefficient
0.14
-1.01
0.00
Std.Error
0.07
0.14
0.05
t-statistic
2.19
-7.38
0.05
R-squared 0.74
Source: own calculations, for more details see pages 360-362
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Utrera and Koroch (1998) found that including regional dummy variables had no impact 
when compared to the absolute beta results. Using the data from Universidad de la Plata, 
I have then added a dummy variable, which is 1 for Tierra del Fuego and 0 otherwise (i.e. 
for the rest of the provinces) and the results are presented in Table 7.7 and appendix V 
page 357 and onwards. It can be seen that the only two regressions that changed 
significantly when adding the dummy variable for Tierra del Fuego are those 
corresponding to the period 1973-1983 and those for the period 1995-1990. As was seen 
in Table 7.3, the period 1973-1983 was characterised by non-convergence. However, 
when I added the variable for Tierra del Fuego the R-squared increased significantly, the 
coefficient for the income on the base year is still positive and not significant and the 
dummy coefficient is also positive and significant implying no convergence.
For the period 1990-1995 the R-squared increased considerably and now the coefficient
o f the income for 1990 is positive and not significant while the dummy coefficient is
negative and highly significant. A significant dummy implies that there is an effect from
*
Tierra del Fuego that it is unexplained by this regression.
5.3. Beta convergence: Political and Macroeconomic variables
In this section, the impact of both political and macroeconomic variables has been 
analysed as suggested in Part I of this thesis. As seen in both the sigma and beta analyses 
above, there seems to be a link between instability periods and convergence. In this 
section, however, I will try to test these preliminary results empirically. Proxies for both 
macro and political instability have been selected. Regarding macroeconomic variables, 
the proxy chosen was the average inflation rate. According to the theory, the higher the 
macroeconomic instability the higher the dispersion. I will try to test whether in times of 
high inflation rates the dispersion is higher. Two regressions have been performed here. 
The first one comprises the period 1961-1974, where inflation rates averaged 28 per cent 
(with a maximum of 60 per cent in 1973 and a minimum of 7.5 per cent growth in 1979). 
The second sub-period is 1975-1990, where the average inflation growth rate was 569 per
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cent (with a minimum of 90 per cent in 1986 and a maximum o f over 3,000 per cent in 
1989).
The results o f this regression can be seen in Table 7.8 and on Appendix V, regression 19. 
According to the absolute beta analysis performed, in the first sub-period there was weak 
convergence (with marginally significant coefficients) while in the second one no 
convergence is found (the coefficients are negative but non-significant and the R-squared 
is 0.01) and not significant F-statistic.
In order to test whether the differences between both sub-periods are significant, a further 
analysis was carried out. Using a dummy variable and adjusting the number o f years for 
both sub-periods, and giving 0 to the period with low inflation while 1 to that 
corresponding to high inflation. The results are also on Table 7.8 where it can be seen 
that although with the right sign, the coefficient of the dummy variable is not significant. 
Therefore, this implies that the hypothesis of both periods being statistically different is 
rejected.
T a b le  7.8. Beta Convergence, Macroeconomic Indicators
1974-1961
Coefficient S td .E rro r t-statistic
C onstant 0.13 0.13 1.00
In (1961) -0.16 0.08 -2.03
R -squared 0.16
1990-1975
Coefficient S td .E rror t-statistic
C onstant -0.12 0.16 -0.76
ln(1975) -0.06 0.12 -0.54
R -squared 0.01
Dum m y var.
Coefficient S td .E rro r t-statistic
C onstant 0.13 0.16 0.81
ln(1975) -0.16 0.09 -1.66
Dummy 0.09 0.14 0.67
R -squared 0.47
Source: own calculations, for more details see pages 360-362
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In order to account for political instability, I have again considered two different sub­
periods. The first, from 1976-1982, was characterised by military governments and will 
be compared with the period 1983-1995 after the return to democracy. According to the 
theory seen in Chapters 2 and 3, in times of political instability - in this case successive 
military governments - divergence will occur via the absence of rule o f law and decrease 
in investment and medium-term planning. It can be seen in Table 7.9 as well as in 
Appendix V, that in the first sub-period there is weak divergence o f GDP per capita 
between the provinces; while in the sub-period 1983-1995 there is convergence. As 
undertaken before in order to test the hypothesis of difference between both periods, a 
dummy variable analysis was performed, with 1 for democracy and 0 for military period. 
The hypothesis is that in times of democracy, convergence would appear. It can be seen 
that the dummy coefficient is negative, implying convergence, and it is significant. Thus, 
the hypothesis o f both periods being different statistically is not rejected.
Table 7.9. Beta Convergence, Political Variables (1976-1982 and 1983-1995)
1982-1976
Coefficient S td .E rro r t-statistic
C onstant 0.17 0.09 1.91
ln (1976) 0.12 0.07 1.74
R -squared 0.12
1995-1983
Coefficient S td .E rro r t-statistic
C onstant -0.18 0.12 -1.46
ln (1975) -0.19 0.09 -2.10
R -squared 0.17
Dummy var.
Coefficient S td .E rror t-statistic
C onstant 0.17 0.08 2.12
ln (1975) 0.12 0.06 1.93
Dummy -0.22 0.08 -2.66
R -squared 0.14
Source: own calculations, for more details see pages 364-366
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However, when another period in which there were military governments is considered 
(1966-1972) the results differ from the above. As can be seen in both Table 7.10 and 
Appendix V, the period 1966-1972 was characterised by convergence. When performing 
the same test it can be concluded that between 1995-1983 and 1972-1966 the regression 
shows not significant coefficient and therefore the hypothesis of the extent of 
convergence being the same in both subperiods is rejected. Although there seems to be 
contradictory evidence regarding both periods of military governments, it can be said that 
the military governments of the period 1976-1982 were far less associated to any rule of 
law that was the previous period of 1966-1972.
Table 7.10. Beta Convergence, Political Variables (1966-1972)
1972-1966
C onstant 
ln (1966)
Coefficient
0.07
-0.09
S td .E rro r
0.14
0.08
t-statistic
0.48
-1.11
R-squared 0.05
Dummy var.
Constant 
ln (1966) 
Dummy 
R-squared
Coefficient
0.07
-0.24
-0.10
0.20
S td .E rro r
0.15
0.19
0.13
t-statistic
0.44
-1.29
-0.80
Source: own calculations, for more details see pages 363-366
6. Conclusions
In this chapter, several methods for analysing disparities have been investigated. One 
important finding for the Argentine provinces is that although there is absolute p- 
convergence for the period 1961-1995, there is no clear pattern when dividing into sub­
periods. In fact, the convergence or divergence among provinces varies according to the 
period analysed and it seems to be influenced by external factors.
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The results presented here show that there was a-convergence in the sixties. This result is 
consistent with that of Utrera and Koroch (1998). There is also absolute P-convergence 
for the period 1961-1973. During the sixties, there was an increasing international 
concern for regional disparities and national economic development, and thus national 
planning played a more significant role in national policies. Throughout the sixties, and 
particularly in the second half, major industrial projects were subsidised as the last stage 
of the industrialisation strategy and there was a state concern for improving both physical 
and social infrastructure, which is consistent with a declining trend in disparities.
In the seventies, disparities increased, as was shown not only by the a-convergence 
analysis but also because of the lack of absolute p-convergence. These results are 
consistent with Utrera and Koroch (1999) and Marina (1999). The economic policy that 
characterised the military governments in the seventies relied on the liberalisation of the 
labour market, foreign trade and finance and a high level of deficit financed with foreign 
debt. The stabilisation programmes led to an overvalued peso, large current account 
deficits, which resulted in a debt crisis in 1981 with the rise in world interest rates.
Over the eighties, according to our sigma analysis, there was a strong divergence in GDP 
per capita across the regions, peaking in 1989. This is consistent with the lack of absolute 
P-convergence for the period. The democratic period starting in 1983 was characterised 
by a more closed economy with a stronger state intervention in expenses, price fixation, 
wages, exchange rates and interest rates. A series of economic plans were introduced, in 
1985 the Plan Austral was launched, introducing a new currency and a freeze in wages, 
prices and exchange rates. By 1986 its initial success was overcome by the increasing 
fiscal deficit and external imbalances. In 1988 inflation accelerated. The adjustment 
measures of 1988 - Plan Primavera - were implemented too late and resulted in the 1989 
hyperinflation, which coincides with the highest level of disparities in GDP per capita.
A strong a-convergence is found after 1990, in particular for 1990, when the largest 
decrease in the whole period takes place. However, after 1990, there is an oscillating 
pattern. The absolute beta analysis shows no convergence for the period. After the 1991
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Convertibility Plan is characterised by a more open economy with non-inflationary 
financing and price flexibility.
The most important conclusion is that convergence across the Argentine provinces varied 
according to the period analysed. The evidence for the period 1961-1994 indicates the 
presence of absolute convergence. This was also observed in Utrera and Koroch (1999) 
where they contradict the results from Utrera and Koroch (1998) when considering two 
different periods of analysis, 1953-1994 and 1961-1994 respectively. However, it is clear 
from the results presented along this chapter for both the sigma and beta analysis that this 
was not a continuous or regular process. In fact, there are sub-periods where convergence 
is the rule followed by others characterised by lack of convergence. Further, it seems that 
periods of economic crisis - in particular 1981 and 1989 - were accompanied by a 
slowdown in the process of convergence among regions. Moreover, there seems to be a 
clear link between political instability and divergence and an indicative, though not 
conclusive link with macroeconomic instability.
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8Brazil: Origin of Disparities
1. Introduction
In this chapter the development of regional disparities and income distribution in Brazil is 
investigated, in a manner already undertaken for Argentina. I will show that inequality of 
incomes and growth has been a characteristic of the Brazilian economy since the 
nineteenth century to the present and that it has proved to be far from exhibiting a 
convergence trend throughout the centuries. The main hypothesis is that the colonial 
socio-economic structure set the pattern for a concentrated distribution o f income in 
modem Brazil.
Most importantly, each of the primary product export cycles benefited certain regions to 
the detriment of others, and these relatively short-lived export booms failed to create a 
balanced or enduring development. The process that continued shaping Brazil’s 
inequalities is more closely linked to the primary export cycles than to political 
developments as has been seen in the case of Argentina. The change from colony to 
empire and subsequently to republic occurred without violence in Brazil and did not 
provoke a significant productive or commercial disruption; in fact, the dependence on the 
export-oriented economy from the colonial period continued as before.
While the sugar cycle in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries benefited the northeast, 
the gold export cycle of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries benefited the present 
state of Minas Gerais and neighbouring regions. However, the dynamic economy 
generated by the coffee export sector from the 19th century in the southeast was to 
develop later into Brazil’s industrial centre. The southeast became the leading sector of 
Brazil’s economy and principal beneficiary of economic growth. As in the case of 
Argentina, the rapid growth of the second half of the twentieth century was highly
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concentrated in certain sectors and income distribution and regional imbalances persisted, 
leading to a divergence ‘map’ as depicted in Figure 1.5 of this Introduction.
2. The Origins of Disparities: Export Cycles
I have structured this section differently that for the case of Argentina. As mentioned 
above, while in the latter political events are quite tightly linked to the concentration 
process, in the case of Brazil this is more linked to different export cycles. These cycles 
often overlapped with each other, and so I have decided to concentrate in the different 
exports booms, providing a general picture of disparities for the whole period at the end 
of this section.
2.1. The Sugar Economy in the northeast
Brazil’s first major export product was sugar. Its cultivation was introduced in the 
country around 1520 from islands under Portuguese power in the Atlantic. It was 
produced in the humid northeast coast zona de mata (forest zone), which was not only 
physically favourable for growing the crop but also conveniently located for shipping to 
Europe and for receiving slave labour from Africa. Sugar production was highly labour 
intensive and required significant capital investment. Since most of the sugar was grown 
on large estates, a powerful elite emerged and the income produced in the colony was 
mainly concentrated in the hands of the plantation owners. Furtado (1963) estimated that 
at least 90 per cent of the income generated by the sugar economy in Brazil was 
concentrated in the hands of sugar-mill and plantation owners (Baer, 1995).
Furtado (1963) compares the Brazilian colonial productive structure with that of the 
United States to investigate why the latter became an industrial nation in the nineteenth 
century, whereas Brazil remained an underdeveloped country throughout the twentieth 
century. The colonial structure in the United States was characterised by small 
agricultural properties, and income was more evenly distributed with a class of small 
farmers combining with modest and great merchants to dominate the economy. A large 
internal market appeared in the United States, setting the basis for an early development
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of an independent and commercial industrial sector. By contrast, in Brazil, the ruling 
class consisted of large farmers and slave owners. This concentration of property and 
income together with the failure to establish a more diversified economy resulted in a 
very constricted domestic market that maintained the colonial economic structure in 
Brazil stagnant and showed no trend towards fragmentation (Wood, 1988).
Furtado (1963) stresses that the rigidity of the production structure determined the failure 
of the sugar export economy in having long-lasting effects on the economy. Most of the 
surplus went to the commercial classes who invested the gains abroad, or to estate owners 
who spent large amounts on imports, both consumption or investment goods, the latter 
also including slaves. Since the monetary economy was very limited, export stagnation 
had little effect on the economy as a whole and was only felt as a decline in the import of 
goods and slaves. Growth was associated with occupation of new land and the expansion 
of imports o f goods and slaves rather than changes in the production process or increases 
in productivity. Thus, during periods of declining exports, the industry would undergo 
certain shrinkage but no structural transformations, which limited the possibilities for 
economic growth.
Sugar production increased steadily during the early seventeenth century when Brazil 
was the world’s largest sugar supplier. However, at the end of the century, this export 
boom started to fade. Although the cost of Brazilian sugar was 30 per cent below that of 
the British Caribbean, according to Furtado (1963) the main reason for the decline was 
the increase in sugar production from the British, Dutch and French colonies, which had 
preferential access to those markets. Besides, the expansion of the mining industry in the 
south-central region attracted skilled workers and raised the price of slaves, which 
reduced the benefits derived from sugar production even further.
However, Leff (1972) argues that one of the main determinants of the decline of the sugar 
economy in the northeast was the growing importance of the coffee economy in the 
centre-south. L eff s argument is that as coffee exports grew, the exchange rate increased 
over the one that would otherwise prevail, affecting both sugar and cotton that demanded
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a lower export tax. Then an increasing overvaluation of the exchange rate for sugar and 
cotton, together with the growing importance of coffee, resulted in a significant reduction 
of sales of sugar and cotton into international markets.
Overall, the sugar plantations did not disappear, and sugar continued to be an important 
crop in terms of volume, but its profitability had declined. Around Salvador some lands 
were switched to the production of tobacco and later, in the middle of the eighteenth 
century, to cocoa. During the sugar export boom, some linkages developed between the 
coastal sugar area and the interior (the agreste and sertao areas respectively), where cattle 
breeding and the agricultural surplus provided food to the population of the sugar zones 
(Baer, 1995). However, the expansion of the latter was subject to expansion on the sugar 
economy. The population that was engaged in cattle-breeding was very small, land 
occupation was extensive and to some degree nomadic due to the arid conditions in the 
interior. Given that land expansion implied higher costs since it was achieved through 
increases both in cattle and labour, its productivity showed a trend towards decline. When 
the sugar sector began to decline, the cattle economy in the interior turned into 
subsistence.
Baer (1995:14) considers that “the legacy of the sugar cycle on Brazil was negative” 
since the organisation of agriculture in the northeast regions remained primitive and in 
the coastal plantations in particular, agricultural techniques remained mostly archaic. 
Further, the slave trade kept human resources underdeveloped and therefore most of the 
profits were appropriated either by Portuguese and foreign intermediaries or by land and 
mill-owners who, in turn, spent it on imported consumer goods rather than on improving 
the production techniques or the existing infrastructure.
In the period stretching from the last quarter of the seventeenth century to the beginning 
of the nineteenth century, the economy of the northeast went through a period of 
stagnation, as real per capita income of the population declined steadily. The higher 
productivity sector -  sugar - was losing its relative importance to the stock-breeding 
sector, where the productivity declined steadily as it expanded because that expansion
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only represented growth of the subsistence sector. Therefore, the northeast, which had 
been a high productivity economic system, turned into an economy of subsistence with an 
involution in the division of labour and specialisation, resulting in a reversion to primitive 
techniques. Furtado (1963) defines this process as ‘retrograde economic evolution’ as 
opposed to economic growth and development, and argues that this process shaped the 
structure of the economy of the northeast, which prevails today.
2.2. The Gold Cycle in the Centre-South
Gold mines were discovered in what is today the state of Minas Gerais in the early 1690s, 
resulting in a shift in population to those regions. Gold production increased and reached 
its peak in the 1750s, relocating the centre of economic activity to the centre-south, and 
Rio de Janeiro emerged as a major port through which the mineral was exported and 
through which manufactured imports entered the country (Skidmore, 1999; Baer, 1995).
The mobilisation of resources to the mining area included mostly slaves from the 
northeast, migrants from southern Brazil, and for the first time large numbers of 
immigrants from Portugal. The high migration flows were consequence of the mining 
process that was undertaken on a small scale, and so was affordable for people of limited 
resources. This resulted in an urbanisation process and the emergence o f several towns 
and cities. New captaincies were also created, and in 1763 the capital of the Portuguese 
colony was moved from Salvador to Rio de Janeiro to keep administrative control over 
the mining area in terms of shipping and trading of gold (Wood, 1988).
The gold cycle started its decline at the end of the eighteenth century due to the 
exhaustion of the most of the economically viable mines. Part o f the mining population 
moved to central Brazil in order to take-up ranching; others went to southern Brazil to 
carry out agricultural activities, and many stayed in Minas Gerais turning mostly to 
subsistence production (Baer, 1995).
As in the case o f the sugar economy, the mining sector of Minas Gerais created some 
linkage effects due to the increase in demand for food that stimulated agricultural
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production and cattle-breeding in the neighbouring regions. Another linkage of the 
mining economy was due to transport needs, and mule-breeding developed on a large 
scale in the present state of Rio Grande do Sul. The mining economy thereby permitted a 
form of articulation between the southern regions of the country (Furtado, 1963).
There were significant differences between the sugar and mining cycles. First, in terms of 
the concentration of income, which was less strong in the latter, primarily due to the 
larger proportion of free labour engaged in mining. Secondly with respect to the market 
structure, since in the mining economy common consumption goods had a larger share 
than luxury goods in domestic consumption. Thirdly, the population was largely 
concentrated in either urban or semi-urban areas, as opposed to living in large plantations 
as in the case o f the sugar economy. Lastly, the longer distances involved made it less 
profitable to import goods and therefore there was a development of activities connected 
with the domestic market and therefore the gold cycle generated significant linkages. 
However, no significant manufacturing industries were created, largely because the 
imperial policies prohibited manufactures of those goods produced in Portugal, but also 
because of the lack of local expertise (Baer, 1995).
Since no permanent activities developed once gold production ceased the system 
collapsed and retreated merely into a subsistence economy. As in the economy of the 
northeast, there was a process of ‘involution’ where a large part of the population drifted 
to the subsistence economy, and a region with high productivity regressed into a 
disconnected mass of population working at the lowest o f their productivity. (Furtado, 
1963)
2.3. Cotton and Rubber production
Cotton had long been grown in the northeast of Brazil, mainly in the Maranhao region. 
There was a first export boom in the eighteenth century at the time of the American 
Revolution. In the 1820s the cotton production exported to the United States and Britain 
outstripped sales of sugar. In the mid-nineteenth century, as a result of the American 
Civil War and the subsequent disruption in world trade, cotton production was further
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promoted. Brazil gained a larger proportion of world trade, which brought some short­
term prosperity to the northeast. However, in 1877 a drought struck the area with 
devastating consequences for cotton production (Wood, 1988; Baer, 1995).
The main drawback for expansion in the northeast cotton industry was the high transport 
cost from the interior to the coast. Fluvial transport was not significant, as in the case of 
the United States, where the steamboats had already started, and cotton transport in Brazil 
still relied on horses and donkeys. Even the first railway lines made little difference since 
sometimes it was cheaper to cover the distance to the port than to the railway station. The 
lack of a viable fluvial network and railway system reduced the value of the land used for 
cotton and resulted in land-intensive activity. The westward expansion of land was either 
abandoned or used for subsistence when cotton prices dropped. Another factor that 
undermined Brazilian cotton production were export taxes and specialisation - due to 
climate - in long fibre cotton, which demanded a labour intensive technique. The 
advantage of this kind of cotton disappeared with the extension of long fibres to other 
regions - namely Egypt and Florida - and with the invention of new machinery useful for 
producing high quality fabric only from short-fibre cotton.
Brazil had a natural monopoly of rubber, a product unique to the huge trees of the 
Amazon forest. The rubber boom developed in the Amazon region from the third quarter 
of the nineteenth century until the first quarter of the twentieth century. The deteriorating 
economic conditions in the northeast coincided with the rise in the demand for rubber 
used in the production of tires for vehicles in Europe and in the Unites States. Many 
workers had incentives to abandon the drought-stricken areas of the northeast in search of 
rubber trees in the Amazon. Between 1900 and 1910 Brazil was the world’s only natural 
rubber exporter. However, this monopoly was decisively lost when both the British and 
the Dutch planted rubber trees in the East Indies, which were also based on more efficient 
systems of production rather than collecting from widely dispersed trees in the Amazon. 
The initial migration to the region resulted in an emigration in the 1920s (Wood, 1988).
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2.4. The Coffee Cycle and the Emergence of Sao Paulo
Production of sugar, gold, cotton and rubber had an impact in the demographic and 
economic history of Brazil. However, none of them had a more lasting impact on 
contemporary agricultural and industrial production than coffee (Wood, 1988). Although 
coffee had been introduced in Brazil in the eighteenth century, its initial consumption was 
limited. It was not until the improvement in living standards in Europe and the United 
States due to the industrial revolution that coffee consumption increasing rapidly. Coffee 
exports accounted for 19 per cent of total exports between 1821-1830; while by 1891 this 
share had increased to some 63 per cent (Baer, 1995).
There were three distinct phases regarding coffee cultivation. Until 1880, most of the 
coffee production was concentrated around Rio de Janeiro, with rudimentary techniques 
relying mostly on slave labour. As the land became exhausted, production expanded to 
the state o f Sao Paulo. With the introduction of British railways in the 1860s, production 
in Sao Paulo grew rapidly, and by the end of the nineteenth century Brazil accounted for 
three-quarters o f the world supply. The final expansion was into the state of Parana, 
reaching a peak in the mid-1950s. The possibility of expanding the land destined for 
coffee cultivation even further away from the coast was provided by the extension of the 
railways (Graham, 1968; Wood, 1988).
Furtado (1963) makes a distinction between the dominant sugar estate owners and the 
newly emerging coffee estate owners. The former never developed into outward-looking 
entrepreneurs given that commerce was a Portuguese monopoly. Coffee producers, on the 
other hand, were intimately linked to the commercial side of the sector and aware of the 
importance o f state’s support for their economic interests (Baer, 1995). Coffee shaped the 
social structure of Brazil and at the same time influenced the balance of political power. 
The increase in the external demand for coffee coincided with a peak in Brazilian 
production, which in turn was triggered by the introduction of the railways (Topik, 1987).
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Coffee, like sugar production, was a highly labour intensive crop, but it required less 
capital. Land was abundant and expansion was only limited by labour shortage. Between 
1850, when imports of slaves was suspended, and the abolition of slavery in 1888 the 
increase in slave trade within Brazil was significant but not enough to meet the growing 
demand. Labour was recruited from Portugal, Spain and Italy subsidised by the 
government. The flow of immigrants reached a peak in 1891-1900, promoting 
infrastructure both in urban and rural Sao Paulo; by the early twentieth century, Sao 
Paulo had become the most advanced region in the country (Wood, 1988).
The coffee production that caused the Brazilian economy to boom in the mid to late 
nineteenth century turned into a liability in the early twentieth century when the world 
coffee market ran a surplus, primarily due to Brazilian overproduction. High coffee prices 
and relatively low production costs in 1890 allowed land-owners to accumulate capital, 
encouraging them to open further land cultivation with the resulting greater harvests. 
Brazil was the largest world coffee producer - 75 per cent of world production in the 
period 1900-01. Export earnings declined with the subsequent drop in coffee prices and 
this, in turn, was exacerbated by an increase in the exchange value of the Brazilian 
currency after 1898 (Topik, 1987).
The three leading producer states - Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais - signed 
the Treaty o f Taubate in 1906, which was a valorisation agreement, in order to limit 
production and exports in the hope of raising international prices to pre-1900 levels by 
withholding Brazilian coffee from international markets. That year’s harvest was over 50 
per cent of the previous record. The Treaty imposed, among other things, a surcharge on 
coffee exports and the stabilisation of the exchange rate. The expenses of storage were 
financed with foreign loans, guaranteed by federal governments since 1907. This was 
only partly successful since it attracted other producers- mostly form Central and other 
South American countries while the profits were diverted, mostly going to foreign coffee 
brokers, bankers and federal governments. World War I reduced coffee exports 
dramatically. Prices began to fall after 1912 but the exports were not seriously affected
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until 1917. The government intervened successfully to sustain coffee prices; which 
increased after the war (Topik, 1987).
However, coffee exports in Brazil remained extremely significant. The share of coffee 
exports in total exports increased from 56 per cent in 1919 to 75.4 per cent in 1924 and 
remained around 70 per cent until the end of the 1920s. The exchange rate was a key 
element in the protection of the coffee sector. The relative price policy undermined 
industrial growth. The 1929 crisis coincides in Brazil with the boom of the coffee 
industry, the result o f investments of the 1920s. Given the adverse international situation, 
Brazil had an enormous excess production. However, due to economic downturn and less 
financial resources, the government had to abandon the programme of sustaining coffee 
prices. In the period 1929/1939, in contrast to the previous decade, coffee earnings 
provided an acceleration of the industrial development (Silber, 1978) as will be seen in 
Section 3.
2.5. The Impact of the Export Cycles on Regional Disparities
Table 8.1 clearly shows the relative importance of sugar, coffee, cotton and other 
products had in the Brazilian economy in different periods. It provides a complete picture 
since 1650 and extends to 1930 with the coffee boom. The importance o f sugar, with 95 
per cent o f total exports in 1650 can be clearly seen and that of course explains the 
prosperity of the northeast in the period. Earlier in this chapter, it was noted that sugar 
continued to be an important crop in the northeast, and as seen on Table 8.1, it was not 
until the beginning of the twentieth century that its share in total export went below 10 
per cent. However, the decline of the northeast between the end of the seventeenth 
century to the beginning of the nineteenth is also evident from the sharp decline seen on 
the Table.
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Table 8.1. Share o f Products in Total Exports
Years Sugar Coffee Cotton Other
1650 95.0 . - 5.0
1750 47.0 - - 53.0
1800 31.0 - 6.0 63.0
1841-1850 26.7 41.4 7.5 25.4
1891-1900 6.0 64.5 2.7 26.8
1921-1930 1.4 69.6 2.4 26.6
Source: Skidmore (1999:50)
The peak reached by the gold mines in the mid-eighteenth century can also be clearly 
seen from the Table, where it reaches a maximum of 63 per cent of total exports in 1800. 
Further, in section 2.2 it was noted that gold mining had relocated the centre of activity 
from the northeast to the centre-south and had derived in the emergence of Rio de Janeiro 
as a major port. This can be seen given that the decline of the sugar economy coincides 
with the increase in gold mining. The figures on Table 8.1 for other products get 
somewhat blurred thereafter, and it becomes more difficult to identify any particular 
product since it includes both rubber (with its peak in the early twentieth century) and 
manufactured products. It has been mentioned that in the first half of the nineteenth 
century, cotton exports managed to bring some prosperity back into the northeast. A 
devastating drought in 1877, however, had dramatic consequences for this crop, as can be 
seen in the table when comparing the figure of the beginning of the twentieth century to 
that of the previous decades. In the case of coffee, its emergence can be clearly seen in 
this Table, with an average of 41 per cent in the period 1841-1850 and an average 
maximum of over 69 per cent in 1921-1930. As seen previously, between 1821 and 1830 
it only accounted for 19 per cent of total exports. It must be noted that these figures on 
this Table correspond to average values, while in section 2.3 I have sometimes referred to 
annual figures, which may well differ from these averages.
The relocation o f activities had a significant impact on the socio-economic structure of 
the country, since population migrated from one region to another. As already mentioned, 
the origin o f Brazilian disparities can be traced as far as the decline of the northeast and 
the emergence of alternative export products. By 1800, both Rio and Salvador (the two 
major centres of the time, of sugar and gold mining respectively) were the only cities
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/with a population in excess of 50,000. When the total population in Brazil is estimated to 
have been 2 million. By the time of the independence from Portugal in 1822, the 
estimated population was about 4 million, heavily concentrated around Rio de Janeiro, 
Sao Paulo and the south. Elsewhere, only Minas Gerais had also a significant population 
given that it had been at the centre of the gold cycle, with a 20 per cent of population. By 
1850, however, total population had increased to seven and a half million, mostly 
concentrated in coastal areas. Of this, 40 per cent were located in the southeast provinces 
(Rio, Minas Gerais and Sao Paulo) and Rio had further increased its population to 
180,000 inhabitants (Bethell, 1989).
Interesting data regarding early distribution of the population in Brazil can be found in 
Leff (1972: 253) who shows both free and slave population for different regions for the 
years 1823 and 1872.1 have included this information on Table 8.2, where it can be seen 
that between 1823 and 1872 there was a decrease in the population of the northeast from 
52 to 47 per cent while that o f the southeast increased from 38 to 40 per cent. More 
interesting, though, is the differences between slave and free population. For the 
southeast, the percentage of slave population increased from 39 to 59 per cent in the 
period; while for the northeast the slave population decreased from 54 to 32 per cent. 
When looking at the free population, it can be seen that the percentages remain mostly 
unaltered. For the south and central regions the same pattern can be observed, with no 
differences regarding the free population but a five-fold increase in the south and a 
reduction from 3 to 1 per cent in the central west region. These results are particularly 
interesting given that Brazil did not abolish slavery until 1888. As Leff points out, the 
data on population of the work-force reflects the relative marginal value o f labour and the 
relative rates of return on capital in the different activities. Therefore, the differences 
shown in Table 8.2 (increase in slave population in the south and south-east and decrease 
in the northeast) are the mirror image of the relative importance o f those regions in export 
shares and show that migration was more significant for slaves than for the free 
population.
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Table 8.2. Regional Distribution o f the Population 1823 and 1872 (in percentages)
Region
1823
Slave
Population
1872 1823
Free
Population
1872 1823
Total
Population
1872
North 3 2 3 4 3 3
North-east 54 32 51 49 52 47
Southeast 39 59 37 37 38 40
South 1 6 7 7 5 7
C-west 3 1 2 2 2 2
Source: Leff (1972:253)
By the first national census in 1872, total population in Brazil reached ten million 
inhabitants. The combined population of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo was already 50 
per cent larger that that of Bahia and Recife in the northeast (Rio had over 275,000 
inhabitants, while Recife and Salvador had no more than 100,000). Moreover, between 
1872 and 1900 the population of Rio increased at an annual rate of almost four percent 
(as can be seen in Table 8.3) while Sao Paulo grew at a rate o f 8.3 per cent. In the 
northeast, however, the population of Bahia grew at 2.2 per cent while Recife was mostly 
stagnant. Moreover, only a fifth of the free population was literate.
Table 8.3. Population Growth in Rio (1872-1906)
Years Annual Growth
1872-1880 3.84%
1880-1890 4.54%
1890-1900 3.23%
1900-1906 2.91%
Source: Murillo de Caravalho (1998)
It is notable that between 1846 and 1875 the country received over 300,000 immigrants, 
half of which were Portuguese, although German and Italian immigrants were also 
important in number in this period. The concentration of capital favoured the 
improvement in urban facilities and changed big cities. By 1872, 84,000 people living in 
Rio were foreign-born. Numbers continued growing and the 1890 census showed that 22 
per cent o f Sao Paulo population were foreign immigrants and 28.7 per cent in Rio. 
Further, in 1890, 26 per cent of Rio’s population was originally from other regions in* 
Brazil. In fact, the percentage of population originally from Rio was only 45 per cent. Out
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of the 150,000 foreigners in Brazil, 70 per cent were located in Rio, Sao Paulo and Minas 
Gerais and another 17.6 per cent in Rio Grande do Sul. Moreover, the abolition of slavery 
led to a further increase in labour supply, creating unemployment problems and migration 
flows from the coffee regions to urban centres (Bethell, 1989; Murilo de Carvalho, 1998).
Capital accumulation was significant, mainly due to the growth of coffee in total exports. 
As expected given the differences among regions, economic growth affected some 
regions more than others. The period after 1860 is characterised by an accumulation 
process that favoured the urban centres and the rural areas linked to the dynamic sectors 
of the economy. Between 1872 and 1890 Rio further doubled its population, while that of 
Salvador increased from 129,000 to 174,000 in the same period. According to the 1890 
census, 30 per cent of the national population consisted of foreigners, and 70 per cent of 
those were from Portuguese origin. By 1888, streetcars had been introduced in the main 
cities, together with a telegraph line to Europe, and a significant improvement in sewage, 
paving, telephones and water facilities were available. Again, these improvements were 
concentrated in few cities in the southeast. Even so, accommodation, both in quantity as 
well as quality, continued to worsen with the spread of a number of diseases. In 1891, the 
infant mortality rate reached 52 people per thousand inhabitants. As mentioned earlier, 
the migration to urban areas put a further strain on labour supply and this, in turn, 
resulted in an increase in the cost of living (Bethell, 1989; Murilo de Carvalho, 1998).
Literacy rates improved in this period, although this was concentrated in urban areas, 
with an estimated 29 per cent of literate rural population. In 1835, literacy rate in Sao 
Paulo was 5 per cent, while it reached 45 per cent in 1882. Railways were also built in 
this period, with just over 900km built between 1854 and 1872 and a further 8,000 
kilometres added between 1873 and 1889. Again, as in the case of the construction of the 
Argentine railways, these were mainly designed to facilitate the transport o f products to 
the ports and the international markets since the export orientation strategy was at its 
peak in this period. Therefore, the railtracks were mostly concentrated in the coffee and 
sugar areas and directed to cities with international trading ports (Bethell, 1989).
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The railways, as in the Argentine case, were at the core of the export-led economy. In 
Brazil, by 1930, over two-thirds of the ownership, and over half of the administration of 
the track, were in the hands of federal and state governments. This can be explained by 
the importance that Brazil attached to the railways not only in terms of economic growth 
but also for national security and territorial integration. According to Topik (1987), the 
federal railways were more influential in promoting domestic growth than exports. 
However, as can be seen in Table 4.8, the national rail system is concentrated in the 
centre and south of the country, which together account for more than 70 per cent of the 
country’s railtracks (see Maps).
Table 8.4. Regional Distribution of Rail, 1930
North Northeast Centre South
% of national system 4.10 17.40 61.60 16.80
% of national population 4.80 35.80 47.40 12.00
Track (in 1,000 km) 0.73 0.42 1.12 1.21
Source: Topik (1987:124)
3. M odern Disparities
This section will address the development strategy followed in Brazil and its impact on 
industrial concentration, regional inequality, urbanisation and rural-urban migration. The 
first sub-section will provide a brief summary of the import substitution industrialisation 
strategy and the liberalisation of the nineties. The second section will accentuate the 
impact o f these national strategies on regional issues such as migration, concentration and 
inequalities. The last sub-section will give a summary of the main regional-specific plans 
in place. This section, as Section 6.3 in the case of Argentina, is not intended to be an 
exhaustive review of regional policies but mainly a summary. Unlike the case of 
Argentina, where a clear effect of a particular regional policy such as the Tierra del 
Fuego industrial promotion scheme described in section 6.3 can be clearly seen -  see 
Figures 7.8 and 7.13 in sections 7.2 and 7.3 respectively as well as the conditional beta 
analysis for Tierra del Fuego in section 7.4 In the case of Brazil, as will be addressed in
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the following Chapter, no such effects were found (see Figures 9.9 to 9.12 and Figures 
9.15 to 9.19 on sections 9.3 and 9.4 respectively).
3.1. The Industrialisation strategy
Industrialisation in Brazil started in the early nineteenth century, manufacturing for the 
domestic markets those products where the costs were lower than the competing imports 
- soap, construction material, beverages and textiles. However, industrialists 
acknowledged the pre-eminence of the export sector, and industrialisation took place 
without major state intervention until 1930, developing “in the shadow” of agriculture 
(Topik, 1987: 158). Industrialisation at the beginning was mostly intended as a way of 
protecting traditional exports rather than a deliberate industrialisation policy and, in fact, 
it can be said it was a by-product o f policies aimed at other objectives. The country had 
been based on primary product exports and therefore there was no domestic market 
integration, only isolated centres linked to export markets. With the 30s depression and 
the subsequent decline in agricultural exports, particularly coffee, together with the 
concentration o f investment in manufacturing activities and the increasing role o f the 
state with the Vargas administration and the Estado Novo, would then initiate a period 
that would re-shape the country and where government intervention and industrial 
development played a major role (Furtado, 1965: 99; Amman, 2000: 29).
In the period between World War II and 1962 Brazil achieved the most successful 
import-substituting industrialisation in the less developed world. There were several 
external shocks that proved positive in terms of industrial production and that culminated 
in Brazil’s successful industrial development in the fifties, namely First World War, the 
1929 crisis and the Second World War. In addition, it should be noted that had it not been 
due to the coffee protection, the industrial sector would have developed much more 
rapidly and before. According to Silber (1978), one of the most significant economic 
policies that contributed to delay the industrialisation in Brazil was the protection of the 
coffee sector in relation to other economic activities. The minimum price for coffee, in 
place for 30 years, distorted the relative benefits in the Brazilian economy, destroyed the 
comparative advantage of coffee production and thus prevented the optimal use of
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resources and the diversification of the economy with industrialisation and development 
of services.
As mentioned above, the First World War, by depriving Brazil o f its regular supply of 
industrial goods while exports were blocked, stimulated industrial growth and Brazil 
therefore experimented rapid industrial growth during the 1920s. In the late 1920s, the 
expansion of coffee due to the high prices led to an overproduction crisis. Brazil was 
faced with having to cut on imports due to external situation and also with the need to 
finance large surpluses of coffee in order to pursue it policy of supporting coffee prices. 
The latter caused inflation and depreciation of the currency. This depreciation, in turn, 
would act as a protectionist barrier for the domestic industry. Therefore, the volume of 
trade was reduced but the productive capacity of the country became more diversified. It 
is estimated that while in the period 1929-1937 imports declined by 23 per cent, 
industrial output increased by 50 per cent (Furtado, 1965: 101).
After 1930, industry will then become an increasingly important sector o f the national 
economy, being located in the southeast region with Sao Paulo at its centre (Willumsen, 
1985). Industrialisation was concentrated in the South and Southeast, particularly in the 
triangle formed by the states of Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. In the 
1920s, Sao Paulo overtook Rio in the number of industries and increased the state’s share 
of Brazilian industry from 15.9 per cent in 1907 to 45.4 per cent in 1937 (Skidmore, 
1999). As mentioned above, the phase of development based on external demand in 
Brazil came to an end in 1929.
The accumulated foreign exchange reserves after World War II fuelled an import boom 
in 1946-7, that, in turn, created a foreign exchange shortage, and so resulted in a new 
emphasis on promotion of coffee exports and placing import controls but not on actively 
promoting industrialisation. The government followed a policy of overvaluation of the 
currency. This policy, aimed at defending the international price of coffee, damaged 
industrialist groups. However, imports grew quickly exhausting the reserves and 
accumulating external debt. The government, then, decided to introduce controls on
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imports (devaluating the currency would have damaged the coffee and therefore was not 
a preferred option), and thus protecting industry. The imports of ‘similar’ products were 
prohibited and exchange subsidies were granted (Furtado, 1965). The Law of Similars 
had its origins in post independence times and is intended to encourage domestic 
production of import competing goods allowing Brazilian manufacturers to request 
prohibition of any imports they believed could be produced locally. However, 
information on the price of domestic production was not formally adopted as a criterion 
for government’s decision until 1967 and has generally been applied with little concern 
for efficiency issues. It was finally abolished in 1990 (Bulmer-Thomas, 1994: 285; 
Amman, 2000: 33).
It was not until the early fifties, during the Getulio Vargas’ second presidency, that 
industrialisation and economic development were actively and purposefully promoted 
(Skidmore, 1999). During 1947-55 domestic production of consumer durables 
experienced a notable success. As imports were reduced, ISI moved into producer goods. 
Domestic production as well as imports of capital goods swiftly increased in the first 
phase (1955-9), with domestic production of intermediate goods expanding at a speedily. 
Manufactured imports as percentage of total imports declined, while imports of raw 
materials increased, as were now being required by the new industries. By the early 
sixties, the import substitution phase was almost complete. While the substitution of 
imports was successful, the exports stagnated. This was mainly caused by the structure of 
protection, which increased industrial prices more than those for agricultural products and 
the resulting overvalued export exchange rate deterred traditional exports, as well as 
potential manufactured exports (Bergsman in Rosenbaum and Tyler, 1965: 71).
Post war industrial development was also accompanied by a significant amount of public 
investments, such as transport network, electric power, among others. This was vital for 
the industrial process to continue, and needed to be carried out by a public authority 
(Furtado, 1965; Baer, 1965). In 1951 Vargas sent a plan to create a state oil and gas 
monopoly and PETROBRAS was formed in 1953. Its success contributed to create a 
national development ideology. It was in the second half of the 1950s, during the
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consolidation of the heavy phase of industry above mentioned, that the less industrialised 
regions such as the northeast were incorporated in this process. That was achieved by the 
creation of infrastructure, especially transport and communication, as well as financial 
and fiscal incentives to attract productive capital to the less developed regions, as will be 
addressed in section 8.3 with the creation of SUDENE and SUDAM. Growth in the 
centre-west region had been originally linked to that of Sao Paulo. However, in the 
1960s, the construction of a transport network and the founding of Brasilia, the new 
capital, induced the spread of agriculture further to the interior o f the country 
(Willumsen, 1985).
Following the Vargas presidency, Kubitschek would implement a national economic 
development programme (Programa de Metas) in the period 1956-1961 for increasing 
production by sector in order to accelerate industrialisation and the construction o f the 
infrastructure necessary to sustain it. His strategy was to concentrate on thirty chosen 
targets -  given the lack of resources to follow a more comprehensive plan -  covering 
industrial products and infrastructure and support their development through subsidies, 
tariff protection and subsidised credit. A system of multiple exchange rates and 
government incentives favoured the imports of certain chosen capital goods. Not all 
targets were met, however the plan was notably successful in achieving rapid economic 
growth and development, although this did not continue into the sixties and growth 
declined while inflation accelerated (Daland in Rosenbaum and Tyler, 1972: 36; Amman, 
2000: 29).
By 1961, Brazil possessed an integrated motor vehicle industry and was creating 
subsidiary industries to vehicle production. There were also impressive gains in 
electricity generation and road building. Moreover, from 1957 to 1961, GDP increased at 
an annual rate of 7 per cent. However, the financing was the negative side to the growth 
strategy. Brazil’s domestic savings remained low, thus keeping investment low. Foreign 
capital inflows were insufficient, and there were continuing balance of payments crises 
since export earnings remained stagnant while imports grew. There was also an increase 
in inflation; which redistributed income and wealth. Workers and lower income sectors
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were mostly affected, since inflation acted as an inflationary tax by eroding incomes 
(Fausto, 1998).
Overall, the period 1945-60 was of rapid industrial growth in which domestically 
produced goods replaced imported consumer durables and intermediate goods. In the 
1950s, development policy became inward-oriented; with an emphasis on import 
substitution industrialisation that would promote domestic production of imported 
manufactured products. Various types of exchange controls were implemented and 
foreign capital inflows were encouraged. However, ISI policies worked against the 
agricultural sector, and the state promoted industrial accumulation by shifting resources 
from the agricultural export sector to the urban industrial economy, with both 
discriminatory trade and exchange policies (Wood, 1988).
The main drawback of the process of industrialisation as a development strategy was the 
reliance on industrial imports. Although the replacement o f import goods was successful, 
the need to import increasing quantities of equipment remained, putting a constant strain 
on the external sector. Replacement of imports in its first phase it a matter of meeting an 
existing demand. In the case of Brazil, as imported goods become more expensive, 
domestic products satisfied the demand. The expansion of certain products changed the 
composition of the demand for imports, creating the need to import intermediate 
products, raw materials and equipment (Furtado, 1965).
The substitution process, which began with manufactured non-durable consumer goods, 
was followed by the replacement of durables, intermediate products and equipment. 
However, this substitution process was likely to reach a saturation point in which certain 
products are more difficult to replace and substitution can become a major obstacle to 
development. The only way out would therefore be to develop an independent supply of 
domestic technology and equipment, which would be impossible unless having attained 
full economic development. Another factor necessary for the substitution process to work 
was the inflationary process. In the beginning, the inflation generated with the protection 
of coffee prices benefited the industrial groups, as mentioned above. Later, the
235
substitution process, by increasing relative prices on previously imported goods, also 
acted as a mechanism for transferring income to the industrial groups. Moreover, the 
exchange rate mechanism, by stabilising the rate while introducing selective import 
controls and increasing domestic prices, favoured even further the industrial 
accumulation (Furtado, 1965: 102).
Following a record growth year in 1961, inflation accelerated and the rate of economic 
expansion began to decline. The rate o f growth decreased significantly in 1963 and 
remained low until 1968. Two development plans were proposed in 1962 and 1964. The 
second central planning experience was the Plano Trienal (1961-64) under the 
presidency o f Joao Goulart. The plan was designed by Celso Furtado, who had been 
appointed as the first minister of planning of Brazil. This plan was of a more 
comprehensive nature. The Plano Trienal recognised the need for monetary control but 
was was never implemented as it was unpopular and Goulart did not have enough 
political support to enforce it. Inflation worsened and the rate of growth came to a halt. 
However, the military government of Castelo Branco that came to power in 1964 
implemented a plan that was very much like the Furtado plan, at least in the way intended 
to reduce inflation and stimulate development -the Programa de Agao Economica do 
Govemo or PAEG (1964-1966). This plan was also continued under Costa e Silva as the 
Programa Estrategico de Desenvolvimento -PED -  in 1968-1970. It was not until 1968, 
when the industrial sector recovered, that the general rate of growth increased. In this 
year, the exchange rate was modified and instead of the occasional devaluation the 
government introduced a “crawling peg”, a periodic adjustment o f the exchange rate 
corresponding to the movements in the inflation rate. By doing this, speculative capital 
flows were reduced and so was uncertainty. In fact, from 1968 until 1973 the Brazilian 
economy grew at an unprecedented accelerated rate, and this period is often referred to as 
the Brazilian economic miracle (Rosenbaum and Tyler, 1972: 18; Wogart, 1972: 167; 
Daland, 1972: 37).
The so-called miracle was the result o f a development plan that aimed to control 
inflation, attract foreign investment and stimulate capital accumulation. GDP increased at
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an average annual rate of 11.2 per cent. Tax incentive schemes aimed to stimulate and 
diversify exports into manufacturing products and so reducing the dependence on 
agriculture, particularly coffee, were passed. However, a weak side to this “miracle” -  as 
already mentioned above for the industrial-led development strategy - was its excessive 
dependency on the financial system and international trade. There was also a further 
concentration of income and while there was a significant industrial potential in Brazil, 
there were very low indicators o f health, education and quality of life (Fausto, 1998).
The main constraint to Brazilian growth was the balance of payments problem. Import- 
substitution industrialisation entails a decrease in the import coefficient (ratio of imports 
to GDP) so that a country would grow even without a proportionate growth in the 
country’s capacity to import. If a floor is reached, however, further increases in GDP 
should go hand in hand with increases in the capacity to import, i.e. the country’s exports. 
Therefore, if import substitution cannot lower the import coefficient, the growth of the 
economy as a whole is limited unless exports can grow at a similar rate. In the case of 
Brazil, ISI succeeded in changing the import composition. Since exports were stagnant 
until 1965 growth slackened and it wasn’t until the export sector recovered that the ISI 
strategy recovered as well (Rosenbaum and Tyler, 1972: 22).
In the 1970s, medium and low-income segments of the population did obtain some gains, 
and especially after 1976 while those with higher incomes did not perform so well. The 
reorganisation o f the labour movement increased wages, and minimum wage levels were 
defined in collective negotiations. The deceleration of the economy after 1973 was a 
result o f the oil crisis that had significant effects on the domestic economy. Measures 
were taken to expand the domestic demand, while import controls and export promotion 
programmes were introduced to fight the balance of payments deficit. The resulting 
excessive demand stimulated inflation. During the seventies, economic policies would 
follow this stop-and-go pattern of demand expansion to cover the balance of payments 
deficit, resulting in inflation and reduction in demand to curb price increases. In the 
1970s, some improvements were made in the north with the construction of important 
roads and foreign investment being attracted to the aluminium sector and domestic
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investment channelled to the lumber sector. The south, although it had not historically 
participated in the export booms, had increasingly been integrating with Sao Paulo and 
Minas from the eighteenth century and became the grain supplier of the country. In this 
modem period, therefore, the growing articulation of the domestic market overtook the 
historic predominance of the external market (Willumsen, 1985).
The Second National Development Plan (PND II) in 1974 directly favoured the capital 
goods sector. This plan was designed as a response to the economic conditions following 
the oil crisis in 1973. At this time, Brazil decided to deepen the process of ISI and gain 
technological self-sufficiency. However, by the beginning of the eighties, the foreign 
exchange problems, coupled with the second oil crisis in 1979 and inflation made the 
debt-led strategy unviable. In the eighties -  and until 1987 -  high tariffs protection was in 
place in order to eliminate the trade deficit. After 1987, liberalisation began gradually 
with the return to democracy under Samey’s presidency and from 1990 onwards a more 
radical trade reform was pursued under Collor de Melo with non-tariff barriers being 
abolished and tariffs cut and the Abertura Comercial and also the creation of 
MERCOSUR. Subsequent governments carried the liberalisation programme further with 
most industrial sectors facing reduction in tariffs and public investment and many public 
enterprises being privatised. While other Latin American countries reformed their 
economies within a decade, in the case of Brazil, and due to the lack of economic reform 
in the eighties, drastic changes were undertaken in few years (Gil Kinzo and Bulmer 
Thomas, (1995); Amman, 2000: 29, 46). The regional impact of the present liberalisation 
period will be further discussed in the following section.
3.2. The impact of development strategies on regions
Before the industrialisation development strategy, the inequality in the distribution of 
income of land was said to be responsible for the unequal distribution of income, given 
that the benefits derived from productivity growth in the primary export activities were 
distributed among few landlords. However, the process of industrialisation not only 
created but also aggravated pre-existing imbalances, mostly due to the rapid 
industrialisation process of the 1950s and 60s, which constitutes the most important
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change of this period. In particular, it is said to have aggravated the existing differences 
between the northeast and the centre-south of the country. This was primarily due to a 
high capital intensity in the manufacturing sector, which did not require increasing 
workforce as production increased the excess supply of labour that permitted maintaining 
low wages and the small size of the market, which resulted in an oligopolistic structure. 
The result was an increasing dual structure in which existing inequality patterns were 
accentuated (Wells, 1976: 2). The industrialisation process not only located most of the 
industrial capacity in the centre-south, where it was already located, but also induced a 
worsening for the northeast. Post-war industrialisation thus accentuated the geographical 
concentration in Brazil with the Sao Paulo region having almost half o f the share of 
national industrial output. Moreover, as mentioned in the previous section, inflation acted 
as an inflationary tax and thus redistributed wealth with lower incomes being adversely 
hit.
In this period, the south registered significantly high rates of population growth, mostly 
corresponding to migration from the northeast. According to Baer (1965: 173), it is 
estimated that the northeast lost over 640,000 in the 1930-40 and over 930,000 in the 
1940-50 because of net migration. By contrast, the centre-south received 975,000 and
576,000 respectively from net immigration. It is generally said that this migration flows 
are due to the differing growth rates; however, government policies by encouraging 
industrialisation were also responsible for the aggravation of disparities as well as 
offsetting the redistribution effects of the fiscal mechanism. In fact, the northeast was 
forced through protective domestic policies to import from the more developed south 
rather than from abroad.
Consequently, the northeast suffered a decline in the terms of trade and it can be said that 
it subsidised the industrialisation in the centre-south. The northeast’s lower 
industrialisation rate translated into a structure of import demand, which differed from 
the more industrialised south. The former had a higher participation of consumer goods in 
its import demand, which were taxed heavier. Given the inability to buy imported goods, 
the northeast had to buy those consumer goods from the centre-south. This meant a dual
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structure similar to what Prebisch referred to, where the centre-south would have the role 
of centre while the northeast would be the periphery, with a constant deficit to the centre- 
south. Moreover, the high rates that north eastern importers had to pay were used by the 
government to sustain the coffee prices (based in the south) or Banco do Brasil used the 
excess balances to make loans (a high proportion of which are made in the south) (Baer, 
1964: 176).
Capital transfer has also been done though the federal fiscal mechanism, but whether this 
has been enough to redress the imbalance is not clear-cut. Under the fiscal mechanism 
there is a transfer of resources from the south to the northeast. However, many of the 
government funds have been used mainly for drought relief. Under the 1946 constitution, 
the federal government is under the obligation to spend a minimum of 3 per cent of its 
revenues in the northeast. The industrialisation process neglected certain areas of 
investment, such as agriculture and education. (Baer, 1964: 283)
The regional distribution of income and population continued to become more 
concentrated. I reproduce below two tables that appear in Baer (1964:272). The first 
(Table 8.5) shows the regional distribution of the Brazilian population from 1947 to 
1959, while Table 8.6 shows the distribution of national income for the same period. As 
can be seen, while in the north, east and centre-south shares are broadly similar; the 
northeast accounts for 25 per cent of the country’s population but only 11 per cent o f the 
income. In the south, by contrast, while the population is about 32 per cent, the national 
income is near 50 per cent.
240
Table 8.5. Regional Distribution o f the Brazilian Population, 1947-1959 (%)
1947 1949 1957 1959
North 3 3 3 3
Northeast 25 24 24 25
East 36 36 35 35
South 32 33 34 34
C-West 3 3 4 4
Source: Leff (1964: 272)
Table 8.6. Regional Distribution of Brazilian Income, 1947-1959 (%)
1947 1949 1957 1959
North 3 2 2 2
Northeast 11 11 10 10
East 37 37 36 36
South 48 48 49 50
C-West 2 2 2 2
Source: Leff (1964: 272)
Graham (1969) compares 1940 with 1950 and concludes that a trend towards widening 
divergence o f income per capita is observed in all states in Brazil. He determines the 
convergent or divergent pattern by using a weighted relative inequality measure 
calculated from the percentage distribution of total income and total population by states. 
The difference between both the shares of income and population (regardless of the sign) 
is considered as a measure of inequality per capita among all states weighted by their 
share o f total population. The limits of the measure are zero (no relative inequality) or 
close to 200 (one state has all the income and practically no population). He concludes 
that between 1940 and 1950, there was divergence (or no convergence) within the low- 
income group o f the north and northeast and a widening divergence within the higher 
income group o f the south, southwest and southeast (from 33 to 43). Also, there is a 
significant increase between the upper and lower groups of states (from 29.8 to 41.6) and 
also between all states (Table 8.7).
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Graham also compares 1960 with 1950 and concludes that the divergent pattern was 
reversed for all states. Although no strong convergence is observed, the divergent trend at 
least ceased. Observing the behaviour of each group, it can be seen on Table 8.7 that 
within the upper group a slight convergence appears (from 43 to 40). In the case of the 
lower group, it shows a slight divergence as in the previous decade. The most striking 
feature of this decade is the convergence between the upper and lower groups o f states 
decreasing from 41 to 35; and a slight convergence among all states. Thus, the 
convergent trend of the fifties is mainly associated to a slight convergence within the 
upper group and a strong convergence between both groups. Therefore, Graham (1969) 
concludes that inter-group (north-south differences) rather that intra-group behaviour is 
the more important element behind the trends of convergence and divergence of the two 
decades.
Table 8.7. Differences Between Income and Population Shares 1940-1960
Sum of Differences 1940 1950 1960
All States 40.2 51.9 48.7
Between Upper and Lower States (each treated as a group) 29.8 41.6 35.6
Upper Group, treated separately 33.5 43.2 40.0
Lower Group, treated separately 12.7 13.8 15.2
Source: Graham, DH (1969:265)
Graham attributes this converging trend to internal migration in the decade of the fifties.
The lower group o f states was a net exporter of migration while the upper group was an
importer of migrants. Further, he shows that long distance migration is more pronounced 
in the fifties than in the previous decade. The lower group of states was a “net exporter” 
o f migrants while the upper group was a “net importer”. Also he adds that long distance 
migration was more significant in the 50s than in the previous decade, so the pattern of 
the 40s continued into the 50s with the lower group becoming an even more significant 
net exporter and the upper group a more important net importer of migrants. Therefore,
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while for the 40s income differences among states played a tentative role in internal 
migration, the income differences in the 50s were clearly a major factor.
The process of import substitution and the rapid economic growth of the fifties and early 
sixties impacted on economic imbalances and contributed to intensify this already present 
dual economy. As mentioned before, the industrialised Centre-South region made more 
evident the economic disparities already present in the country. However, the ISI 
development strategy left agriculture out of the development strategy by solely 
concentrating on industry and therefore creating another co-existing dualistic pattern. 
Given that employment opportunities in urban areas failed to expand in order to absorb 
the excess labour due to high rates of population growth, both rural-urban migration and 
the low education levels aggravated the problem of urban unemployment (Rosenbaum 
and Tyler, 1972: 22). “Brazil has one of the highest rates of urban growth in the world 
and one o f the lowest rates of labour absorption by industry” (Salmen in Rosenbaum and 
Tyler, 1972: 415). Therefore, as can be seen in the table reproduced below, by 1970, 
Brazil had become a predominantly urban country.
Table 8.8. Urban and Rural Population in Brazil (1940-1970)
Census Year • Urban (%) Rural (%)
1940 31 69
1950 36 64
1960 45 55
1970 53 47
Source: IBGE Census. Quoted in Salmen. L, in Rosenbaum and Tyler (1972: 416).
The major cause of urban growth has been migration, although some was not to cities but 
from poor rural areas to richer rural ones as well as from the Northeast to the agricultural 
areas o f the South and West. From 1960 to 1970 the two states that experienced highest 
average annual population increase were Parana and Goias (mainly due to agricultural 
booms in those states). However, the major migration flows were directed towards the 
cities given the disparities between rural and urban incomes. Between 1950 and 1970, the
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population of the nine major metropolitan areas in Brazil increased by 161 per cent 
(Belem, Fortaleza, Recife, Salvador, Belo Horizonte, Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Curitiba 
and Porto Alegre) compared to a 77 per cent increase in the country’s total population 
(Salmen in Rosenbaum and Tyler, 1972: 419).
With both the PAEG (1964-1966) and its continuation under Costa e Silva -PED -  in 
1968-1970 progress was evident in certain areas but the whole economy was not 
revitalized, particularly agriculture, and the gains were not evenly distributed in the 
population and area. Therefore, efforts of state planning were mainly effective in rich 
states, particularly in Sao Paulo but had little or no effect in the poorer areas.
On the following table, the distribution of the monthly income in services by regions can 
be seen. While Rio de Janeiro (RJ on the table) and Guanabara as well as Sao Paulo 
register well over 50 per cent of employers and self-employed with high incomes; the 
south and northeast are below. In the south, inequalities are not that pronounced, with 
similar percentages of population in the three categories of income. In the northeast, 
however, over 40 per cent of the population is located in the bottom-earning category, 
while the top one has less than 20%.
Table 8.9. Distribution of size of monthly income of employers and self employed in 
services, by regions, second quarter, 1969 (in percentages)
Region Up to cr$49,99 Cr$50,00-149,00 Over Cr$ 150,00
R.J & Guanabara 12.6 27.7 59.7
Sao Paulo 12.0 18.8 69.2
Extreme South 31.6 30.5 37.9
Northeast 43.1 37.2 19.7
Source: Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios (PNAD), Anuario estatistico, 
taken from Salmen (1972: 418)
As a final step in promoting development of the interior regions, the plan for moving the 
capital to Brasilia was given new impetus. This was also done together with policies
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designed to promote the occupation of Amazonia, as will be seen in the following 
section.
The “Brazilian miracle” led to a debate on the distribution of the benefits of rapid 
economic growth. Goodman (1976: 15) points out at the decade of the sixties as one of 
increased concentration of income and a deterioration of the distribution particularly in 
urban areas with the share of the poorer 50 per cent of the population of regional income 
decreasing from 18.6 to 16.3 Moreover, while there was a rapid industrial growth in 
Brazil, there were very low indicators of health, education and quality o f life (Fausto, 
1998). Despite the fact that in the 1970s medium and low-income segments of the 
population did obtain some gains, especially after 1976; income concentration, as 
mentioned by the Gini coefficients, increased from 0.497 in 1960 to 0.565 in 1970 and
0.592 in 1980 (Willumsen, 1985). Several factors are often mentioned as causing the 
growing disparities. Among them, the educational levels and demand for skilled-labour, 
wage differentials and labour market institutions are the most often cited ones.
Following the promulgation of the 1988 Constitution, decentralisation in both political 
and financial resources played a significant part. Decentralisation, however, had different 
impact in the regions, mainly given the existence of regional inequalities. Also, not every 
state has the same amount of power, and there are several centres of power that decide on 
national policies. Moreover, the subsequent weakening of the federal government might 
prove counterproductive for the reduction of disparities. Since 1946 Brazil has a fiscal 
system in which the redistribution of national income is done from the richer to poorer 
regions and this was extended by the 1988 Constitution. It is calculated that while the 
Centre-South generates around 80 per cent of GDP and national revenue, it only has 60 
per cent o f the expenditure. According to Souza the high level of entanglement of this 
system is the reason why when the economy of richer states slows down, so do the less 
developed regions (Souza in Gil Kinzo, 1997: 41).
The liberalisation policies of the 1990s are quite likely to increase disparities with market 
forces in Brazil might favour the more developed regions in the country. In fact the
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“trickle down effects are very unlikely to overtake the polarisation effects from the centre 
south” (Hadad and Hewings, 1998: 38). If regional equity is part of the country’s 
development agenda, an active and comprehensive regional policy should be pursued in 
order to reduce regional disparities.
Over the last decade, there has been some discussion on the regional effects of the 
increased autonomy of the states in giving tax incentives, which has evolved in what is 
called the ‘fiscal war’. The Constitutional Ammendment No 18, which was incorporated 
in the 1967 Constitution under Imposto sobre a Circulagao de Mercadorias (ICMS) -  a 
sales and services tax similar to value added - replaced the Imposto de Vendas e 
Consignagdes (IVC) of the 1946 Constitution. The mechanisms of fiscal incentives based 
on ICMS have allowed many states attract industries many times disregarding efficiency 
concerns. Complementary Law 24/75 prohibited states to grant incentives, unless these 
were approved by CONFAZ, which is a council formed by the minister of finance as well 
as the finance secretaries of the states. However, this law has not been observed. In the 
last decade, and following the Apertura, the fiscal war has intensified in order to attract 
foreign investment (Olenike, 2000).
In theory, decentralized industrial policies and fiscal incentives can contribute to reducing 
disparities in development levels across regions and stimulating expansion. From a 
government’s point of view this is a good development strategy provided there is 
investment flowing to a particular region where otherwise investment would not have 
gone and if  this investment creates domestic linkages. However, in practice, once a 
particular state gets fiscal incentives, other states follow suit and a fiscal war starts, with 
all states participating given that failure to do so might entail the risk of losing 
production. As this continues to expand, there is a loss of efficiency as the fiscal 
incentive turns simply into a tax discount, reducing the private cost of production while 
increasing the social cost (since industrial activity location is determined not by 
efficiency but on ICMS devolution). In the medium term, those states with fewer 
resources and less levels of developed are unable to provide the private sector with the 
infrastructure required. In the end, only those financially strong states would win the war 
since they are the only ones in conditions to be able to continue providing incentives as
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well as suitable production conditions and therefore the result is an increase in income 
disparities (Varsano, 2001:20).
The fiscal war is therefore a consequence o f an aggressive inter state competition in order 
to attract investment. Although some might argue that it produces benefits in terms of 
industrial relocation, these benefits are likely to impact on the short run while in the long­
term, as long as investment is associated with tax incentives rather than efficiency issues, 
the impact on the local finances will be negative (Rodriguez-Pose et al, 2001: 14). As 
local finances deteriorate, local production conditions worsen as well and therefore the 
incentives lose their initial attraction. The fiscal war hints at obvious signaling problems 
in the economy that create disparities between the national and states’ goals and between 
long and short run development strategies (Varsano, 1997: 12).
Despite the argument in favour o f the results of the fiscal war so far in terms of 
decentralising national development and moving away from the Sao Paulo, Rio de 
Janeiro Minas Gerais pole while allowing development to other regions that otherwise 
did not have resource to converge with the richer ones (Olenike, 2000); according to a 
report by BNDES (2000: 3), the fiscal war as an instrument to develop poorer regions is 
questionable. It is quite likely that as incentives are placed, the final redistributive effect 
of the fiscal war will be neutral. Recent GDP statistics by state do not show signs of 
decentralisation of national income. In fact, the study concludes that some less developed 
states that were notoriously more aggressive in the fiscal war have even experienced 
losses in their shares of national GDP, including the industrial GDP. In particular, 
BNDES concludes that the share of the southeast in national GDP decreased between 
1970 and 1985 and increased at the end of 1998. Moreover, the northeast region, which 
had increased its share between 1970 and 1985, saw its share decline by 1998. When 
looking at industrial shares the southeast increased its share in the last period while the 
northeast has declined its industrial production.
As will be seen in the following chapter regardless of the many arguments in favour of 
the fiscal war, it can be seen from the sigma and beta analyses that disparities in the last 
decade have not decreased. The beta analysis for the subperiod 1990-2000 indicate that
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no convergence was found- see Table 9.2 in Chapter 9.. Moreover the figures on 
percentages of national average GDP show that the while other regions remained mostly 
the same, the percentage of the centre west region has increased particularly over the last 
15 years (see Figures 9.5 and 9.9 in chapter 9). Therefore, despite the fiscal war inducing 
some relocation of industries away from traditional centers it has not translated into 
convergence o f disparities, which is, after all, the main reason for providing these 
incentives on the first place.
3.3. Regional government policies
Regional policies in Brazil date from the early thirties. However, as will be seen in this 
section, and in accordance to the Argentine experience, their main characteristic is a lack 
o f co-ordination and coherence, which, in turn, reduced effectiveness. In 1930, the three 
main characteristics of the Brazilian economy were the significant role of the state in 
economic development planning, the highly concentrated and centralised power and 
decision-making process, and the structure of labour relations (Gil Kinzo, 1997). The 
1930s are associated with the beginning of import substitution policies o f development 
mainly in response to external conditions -  as seen in the previous sub-section. Controls 
on foreign exchange were introduced in order to correct imbalances of the balance of 
payments given that prices of agricultural goods had been decreasing. These funds were 
then channelled into the development of an industrial base aiming at the substitution of 
former imports with local manufactures. During the Vargas administration the 
construction of dams, steel plants and Petrobras (the oil and gas monopoly) were 
encouraged (Daland, 1967).
However, it was not until after World War II that the Brazilian government intervened 
substantially in the economy, not only to deepen the industrialisation process but also to 
reduce regional imbalances. Many programmes were implemented, which ranged from 
building Brasilia, for reduction of illiteracy and poor health, subsidising industrial plants 
outside the heartland, agrarian reforms, land-use legislation and infrastructure investment 
(Henshall and Momsen, 1976: 247). As a result of these policies, the share o f agriculture
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in the gross domestic product dropped from 27 to 22 per cent from 1947 to 1961, while 
that of industry increased from 21 to 34 per cent (Daland, 1967).
At a national level, state intervention in this period was significant. In 1948, the SALTE 
plan (health, food, transport and energy) was submitted to congress, but it was not ratified 
until 1950. It was designed to co-ordinate the variety of existing plans and with the 
essential function of assigning funds to eligible agencies. In 1952, the National Bank for 
Economic Development (BNDE) was created with the objective of obtaining funds from 
both international as well as domestic sources. The following year, the BNDE together 
with ECLA formed a team of economists in order to prepare a comprehensive study of 
the Brazilian economy. This plan laid the basis for the first real economic plan although 
comprehensiveness was still lacking. The result was the Programa de Metas mentioned 
in the previous section, a five-year plan covering the period 1956-1960 comprising most 
sectors of the economy.
As a consequence of severe droughts that affected the northeast in 1958, a report was 
produced at the BNDE by Furtado that led in 1959 to the creation of the Superintendency 
for the Development of the Northeast (SUDENE), which will shortly be referred to in 
more detail. Furtado was appointed superintendent of the Council for the Development of 
the Northeast (CODENO). In 1961 the National Planning Commission (COPLAN) was 
created to work on three levels - emergency plans, five-year plans and those with a 
twenty-year perspective (Daland, 1967).
From 1940 onwards, the northeast experienced an employment crisis product of the 
increased competition (in both manufactured as well as agricultural products) from the 
more developed industrial regions. The increase in competition and market penetration 
was favoured by the improvement of roads and railroads, which took place mostly in the 
forties and fifties and some other important highways later in the sixties and seventies. 
Moreover, from 1960, a number of economic policies favouring the developed south 
depressed peripheral regions such as the northeast even further. Both government price 
controls of some basic staples as well as unfavourable world market prices for natural
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fibres led to a long period of decline for many northeast crops during the sixties and 
seventies. The 1964 military coup established a highly centralised government and 
increased the dependency of the politicians of the interior, and in particular the northeast, 
on federal and state government (Hoefle, 1985: 5). The constitutions of 1967 and 1969 
provided the military government a highly centralised authority, which contributed to an 
increase in federal executive authority (Rosenbaum and Tyler, 1972: 5).
In 1960, President Goulart launched the Plano Trienal, which covered the period 1963- 
1965. In 1963 a new planning office was created in an attempt to co-ordinate national 
planning. The following year, Roberto Campos was appointed as minister extraordinary 
for planning and economic co-ordination, and the Program of Action (PAEG) was 
launched. One year later, the advisory council (CONSPLAN) was created. These 
measures together constituted the first serious experiments in formal planning yet, despite 
the number of agencies and bodies dealing with planning and development created in 
those years, there were still no effective and coherent pattern of planning in Brazil, except 
for the BNDE that was concerned with micro-planning (Daland, 1967). The Plano de 
Integragao Nacional (PIN), launched in 1970, involved taking funds from wealthier 
sectors and transferring them to projects in less developed regions, and it is seen as a 
culmination of the 1960 Plano Trienal. However, most of these efforts were channelled 
through a variety of sectoral and regional development agencies.
Besides the programmes already mentioned, there existed a national system o f resource 
transfers from the federal government called the Fund for the Participation of States and 
Municipalities and Negotiated Transfers (Fundo de Participagao de Estatos e Municipios 
e de Transferencias Negociadas), which today accounts to 4 per cent of annual GDP. The 
north and northeast regions receive approximately half of these transfers. Besides the 
federal fiscal incentives, state incentives have also been used since the end of the sixties, 
particularly the exemption of the ICM tax, donation of land and financial contribution via 
share holding (Diniz, 1999: 29). Many states increased the fiscal incentives to attract 
more investment deriving in the so-called ‘fiscal war’ referred to previously, which 
although contributing to the relocation of some industrial activity in states such as Minas
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Gerais, Parana and Santa Catarina, they have not decreased disparities -  as will be seen in 
the next Chapter.
During the seventies, economic policies would follow this stop-and-go pattern of demand 
expansion to cover the balance of payments deficit, resulting in inflation and reduction in 
demand to curb price increases. In the 1970s, some improvements were made in the north 
with the construction of important roads and foreign investment being attracted to the 
aluminium sector and domestic investment channelled to the lumber sector. The south, 
although it had not historically participated in the export booms, had increasingly been 
integrating with Sao Paulo and Minas from the eighteenth century and became the grain 
supplier o f the country. In this modem period, therefore, the growing articulation of the 
domestic market overtook the historic predominance of the external market (Willumsen, 
1985). Mention in this section- from above
In 1988, the Federal Constitution created the Fund for the Development o f the North, 
northeast and Centre West Regions (Fundo para o Desenvolvimento das Regides Norte, 
Nordeste e Centro-Oeste), which receives 3 per cent of the revenues from the income and 
industrialised product taxes, the values of which began to be calculated and assigned in 
1989. Other funds benefit from specific sectors as well as incentives to exports and 
subsidised credit scattered all over the country. Even though there is a number of 
incentives in place, their effect have been small and of negligible importance (Diniz, 
1999:31).
In the 1990s there was a redefinition of the role that the state had played. The state-led 
industrialisation model was no longer viable under conditions of economic stagnation, 
high inflation rates and globalisation. The 1988 constitution set the basis for a 
decentralised country in terms of distribution of political and financial resources. In 
particular, it challenged the role of the state as a provider of social and economic benefits 
and the responsibility for working towards the reduction of inequalities among states and 
regions. As a result of decentralisation, the federal governments were sharply affected by 
financial constraints. On the one hand, state governors, in particular those of wealthier 
states, became the main centres of power in negotiating with the federal government. On
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the other hand, however, the Brazilian experience shows that decentralisation might 
impede the reduction of the country’s regional inequalities because of the financial and 
political weakening of the federal government (Souza, 1997).
The relationship between the federal and the state governments is also significantly 
complex and varies across regions. In order to counterbalance regional inequalities, since 
1946 Brazil has adopted a fiscal system with the objective of redistributing national 
revenue from the wealthier to the poorer regions. This scheme was extended by the 1988 
constitution. The fiscal system is therefore highly entangled and whenever the economy 
of well-off states slows down the less developed regions are also affected (Souza, 1997).
The regions comprised in the SUDENE and SUDAM programmes the northeast and 
north respectively, have attracted the greatest attention, primarily due to the magnitude of 
the areas involved (Henshall and Momsen, 1976). The northeast region has applied 
drought relief programmes since the 1930s with the main objective of retaining the work 
force that would otherwise have left the region. Fiscal policies specifically targeted at 
increasing the icome per vapita in the Northeast have been into effect since the fifties. 
The Bank of the Northeast (BNB) and the Superintendency for the Development of the 
Northeast (SUDENE) have been established in 1954 and 1958 respectively. The 
Superintendency of the Sao Francisco Valley (SUVALE), which later fell under 
supervision of SUDENE, focused on the same issues as both SUDENE and SUDAM but 
in a more restricted area. SUDENE usually attracts more attention because o f the 
magnitude of the area concerned.
Originally, SUDENE was more concerned with infrastructure projects as stated in its 
First Guidance Plan for the 1961-69 period, in which road and power projects accounted 
for 70 per cent of the budget with only 15 per cent in education. In the Fourth Guidance 
Plan (1969-73), however, road and power projects accounted for 35 per cent of the 
budget while agriculture and sanitation to 10 per cent and education to 6 per cent. The 
main source of funding for SUDENE was the 34/18 tax incentive plans and the Bank of 
Brazil. The 34/18 tax was named after article 34 in the law approving SUDENE’s First 
Guidance Plan (1961) and modified by article 18 of the law approving the agency’s 1963-
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1965 programme. It states that corporations in Brazil may deposit up to 50 per cent of 
their annual income tax obligation in a blocked account at the BNB. Therefore, this 
scheme gave all Brazilian corporate entities the possibility of cutting their tax liability by 
50 per cent provided they invested the saved 50 per cent in projects within the northeast 
approved by SUDENE.
Although it prime objective is achieving an integrated approach to the development of the 
northeast region; in practice, however, it has been a supervisory body for the many 
projects undertaken in the area. Despite the federal government investing significantly in 
social capita through SUDENE, private capital, however, was slow to appear and it was 
only after 1964 that it was taken advantage of the Art 34/18. These funds could either be 
invested in corporations already operating in the region or could be lent for a period of 5 
years at predetermined interest rates. Most firms deposited tax funds in the Bank of the 
Northeast and applied them with loans from BNB for business ventures (Wogart, in 
Rosenbaum and Tyler, 1972: 173).
SUDENE has favoured an increase in the per capita wage levels and provided alternative 
employment for rural population in the region. However, it failed to address the basic 
problem, which was to change the social and economic structure of the region that had 
been shaped in colonial times. Without addressing this issue no development effort would 
be entirely successful. In 1972, the PROTERRA plan was created in order to focus on 
upgrading the agricultural interior but only changed focus from industry to agriculture but 
still not addressing the main regional planning issues. Although SUDENE played an 
important role in the northeast, there was still a significant amount of overlapping and 
therefore lack of control for SUDENE, such as DNOC (National Department for Anti- 
Drought Works), CHESF (Sao Francisco Hydroelectric Company), SUVALE and other 
state development agencies (Henshall and Momsen, 1976: 250; Hirschman, 1968).
The north region, by contrast, remained largely unaffected by official development 
interventions until the sixties. The rubber industry that had been established in the 
nineteenth century was briefly encouraged during the 1940s by Vargas, but with little
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success. The first federal Amazon development agency was the SPVEA 
(Superintendency of the Planning for the Economic Valorisation of the Amazon), which 
preceded SUDENE given that it was created in 1953. The objective was promoting a 
fuller occupancy of the Amazon Basin, upgrading the economy and integrating into the 
Brazilian economy by promoting agriculture, industry and infrastructure.
SPVEA differed from SUDENE in that the programme focused on small, unconnected 
regional units while SUDENE has a more sectoral approach. During the following 
decade, however, the interest shifted to public works, and in 1972 the idea of attracting 
industries to the region led to tax exemptions for plants that processed local raw 
materials. As other regional programmes, SPVEA also achieved very little success. In 
1966 SPVEA was substituted by SUDAM (Superintendency for the Development of the 
Amazon), which was similar to SUDENE in the sense of having a broader, co-ordinative 
role and also offering similar tax incentives, such as benefiting from the 34/18 tax. Both 
regions guarantee exemptions from various state taxes and reduction of import duties on 
imported machinery for a period of ten to fifteen years (Henshall and Momsen, 1976: 
256; Wogart, in Rosenbaum and Tyler, 1972: 175). The BNDE (National Development 
Bank) remained the most important agent of the federal government. Further, it received 
a 3 per cent o f federal government tax, two-thirds of which would go to public sector and 
one-third to back private investment under the supervision of a separate agency- FIDAM 
(Private Fund for Amazon Development). Despite the large amounts invested (by 1981 
630 projects covering 8.4 million hectares and with US$ 700 million in official 
subsidies), cattle ranching failed to promote regional growth, generate employment or 
increase income levels (Hall, 1993).
An ambitious highway construction programme (the Trans-Amazon highway) was 
intended to encourage settlement both by small farmers as well as by wealthier 
individuals and corporate interests. The project had a prominent social purpose since the 
Trans-amazon highway was intended to promote the geographical integration of the 
Amazon as a symbol of national unity and to encourage small farmers suffering from the 
droughts in the northeast to resettle along it. A tax incentive (Finor) was introduced as
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well as other financial incentives to encourage businessmen from southern Brazil and 
from overseas to invest in cattle ranching and other enterprises in order to promote 
regional development. However, by 1978 only 6 per cent of the original target had been 
met, less than half was from the northeast. Agriculture performance along the Trans­
amazon was poor and the government failed to provide an adequate social infrastructure 
and thus ended in a high rate of project abandonment. By 1974 political pressures as well 
as technical shortcomings, ended in a reversal of policies with regional development 
being pursued again by ranching, mining and other large-scale activities. Therefore 
conditions for small farmers deteriorated even further (Hall, 1993).
In 1981, the north-west frontier development programme {Polonoroeste) was launched in 
order to attract small farmers expelled from southern Brazil by land concentration arising 
from the spread of mechanised wheat and soy bean cultivation. Again, however, although 
originally designed in order to assist the landless rural poor, Polonoroeste fell short of its 
ambitious objectives. Although settling about 26, 000 families from 1970 to 1975, most 
o f the beneficiaries were cattle ranchers instead of smallholders. During the seventies, 
violent conflicts between ranchers, small farmers and indigenous groups multiplied (Hall, 
1993).
Another development scheme with negative social consequences was the Grande Carajas 
Programme in eastern Amazon, based on mining and processing activities. In the same 
way as the cattle-ranching programmes, the Trans-Amazon highway and Polonoroeste; 
Carajas exacerbated rural violence associated with land conflicts, land concentration and 
ecological destruction as a consequence mainly of the eviction of indigenous groups and 
peasant farmers from their land. The Tucurui hydroelectric scheme, for example, the 
largest in any rainforest and designed to supply subsidised power for the Grande Carajas 
aluminium industry, displaced 25,000 people. Commercial activities have been strongly 
subsidised by the governments in an attempt to promote exports or to favour certain 
groups while the interests of the rapidly growing urban and rural populations have 
consistently been neglected (Hall, 1993).
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In 1967, a free trade zone was created in Manaus - SUFRAMA (Superintendency for the 
Free Administration of Manaus), in which imports used by local industries paid no duties 
while exports from Manaus paid no export taxes. By the end of 1968, imports of 
electronic equipment, radios and television sets were taking place at the value of US$
250,000 per month. Between 1967 and 1968, 3,000 new jobs were created, absorbing all 
labour surpluses. Construction and cement imports increased in that period by ten-fold. 
The system of incentives in the region of Manaus with the free trade zone, which is based 
on tax waivers, made possible the building of the industrial pole in the area, specialising 
in consumption electronics. The opening of the Brazilian economy, however, led to a 
crisis in this zone, decreasing sales by half between 1990 and 1992 although a relative 
recovery followed. This zone is costly and there are doubts about its efficiency. These tax 
exemptions will end by 2013, and this is expected to induce a further crisis in the 
economy of Manaus (Diniz, 1999).
Two other programmes that are often cited are SUFRONTE, aiming at the development 
o f the south, which also had limited impact; and PROESTE, launched in 1971, aimed at 
developing the rural environment of Goias, Mato Grosso and Northwest Minas Gerais, 
(Henshall and Momsen, 1976).
Following the promulgation of the 1988 Constitution, decentralisation in both political 
and financial resources played a significant part. Decentralisation, however, had different 
impact in the regions, mainly given the existence of regional inequalities. Also, not every 
state has the same amount of power, and there are several centres of power that decide on 
national policies. Moreover, the subsequent weakening of the federal government might 
prove counterproductive for the reduction of disparities. Since 1946 Brazil has a fiscal 
system in which the redistribution of national income is done from the richer to poorer 
regions. This was extended by the 1988 Constitution. It is calculated that while the 
Centre-South generates around 80% of GDP and national revenue, it only has 60% of the 
expenditure. According to Souza the high level of entanglement of this system is the 
reason why when the economy of richer states slows down, so do the less developed 
regions (Souza in Gil Kinzo).
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Although there is a long tradition of regional development institutions in Brazil, both at 
the national as well as at the regional level, none of these have had any significant impact 
when it comes to promoting the development of backward areas. The main hindrance of 
the policies that have been implemented in Brazil has been the lack of co-ordination and 
coherence in both the design and implementation o f the different plans. Therefore, and 
even though since 1975 the unilateral granting of fiscal incentives by the states was 
forbidden by law, and due to the lack of government regional policies, the fiscal war 
escalated in the nineties. Reform is still pending, but faces strong opposition from those 
states most involved in the fiscal war, such as Bahia, Ceara, Goias and Parana.
5. Conclusions
This chapter has sought to provide a survey of regional economic disparities in Brazil 
since colonial times, when the external market played a fundamental role for the regions. 
The rise and later exhaustion of a particular activity resulted in the emergence of another 
product in a different region, which, in turn, would generate regional spillovers. The 
sugar cycle of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries favoured the northeast; while the 
gold cycle of the following century favoured the state of Minas Gerais and coffee, the 
main product of the nineteenth century, benefited Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. Besides, 
there were other minor cycles such as the rubber production in the Amazon at the end of 
the nineteenth century and cocoa in Bahia in the middle of last century.
In the twentieth century, there was a shift towards the internal market and 
industrialisation accentuated disparities, locating its benefits in the southeast, with Sao 
Paulo at the centre. According to classical theory, disparities would decrease over time, 
mainly due to capital and labour mobility within a country and diminishing returns. 
However, this pattern is not that obvious at all for the case of Brazil. As in the case of 
Argentina, migration patterns did not favour convergence since they were mostly directed 
towards the industrialising areas. It is important to determine whether disparities have 
decreased over the last few decades, or whether specific mechanisms need to be
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introduced in order to favour convergence. Several issues will be looked at in the 
following chapter. Firstly, whether convergence among the Brazilian regions over the last 
couple of decades has indeed occurred and, if so, to what extent. Secondly, to determine 
whether there are any regions that consistently lag behind the rest of the country and 
whether any government policies seen in section 3.3 have had any significant effect in a 
particular state. Finally, whether macroeconomic shocks and short-term economic 
situations played any role in terms of regional income convergence or divergence.
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9Convergence Analysis in Brazil
1. Introduction
This chapter follows the analysis of Brazil’s disparities from colonial times by testing for 
convergence between the twenty-seven Brazilian states for the period 1970-2000. The 
objective, as in the case of the chapter on Argentina, is to determine whether the 
disparities that were shaped in early stages of Brazilian history remain nowadays, as 
observed in Figure 1.4 in the introduction of this thesis. Besides, I will try to determine 
whether external factors influence the process of convergence among the Brazilian states.
Section 2 describes the methodology that was used in order to analyse the available data. 
Section 3 presents a descriptive analysis of disparities, by presenting sigma analysis on 
socio-economic variables as well as percentages of average national income. In Section 4 
o f this chapter, a a-convergence analysis of regional GDP is performed from 1970 to 
2000. An analysis similar to that carried out for the Argentine provinces was also done, in 
which the impact of omitting one state at the time is analysed. Finally, Section 5 includes 
both the absolute as well as the conditional p-convergence analyses.
2. Data Availability and Methodology
Data regarding the GDP per capita by regions and federal states for the period 1985-2000 
at current prices was obtained from the Institute Brasilero de Geografia Estadistica 
(IBGE). For the years 1970, 1975 and 1980, the data reported in this chapter refers to 
IBGE (1987), also in current per capita units. The Consumer Price Index for the period
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was obtained from the Fundagao Instituto de Pesquisas Economicas (FIPE) and the UN 
Statistical Yearbooks (1978, 1985, and 1994). The index was presented with several base 
years. In this chapter, I have decided to use the same base year as for the Argentine 
(1986) chapter. As can be seen in Appendix V.g. the choice of base year for the analysis 
of convergence is irrelevant -  provided consistency throughout the series -  since the 
main results for the analysis remain unaltered whether the base year is 1986 or 1995 (as 
shown in the Appendix). Data for Tocantins was not available before 1989 and therefore 
this state will be left out of the analysis. Although the states of Tocantins and Piaui have 
the same shares of national GDP for the period 1989 onwards and ratios could have been 
calculated in order to fill the gaps, I believe that it was too long a period in order to do 
this properly. Ferreira (1998) considers that although it is desirable to use the longest 
available series when studying regional convergence, whenever there are doubts about 
the quality o f the data as well as the compatibility of different series, it is preferable to 
limit the analysis to shorter periods. He therefore analyses the period 1970-1995. Data for 
2001 was available after performing these regressions and results also appear in 
Appendix V.f as a footnote, but not here, since the main results were not altered by the 
additional year.
For the conditional convergence, data on total school enrolment corresponding to 1970 
was obtained from IBGE (1979). However, data on literacy rates for 1970 was used given 
that for the conditional p-convergence literacy rates are more useful than enrolment, 
which affects the medium term. Industrial and agricultural shares of GDP for 1970 have 
also been obtained from IBGE. Data used in this chapter can be seen in Appendix IV.
In this chapter, the geographical division used for Brazil will be referred to regions and 
federal states as follows:
Grandes Regioes or regions: North {Norte), northeast (,Nordeste), Southeast (Sudeste), 
South {Sul) and Centre-West {Centro-Oeste). Each region comprises several unidades de 
federagao or federal states as follows.
- Norte: Rondonia, Acre, Amazonas, Roraima, Para, Amapa and Tocantins
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- Nordeste: Maranhao, Piauf, Ceara, Rio Grande do Norte, Paraiba, Pernambuco, 
Alagoas, Sergipe, Bahia
- Sudeste: Minas Gerais, Espirito Santo, Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo
- Sul: Parana, Santa Caterina and Rio Grande do Sul
- Centro-Oeste: Mato Grosso do Sul, Mato Grosso, Goias and Distrito Federal
3. Socio- Economic Inequalities
In this section, a sigma analysis of some socio-economic variables is performed. The 
social indicators considered in the analysis were life expectancy from 1940 to 1999 and 
infant mortality from 1940 to 1999. It can be seen in Figure 9.3 that despite the 
persistence of significant differences among the regions, there is a continuous increase in 
life expectancy. The northeast region is consistently below the average while the south 
ranks highest for all years, followed by the centre-west region.
Figure 9.1. Sigma Convergence of Life Expectancy in Brazil, 1940-1999
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1999
Source: own calculations
The sigma analysis for this indicator (Figure 9.1) reveals that although for each region 
there has been an improvement, there have been no major benefits in terms of 
convergence until the eighties. In fact, disparities within Brazil in terms of life 
expectancy have increased from 1940 onwards, with a peak in the sixties.
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Figure 9.2. Sigma Convergence o f Infant Mortality Rates in Brazil, 1940-1999
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For the figures on infant mortality rates (Figure 9.4) there is an improvement for all 
regions in the period under consideration. The northeast region is also consistently above 
the average while the south is always below the national average. In fact, all regions are 
below the average, except for the northeast and the north in certain years. The only period 
when there is a-convergence in infant mortality rates is again in the eighties (Figure 9.2), 
after a significant increase in the sixties. This period of convergence, though, returned the 
indicator to its previous 1950s level. Thus, the analysis for life expectancy and infant 
mortality show that although the absolute rates have decreased throughout the whole 
period (see Figures 9.3 and 9.4 respectively), the sigma indicators have not. In fact, these 
increased in the fifties and sixties but stayed mostly unchanged (Figures 9.1 and 9.2 
respectively).
When performing sigma analysis for urbanisation rates from 1960 to 1995 it can be seen 
in Figure 9.5 that there was divergence until 1980 and only in the last decade 
convergence is found. This can be explained because in the forties, the region with the 
highest growth in urbanisation was the southeast; which had an increase of 21 per cent. In 
the fifties and sixties, the centre-west had a 40 per cent increase in urbanisation, while in 
the seventies both the centre-west and the south were the two regions with highest rates. 
In the period 1980-1995, the northeast increased its urban population more than the 
centre-west and the south and that explains why the indicator only converged in the last
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period. Those states with initially higher rates were the ones that had the highest rates 
until the period 1980-1995.
Figure 9.3. Life Expectancy Rates by Regions, 1940-1999
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Figure 9.4. Infant Mortality Rates by Regions, 1940-1999
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Figure 9.5. Sigma Convergence o f Urbanisation Rates, 1960-1995
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Regarding percentages of average national GDP, the extent of the disparities can be seen 
in Figure 9.6. The northeast, with a large share of national population (30 per cent), 
accounts only for 13 per cent of the total GDP and therefore has the lowest level of GDP 
per capita as percentage of national average. Both the southeast and south have a higher 
than their population distribution of GDP and are above the national average of GDP per 
capita. (137 and 118 respectively) When looking at Figure 9.6, it can be seen that there 
have not been any significant changes in the distribution of GDP between the regions 
since 1970. In fact, since 1985 an increase in the centre west region -  and a decrease in 
the north region -  can be seen.
When looking at the maximum and minimum values of percentage national GDP, it can 
be seen that the minimum has stayed mostly stable throughout the period; that is, those 
states with minimum percentage national GDP per capita remained around the same level 
in the period 1970-2000. On the other hand, the maximum levels have slightly decreased 
until the mid-eighties; then remained stable for the rest of the decade and, after a peak in 
the early nineties, they decreased to the 1980’s levels in the first half of the nineties and 
increased in the second half until 1998 when they decreased and increased again.
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Figure 9.6. Percentages of National GDP by Regions
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Source: own calculations
Figure 9.7. Maximum and Minimum state GDP Values in Brazil in percentage of 
national GDP, 1970-2000
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Source: own calculations
Figure 9.8 depicts the ratio o f extreme values, in which a clear downward trend can be 
seen until the mid-eighties and a decrease in 1990 followed by an increase in the 
following year and finally a decrease of the extreme value indicator until a significant 
increase in the mid-nineties.
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Figure 9.8. Ratio o f Extreme Values o f  state GDP, in percentage o f national GDP
1970 1980 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
Source: own calculations
Figure 9.9 shows the percentage of national income by regions. It can be seen that while 
the northeast remains mostly stable around 50 per cent of national average; the southeast 
remains stable but at 150 per cent of average national GDP only showing a slight 
decrease can be seen until the first half of the eighties. The south region also remains 
quite stable around 150 percent except for the first decade. In the case o f the north and 
centre-west regions, they start with average or 20 percent above respectively but while 
the centre south increases to over 140 percent of national average, the north region 
decreases to 80 percent. This follows the pattern seen above in Figure 9.6.
Figure 9.9. Percentage of National GDP per Capita by Regions
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When looking at Figures 9.10, 9.11 and 9.12 it can be seen that there are some 
differences regarding the behaviour of certain states in those regions (the south west and 
northeast are not depicted because they were mostly stable throughout the period). In the 
case o f the centre-west, it can be clearly seen that the increase seen in the nineties in 
Figure 9.9, reflects the increase in Distrito FederaPs percentage of national income at that 
time. In fact, the line in Figure 9.9 for the centre-west follows quite accurately that for 
Distrito Federal in Figure 9.10. The rest of the states in the region remained stable in a 
range of 50 to 150 per cent of national average.
Figure 9.10. Percentage of national GDP in Centre-West
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In the case of the north, it can be seen that while Acre and Para remained stable just over 
50 per cent of average GDP, Amapa presented a sharp decrease in 1970-75 and then 
gradually increased to to almost reach national average. It then remains relatively stable 
through the first half o f nineties at 80 per cent of average and decreases rapidly 
afterwards. Despite an initial increase and subsequent sharp decline (which casts some 
doubts on the data), Rondonia then fluctuates between 50 and just over 100 per cent for 
the rest of the period. Roraima, on the other hand, remains relatively stable until 1990 at 
about 70 per cent and then decreases until reaching a minimum of 40 per cent. The only
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state in the north region to increase in the period is Amazonas, with a steady increase 
until the mid-eighties and then remains mostly stable around 50 per cent above national 
average and although it decreases in the last half of the nineties it still is 30 percent 
above.
Figure 9.11. Percentage of National GDP in the North region
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The south region is the most homogeneous since all the states have increased slightly 
along the period as can be seen in Figures 9.9 and 9.12 with the exception of Santa 
Catarina which experiences two major jumps -  an increase in 1989 and a decrease in 
1997.
Figure 9.12. Percentage of National GDP in the South region
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268
4. Sigma Analysis
Figure 9.13 shows the dispersion of the logarithm of the per capita GDP across the five 
Brazilian regions, as defined in the previous section, for the period 1970-2000. The 
double lines indicate that the series is not continuous between those years (in the 
following figures I omit the double lines).
Figure 9.13. Sigma Convergence among the Brazilian Regions
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It can be seen from the figure that the dispersion ranges from a maximum value of 0.55 in 
1975 and a minimum of 0.4 in 1986. The sigma indicator therefore has an overall average 
rate of change for the period 1970-2000 of 1 per cent. In the period 1970-1975 regions in 
Brazil benefited from the Brazilian economic miracle; which increased the levels of GDP 
particularly between 1968-70, and it came to a halt in the mid-seventies. In the northeast, 
by contrast, severe droughts affected the area in those years and produced stagnation in 
the first years of the seventies. Also, the economic growth of the sixties and early 
seventies is often associated to an increase in income concentration. These factors might 
explain the increase in the indicator for the first half of the seventies.
In the following decade, a sharp reduction in the indicator can be seen, with disparities 
across the regions decreasing by 24 per cent between 1975 and 1985. The period
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comprising the late seventies and early eighties was, by contrast to the previous decade, 
characterised by the implementation of social policies and wage indexations tending to 
favour income redistribution. In the last sub-period, as indicated by Figure 9.13, the 
period 1986-1989, there is an increase in the variability of GDP across regions of more 
than 17 per cent. This increase was more pronounced between 1986 and 1987, when it 
reached 9 per cent. This was a period characterised by economic instability and inflation 
rates were at a maximum. In the first half of the nineties stability was achieved and a 
decrease in the indicator between 1989 and 1991 can be seen and after the 8 per cent 
increase in 1992, the indicator remains mostly stable.
Figure 9.14. Sigma Convergence among the Brazilian States
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When performing a sigma analysis to the states instead of regions some differences can 
be found (Figure 9.14). First, there is an increase in the overall figures o f the indicator, 
ranging from a maximum value of 0.69 in 1975 to a minimum of 0.51 in 1986, which is 
expected given the higher variability when including all 27 states. Nevertheless, the years 
with maximum and minimum values still correspond to those of Figure 9.13. The main 
difference in the first decade is given by the magnitude of the decrease in the first years. 
The overall decrease for 1975-1986 is still about 25 per cent but most of that decrease 
corresponds to the earlier years. In fact, between 1975 and 1980, there is a 20 per cent 
decrease, while it is only 13 per cent in Figure 9.13. This decrease in the indicator for the
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late seventies corresponds, as mentioned, above, to the fact that in the second half of the 
seventies is a period often associated with decreasing disparities since medium and lower 
segments of the population obtained real gains while the higher income segments 
experienced a decline in income.
The increase until 1989 also remains, though it is more pronounced, and from then 
onwards there are no significant changes in the indicator as opposed to Figure 9.13, and 
the 1989 levels are reached in 1992. As already noted, increasing income concentration, 
poverty levels and macroeconomic instability characterise this period. After 1986, there 
were alternating periods of stabilisation and instability while inflation rates where higher 
than ever in Brazil, particularly in 1988 and 1989, which coincides with a peak in the 
sigma indicator as well.
During the nineties the indicator remained mostly stable, with slight changes - such as the 
increase in 1992 and the decrease in 1994 (Figure 9.13). This can also be related to the 
failure of the Collor Plan in 1992 (which had been implemented in 1990) and the launch 
of the Plan Real in 1994 that reduced inflation rates to the lowest levels in decades. From 
1994 to 1997 the indicator was mostly constant with an increase in 1998.
A further approach has been included within the sigma analysis. This is the same 
procedure that had been applied to the analysis of the Argentine regions. The regions 
were divided according to the five groupings detailed in the methodological section. 
Within each region, each of the states at a time was omitted from the sigma indicator in 
order to detect any impact. Figures 9.15 to 9.19 show these results.
Figure 9.15, corresponds to the north region. The rest of the states follow the same 
pattern and the only other one that is slightly lower is that corresponding to the curve 
without the state of Amazonas. For the years 1986 to 1988, 1990 and 1993 the difference 
is 1 per cent.
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Figure 9.15. Sigma Convergence Analysis within the North Region
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Figure 9.16. Sigma Convergence Analysis within the Southeast Region
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Figure 9.16 represents the southeast region. When either Rio de Janeiro or Sao Paulo are 
omitted, the indicator decreases. This decrease is present throughout the whole period, 
and it is larger in the case of Sao Paulo. It represents a 2 per cent throughout the period 
except for 1975, 1980, 1987 and 1988 when it is 3 per cent. In the case o f Rio de Janeiro, 
the difference between the curve including all states and that without Rio de Janeiro is 1
272
per cent for each year except for the period 1986-1990 when there is no difference. The 
reduction in the sigma indicator when these states are omitted is associated with the 
decrease in the variability of the indicator once two states with the highest GDP are taken 
out from the analysis.
In Figure 9.17, the northeast region is considered. The omission of both Maranhao and 
Piaui make a considerable change in the indicator. This effect is present also throughout 
the period. The biggest difference, however, is for the state o f Piaui, particularly in 1975 
when it reaches 11 per cent. For both states, the average difference is 3 per cent with the 
largest differences between 1985 and 1988 when it reaches 4 per cent. This difference 
could be associated, as in the case of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, with the behaviour of 
particular states in times of great instability. In this case, when two of the poorest states 
are omitted the variability decreases.
Figure 9.17. Sigma Convergence Analysis within the northeast Region
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In Figure 9.18, the south region was considered. In this region, there are no noticeable 
changes when omitting each of the states. The reason for this might be found in that the 
four states in the south do not present any extreme cases o f either ‘very poor’ or ‘very 
rich’ states and therefore their values correspond to the average.
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Figure 9.18. Sigma Convergence Analysis within the South Region
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In the centre-west region, as can be seen in Figure 9.19, the main difference is observed 
when Distrito Federal is omitted, as expected. The average difference is 2 per cent; this is 
larger at the beginning of the period and after 1990, but particularly in 1991 when both 
indicators differ by 4 per cent. This could be related to the fact that in times of growth 
richer areas are better prepared for reaping the benefits of this growth. The variability 
including this state increases (or decreases when omitted). It can be seen that in the 
second half of the nineties the curve without Distrito Federal diverges even more from 
the others.
Figure 9.19. Sigma Convergence Analysis within the Centre-West Region
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It is interesting to note that in most o f the figures there are some states that when omitted 
change the value of the sigma indicator. However, that decrease in the indicator is only of 
magnitude and not of pattern. In the case of Brazil, it is clear that all states behaved in a 
similar way and that the only differences relate to magnitude. The differences seen in 
those curves indicate those states further from the average and so, when omitting both the 
richer and poorer ones, the curve decreases as the ‘outliers* are taken out from the 
indicator. It could be said that all shocks affected the states in the same way. Moreover, 
there were no regional plans or incentive programmes that had any noticeable effect in 
any particular state.
This can be compared to what has been seen in the Argentine provinces since the analysis 
seems to indicate a reality different to that of Argentina. In that country, only one 
province (Tierra del Fuego) displayed completely different behaviour (Figures 7.13 and 
7.18 in pages 193 and 197 repectively); while the rest of the provinces behaved in the 
same way (except for the Capital Federal, which slightly reduced the indicator -  Figure 
7.16 on page 195). In the case of Brazil, by contrast, the sigma analysis points at a larger 
differentiation between ‘very’ rich and ‘very’ poor states and therefore when omitting 
those extreme cases, the indicator decreases.
Ferreira and Diniz (1997) and Schwartzman (1996) both worked on the period 1970-85. 
Azzoni (1997) criticised both papers not only because that period is too short to draw any 
valid conclusions but also due to the fact that in that particular period there was strong 
convergence. He argues that this convergence is not present for other periods and that the 
a-convergence analysis shows almost no changes in the period 1985-1995. Azzoni 
(1997) developed a methodology to merge different series o f regional GDP. These data 
are for 1939,1947 and 1995 and groups the states into 20 aggregated units.
Azzoni (1997) works with the Theil inequality index and finds there is a trend towards 
the reduction of this index that can be clearly seen between 1939 and 1995. The 
minimum value for that series is 0.11 and is given for 1994, while the maximum value of
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0.25 corresponds to 1952. Azzoni (1997) agrees that for that period the increases in the 
Theil index are followed by decreases, but the general trend is that of decline. In Azzoni 
(2000), inequality, as measured by the Theil index, has high values throughout the period 
1939-1995 rising until the mid-fifties and later decreasing until the mid-sixties. From the 
late-sixties until 1975 he finds a sharp increase and a reversal until 1986. Thereafter, the 
index is relatively stable. This coincides with the results of the sigma analysis I have 
performed above as the index decreased from 1975 until 1985 and, following and 
increase until 1989, maintained a stable trend throughout the nineties (Figure 9.13).
According to Ferreira (1998), the most desirable methodology would be to construct a 
new series for the whole period, although only institutions such as IBGE have the 
financial and technical resources to carry out such a task. However, Ferreira does analyse 
a-convergence with the long series from Azzoni (1997). He concludes there is a- 
convergence since the coefficient decreases from 0.69 in 1939 to 0.48 in 1995. Yet, when 
applying standard deviation to the natural logarithms of the GDP data, I myself find that 
the indicator decreases from 0.58 in 1939 to 0.49 in 1995. The indicator corresponding to 
1947 has remained unchanged compared to that of 1939. In any case, the 15 per cent 
decrease in a 56-year-period (1939 to 1995) does not look very promising in terms of 
regional convergence. The data used here from Azzoni (1997) is presented in Appendix 
IV.
5. Beta Convergence Analysis
5.1. Absolute Beta Convergence
When performing an absolute P-convergence test to the states in Brazil it can be seen that 
for the whole period (1970-2000) there is absolute convergence since the coefficient on 
initial income is negative and t-values are significant though at 10 per cent. It should be 
recalled that the state of Tocantins has been excluded from the analysis due to lack of 
data as explained in the previous section. The results can be seen both in Table 9.1 and 
page 371. As mentioned in previous Chapters, the full econometric readout for Tables 9.1 
to 9.7 can be found on Appendix V, page 371 onwards.
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Table 9.1. Absolute Beta Convergence in Brazil 1970-2000
2000-1970 ,
Coefficient Std.Error t-statistic
Constant -24.35 0.88 -27.82
In (1970) -0.17 0.09 -1.96
R-sq 0.14
Source: own calculations, for more details see page 371
When the analysis is done by decades (Table 9.2 and pages 372 to 374), the results do not 
show a strong convergence. For the first decade (1970-80), the coefficient on initial 
income is negative and not significant at either 5 or 10 per cent level of significance plus 
F statistic is not significant. In the following decade, the coefficient on initial income 
again has the right sign but is only marginally significant at the 5 per cent level of 
significance and F statistic is not significant. According to Diniz (1999), the seventies 
and early eighties saw a period of reversal of polarisation, characterised by the decline in 
the industrial production of the southeast region between 1970 and 1980. He believes that 
the crisis of the eighties slowed this deconcentration but the trend towards spreading 
economic activity to the interior remained.
In the period 1990-2000, F statistic is again not significant and the coefficient displays 
the right sign but is not significant at either confidence level. Finally, in the sub-period 
comprising 1990-1996, the coefficient is not significant. Haddad and Hewings (1998) 
suggest that the policies of the nineties, by increasing international competitiveness are 
likely to increase rather than decrease imbalances and that they will tend to favour the 
more developed regions. There is a weaker convergence when comparing the eighties 
with the seventies, and even weaker between the nineties and the eighties. As already 
mentioned, Diniz (1999) suggests a relative industrial deconcentration process over the 
last twenty years that weakened in the eighties and beginning o f the nineties given the 
economic crisis in the country. He then concludes that free trade policies, privatisations, 
trade agreements such as MERCOSUR and a reduction of government investment in
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infrastructure will work against the deconcentration of industry and therefore benefit the 
most advanced regions.
Table 9.2. Absolute Beta Convergence in Brazil 1970-2000, by sub-periods
1980-1970
Coefficient S td .E rro r t-statistic
C onstant 2.70 0.73 3.68
In (1970) -0.11 0.07 -1.46
R-sq 0.08
1990-1980
Coefficient S td .E rro r t-statistic
C onstant -12.24 0.59 -20.69
ln(1980) -0.09 0.05 -1.72
R-sq 0.11
1996-1990
Coefficient S td .E rro r t-statistic
C onstant -14.68 0.11 -129.52
In(1990) -0.05 0.06 -0.82
R-sq 0.03
2000-1990
Coefficient S td .E rro r t-statistic
C onstant -14.53 0.12 -117.60
ln(1990) -0.03 0.07 -0.46
R-sq 0.01
Source: own calculations, for more details see pages 372-374
Given that beta is a necessary though not sufficient condition for sigma to occur, Table 
9.3 reports the regression results when the period is subdivided corresponding to the 
breaks seen in the sigma analysis of the previous section. Two sub-periods will then be 
considered, the first one from 1975-1985 and the second one from 1986 to 2000. It can be 
seen that the sub-period 1975-1985 is of absolute convergence since the coefficient on 
the initial GDP level is negative and the t-value is highly significant. In fact, convergence 
is stronger than that in Table 9.1 and therefore it is this sub-period that accounts for the
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absolute convergence results in that table. For the following sub-period (1986-2000), 
although the coefficients are still negative, the t-values are not significant. Therefore, the 
only sub-period in which absolute p-convergence was found is from 1975 to 1985.
Table 9.3. Absolute Beta Convergence in Brazil, sub-periods 1975-85 and 1986-2000
1985-1975
Coefficient S td .E rro r t-statistic
In (1975) -0.28 0.07 -4.00
constant 4.16 0.71 5.87
R-sq 0.44
2000-1986
Coefficient S td .E rro r t-statistic
ln(1986) -0.04 0.05 -0.76
constant -7.93 0.45 -17.45
R-sq 0.02
Source: own calculations, for more details see pages 375-376
Ferreira (1998) also analysed P-convergence with the longer series presented in Azzoni 
(1997). I have replicated his analysis and the results can be seen in Table 9.4. It can be 
seen that there is convergence for the period 1939-1995 and also for the sub-period 1947- 
1995. In fact, they both show quite similar results. However, when comparing to the sub­
period 1938-1947 it can be seen that the coefficient - though negative - is not statistically 
significant.
Ferreira only compares the two sub-periods 1939-1995 and 1947-1995. but instead of 
undertaking another regression for the whole period, he compares with the period 1939- 
1992 and finds that this is not significant, following Azzoni (1996). He attributes these 
results to the poor performance of the state of Piaui, which according to Ferreira 
constitutes an outlier in this regression. A dummy variable for the state o f Piaui is then 
included, which is 1 for Piaui and 0 otherwise. In this case the coefficient for initial 
income is significant, pointing out the existence of convergence when excluding the state 
o f Piaui. This state will be converging to a long-term value lower that the rest o f the
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states. Azzoni (1996) derives another equation for the period 1947-1992. In this case the 
hypothesis of convergence is accepted without controlling for the state of Piaui.
Table 9.4. Beta Convergence, Ferreira (1998)
1939-47
In (1939)
Coefficient S td .E rror t-statistic
-0.06 0.09 -0.76
R-sq 0.03
1995-1947
ln(1947)
Coefficient S td .E rro r t-statistic
-0.25 0.09 -2.71
R-sq 0.29
1995-1939
ln(1939)
Coefficient S td .E rro r t-statistic
-0.30 0.11 -2.65
R-sq 0.28
It can be seen that the different studies seem to conclude that there has been convergence 
among the Brazilian states. However, as in the case of Argentina, it is also obvious the 
importance of the period of time of to allow for the behaviour of certain states that can 
act as outliers for the tests. Azzoni (2000) points out the importance o f the different sub­
periods for the consistency of results. When performing a regression for the period 1947- 
1995 he finds evidence of absolute convergence. However, a regression for 1939-1970, 
shows no evidence of convergence. According to Azzoni, this indicates that the 
equalisation of the per capita incomes among states in Brazil is a process that took place 
mainly after 1970.
This variability in results seems to suggest that there was a continuous and identifiable 
process of convergence in the late seventies, which was reversed in the eighties. In 
particular, the eighties were characterised by a series of expansion and recession sub­
periods, as has been seen here in both the sigma and P-convergence analyses. According
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to Azzoni (2000) there are two periods that constitute outliers, 1955-60 and 1975-80, 
both associated with strong policy interventions aiming at reducing regional inequalities 
in the country. This conclusion coincides with the results of both the sigma and the beta 
analyses in this chapter.
5.2. Conditional Beta Convergence
For the conditional analysis several variables have been considered, as was explained in 
the methodological section. These included literacy rates for 1970 as well as shares of 
agriculture and industry as a percentage of GDP for 1970. As can be seen in Appendix IV, 
the shares o f agriculture and industry are not by states but instead grouped into regions 
and major conglomerates. Once again, full econometric readout can be found in 
Appendix V.f.
When including education levels at the beginning of the period, it can be seen that the 
coefficient on initial income is negative and statistically significant. Moreover, the 
coefficient on literacy rates is positive as expected (i.e. the higher the literacy rates in a 
particular state, the higher the growth rates) and significant.
When including each region’s agriculture and industry participation in GDP, the 
coefficients on initial income as well as that for agriculture are both significant. In the 
case of industry, the coefficient is negative and not significant. The R-squared is higher 
when compared to the unconditional case (Table 9.1). Finally, when all variables are 
included it can be seen that the only two variables that remain significant are that on 
initial income and that of agriculture, which is only marginally significant. Both industry 
and education are not significant at either 5 or 10 per cent level of significance.
Ferreira (1998b) has also worked with conditional convergence and his results indicate 
that for the period 1970-85, the rate o f growth of the GDP per capita in different states 
varied directly with the rate of investment, secondary school enrolment, and the 
participation of the workforce. It varied inversely, though, with the level of initial GDP
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per capita and the rate of growth o f work force in each state. Ferreira highlights the 
importance of analysing the presence of conditional convergence, but he also points out 
the lack of detailed regional information in order to be able to test this empirically in 
Brazil.
Table 9.5. Conditional Beta Convergence, 1970-2000
2000-1970 with education
CoefflcientStd.Error t-statistic
In (1970) -0.59 0.18 -3.29
educ 0.02 0.01 2.59
R-sq 0.33
2000-1970 with agric and industry
CoefflcientStd.Error t-statistic
ln(1970) -0.26 0.09 -2.76
ind(1970) -0.00 0.01 -0.41
agr(1970) 0.04 0.02 2.23
R-sq 0.33
2000-70 with educ, agric and industry
CoeffIcientStd.Error t-statistic
ln(1970) -0.54 0.19 -2.85
ind(1970) 0.00 0.01 -0.06
agr(1970) 0.02 0.02 1.33
ed(1970) 0.01 0.01 1.68
R-sq 0.41
Source: own calculations, for more details see page 377-379
5.3. Conditional Convergence: Political and Economic V ariables
In the case of Brazil I have divided the period into again two different sets o f sub-periods. 
For the macroeconomic variables, the two sub-periods chosen are 1970-1986 and 1987- 
1994. The former is the period with “low” inflation rates, with an average growth of 95 
per cent and a maximum of 200 per cent in 1985 and a minimum of 35 per cent in 1976. 
The second subperiod, corresponding to high inflation rates, had an average growth of
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1,300 per cent, within a range of 220 per cent in 1987 to 2,900 per cent in 1990. The 
results can be seen in Table 9.6, and it can be seen that a period with lower inflation rates 
shows convergence while that of higher inflation has a negative but not significant 
coefficient. When performing a dummy analysis with 1 for high inflation and 0 for low 
inflation (and adjusting for differences in the time periods) it can be seen that the 
differences are not statistically significant. Therefore, the hypothesis is rejected.
Table 9.6. Conditional Beta Convergence. Macroeconomic Variables.
1986-1970 . _
Coefficient S td .E rro r t-statistic 
C onstant -2.84 0.8 -3.54
In (1961) -0.19 0.08 -2.33
R -squared______________ 0.18___________________
1994-1987
C onstant
ln(1975)
R -squared
Coefficient
-21.18
-0.07
0.05
S td .E rro r t-statistic
0.34 -61.74
0.07 1.00
Dummy var.
C onstant
ln(1970)
Dummy
R-squared
Coefficient
-2.84
-0.19
0.04
1.00
S td .E rro r
1.05
0.11
0.16
t-statistic
-2.71
-1.78
0.28
Source: own calculations, for more details see pages 383-385
In order to test for the impact of political instability on convergence, again the proxy 
chosen was the military versus democratic periods. The sub-periods then are 1970-1985 
(although the military coup in Brazil was in 1964, the data set begins in 1970) and the 
democratic period 1986-2000. It can be seen in Table 9.7 that there is p-convergence 
during the military period, with a negative and significant coefficient on initial income. 
However, for the democratic period, although the coefficient is negative it is not 
significant. When performing the dummy analysis (using 1 for democracy and 0 
otherwise) the results indicate a positive and insignificant coefficient. It must be noted
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that the military sub-period coincide with a period of high growth in Brazil, often referred 
to as the Brazilian economic “miracle” and this might help to explain why the 
coefficients are not significant.
Table 9.7. Conditional Beta Convergence. Political Variables
1985-1970
C onstant 
In (1961)
Coefficient
3.79
-0.18
S td .E rro r
0.84
0.08
t-statistic
4.53
-2.08
R-squared 0.15
2000-1986
C onstant
ln(1986)
Coefficient
-21.18
-0.04
Std .E rror
0.41
0.08
t-statistic
-51.97
-0.51
R -squared 0.01
Dummy var.
C onstant
ln(1970)
Dummy
R -squared
Coefficient
3.79
-0.18
0.14
1.00
S td .E rro r
0.77
0.08
0.12
t-statistic
4.92
-2.26
1.17
Source: own calculations, for more details see pages 380-382
Azzoni (2000) concluded that fast growth periods are not only associated with increases 
in regional inequality but also that the speed of at which inequality varies is associated 
with the national income variation; i.e. the higher the speed of national growth (decline), 
the higher the regional divergence (convergence). According to this explanation, in 
periods of rapid growth richer regions are better prepared to face growing demand than 
are poorer regions, and, conversely, in periods of decline it will be precisely those richer 
areas the first ones to be affected. Azzoni performs a set of regressions and concludes that 
the association between national income growth and regional inequality cannot be 
rejected.
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Diniz (1999) suggests a possible reconcentration of incomes in the centre-south region as 
a consequence of MERCOSUR. The processs of macro spatial industrial deconcentration 
has stopped and a new regional industrial outline has occurred, combining the 
polarisation reversal of the metropolitan area of Sao Paulo with a relative agglomeration 
in the “polygon” area, which he defines as extending from the central part of Minas 
Gerais to the northeast of Rio Grande do Sul including the interior of the state of Sao 
Paulo. According to Diniz (1999) this indicates that the regions of the northeast and the 
north that had been the target of regional development policies have not experienced 
sustainable growth that could then result into significant regional changes.
6. Conclusions
In this chapter, both sigma and p-convergence analysis were applied to the Brazilian 
states for the period 1970-2000. Three main issues were addressed: First, whether there 
has been any significant process o f convergence among Brazilian states; second, to 
determine the existence of lagging regions and impact of regional plans; thirdly, what 
role can be attributed to macroeconomic and political conditions in the process of 
convergence.
The sigma analysis showed a decrease in the indicator; that is, a decrease in the 
variability of GDP per capita across Brazilian regions in the first decade. Thereafter, the 
indicator remained mostly constant until the end of the period under consideration. As 
has also been seen in the chapter, there is absolute convergence in Brazil for the entire 
period. However, when dividing the period into ten- and five-year sub-periods, 
convergence was present in the first decade and, in particular, between the years 1975-80. 
Therefore, the first conclusion is that there has not been any significant process of 
convergence among the Brazilian states between 1970 and 2000 except for the period 
1975-80. Other authors have reached this same conclusion and considered the sub-period 
an outlier, as seen in previous sections. The reason for this is that the late seventies was 
often associated to the expansion of employment through economic growth and relatively
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low inflation, together with the implementation of re-distributive social policies and 
official rules of wage indexation, which favoured redistribution of income.
The late-eighties, on the other hand, was a period characterised by an increase in the 
concentration of income and an increase in poverty levels. The worldwide recession 
caused the crisis of the late-eighties. In macroeconomic terms, the eighties were a period 
o f instability and short-run fluctuations. Inflation rates were higher than ever in Brazil. It 
could also be seen from the sigma analysis that in the years of high inflation and 
macroeconomic instability, divergence was the rule. In this period, redistributive policies 
were discarded in favour of macroeconomic programmes to tackle inflation and increase 
growth.
Finally, in the nineties, stability was reached after the second half with the Plan Real that 
managed to decrease inflation rates. The sigma analysis also showed stability in the 
indicator; which was reinforced by the p-convergence analysis. During the nineties, there 
have not been any improvements regarding convergence and, in fact, neither convergence 
nor divergence occurred.
It was surprising, though, to see that none of the social variables included was significant 
and no important conclusions can be drawn from this. However, with respect to social 
data, some conclusions can be drawn. First, there are significant differences regarding the 
five regions in Brazil, and these persist to date, particularly in the northeast. Secondly, 
although infant mortality rates and life expectancy have both improved, there have not 
been any convergence as measured by the sigma indicator and, in fact, there was 
divergence during the sixties.
When looking at the impact of both macroeconomic and political variables in the 
convergence process in Brazil, no conclusive evidence of any link between them was 
found. This could be explained by the fact the both sub-periods are very similar and that 
in fact, the military period coincides with that of low inflation rates in Brazil and the 
Brazilian economic ‘miracle’. Better proxies in order to test for this are needed. Also, no
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specific states seem to have had a different behaviour that the rest of the states, as 
happened in the case o f Argentina for the province o f Tierra del Fuego, which showed a 
markedly different behaviour from the rest.
It does, therefore, seem that convergence in Brazil has not taken place except for a period 
in which this was triggered by specific policies (as in the seventies), while divergence has 
appeared as a result of specific shocks or macroeconomic instability (as in the eighties 
and early nineties). Moreover, it seems that different authors agree that the policies 
followed in the nineties, together with MERCOSUR will tend to favour the more 
developed regions of the country. These results, again, show that when dividing the 
whole period into different sub-periods, more interesting conclusions can be reached.
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10
Conclusions
The main objective of this thesis has been to study regional economic disparities and the 
processes that shape regional convergence both within as between countries. In 
particular, this thesis has focused on Argentina and Brazil in order to draw useful 
conclusions regarding the impact of regional integration within the MERCOSUR 
countries. These conclusions, together with those given by the European integration 
experience, may also be applied to other economically integrated areas, in particular for 
Latin America.
The issue of convergence is vital not only for individual countries but particularly for 
integrated areas. The importance of achieving more homogenous national societies is 
significant not only from a ‘humanitarian’ perspective but also for solid economic 
reasons. The more integrated and homogeneous a country is, the larger the internal 
market and the more linkages in the economy. In areas such as the European Union, 
where individual countries delegate some of their national policies to a supra-national 
entity, if  inequalities within the union were to persist or enlarge, it may be that belonging 
to the area is no longer worthwhile. Handing over authority in certain fields implies a cost 
for each state, and if these costs are larger than the benefits they receive they might 
logically opt for retrieving their national autonomy. The issue of convergence of regional 
incomes, both between as within countries is, evidently, crucial.
In fact, at present, regional policy has become one of the most significant topics within 
European Union’s policies and institutional framework. MERCOSUR will, therefore, have 
to deal with the same issues in the next years before integration deepens, in order to 
become a successful trade area. As seen in the introduction to this thesis, disparities 
between member countries o f MERCOSUR are markedly significant, more so than any
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other disparities within Europe. It follows that if the European Union acknowledged it 
was slow in dealing with the issue of regional disparities, the countries o f MERCOSUR 
must try to avoid the same mistake.
As mentioned above, despite the significance of this issue, it has often been neglected. 
Countries around the world increasingly embark on globalisation and the elimination of 
trade barriers and, in the process, are willing to give up national decisions to a 
supranational power, disregarding the potential harmful effects for the less advantaged 
areas. The “automatic” forces of market competition are considered better fit to reallocate 
resources from poorer to richer areas while the state’s alleged inefficiency is supposedly 
tampering with development. This is a crucial issue when dealing with integrated areas, 
since disregards for regional issues, particularly for less developed regions, can arise 
serious problems that might end working against the objectives of development and 
equality.
As it was discussed in the theoretical chapter, there does not seem to be consensus among 
economists as to whether convergence in the neo-classical context is the rule or not. In 
fact, while neoclassical economists advocate the long run automatic reduction in 
disparities the regional development economists point out at the need for strong regional 
policies and highlight the failures of the neoclassical model that will make countries and 
regions diverge. In this thesis I sought to answer four main questions.
First, I tried to identify how disparities between different areas emerge. Secondly, 
whether the issue of automatic convergence, as stated by neoclassical economics, holds in 
practice and in particular for less developed countries and areas. Thirdly, and following 
the new lines of regional economics research, whether convergence can be affected by 
external factors, such as macro or political ones, which is another important issue when 
dealing with less developed countries. Finally, I sought to discuss the significance of 
regional policies in helping bridge the gap between poorer and richer regions (countries).
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This thesis was divided into two parts. Part I referred to the theory and methodology 
relevant to the study of regional disparities as well as the case study of the European 
Union. In the introduction to this thesis, I highlighted the importance of the study of 
convergence for Argentina and Brazil in particular and for MERCOSUR by presenting 
figures in order to show the wide disparities among the member countries. In these, it 
could be seen the significant difference in both total GDP and population, where both 
Argentina and Brazil account for 96 percent of MERCOSUR’s total, with Brazil 
accounting for 79 and 71 percent of population and total GDP respectively. Disparities 
between these four countries are therefore more than dramatic. When inspecting the 
disparities within the two largest countries, it was shown that GDP per capita across 
provinces (Argentina) and states (Brazil) is again more than significant. It follows that the 
issue of regional differences should not be overlooked.
Chapter 2 presented the theoretical framework and reviewed not only the automatic 
convergence mechanisms, as stated by the neo-classical model o f growth but also failures 
to the neoclassical model that validate the existence of regional disparities. According to 
neoclassical economics, disparities would be automatically reduced over time via the 
equalising effects of the marginal productivity of perfectly mobile factors such as capital 
and labour. This was also extended to cover integrated areas, not only regions within a 
country, and therefore according to these models integration would be beneficial. Other 
studies pointed at several factors that might prevent automatic convergence from taking 
place, such as cumulative processes, migration, and location economies.
Further, this chapter also briefly reviews the Latin American school o f thought and the 
role of less developed countries in world’s development. Historically, countries in Latin 
America developed linkages to external markets, which shaped their development 
models. Forced by external conditions, Latin America sought to devise its own 
development strategy. The problematic faced by Latin American countries after the 
Second World War gave rise to both structuralism and dependency, which shaped the 
development strategy of these countries by following and industrialisation strategy based 
on the substitution of imports.
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Chapter 3 described the methodology that was used throughout this thesis, mainly sigma 
and beta analyses. In addition, chapter 3 presented a review o f the main studies of 
convergence for a wide range of areas if the world but with an emphasis on Latin 
America. Already in this chapter, one of the main conclusions will appear, the longer the 
period under study, so convergence is found as reported in studies for the United States, 
Canada (Sala-i-Martin, 1996) and Sweden (Persson, 1997). However, when dividing into 
sub-periods, convergence and divergence alternate. Studies included regions in Mexico 
(Esquivel, 1999), Colombia (Cardenas and Ponton), Latin American countries (Caceres 
and Sandoval, 1999; Dobson and Ramlogan, 2002) and China (Jian et al, 1996; Zhao and 
Tong, 2000). These findings seem to validate the existence of factors that might 
temporarily drive the economy to divergence and, therefore, prevent automatic 
convergence from taking place.
Chapter 4 analysed the case of the European Union over the last fifty years as a case 
study for other integrated areas. The objective was not only to determine whether an 
automatic process of convergence had been in place, but also as a framework for a study 
of less developed countries. In the European Union institutions related to the issue of 
regional disparities were slow to emerge and it was not until further enlargements added 
disparities that stronger and more efficient institutions emerged, such as the 1988 Reform 
of the Structural Funds and the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992.
Convergence in the European Union was certainly not automatic and, as seen in chapter 
4, disparities were easier to converge when they were not that wide. However, with the 
inclusion of other member countries and the increasing disparities in incomes, 
convergence was harder to achieve. In the case of the European Union, convergence was 
found for the countries whereas divergence seems to be the rule for the regions. Between 
countries, convergence was at its strongest during the seventies therefore confirming that 
at least for the EU, in times of recession (mainly the oil crises of the seventies) 
convergence occurs. This indicates that the more developed regions within the union 
were those most affected and therefore helped in closing the gap. Automatic convergence
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was not present and as indicated by this thesis, periods of convergence follow periods of 
non-convergence.
Part II gave a brief review of disparities in MERCOSUR and Argentina and Brazil in 
particular. Chapter 5 briefly reviewed the case of MERCOSUR and tried to give some 
preliminary conclusions. Disparities between the four member countries are vast, as 
mentioned in the introduction to this thesis and Chapter 4, in terms of population, GDP, 
and other socio-economic indicators. It was seen that the countries o f MERCOSUR 
exhibited convergence for the whole period 1940-1995 but this was only particularly 
strong for the decade of the seventies. The period 1990-1995 was a period o f clear 
divergence. This can be explained by the lower growth of the two countries with relative 
highest incomes at the beginning of the period (Argentina and Uruguay) while Brazil and 
Paraguay exhibited higher growth rates. Conversely, in the first half of the nineties, the 
opposite was true, with Argentina and Uruguay again exhibiting higher growth, and so 
divergence was the rule. In this instance, the decade of the seventies favoured 
convergence, as in the case of the European Union. Therefore, for the MERCOSUR as a 
whole, external shocks such as the oil crises affected those countries with higher initial 
incomes most. Also, automatic convergence did not take place, and as in the European 
Union period of convergence and divergence alternate, signalling to a lack o f automatic 
mechanisms and more to a link with policies and external factors.
Both Chapters 6 and 8 review the history of Argentina and Brazil respectively from 
colonial times in order to identify the origins o f the present “divergence” map as seen in 
the introduction to this thesis, and the role that national development strategies played for 
convergence dynamics. Both chapters also included a brief description of certain regional 
policies in both countries.
In both Argentina and Brazil, the colonial legacy of regional concentration seems to have 
had a significant impact on disparities. Historical models of development, then, appear to 
be significant in the origin of disparities, albeit not static but dynamic, with export-led 
growth and later import substitution industrialisation reinforcing them. Both the Spanish
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and Portuguese colonisations were centred in land with agricultural and mining potential. 
Important mining regional economies flourished in Minas Gerais in Brazil and in Potosi, 
while food and mule markets were centred in the northwest of Argentina. As these 
countries strengthened their links with external markets as suppliers o f raw materials and 
foodstuff, significant changes in the internal structure of these countries occurred. In the 
case o f Brazil, this implied the decline o f the northeast and the growth of Sao Paulo and 
surrounding areas. In Argentina, the decline of the economies of the northwest gave way 
to the prosperity of the pampa surrounding Buenos Aires.
In the second half of the century, countries sought for an alternative in order to replace 
the dependence on export-led growth and reduce the vulnerability to external shocks. An 
inward-looking industrialisation process was followed and, though successful in many 
respects, for some countries it contributed to reinforcing regional concentration. Both in 
Argentina and Brazil, the main centres o f the agro-export models - Sao Paulo and Buenos 
Aires - were also the centres of the industrialisation process. Contrary to neo-classical 
maxims, the massive migration in both countries in the sixties was directed to the urban 
centres and therefore reinforced the concentration around the consumption markets.
Chapters 7 and 9 analysed the regional data for Argentina and Brazil in order to test for 
the presence of convergence among the regions. Disparities have not decreased 
significantly and again, as in the case of the European Union and MERCOSUR, periods of 
convergence are followed by periods of non-convergence. Although a definite link 
between macro and political variables could not be made, the evidence points out at a 
tentative link. For both Argentina and Brazil the longer periods show convergence, 
though this is only weak convergence. In the case of Argentina the period 1961 to 1973 
was one of convergence and so is 1989-1995. The other sub-periods do not display any 
convergence. For Brazil, the only period that displays convergence is 1975-1985 while 
the others do not converge. Regarding the sigma convemgence in both countries, the 
main conclusion is that while for the case of Argentina one province has a different 
behaviour that the rest, in Brazil all states follow the same pattern and only differ in 
magnitude.
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In order to answer the first of out main issues on how disparities emerge, disparities are 
significant in those countries with a vast array of resources across regions. This, together 
with historical patterns of development, as in the case of Argentina and Brazil in 
particular and other countries throughout Latin America in general, determined a 
divergence map much more significant that developed countries in general and in 
particular for the member countries in the European Union. In Latin America, as seen in 
the thesis, development not only originated certain disparities (with the focus on the 
export of primary product) but also contributed to reinforce existing ones (when 
industrialisation took place mostly in the already developed centres). This reinforcement 
came in the form of industrialisation effort centralised around consumption centres and 
migration from the interior attracted to those booming regions.
In response to the second main issue addressed in this thesis -  whether disparities would 
be reduced automatically - it was seen that according to classical economic theory, 
disparities within countries (and economic areas) should decrease automatically over time 
via factor mobility and decreasing marginal returns. It was seen throughout the thesis that 
this convergence did not happen, either for countries or for economic areas. The longer 
the period under consideration, convergence is found. However, when dividing the period 
into smaller sub-periods, convergence and divergence seem to alternate for all areas 
under study in this thesis.
Contrary to neo-classical theory, the poorest and richest areas both in Argentina and 
Brazil have not converged, at least not significantly, as discussed in Chapters 7 and 9. 
Only for the period 1961-1973 and 1975-1985 respectively there seems to be significant 
convergence. The same seems to be the case for the countries of MERCOSUR, where only 
a few sub-periods were of convergence, such as the seventies, while the nineties is of 
divergence. In the European Union, disparities persist, not only between the countries but 
also within regions, still after fifty years of integration. In the wake of the new additional 
member countries from Eastern Europe to the European Union, the institutional
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framework is being revised in order to take into account disparities within the new 
enlarged Union.
The third question that I have sought to address throughout this thesis is the role of 
macroeconomic conditions and political instability, to find possible links between period 
of convergence (divergence) and economic and political stability (instability). Even in the 
case of the European Union there is some evidence o f reduction in the speed of 
convergence in times of economic slowdown, and political turmoil, such as in the case of 
Greece and Spain until 1975, seems also to have affected the process of convergence. For 
Argentina and Brazil, both political and macroeconomic variables seem to have a link 
with a-convergence. However, when performing formal tests and doing beta-convergence 
analyses it was seen that only in the case of Argentina did political variables have an 
impact on convergence, while macroeconomic variables did not offer conclusive 
evidence. In the case of Brazil, neither political nor macroeconomic variables seem to 
have had any impact, and there might be a counterbalancing effect given that military 
periods and macro stability almost coincide. Better proxies and further study will be 
needed in order to find conclusive evidence.
It then follows that if ‘automatic’ convergence is hard to achieve (i.e. sub-periods of 
convergence and divergence alternate) and, given that there are factors that might be 
responsible for this (possibly macro and political factors among others), policies to 
correct such imbalances and disparities become more relevant. There is, o f course, the 
issue of whether regional policies should primarily be in charge of central governments, 
or in the case of integrated areas left in hands of supra-national entities. Although the 
latter is beyond the scope of this thesis, it must be remembered that in the EU, even once 
regional polices became a significant pillar within the EU structure, convergence was 
hard to achieve, particularly within regions. Therefore, in order for convergence to 
happen, coherent and efficient regional policies with a medium and long-term perspective 
need to be put in place in order to bridge the gap between poorer and richer areas both 
within as across countries.
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The scope of action for Latin American governments to remove inequalities is palpably 
limited, given the links between the local groups of power and the models in place. As 
the dependency theorists explain so, social and political barriers can also lie behind the 
persistence of disparities in these countries. In the cases of Argentina and Brazil policies 
to correct imbalances were either ineffective or of limited impact. One has, then, to be 
cautious when taking the case of MERCOSUR and the possible impact of a deepening 
integration on disparities. Considering the lack of supra-national institutions in the area, 
divergence will most likely be the rule. Regional policies should therefore, assuredly be 
included in MERCOSUR’s agenda.
There is therefore a need to redefine the role of the national governments in providing 
consistent regional policies in order to promote a balanced growth within the individual 
countries in line with the integration between the countries. The importance of these 
policies is even more significant when considering less developed countries of Latin 
America and their historically determined dependence and development patterns. 
MERCOSUR is not likely to develop as an area where disparities will be automatically 
reduced. In fact, it is likely to promote further divergence with concentration on the main 
centres of economic activity, mainly in both Argentina and Brazil. The losers of this 
arrangement will be the poorer areas in both countries, as well as those from the other 
countries. If MERCOSUR is to become a successful economic area, balanced 
development of all regions within its countries is essential and regional policies should be 
a main concern before embarking on further integration. The neoclassical consideration 
of the state as inefficient and prejudicial should be changed and an active role of the 
states within MERCOSUR should be both encouraged and sought.
When extending these conclusions to a possible Free Trade Area o f the Americas, the 
issue of disparities becomes even more relevant, given the wide variety of countries 
involved in this initiative. The undesirable outcomes o f integration processes should be 
avoided at all costs, given Latin America’s already significant and unresolved poverty 
and regional inequalities issues. Regional policy must, again, be a top political priority if 
integration is to succeed, both at the national as well as a supranational level.
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APPENDIX I 
The European Union
I.a. Regional Policy in the EU: A Summary
The policy instruments for regional policy in the EU can be summarised as follows:
• Structural Funds
European Social Fund (ESF) - Treaty of Rome (1958) - about 30 per cent of Structural 
Funds
European Agricultural Guarantee Guidance Fund (EAGGF) - Treaty of Rome - Guidance 
almost 17 per cent of Structural Funds
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) - established in 1975 - 50 per cent of 
Structural Funds
Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG) - created in 1994 - 3 per cent of 
Structural Funds
• Cohesion Funds - established by the Treaty of Maastricht, in force since 1993
• Other
European Coal and Steel Community - Treaty of Paris (1951)
European Investment Bank - Treaty of Rome (1958)
New Community Instrument (NCI) - since 1977 granting specific loans to SMEs 
managed by EIB
Integrated Development Operations (IDO) - geographically limited aid
Integrated Mediterranean Programmes (IMPs), aid for France, Italy and Greece since
1986. Originated as compensation for 1986 enlargements.
These funds are implemented through two main mechanisms
• Regional development plans, through Community Support Frameworks (CSF) for each 
region or Single Programming Documents (SPD).
• Community initiatives - focusing on particular areas.
There are two advisory bodies for regional policies:
• Economic and Social Committee - Treaty of Rome
• Committee of the Regions - Treaty of the EU
After the creation of the ERDF in 1975, the initial EC regional policy was based on a financial 
instrument (ERDF), and complemented by other funds and institutions such as EIB, ESF, ESC, 
EAGGF- Guidance and ECSC. The fund was distributed according to shares and negotiated
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quotas guided by the Council, without major intervention from the Commission. However, aid 
was limited both in scope and resources (this constituted a 4.8 per cent of the EC budget in 1976). 
In 1979, a first reform was made, whereby 5 per cent of the fund was made into a non- quota 
section and therefore the Commission had more control over this. However, 95 per cent of the 
fund remained in control of Member States and quotas still applied. In 1984, there was a further 
reform of the fund and Project and Programme assistance replaced the previous system of quotas. 
The funds were channelled through an indicative share or ‘fourchette’ whereby the lower 
indicative figure would be granted and each Member State should convince of the need for 
financing more projects. (Glockler, G. et al, 1998)
The 1988 reform of the Structural Funds is still guiding regional policies nowadays. It introduced 
a shift in the sense that took into account regional authorities and therefore policies were more 
regional oriented. From 1975 until 1988 the funds of the ERDF increased from 4.8 per cent to 8.1 
per cent of Community budget. In Agenda 2000, more than 30 per cent is planned for the period 
2000-2006. (Lopes Porto, 1997; Eurostat)
There are five principles that guide the Structural Funds.
• Concentration, on a set of priorities and objectives. Thus, the regions are classified in NUTS 
{Nomenclature des unites territoriales statistiques) and can be eligible according to the 
objectives.
• Programming, referring to the elaboration of plans rather than single projects by establishing 
the Community Support Programme or Single Programming Document.
• Partnership refers to a closer co-operation between the Commission and the national, regional 
and local authorities.
• Additionality, requiring that Community funds do not overlap with national investments, and 
that they must complement not substitute each other. Regional polices should not subsidise 
incomes and simply offset inequalities in standards of living, but instead help to equalise 
production conditions through investment programmes
• Monitoring, as all regional policy activities are appraised and monitored during the operation 
and evaluated afterwards. (Glockler, G. et al, 1998)
Moreover, there were five Objective policies introduced in 1988. During the 1990s some 
modifications were introduced, but overall it remained unaltered. The main modifications were to 
include the East German Lander as Objective 1 regions after re-unification and to include a new
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Objective 6 to account for new entrant countries (Austria, Finland and Sweden) (Glockler, G. et 
al, 1998) The EIB intervenes in all six objectives.
• Objective 1: include those regions whose development is lagging behind the rest of the 
Community. The standard for eligibility was having a GDP per capita of less than 75 per cent 
of the Community average. All Structural Funds deal with this regions, ERDF in particular, 
and also the Cohesion Funds.
• Objective 2: regions affected by industrial decline and restructuring. The eligibility was 
determined according to quantitative labour-market criteria: unemployment rates (three-year 
average unemployment above the EC average), share of industrial employment in total 
employment (above the EC average since 1975), and those affected by a decline in industrial 
or fisheries employment since 1975. ERDF, FIFG and ESF apply to this objective, although 
the ESF has a significant role.
• Objective 3: to combat long-term unemployment and facilitate the young professional’s 
insertion in the labour market and of those socially excluded. ESF is the only mechanism that 
is entitled to deal with this.
• Objective 4: concerns the adaptation of workers to industrial shifts and evolution of 
productive system. ESF is the only one for this objective, which was added in 1993.
• Objective 5a: promoting rural development through helping in the adjustment of agricultural 
structures and therefore the EAGG-Guidance is involved.
• Objective 5b: to promote rural development and structural adjustment in rural areas. Not only 
the EAGG-Guidance, but the ERDF and the ESF deal with this objective.
• Objective 6: to promote the development of those areas with very low density of population 
(below 8inh/sq km). This was added in 1995 focusing on the Arctic regions of Sweden and 
Finland. All Structural Funds except the Fisheries Financial Instrument apply to this 
objective.
Objectives are then classified into regional (1, 2, 5b and 6) and horizontal (3, 4 and 5a) (Hall, 
1994; Glfickler, G. et al, 1998)
As mentioned before, Agenda 2000 proposed a greater efficiency of the Structural Funds by 
increasing concentration. This concentration refers to reducing the number of objectives, the 
geographical area that benefits from Objectives 1 and 2 by 10-15 per cent and financially by
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devoting two-thirds of the resources of the funds to objective 1 regions. The former seven
objectives will be reduced to three.
• Objective 1: regions whose development lags behind (75 per cent of average GDP per capita) 
including former Objective 6 regions with the same GDP percentage. About 20 per cent of 
the population would benefit. All Structural Funds would be involved in this objective.
• Objective 2: for areas undergoing economic and social conversion or structural problems. 
About 18 per cent of the EU population would be covered by this objective and all funds will 
be directed to it.
• Objective 3: to support the modernisation and adaptation of education, training and 
employment. Only those areas not covered by the other objectives will apply and the ESF 
will be the only instrument to deal with this objective.
Also, the number of initiatives was reduced to four:
• INTERREG, stimulating cross-border, trans-national and inter-regional co-operation
• LEADER, promoting rural development
• EQUAL, combating discrimination and inequality in access to labour markets
• URBAN, economic and social restructuring of towns, cities and suburbs in crisis.
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Lb. European GDP data (GDP in millions - for 1960 in domestic currencies 
afterwards in ECU). Source: Eurostat
EEC-6 (1960-1995)
1960 1973 1988 1995
GERMANY 302,550.0 273,190.0 979,300.0 1,846,351.0
Schleswig-Holstein 9,758.0 9,433.0 35,300.0 58,737.0
Hamburg 16,190.0 12,761.0 39,500.0 68,032.0
Bremen 5,088.0 4,333.0 13,000.0 21,343.0
Niederachsen 31,451.0 27,805.0 95,000.0 166,187.0
Nordrhein-Westfalen 92,988.0 76,461.0 252,100.0 412,676.0
H essen 25,686.0 25,275.0 101,900.0 184,087.0
Rheinland-Pfalz 15,367.0 14,579.0 50,900.0 79,869.0
Baden-Wurttenberg 42,707.0 43,651.0 163,000.0 265,755.0
Bayern 45,462.0 45,104.0 178,200.0 309,216.0
Saarland 5,470.0 4,175.0 14,500.0 24,032.0
Berlin (West) 12,383.0 10,199.0 35,900.0 74,623.0
1960 1973 1988 1995
FRANCE 226,745.2 185,782.0 746,000.0 1,169,074.0
Reg.Parisienne/ l.de France 60,648.9 51,921.0 209,400.0 342,456.0
Bassin Parisien 38,551.0 31,982.0 122,300.0 187,457.0
Nord 16,350.5 12,709.0 41,500.0 66,957.0
Est 20,546.7 16,571.0 60,200.0 94,188.0
Ouest 24,617.4 19,380.0 81,600.0 128,416.0
Sud-Ouest 20,750.7 15,204.0 66,800.0 103,591.0
Centre-Est 24,459.1 21,224.0 82,700.0 129,379.0
Mediterranee 20,820.9 16,323.0 74,000.0 116,629.0
1960 1973 1988 1995
NETHERLANDS 37,682.0 45,116.0 185,000.0 304,148.0
Noord 3,729.9 4,864.0 18,600.0 31,214.0
Oost 6,262.3 7,543.0 31,400.0 55,335.0
West 19,268.5 23,558.0 94,600.0 153,291.0
Zuid 8,421.3 8,861.0 38,200.0 6,838.0
1960 1973 1988 1995
ITALY 19,286.0 122,301.0 517,600.0 831,409.0
Nord-Ovest 3,103.0 18,216.0 65,500.0 101,721.0
Lombardia 4,147.0 26,075.0 103,600.0 167,311.0
Nord Est 2,201.0 14,485.0 65,500.0 114,758.0
Emilia Romagna 1,633.0 10,225.0 45,100.0 73,116.0
Centro 1,924.0 12,705.0 56,100.0 87,921.0
Lazio 1,827.0 11,168.0 51,500.0 83,331.0
Campania 1,255.0 7,861.0 11,700.0 19,776.0
Abruzzi-Molise 370.0 2,396.0 35,600.0 53,855.0
Sud 1,308.0 9,186.0 40,300.0 64,360.0
Sicilia 1,130.0 7,450.0 31,500.0 47,753.0
Sardegna 387.0 2,534.0 11,100.0 17,508.0
1960 1973 1988 1995
BELGIUM 506,236.0 34,567.0 122,800.0 208,954.0
R.FIamande/ Vlaams Gewest 229,093.0 19,100.0 71,600.0 124,639.0
R.Wallonne/ W aals Gewest 163,152.0 9,661.0 31,400.0 54,612.0
R.Bruxelloise/ Brussels Gewest 113,991.0 5,807.0 19,800.0 29,703.0
1960 1973 1988 1995
LUXEMBOURG 23,185.0 1,500.0 6,200.0 13,222.0
EEC-9 (1973-1988)
1973 1988 1995
UNITED KINGDOM 134,382.0 450,600.0 846,411.0
North 6,859.0 22,000.0 38,559.0
Yorkshire and Humberside 10,206.0 33,400.0 65,936.0
East Midlands 7,740.0 26,900.0 556,083.0
East Anglia 3,848.0 13,200.0 30,656.0
South-East 47,803.0 154,000.0 305,851.0
South-West 8,863.0 31,200.0 67,151.0
West Midlands 11,849.0 34,300.0 71,203.0
North-West 15,847.0 47,300.0 82,724.0
W ales 5,744.0 18,700.0 34,861.0
Scotland 12,266.0 38,100.0 74,090.0
Northern Ireland 3,106.0 9,900.0 19,297.0
1973 1988 1995
IRELAND 4,582.0 26,000.0 49,360.0
1973 1988 1995
DENMARK 21,622.0 80,400.0 129,378.0
EEC-12 (1988-1995)
1988 1995
GREECE 39,300.0 87,760.0
Voreia Ellada n/a 27,179.0
Kentriki Ellada n/a 19,011.0
Attiki n/a 32,856.0
Nisia n/a 8,715.0
1988 1995
SPAIN 292,300.0 430,877.0
Noroeste 28,600.0 39,896.0
Noreste 37,000.0 52,602.0
Madrid 44,300.0 68,499.0
Centro 34,300.0 48,776.0
Este 89,200.0 135,121.0
Sur 47,100.0 69,344.0
Canarias 11,500.0 16,639.0
1988 1995
PORTUGAL
Continente
Acores
Madeira
28,000.0
28,000.0
80,000.0
77,074.0
1.380.0
1.546.0
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Evolution of Disparities in the EU
Absolute Convergence among the EU countries 
Source: Tavera (1999)
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Figure 2
C o n c e n t r a t io n  o f  ERDF in v e s tm e n t  
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C o n c e n tr a t io n  o f  ERDF in v e s tm e n t  
g r a n t s  (1986-1988)
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I.e. The Eastern European Economies
GDP per Capita. 1998 (EU15= 100)
Source: Eurostat (2000), own calculations
GDP per Capita, 1998 (in thousand PPS)
EU-minimum (Greece)
Source: Eurostat (2000), own calculations
Impact of Succesive Enlargements in the EU
Based on 1995 
data Increase in 
area
Increase in 
population
Increase in 
total GDP
Increase in 
per capita 
GDP
Average per 
capita GDP 
(EUR6-100)
EUR 9/ EUR 6 31% 32% 29% -3% 97
EUR 12 /EUR 9 48% 22% 15% -6% 91
EUR 15 /EUR 12 43% 11% 8% -3% 89
EUR 2 6 /EUR 15 34% 29% 9% -16% 75
Source: Agenda 2000 (1997b)
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APPENDIX II
MERCOSUR
Il.a. Total GDP in the MERCOSUR countries at factor cost using 1970 prices,
1940-2000 (in millions)
Argentina Brazil Uruguay Paraguay
1940 9035 6515 1273 306
1950 13113 11559 1867 410
1960 17577 23566 2295 521
1970 28686 42885 2676 813
1980 39746 98201 3398 1804
1990 36280 115164 3558 2411
1995 47519 131202 4194 2810
2000 55348 157257 4895 3231
Source: Astorga and FitzGerald (1998), World Bank website
ILb. Population in the MERCOSUR countries in thousands, 1940-2000
Argentina Brazil Uruguay Paraguay
1940 14,169 41,524 1,974 1,068
1950 17,150 53,444 2,195 1,408
1960 20,616 72,594 2,503 1,749
1970 23,962 95,847 2,705 2,250
1980 28,114 121,286 2,869 2,896
1990 32,546 148,477 3,094 4,277
1995 34,587 161,790 3,186 4,986
2000 37,000 170,000 3,300 5,300
Source: Astorga and FitzGerald (1998), World Bank website
ZZ.c. Illiteracy Rates in the MERCOSUR countries, 1900-1995 (as percentage of
population age 15 and over)
Argentina Brazil U [_
1900 48.70 65.30 40.60 68.60
1910 39.60 65.10 35.20 61.70
1920 31.80 64.90 25.50 54.90
1930 25.10 60.50 23.90 48.00
1940 18.30 56.10 18.70 40.70
1950 12.40 50.60 14.30 34.20
1960 8.60 39.70 10.50 27.20
1970 7.40 33.80 7.50 21.00
1980 6.10 25.50 5.40 14.00
1990 4.20 20.60 3.70 10.30
1995 3.80 16.70 2.70 7.90
Source: Astorga and FitzGerald (1998)
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ILd. Life Expectancy in the MCS countries 1920-1995
Argentina Brazil Uruguay Paraguay
1920 49.00 32.00 31.00 33.00
1930 53.00 34.00 32.00 38.00
1940 56.00 37.00 38.00 42.00
1950 61.00 43.00 51.00 48.00
1960 65.00 55.00 60.00 55.00
1970 67.00 59.00 65.00 61.00
1980 70.00 63.00 68.00 67.00
1990 72.00 66.00 71.00 69.00
1995 72.00 66.00 72.00 69.00
Source: Astorga and FitzGerald (1998)
ILe. Vehicles per Thousand persons in the MCS countries, 1929-90
Argentina Brazil Uruguay Paraguay
1929 36 6 30 1.4
1940 30 4 32 2.2
1950 32 7 29 2
1970 92 32 77 12
1990 178 88 129 45
Source: Astorga and FitzGerald (1998)
II.f. Railroads Density (km of tracks per thousand square km)
Argentina Brazil Uruguay Paraguay
1900 6 1.8 9.3 0.6
1913 12.1 2.9 13.8 0.9
1929 13.5 3.8 14.6 1.2
1950 15.4 4.3 16.1 1.2
1970 14.4 3.7 15.9 1.1
1995 12.9 3.6 16.1 1.1
Source: Astorga and FitzGerald (1998)
ILg. Telephones (number of lines per thousand inhabitants)
Argentina Brazil Uruguay Parac
1913 10 2 8 1
1929 23 5 19 2
1940 32 7 28 3
1950 47 10 41 4
1970 73 21 79 11
1990 142 95 187 30
Source: Astorga and FitzGerald (1998)
ILh. Sigma analysis in Mercosur, 1950-1990, Caceres and Sandoval (1999)
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APPENDIX m  
Argentina
// /.a . Provincial GDP in Argentina at constant domestic 1986 prices, in 
thousands
Cap.Fed. Catamarca . , Corrientes Chaco Chubut Entre Rios
1961 2,044.60 1,507.30 18.80 434.00 76.70 90.40 110.29 130.40
1973 3,138.70 2,329.10 26.30 604.90 113.90 92.10 113.00 179.60
1983 3,340.80 2,178.20 41.10 711.10 157.70 97.20 208.20 233.20
1990 2,978.50 2,031.10 56.20 625.00 173.50 115.20 174.50 249.60
1995 3,906.30 2,844.60 63.80 855.40 195.80 122.30 238.50 330.60
Formosa Jujuy La Pam pa La Rioja Mendoza Misiones Neuqu6n Rio Negro
1961 20.90 36.60 47.40 15.30 213.60 41.00 37.50 52.40
1973 41.50 81.00 71.70 21.00 360.50 91.00 71.80 101.60
1983 45.80 100.70 88.60 35.30 384.80 111.10 189.10 169.50
1990 63.70 107.60 91.50 59.00 288.30 121.90 200.70 166.90
1995 75.60 116.90 100.70 86.00 296.30 168.20 338.90 194.40
Salta San Juan San Luis Sta Cruz Santa F6 S.Estero T.Fuego Tucumdn
1961 77.22 56.10 27.40 78.52 475.10 48.50 7.40 92.39
1973 116.70 81.80 46.00 53.00 778.90 77.30 10.50 231.70
1983 158.90 87.80 72.20 85.20 907.10 91.80 47.70 279.60
1990 160.50 95.50 162.40 80.70 818.10 76.60 65.10 231.30
1995 204.20 131.50 207.20 129.60 1,100.90 105.20 61.20 327.50
Source: Universidad Nacional de la Plata (1999)
IILb. Total Population by provinces, in thousands
BsAs Cap.Fed. Catamarca Cdrdoba Corrientes Chaco Chubut Entre Rios
1960 7,159 2,967 173 1,821 551 559 149 829
1970 8,995 2,972 177 2,141 589 576 196 843
1980 10,865 2,929 208 2,408 661 701 263 908
1990 12,427 2,989 258 2,732 783 826 347 1,009
1995 13,236 2,988 285 2,894 845 883 392 1,056
Formosa Jujuy La Pampa La Rioja Mendoza Misiones Neuqu6n Rio Negro
1960 187 252 164 132 855 376 115 195
1970 240 314 177 138 1,004 459 162 270
1980 296 410 208 164 1,196 589 244 383
1990 387 502 255 215 1,391 768 373 494
1995 439 548 278 244 1,489 867 452 550
Salta San Juan San Luis Sta Cruz Santa F6 S.Estero T.Fuego TucumSn
1960 429 363 179 56 1,955 491 9 797
1970 520 401 188 89 2,176 520 14 801
1980 663 466 214 115 2,466 595 29 973
1990 845 522 279 155 2,766 665 64 1,125
1995 944 546 316 178 2,915 692 93 1,201
Source: INDEC, several years
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III.c. Agriculture and Industry Shares by provinces, 1970 (as % of total provincial 
GDP)
BsAs Cap.Fed. Catamarca C6rdoba Corrientes Chaco Chubut Entre Rios
Agric 1970 14.55 - 16.44 17.30 28.15 28.12 6.18 23.58
Ind 1970 34.81 28.79 5.02 23.73 1 7.59 12.85 11.46 12.67
Formosa Jujuy La Pampa La Rioja Mendoza Misiones Neuqu6n Rio Negro 
Agric 1970 27.41 23.75 53.04 17.05 12.38 18.36 5.73 16.74
Ind 1970 14.76 25.08 5.27 5.11 24.67 16.10 5.56 9.21
Salta San Juan San Luis Sta Cruz Santa F6 S.Estero T.Fuego Tucumdn
Agric 1970 19.17 20.67 34.80 14.78 20.24 32.26 10.59 14.40
Ind 1970 17.95 18.09 11.37 1.52 29.69 6.57 5.88 20.62
Source: Universidad de la Plata (1999)
Ill.d. Illiteracy Rates by Provinces, 1947-1991 (population over 15 years)
BsAs Cap.Fed. Catamarca C6rdoba Corrientes Chaco Chubut Entre Rios
1947 10.54 3.28 10.76 9.12 18.37 17.41 9.97 52.01
1960 3.91 2.53 6.68 5.37 12.41 11.96 8.33 8.05
1970 3.56 2.10 5.59 4.87 10.76 11.98 7.22 6.85
1991 1.79 0.56 3.12 2.45 6.45 7.57 3.26 3.62
Formosa Jujuy La Pampa La Rioja Mendoza Misiones Neuqu6n Rio Negro
1947 14.17 22.64 9.84 10.73 11.79 13.64 15.31 15.56
1960 10.56 14.24 6.81 6.41 7.41 9.41 11.05 10.52
1970 10.16 10.75 5.93 5.56 6.30 9.01 8.86 9.15
1991 5.56 4.77 3.07 2.76 3.42 5.44 3.78 4.00
Salta San Juan San Luis Sta Cruz Santa F6 S.Estero T.Fuego Tucuman
1947 18.68 12.16 10.36 3.70 10.95 17.29 2.93 13.25
1960 11.28 7.40 6.81 4.03 5.82 11.19 2.77 7.78
1970 9.44 5.57 5.43 3.87 5.17 9.63 2.19 7.05
1991 4.66 3.10 3.13 1.58 2.78 5.86 0.77 3.55
Source: INDEC, several years
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IILe. Infant Mortality Rates by Provinces, 1938-1997 (per 1,000 live births)
. ' ■ Cap.Fed. Catamarca C6rdoba Corrientes Chaco Chubut Entre Rios
1938 83.98 51.75 125.16 120.92 50.23 113.77 146.11 326.40
1957 47.70 46.89 99.38 62.01 97.26 106.85 91.66 103.48
1970 55.40 42.40 73.60 51.40 78.60 100.10 82.60 55.30
1980 28.40 18.50 41.90 24.20 44.60 54.20 34.80 35.80
1991 23.11 15.02 29.90 22.30 29.10 31.30 24.10 20.80
1997 18.80 12.20 18.80 25.60 16.30 22.80 28.20 19.10
Formosa Jujuy La Pampa La Rioja Mendoza Misiones Neuqu6n Rio Negro
1938 82.67 233.05 109.71 144.06 140.05 120.08 153.91 145.75
1957 60.13 170.86 79.99 93.15 60.95 66.44 132.71 118.51
1970 62.50 132.60 37.30 83.60 65.90 77.70 107.60 95.10
1980 38.10 51.40 30.30 45.80 31.80 51.90 31.70 35.70
1991 25.40 34.60 17.70 24.10 23.40 30.30 17.50 22.20
1997 19.60 29.80 24.00 12.10 19.30 16.70 21.30 13.80
Salta San Juan San Luis Sta Cruz Santa F6 S.Estero T.Fuego Tucum^n
1938 179.05 151.51 151.20 122.72 95.16 113.42 81.93 203.07
1957 106.35 88.42 139.90 66.96 54.10 86.06 45.43 83.16
1970 114.40 86.00 78.70 50.20 56.40 52.20 55.20 69.90
1980 52.10 30.10 37.20 34.40 34.30 35.10 20.30 42.00
1991 35.70 23.60 23.10 18.20 25.10 22.30 10.90 26.70
1997 15.50 20.50 21.50 19.90 16.00 16.30 11.20 19.60
Source: INDEC, several years
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/ / / . /  Urbanisation Rates by Provinces, 1869-1991 (%)
BsAs Cap.Fed. Catamarca Cdrdoba Corrientes Chaco CIhubut Entre Rfos
1869 17.50 99.90 31.70 20.40 15.70 n/a n/a 36.70
1895 35.30 99.90 10.60 19.00 23.60 n/a n/a 31.50
1914 54.40 100.00 16.10 41.00 31.60 23.10 21.70 37.60
1947 72.00 100.00 31.30 53.00 34.20 30.10 38.30 41.80
1960 84.30 100.00 43.30 69.00 48.60 39.60 52.20 50.00
1970 91.30 100.00 52.90 75.10 57.20 47.00 69.60 60.80
1980 100.00 100.00 57.50 80.80 64.40 60.90 81.40 68.80
1991 100.00 100.00 70.00 85.50 73.90 70.30 87.80 77.70
Formosa Jujuy La Pampa La Rioja Mendoza Misiones Neuquen Rio Negro
1869 n/a 15.40 n/a 15.80 12.40 n/a n/a n/a
1895 n/a 13.90 n/a 12.20 24.40 12.80 n/a n/a
1914 22.30 18.90 17.20 13.00 32.10 18.90 7.50 7.50
1947 19.70 37.80 29.80 31.80 49.20 20.20 22.70 28.10
1960 28.80 48.30 39.60 41.60 60.40 34.70 36.80 44.20
1970 40.30 64.90 49.80 51.50 66.20 37.50 66.00 59.60
1980 55.70 73.60 64.90 61.70 68.80 50.40 76.10 71.80
1991 70.50 82.30 74.70 75.20 77.90 63.40 86.30 79.80
Salta San Juan San Luis Sta Cruz Santa F6 S.Estero T.Fuego Tucuman
1869 15.80 13.80 11.40 n/a 38.00 12.10 n/a 16.00
1895 12.20 12.40 18.90 n/a 32.70 5.90 n/a 17.10
1914 13.00 19.70 28.70 n/a 47.30 14.00 16.90 45.60
1947 31.80 46.00 39.10 n/a 59.30 25.80 29.80 49.90
1960 41.60 53.40 51.80 n/a 71.40 36.80 44.20 54.80
1970 51.50 62.40 57.30 n/a 77.70 66.00 75.90 64.70
1980 71.80 72.00 70.00 85.00 82.00 51.90 82.50 70.90
1991 78.90 80.80 81.20 91.40 85.50 60.80 97.20 76.70
Source: INDEC, several years
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IILg. Additional Data (1996-2000) and data for 1998
As seen in Chapter 7, the main analysis for Argentine disparities was performed using the 
data from Universidad de la Plata for the period 1961-1995 (III a. in this Appendix) since 
data for 1995-2000 was not available. Argentine regional data -  as opposed to Brazilian 
data, which is published by IBGE - has always been lacking coherence and continuity in 
both collection and compilation. As explained in Section 2 of Chapter 7, due to the 
neoliberal policies in the nineties, several organisms in charge of statistics were 
dismantled, affecting the compilation of provincial GDP. Regional GDP had been 
elaborated by CFI (Consejo Federal de Inversiones) and there was a project to publish 
new data every five years. The provinces used to receive assistance, which was 
coordinated by CFI, in order to gather and compile data to produce the series. Manzanal 
(2000) explains that after 1990, and due to the reforms, CFI no longer coordinates this 
process and each province is left with that task, with CFI only providing limited 
assistance. Therefore, the quality of this estimate has decreased since then. Unfortunately 
it cannot be replaced or proxied by other available data and therefore even with its 
obvious shortcomings is the series that has to be used. An additional problem is that 
nowadays data for only a few provinces is available and due to the lack o f coordination in 
gathering/compiling it is almost impossible to compare them.
The data used in this thesis is from Universidad de la Plata, as mentioned before, and has 
been compared with shorter series provided by CFI for consistency (as explained in the 
methodological section of Chapter 7). For data sets comprising the period 1995-2000, 
CFI was contacted without success and several searches carried out on the Internet 
(www.cfi.com.ar). Their website only provides data for all provinces from 1980 to 1986 
and for Salta (1993-1999) and Tierra del Fuego (2002). At the Ministerio de Economia, 
(www.mecon.gov.ar) there are no records of any regional GDP -  not even the previous 
years- and the same for INDEC (www.indec.gov.ar). Also, at 
www.netp.adm.ufrgs.br/mercosul/dadoscorrientes.htmdata until 1995 was published. On 
a paper by Escudero et al (2002), data for the years 1996-2000 is presented but the source 
not mentioned. I have contacted OEI and one the authors (Borda, whose address was
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found on the internet), but none replied to my requests. Manzanal (2000) provides data 
for 1996, but this will not be considered, as the addition of only one year will not be of 
much use for the main analysis.
The data from Escudero et al (2002) is presented below and although it will not be 
considered as part o f the main analysis (due to the unknown source), these data have been 
merged with those of Universidad de la Plata and sigma and beta analysis (the latter only 
in absolute terms for the whole 1961-2000 period and for the decade 1990-2000) has 
been performed. The results will only be considered as indicative and appear on the 
Econometric Appendix V.e on page 373.
Data on current prices for 1998 and 1959 have been obtained from CFI and CFI/Di Telia 
respectively. Given the nature of convemgence analysis, i.e. the regression equation 
when comparing two given years takes into account those particular years only, I 
considered inappropriate to include both 1998 and 1959 in the series for UNLP as part of 
that data set. Calculating 1998 against 1959 would be fine, though mixing data from 
different sets in order to extract valid conclusions was a bit riskier, particularly given that 
the data belongs to either extremes of the sample and would potentially induce a 
significant bias. In Appendix Ve a regression using both years 1998/1959 is performed in 
order to compare it to the main regression 1995/1961.
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Regional GDP data in million o f current pesos (1996-2000) as appear on Table 2, 
Escudero et al (2002)
BsAs Cap Fed Catamarca Cordoba Corrientes Chaco Chubut Entre Rios
1996 79,527 64,397 1,190 18,501 2,952 3,097 3,306 5,098
1997 84,814 69,193 1,268 19,683 3,184 3,235 3,416 5,405
1998 87,042 71,699 1,308 20,264 3,279 3,203 3,376 5,608
1999 82,290 69,339 1,268 19,006 3,120 3,047 3,284 5,340
2000 81,847 69,405 1,257 18,916 3,109 3,044 3,630 5,336
Formosa Jujuy La Pampa La Rioja Mendoza Misiones Neuquen Rio Negro
1996 1,517 1,848 2,158 1,267 9,920 3,251 5,011 3,362
1997 1,624 2,051 2,246 1,330 10,476 3,491 5,081 3,542
1998 1,676 2,081 2,296 1,389 10,846 3,665 4,590 3,688
1999 1,599 2,013 2,159 1,348 10,324 3,494 4,666 3,578
2000 1,615 2,003 2,185 1,351 10,665 3,488 5,602 3,675
Salta San Juan San Luis Sta Cruz Santa Fe S. Estero T. Fuego Tucuman
1996 3,544 2,820 2,486 2,791 19,334 1,862 1,495 4,963
1997 3,735 2,997 2,688 2,766 20,415 1,973 1,656 5,329
1998 3,910 3,140 2,741 2,829 20,681 2,069 1,633 5,468
1999 3,695 2,977 2,551 2,815 19,466 2,003 1,547 5,213
2000 3,757 2,950 2,520 3,508 19,429 1,996 1,641 5,202
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APPENDIX IV  
Brazil
IV.a. State GDP per capita, in domestic current prices (1970-2000)
Rondonia Acre Amazonas Roraima Para Amapa Maranhao Piaui Ceara
1970 1,466 941 1,128 1,260 790 1,536 433 341 514
1975 8,649 2,679 5,507 4,977 3,247 3,669 1,873 675 2,278
1980 59,012 46,402 90,344 64,099 53,999 49,318 24,967 20,670 33,091
1985 7,878,418 4,779,032 11,384,540 6,197,347 4,813,173 6,892,947 2,179,362 2,185,109 3,868,100
1990 145,437 108,277 283,556 174,598 136,212 183,790 52,376 56,036 82,149
1996 2,947 2,360 5,870 2,202 2,504 3,498 1,313 1,458 2,291
2000 4,065 3,037 6,668 3,417 3,041 4,098 1,627 1,872 2,794
RG.Norte Paraiba Pernamb. Alagoas Sergipe Bahia M. Gerais E. Santo R. Janeiro
1970 541 464 863 669 746 770 1,088 1,150 2,683
1975 2,932 2,313 3,905 2,938 3,305 3,664 5,752 4,968 11,724
1980 37,202 27,504 47,593 38,853 41,140 53,724 80,481 83,721 137,031
1985 4,748,568 3,141,336 5,159,879 5,000,398 9,178,305 6,581,346 8,633,361 9,747,312 13,754,450
1990 96,464 84,989 120,111 91,153 125,297 122,709 190,310 207,032 272,410
1996 2,291 1,979 2,887 1,923 2,641 2,625 4,704 5,304 6,460
2000 3,343 2,681 3,673 2,485 3,310 3,680 5,925 6,931 9,571
Sao Paulo Parana S. Catarina RG do Sul MG do Sul M. Grosso Goias D. Federal
1970 3,333 1,196 1,434 1,964 1,055 1,055 801 2,926
1975 14,876 7,262 7,254 9,840 5,661 4,103 3,883 13,742
1980 172,004 88,668 104,376 118,406 93,294 60,400 55,740 150,081
1985 16,735,179 9,600,202 10,608,721 12,178,430 7,912,482 5,781,287 5,383,829 12,943,622
1990 379,926 240,814 266,348 286,884 175,176 136,673 141,613 328,100
1996 7,950 5,287 6,025 6,551 4,301 3,541 3,217 9,035
2000 9,995 6,882 7,902 8,341 5,697 5,342 4,316 14,405
Source: IBGE (2000)
IV.b. Agriculture and Industry shares in Brazil, by areas, 1970 (as % of GDP)
North Northeast M.Gerais E.Santo R.Janeiro SSo Paulo
Agriculture
Industry
0.59
0.16
2.32
0.78
8.55
19.78
8.55
19.78
8.55
19.78
8.55
19.78
South D.Federal M.Grosso MG do Sul Golds
Agriculture 11.13 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85
Industry 3.70 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23
Source: IBGE, several years
IV.c. Infant Mortality Rates by Regions, 1940-1999 (per 1,000 live births)
Brazil North Northeast Southeast South C-West
1940 158.27 161.42 178.71 152.82 127.37 134.81
1950 144.73 151.70 176.34 132.62 114.31 123.56
1960 118.13 117.14 154.94 99.97 86.88 102.17
1970 116.94 111.39 151.18 100.24 87.19 103.90
1980 87.88 72.31 121.36 74.50 61.80 70.32
1999 37.50 36.10 60.40 25.80 22.80 25.80
Source: IBGE, several years
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IV.d. Life Expectancy at Birth (years), by Regions
Brazil North Northeast Southeast South C-West
1940 43 40 38 44 50 48
1950 46 44 39 49 53 51
1960 53 53 43 57 60 56
1970 53 54 44 57 60 56
1980 60 64 52 64 67 65
1999 68 68 66 69 71 69
Source: IBGE, several years
IV.e. Urban Population by Regions 1960-1995
North Northeast Southeast South Centre-west
urban total urban total urban total urban total urban total
1940 405,792 1,462 ,420 3,381,173 14,434,,080 7,231,905 18,345,,831 1,590,475 5,735,,305 270,837 1,258,,679
1950 580,867 1,844 ,655 4,744,808 17,973,,413 10,720,734 22,548,,494 2,312,985 7,840,,870 423,497 1,736,,965
1960 957,717 2,561 ,782 7,516,500 22,181,,880 17,460,897 30,630,,728 4,360,691 11,753,,075 1,007,228 2,942,,992
1970 1,626,600 3,603 ,860 11,752,977 28,111,,927 28,964,601 39 ,853,,498 7,303,427 16,496,493 2,437,379 5,073,,259
1980 3,037,150 5,880 ,268 17,566,842 34 .812,,356 42,840,081 51 ,734,,125 11,877,739 19,031,,162 5,114,597 7,544,,795
1995 7,701,799 12,342 ,627 30,640,801 46 ,995,,094 62,680,175 70,190, 565 18,950,271 24,546, 983 9,534,013 11,296,,224
Source: IBGE, own calculations
IV.fi Literacy Rates by States, over 15 years
Ronddnia Acre Amazonas Roraima Para Amapa Tocantins MaranhSo Piaui
1970
1996
65 47 
86 70
63 66 68 
79 86 79
66
85
n/a 41 
78 67
40
66
. Ceara RG Norte Paraiba Pernambuco Alagoas Sergipe Bahia M Gerais E Santo
1970 45 46 45 50 39 47 49 66 67
1996 69 72 69 74 64 75 76 87 86
R Janeiro S8o Paulo Parana S Catarina RG do Sul MG do Sul M Grosso Goids D Federal
1970 83 81 69 81 82 64 64 64 83
1996 94 93 88 93 93 88 88 87 94
Source: IBGE, several years
324
IV.g. GDP per capita by states for 2000, in constant 1986 prices (in millions)
Distrito Federal
Mato Grosso
M Grosso do Sul
RG do Sul
Santa Catarina
Parana
Sao Paulo
Rio de Janeiro
Espirito Santo
Mnas Gerais
Bahia
Alagoas
Pernambuco
Paraiba
RG do Norte
Maranhao
Amapa
Roraima
Amazonas
Rondonia
5 10 15 20 25 30 35
325
IV.h. GDP per capita in constant 1995 US$
Estados ■ ■ ■ 1939 1947 1995
Rondonia/ Acre/ A m azonas 861.00 847.87 2,716.10
Para / Amapa 562.35 510.70 2,156.72
Maranhao 355.55 222.48 1,152.87
Piaui 276.73 262.41 964.92
Ceara 274.04 278.96 1,539.44
RG do Norte 299.89 386.58 1,999.59
Paraiba 254.95 316.57 1,274.45
Pernam buco 461.37 502.63 1,890.44
A lagoas 271.90 356.04 1,610.97
Sergipe 325.26 360.11 2,441.42
Bahia 326.76 366.45 2,004.47
Minas Gerais 450.96 585.50 3,173.04
Espirito Santo 436.26 487.34 3,226.31
Rio de Janeiro 1,819.86 1,769.12 4,446.16
Sao Paulo 1,396.96 1,572.71 5,898.48
Parana 834.09 862.79 4,283.25
Santa Catarina 572.97 797.77 3,886.50
RG do Sul 907.45 992.59 4,297.12
Mato G rosso 917.15 636.02 3,000.09
G oias 442.62 328.73 2,571.94
Source: Ferreira (1998)
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APPENDIX V
Econometric Analysis
V.cl Introductory Note and Econometric Tables
This Appendix contains some statistical and econometric results as well as explanations 
o f the main results reported in Chapters 4, 5, 7 and 9, resulting from using the data in 
Appendices I, II, III and IV. The methodology for analysing convergence is ordinary least 
squares regression analysis, which was explained in Chapter 2. The sigma convergence is 
also explained in the relevant Chapters, though the ones corresponding to the additional 
years for Argentina (1996-2000) as well as for 1959/1998 are included in this Appendix 
(IILg). The reason for that, as explained in Chapter 7 and Appendix III is that the latter 
data sets do not constitute part of the main analysis. Also in this Appendix (section V.g.) 
results for Brazil using 1995 as base year as well as data in current prices are presented. 
As discussed, the results remain unaltered whether using current or constant (1995 or 
1986) prices. The coefficients, t-tests, R-squared, F statistic all remain unaltered except 
for the constant term -  which is irrelevant for the convergence analysis anyway. This 
section does not intend to be a thorough econometric explanation but merely a guideline 
to the results reported in this Appendix. For further details, see Green (1990).
For each regression equation of the form y = a  + p X  + p in  this Appendix, the results are 
displayed in seven sub-sections, where applicable.
1. Regression results
The regression results reported here will include the R-squared, the adjusted R-squared, 
the standard errors, the F statistics and the sum of squared errors. The R-squared, or 
coefficient of determination is a measure o f how well the regression fits the data. The R- 
squared compares the estimated and the actual y-values. Its value ranges between 0 and 1. 
If this is 0, then the regression equation is not helpful in predicting a y-value. Conversely, 
if  the value is 1, there is a perfect correlation on the sample. The analysis of the R- 
squared is complemented by the analysis of the adjusted R-squared. R-squared increases 
when regressors are added to the equation and therefore it is useful to use the adjusted R- 
squared, which takes into account the degrees of freedom while still showing the 
improvement of the fit. The adjusted R-squared might decline as variables are added and
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can also be negative. The F-statistic is used in order to test the hypothesis of whether the 
results -  as seen by the R-squared -  occurred by chance or otherwise indicate a strong 
relationship between the independent and dependent variables. There is a relationship 
among the variables if the F-observed statistic of the regression is greater than the F- 
critical value. The F-critical is obtained from an F-critical table. The alpha value o f 0.05 
assuming a one-tailed test and degrees of freedom v l and v2, where v l=k-l and v2=n-k. 
If the F-obtained is larger that the F-critical then the regression will be statistically 
significant.
2. Coefficient results
For the results of the coefficients of the variables, the coefficients, standard errors, t- 
statistics and probabilities have been reported for each regression. The t-critical can be 
found on a table (also at the end of this Appendix) in which a t-critical, single-tail of 
alpha 0.05 with n degrees of freedom is used. It is usually tested whether a parameter is 
significantly different from zero. The test statistic used is t. The t-statistic obtained by 
dividing the resulting coefficient by its standard error is then compared with the t-critical 
value and if the t-obtained is higher than the t-critical, then the hypothesis of the 
coefficient being statistically different than zero is rejected. When testing convergence in 
a model, a significant and negative coefficient on initial income means there is 
convergence among the regions considered; while a significant but positive coefficient 
means there is divergence among them (for definitions used in this thesis see page 330). 
The tables also report the lower and upper margins of the confidence interval for each 
coefficient at 95% confidence level.
3. Autocorrelation and heterosckedasticitv
Another important assumptions of the linear model are those of homoscedasticity, ie. Var 
(ei)= 52, a constant, for all i; and nonautocorrelation cov(ej, ej)=0 if i is different than j. 
Although the data sets used in this analysis are annual, the actual regression analysis is 
dome on a cross section since each variable contains information on each region for a 
particular year. Therefore, we cannot test for the presence of autocorrelation in the 
regression. However, heterosckedasticiy can be tested for. If the disturbances are
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heteroscedastic, the ordinary least squares standard errors will be biased. Several tests can 
be performed, such as the general White test and the Goldfeld- Quandt test. The latter is a 
very powerful test for heteroskedasticity and given the small samples I have performed 
this test on each regression reported in this thesis. A brief summary of the results is 
presented at the end of this Appendix (section V.h) but for simplicity and presentation I 
have omitted the intermediate steps.
When testing for Goldfeld-Quandt, the data is ordered by independent variable (X) and 
split into two equal-sized groups, the first one corresponding to the smallest and the 
largest values. For more powerful tests, a number of observations will be omitted from 
the sample. When a sample has 26 observations, for instance, the middle six will, 
normally be omitted; and for 48 observations, around 12 will be left out. Separate 
regressions are run for both groups and the ratio of their sums of squared residuals is 
formed. This will be an F-statistic and a critical value from the F-distribution can be used 
to test the hypothesis of homoskedasticity.
4. Dummy variables
Dummy variables indicate in which sector an observation falls in, and have either a 0 or a 
1 to indicate presence or absence of attributes. When a dummy is included in the 
regression equation, the resulting dummy variable coefficient will measure the difference 
between the presence of the attribute and its absence. Dummy variables have been used 
in this thesis for two reasons. The first one to test for differences in the convergence for 
Tierra del Fuego in the case of Argentina and the other one to test for macro and political 
stability and convergence.
5. Definition of Convergence and divergence
The following are the definitions that will be used in the following pages of this 
Appendix as well as throughout the thesis, as indicated in Chapter 3.
• Convergence: there is convergence when there is a good fit - the higher the R 
squared the stronger the convergence -  and a significant F statistic and the 
coefficients on initial income are both negative and significant
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• Divergence', there is divergence when there is a good fit (high R squared and 
significant F statistic) but the coefficient on initial income is positive and 
significant.
• Weak convergence: there is weak convergence when the F statistic is significant 
and the coefficient on initial income is negative but not significant or when the t- 
values are significant but not the F- statistic.
•  No convergence: there is no convergence when the F statistic and t values are not 
significant.
Methodology for Argentina and Brazil
The period of analysis for Brazil comprises 1970 to 2000 (data for 2001 was made 
available shortly after these regressions were perfomed and due to the fact that the results 
are not altered significantly will only be presented as a footnote later in this Appendix). 
As mentioned in the methodological section in chapter 9, data for Brazil was available 
from IBGE. In the case of Argentina, data collection was more difficult given the number 
o f different sources and the lack of availability of one long series as in the case of Brazil. 
As discussed in chapter 7, the period of analysis will then be 1961-1995 for Argentina 
while the additional data for 1996-2000 as well as the current data for 1959-1998 will 
appear as additional in the following appendix.
The analysis of sigma convergence has been performed for all provinces (Argentina) and 
all states (Brazil) as well as by regions. The results are presented in the relevant chapters 
(7 and 9 respectively). In each region I tried to identify whether any province or state in 
particular had a different behaviour from the rest. In the case of Argentina, only Tierra 
del Fuego displayed a different pattern. In the case of Brazil, no state showed a different 
pattern, only changes in magnitude (see below).
The beta convergence analysis for Argentina and Brazil (as explained in Chapters 7 and 9 
respectively) was carried out by first analysing whole periods, then dividing by decades, 
and lastly by any breaks given by sigma analysis. In the case of Brazil there is only one 
major break as seen by the sigma analysis, while for the case of Argentina there are
331
several. Also, in the case of Argentina, as found in the sigma analysis, there is one 
province (Tierra del Fuego) with a different behaviour and therefore Dummy variable 
analysis will be used to test for this. In the case of Brazil, however, only differences in 
magnitude and not in pattern were found. Therefore this dummy analysis was only 
performed for the case of Argentina. Both political and macroeconomic variables have 
been tested for both countries using dummy analysis. In the case of Argentina, two 
military periods will be considered while in the case of Brazil only one. For the 
macroeconomic variables two subperiods have been tested. The results of the beta 
convergence analyses are found in both the relevant chapters (in a summarised form) plus 
in this appendix (a longer version of the results plus the corresponding figures).
The European Union and MERCOSUR
As mentioned in the relevant chapters, the European Union (chapter 4) will be divided 
into three sub-periods and both sigma and beta analyses were performed for regions as 
well as countries. The first subperiod data is available in domestic currencies. However, 
for the second period onwards data availability is more homogeneous and available in 
ECU. The period of analysis is 1960-1995 because at the time of writing of this thesis 
that was the last year available. At the moment new data has become available but given 
that the European Union is considered mainly as a case study the results for a long period 
willl suffice for this analysis. In the case of MERCOSUR, as stated in Chapter 5, the 
results of the regression analysis can only be indicative given the few observations. Only 
when a certain trend is highly significant will conclusions be derived. Again, in both 
cases, sigma analyses are depicted in the relevant chapters, together with summarised 
information of the regressions corresponding to beta convergence. The extended tables of 
these regressions, together with figures, are found in this appendix.
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Vb. Econometric Results -  European Union
Regions (1960-1973)
1 -Regression 1960-1973 
Regression results period
R Square 0.18
Adjusted R Square 0.16
Standard Error 0.24
Observations 38.00
Degrees of freedom 36.00
Regression sum of s 0.46
Sum of sq residuals 2.07
F-statistic 8.05
Significance F 0.01
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable
Coefficient 0.85
Standard error 0.09
t-statistic 9.54
P-value 0.00
Lower 95% 0.67
Upper 95% 1.03
In (1960)
Coefficient -0.10
Standard error 0.04
t-statistic -2.84
P-value 0.01
Lower 95% -0.18
Upper 95% -0.03
x= In 1960 
y = In 1973- In 1960
-6 -4 ■2 0 2
t critical 2.03 5%
t critical 1.69 10%
F (1,36) 4.12
The regression for the regions for the period 1960-1973 
shows a significant F statistic with a negative and also 
significant coefficient on initial income. In this period 
there was convergence among the EEC6 regions
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Countries (1960-1973)
2- Regression 1960-1973
Regression results period
R Square 0.73
Adjusted R Square 0.67
Standard Error 0.12
Observations 6.00
Degrees of freedom 4.00
Regression sum of s 0.16
Sum of sq residuals 0.06
F-statistic 11.08
Significance F 0.03
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable
Coefficient 1.12
Standard error 0.06
t-statistic 19.10
P-value 0.00
Lower 95% 0.96
Upper 95% 1.28
In (1960)
Coefficient -0.45
Standard error 0.14
t-statistic -3.33
P-value 0.03
Lower 95% -0.83
Upper 95% -0.07
x= In 1960
y = In 1973- Ini 960
1o 0.5-0.5
t critical 2.77 5%
t critical 2.132 10%
F(1,4) 7.71
For the countries, the period 1960-1973 has a significant 
F statistic and a high R squared.
The coefficient on initial income is negative and significant, 
implying convergence among the EEC6 countries for the period
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Regions (1973-1988)
3- Regression 1973-1988
Regression results period
R Square 0.02
Adjusted R Square 0.00
Standard Error 0.29
Observations 40.00
Degrees of freedom 38.00
Regression sum of s 0.08
Sum of sq residuals 3.10
F-statistic 0.95
Significance F 0.34
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable
Coefficient 1.28
Standard error 0.06
t-statistic 20.78
P-value 0.00
Lower 95% 1.15
Upper 95% 1.40
In (1973)
Coefficient -0.04
Standard error 0.04
t-statistic -0.97
P-value 0.34
Lower 95% -0.13
Upper 95% 0.04
x= In 1973
y= In 1 9 8 8 -In 1973
t critical 2.03 5%
t critical 1.69 10%
F(1,38) 4.12
In this period, the F statistic is not significant, there is a 
low R squared and the coefficient is negative though not 
significant and therefore there is no convergence among 
the regions
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Countries (1973-1988)
4- Regression 1973-1988
Regression results period
R Square 0.82
Adjusted R Square 0.79
Standard Error 0.05
Observations 8.00
Degrees of freedom 6.00
Regression sum of s 0.08
Sum of sq residuals 0.02
F-statistic 27.79
Significance F 0.00
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable
Coefficient 1 .67
Standard error 0.06
t-statistic 25.79
P-value 0.00
Lower 95% 1.51
Upper 95% 1 .83
In (1973)
Coefficient -0.28
Standard error 0.05
t-statistic -5.27
P-value 0.00
Lower 95% -0.41
Upper 95% -0 .1 5
x= In 1973 
y= In 1988- In
.7
.6
.5
.4
.3
.2
.1
1
21.510 0.5
t critical 2.447 5%
t critical 1.943 10%
F(1,6) 5.99
The F statistic is highly significant, and the R is algo 
The coefficient on initial income is negative and highly 
therefore the countries were converging during this
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Regions (1988-1995)
5- Regression 1988-1995 
Regression results period
R Square 0.08
Adjusted R Square 0.06
Standard Error 0.46
Observations 59.00
Degrees of freedom 57.00
Regression sum of s 1.01
Sum of sq residuals 12.04
F-statistic 4.77
Significance F 0.03
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable 
Coefficient 
Standard error 
t-statistic 
P-value 
Lower 95%
Upper 95%
In (1988)
Coefficient 
Standard error 
t-statistic 
P-value 
Lower 95%
Upper 95%
0.52
0.06
8.49
0.00
0.40
0.64
-0.15
0.07
-2.18
0.03
-0.28
- 0.01
x= In 1988
y= In 1995- In 1988
1.5-0.5 0.5
t critical 
t critical 
F(1,57)
2.009
1.676
4.05
5%
10%
The F statistic is marginally significant and the coefficient 
on initial income is negative and significant at both 
5 and 10% so there is convergence in this period 
Since the R squared is quite low the convergence is not strong
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Countries (1988-1995)
6- Regression 1988-1995
Regression results period
R Square 0.49
Adjusted R Square 0.44
Standard Error 0.15
Observations 12.00
Degrees of freedom 10.00
Regression sum of s 0.21
Sum of sq residuals 0.22
F-statistic 9.53
Significance F 0.01
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable
Coefficient 1.15
Standard error 0.19
t-statistic 5.95
P-value 0.00
Lower 95% 0.72
Upper 95% 1.58
In (1988)
Coefficient -0.24
Standard error 0.08
t-statistic -3.09
P-value 0.01
Lower 95% -0.41
Upper 95% -0.07
x= In 1988
y= In 1995- In 1988
1.2
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
t critical 2.228 5%
t critical 1.813 10%
F(1,10) 4.96
The F statistic is highly significant and the R squared 
shows a good fit. The coefficient is also significant and negative and therefore 
there is convergence among the countries. This convergence is thus stronger 
than for the regions.
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V.c. Econometric Results -  MERCOSUR
1- Regression 1940-1995 
x = In 1940; y= In 1995 -In 1940 
Regression results period
R Square 0.63
Adjusted R Square 0.44
Standard Error 0.15
Observations 4.00
Degrees of freedom 2.00
Regression sum of s 0.08
Sum of sq residuals 0.04
F-statistic 3.40
Significance F 0.21
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable
Coefficient -1.43
Standard error 1.00
t-statistic -1.43
P-value 0.29
Lower 95% -5.74
Upper 95% 2.88
In (1940)
Coefficient -0.54
Standard error 0.29
t-statistic -1.84
P-value 0.21
Lower 95% -1.79
Upper 95% 0.72
t critical 
t critical
F (k-1; n-k)= F(1;2)
2- Regression 1940-2000 
x = In 1940; y= In 2000- In 1970 
Regression results period
R Square 0.61
Adjusted R Square 0.42
Standard Error 0.16
Observations 4.00
Degrees of freedom 2.00
Regression sum of s 0.08
Sum of sq residuals 0.05
F-statistic 3.13
Significance F 0.22
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable
Coefficient -1.43
Standard error 1.07
t-statistic -1.34
P-value 0.31
Lower 95% -6.03
Upper 95% 3.17
In (1970)
Coefficient -0.55
Standard error 0.31
t-statistic -1.77
P-value 0.22
Lower 95% -1.89
Upper 95% 0.79
4.3 5%
2.92 10%
18.5
Regression 1 shows a high coefficient of correlation and a not significant F statistic 
The coefficient on initial income is negative and also not significant.
Therefore, there is only weak convergence for the whole period
Regression 2, which is extended to include more update data until 2000, shows similar results
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3- Regression 1940-1950
x = in 1940; y ■ In 1950- In 1940
Regression results period
R Square 0.01
Adjusted R Square -0.49
Standard Error 0.07
Observations 4.00
Degrees of freedom 2.00
Regression sum of s 0.00
Sum of sq residuals 0.01
F-statistic 0.02
Significance F 0.91
4- Regression 1950-1960
x = In 1950; y= In 1960- In 1950
Regression results period
R Square 0.32
Adjusted R Square -0.01
Standard Error 0.08
Observations 4.00
Degrees of freedom 2.00
Regression sum of s 0.01
Sum of sq residuals 0.01
F-statistic 0.96
Significance F 0.43
Coefficient Results Coefficient Results
Constant Variable Constant Variable
Coefficient 0.03 Coefficient -0.41
Standard error 0.48 Standard error 0.49
t-statistic 0.06 t-statistic -0.84
P-value 0.96 P-value 0.49
Lower 95% -2.03 Lower 95% -2.52
Upper 95% 2.08 Upper 95% 1.70
In (1940) In (1950)
Coefficient -0.02 Coefficient -0.14
Standard error 0.14 Standard error 0.15
t-statistic -0.12 t-statistic -0.98
P-value 0.91 P-value 0.43
Lower 95% -0.61 Lower 95% -0.77
Upper 95% 0.58 Upper 95% 0.49
t critical 4.3 5%
t critical 2.92 10%
f (1.2) 18.5
Regression 3 shows the results when analysing by decades for the first subperiod. 
The R squared is extremely low and so is the F statistic.
The coefficient is negative but not significant and therefore the subperiod 
1940-1950 is one of no convergence.
When looking at the subperiod 1950-1960, the R squared is higher but 
the F statistic is still not significant. The coefficient on initial income 
is again negative but not statistically significant.
Both subperiods correspond to non convergence among the 
countries now members of MERCOSUR
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5- Regression 1960-1970
x = In 1960; y= In 1970 - In 1960
Regression results period
R Square 0.06
Adjusted R Square -0.41
Standard Error 0.06
Observations 4.00
Degrees of freedom 2.00
Regression sum of s 0.00
Sum of sq residuals 0.01
F-statistic 0.13
Significance F 0.75
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable
Coefficient -0.07
Standard error 0.46
t-statistic -0.14
P-value 0.90
Lower 95% -2.03
Upper 95% 1.90
In (1960)
Coefficient -0.05
Standard error 0.14
t-statistic -0.36
P-value 0.75
Lower 95% -0.65
Upper 95% 0.55
6- Regression 1970-1980 
x = In 1970; y= In 1980- In 1970 
Regression results period
R Square 0.93
Adjusted R Square 0.90
Standard Error 0.03
Observations 4.00
Degrees of freedom 2.00
Regression sum of s 0.03
Sum of sq residuals 0.00
F-statistic 28.26
Significance F 0.03
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable
Coefficient -1.04
Standard error 0.23
t-statistic -4.59
P-value 0.04
Lower 95% -2.02
Upper 95% -0.07
In (1970)
Coefficient -0.38
Standard error 0.07
t-statistic -5.32
P-value 0.03
Lower 95% -0.68
Upper 95% -0.07
t critical 4.3 5%
t critical 2.92 10%
f (1,2) 18.5
For the period 1960-1970, the R squared is again very low, with 
not significant F statistic and negative though not significant coefficient 
However, the period 1970-1980 shows a very high coefficient of correlation 
indicating a very good fit for the period. The F statistic is highly significant. 
The coefficient is negative and also significant at both 5 and 10%
The subperiod 1960-1970 is one of no convergence while the subperiod 
1970-1980 was one of strong convergence
341
7- Regression 1980-1990
x = In 1980 ; y= In 1990 - In 1980
Regression results period
R Square 0.21
Adjusted R Square -0.19
Standard Error 0.04
Observations 4.00
Degrees of freedom 2.00
Regression sum of s 0.00
Sum of sq residuals 0.00
F-statistic 0.53
Significance F 0.54
8- Regression 1990-2000 
x = In 1990; y= In 2000 - In 1990 
Regression results period
R Square 0.96
Adjusted R Square 0.93
Standard Error 0.01
Observations 4.00
Degrees of freedom 2.00
Regression sum of s 0.00
Sum of sq residuals 0.00
F-statistic 43.32
Significance F 0.02
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable 
Coefficient 
Standard error 
t-statistic 
P-value 
Lower 95%
Upper 95%
In (1980)
Coefficient 
Standard error 
t-statistic 
P-value 
Lower 95%
Upper 95%
-0.40
0.49
-0.82
0.50
-2.50
1.70
- 0.12
0.16
-0.73
0.54
-0.81
0.58
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable 
Coefficient 
Standard error 
t-statistic 
P-value 
Lower 95%
Upper 95%
In (1990)
Coefficient 
Standard error 
t-statistic 
P-value 
Lower 95%
Upper 95%
0.93
0.13
7.25
0.02
0.38
1.49
0.28
0.04
6.58
0.02
0.10
0.46
t critical 
t critical
f 0.2)
4.3
2.92
18.5
5%
10%
The decade of 1980-1990 shows a much lower coefficient of determination and a non significant F statistic 
The coefficient is negative though not significant and therefore there is no convergence in this decade 
the decade 1990-2000 shows a high correlation, indicating an almost perfect fit 
the f statistic is also highly significant and the coefficient is positive and significant 
this decade was of strong divergence among the MERCOSUR member countries
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9- Regression 1990-1995
x = In 1990; y= In 1995 - In 1990
Regression results period
R Square 0.84
Adjusted R Square 0.76
Standard Error 0.02
Observations 4.00
Degrees of freedom 2.00
Regression sum of s 0.00
Sum of sq residuals 0.00
F-statistic 10.54
Significance F 0.08
10- Regression 1995-2000
x = In 1995; y= In 2000 - In 1995
Regression results period
R Square 0.05
Adjusted R Square -0.43
Standard Error 0.01
Observations 4.00
Degrees of freedom 2.00
Regression sum of s 0.00
Sum of sq residuals 0.00
F-statistic 0.10
Significance F 0.78
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable
Coefficient 0.82
Standard error 0.24
t-statistic 3.42
P-value 0.08
Lower 95% -0.21
Upper 95% 1.85
In (1990)
Coefficient 0.25
Standard error 0.08
t-statistic 3.25
P-value 0.08
Lower 95% -0.08
Upper 95% 0.59
t critical 
t critical 
f (1.2)
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable
Coefficient 0.08
Standard error 0.13
t-statistic 0.67
P-value 0.57
Lower 95% -0.46
Upper 95% 0.63
In (1995)
Coefficient 0.01
Standard error 0.04
t-statistic 0.31
P-value 0.78
Lower 95% -0.17
Upper 95% 0.19
4.3 5%
2.92 10%
18.5
The subperiod 1990-1995 shows a strong correlation and a significant F statistic 
The coefficient is positive and significant at 10% level, therefore suggesting divergence for the period 
on the other hand, the subperiod 1995-2000 shows a very low R squared, a not significant F statistic 
and a positive though not statistically significant coefficient, and therefore no convergence for the period 
Most of the divergent trend seems to be concentrated in the subperiod 1990-1995
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11- Regression 1970-1995 12- Regression 1940-1970
x= In 1970; y= In 1995 - In 1970 x = In 1940; y= In 1970 - In 1940
Regression results period Regression results period
R Square 0.77 R Square 0.27
Adjusted R Square 0.65 Adjusted R Square -0.10
Standard Error 0.05 Standard Error 0.16
Observations 4.00 Observations 4.00
Degrees of freedom 2.00 Degrees of freedom . 2.00
Regression sum of s 0.02 Regression sum of s 0.02
Sum of sq residuals 0.01 Sum of sq residuals 0.05
F-statistic 6.63 F-statistic 0.72
Significance F 0.12 Significance F 0.48
Coefficient Results Coefficient Results
Constant Variable Constant Variable
Coefficient -0.78 Coefficient -0.65
Standard error 0.37 Standard error 1.06
t-statistic -2.13 t-statistic -0.61
P-value 0.17 P-value 0.60
Lower 95% -2.35 Lower 95% -5.23
Upper 95% 0.79 Upper 95% 3.93
In (1970) In (1940)
Coefficient -0.30 Coefficient -0.26
Standard error 0.11 Standard error 0.31
t-statistic -2.57 t-statistic -0.85
P-value 0.12 P-value 0.48
Lower 95% -0.79 Lower 95% -1.59
Upper 95% 0.20 Upper 95% 1.07
t critical 4.3
t critical 2.92
f (1,2) 18.5
Following the breaks given by the sigma analysis in chaper 5, the subperiod 1940-1970 has a not 
significant F statistic and a negative but not significant coefficient on initial income, so there is n o . 
convergence. The subperiod 1970-1995, by contrast, shows a significant f statistic with a much higher R 
squared and a negative though not significant coefficient (weak convergence)
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13- Regression 1970- 2000
x = In 1970; y= In 2000 - In 1970
Regression results period 
R Square 0.67
Adjusted R Square 0.51
Standard Error v 0.06
Observations 4.00
Degrees of freedom 2.00
Regression sum of s 0.02
Sum of sq residuals 0.01
F-statistic 4.14
Significance F 0.18
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable
Coefficient -0.74
Standard error 0.46
t-statistic -1.59
P-value 0.25
Lower 95% -2.73
Upper 95% 1.26
In (1970)
Coefficient -0.30
Standard error 0.15
t-statistic -2.03
P-value 0.18
Lower 95% -0.92
Upper 95% 0.33
t critical 4.3
t critical 2.92
f (1,2) 18.5
5%
10%
When extending the period until 2000, the R squared decreases and so does the 
F statistic. The coefficient is negative and not significant. There is no convergence for 
this period
Vd. Econometric Results -  Argentina
1- Regression 1961-1995 x= In 1961; y = In 1995 - In 1961
Regression results period
R Square 0.13
Adjusted R Square 0.09
Standard Error 0.13
Observations 24.00
Degrees of freedom 22.00
Regression sum of s 0.47
Sum of sq residuals 3.13
F-statistic 3.28
Significance F 0.08
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable
Coefficient 0.06
Standard error 0.24
t-statistic 0.23
P-value 0.82
Lower 95% -0.45
Upper 95% 0.56
In 1961
Coefficient -0.26
Standard error 0.14
t-statistic -1.81
P-value 0.08
Lower 95% -0.56
Upper 95% 0.04
u>o>
aw
0)o>
c
-2.5 -0.5
OrS-
ln 1961
t-critical 2.07 5%
1.72 10%
F (1, 22) 4.3
The F statistic for the whole period is lower that the F critical and therefore not 
significant. The coefficient on initial income (In 1961) is negative and, although 
not significant at the 5% confidence level it is significant at 10%. Therefore, the 
period displays only weak convergence
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2- Regression 1961-1973 x= In 1961; y=
Regression results period
R Square 0.19
Adjusted R Square 0.15
Standard Error 0.20
Observations 24.00
Degrees of freedom 22.00
Regression sum of s 0.21
Sum of sq residuals 0.90
F-statistic 5.09
Significance F 0.03
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable
Coefficient 0.03
Standard error 0.13
t-statistic 0.20
P-value 0.84
Lower 95% -0.25
Upper 95% 0.30
In 1961
Coefficient -0.17
Standard error 0.08
t-statistic -2.26
P-value 0.03
Lower 95% -0.33
Upper 95% -0.01
1973 - In 1961
<0cn
CO
o>
-1.5 -0.5-2.5
In 1961
t-critical 2.07 5%
t-critical 1.717 -5%
F (1, 22) 4.3
The first subperiod, corresponding to the sigma breaks as 
seen in chapter 7, shows a higher R squared than regression 1 and a significant 
F statistic. The coefficient is negative and significant at both levels 
and therefore in this period there was convergence among 
the Argentine provinces
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3- Regression 1973-83 x= In 1973: y = In 1983- In 1973
Regression results period
R Square 0.09
Adjusted R Square 0.05
Standard Error 0.22
Observations 24.00
Degrees of freedom 22.00
Regression sum of s 0.10
Sum of sq residuals 1.05
F-statistic 2.10
Significance F 0.16
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable
Coefficient 0.29
Standard error 0.13
t-statistic 2.27
P-value 0.03
Lower 95% 0.03
Upper 95% 0.56
In 1973
Coefficient 0.13
Standard error 0.09
t-statistic 1.45
P-value 0.16
Lower 95% -0.06
Upper 95% 0.33
-M-
-&4-
-QnJ-
♦♦
In 1B73
t-critical 2.07 5%
t-critical 1.717 -5%
F (1, 22) 4.3
The R squared in this subperiod is low (and lower than regression 1), and the F statistic is not 
significant. The coefficient on In 1973 is positive and not significant. This indicates there was 
weak divergence among the provinces.
348
4- Regression 1983-1989 
Regression results period
R Square
Adjusted R Square 
Standard Error 
Observations 
Degrees of freedom 
Regression sum of s 
Sum of sq residuals 
F-statistic 
Significance F
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable 
Coefficient 
Standard error 
t-statistic 
P-value 
Lower 95%
Upper 95%
In 1983 
Coefficient 
Standard error 
t-statistic 
P-value 
Lower 95%
Upper 95%
x= In 1983; y= In 1989-1983
0.00
-0.04
0.27
24.00
22.00 
0.00 
1.62 
0.02 
0.89
--------------------------------------------
^  n a
O fi
♦  n a
n 9
0 + Aft A.o
W
* ^  0m o ()
n a
----------------------------------------- as-
In 1983
-0.06
0.13
-0.49
0.63
-0.32
0.20
t-critical 2.07 5%
-0.01 t-critical 1.717 -5%
0.09 F (1,22) 4.3
-0.13 
0.89 
- 0.21 
0.18
R squared is 0, indicating no correlation between the 
variables. The F statistic is also not significant. The coefficient 
of In 1983 is negative though not significant at either 5 or 10% 
significance level. The sub-period 1983-1989 displays no convergence
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5- Regression 1995-1989 x= In 1989; y=
Regression results period
R Square 0.33
Adjusted R Square 0.29
Standard Error 0.20
Observations 24.00
Degrees of freedom 22.00
Regression sum of s 0.43
Sum of sq residuals 0.90
F-statistic 10.61
Significance F 0.00
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable
Coefficient -0.16
Standard error 0.09
t-statistic -1.81
P-value 0.08
Lower 95% -0.35
Upper 95% 0.02
In 1989
Coefficient -0.21
Standard error 0.07
t-statistic -3.26
P-value 0.00
Lower 95% -0.35
Upper 95% -0.08
In 1995-1989
00
o>
In 1989
t-critical 2.07 5%
t-critical 1.717 -5%
F (1, 22) 4.3
For the period 1989-1995, the R squared is much higher than 
in any of the previous subperiods. The F statistic is highly 
significant and the coefficient on initial income is negative and 
significant at both levels.
The subperiod 1989-1995 is therefore one of strong convergence
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6- Regression 1970-80 x= In 1970; y= In 1980-1970
Regression results period
R Square 0.00
Adjusted R Square -0.04
Standard Error 0.15
Observations 24.00
Degrees of freedom 22.00
Regression sum of s 0.00
Sum of sq residuals 0.51
F-statistic 0.10
Significance F 0.76
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable
Coefficient 0.22
Standard error 0.09
t-statistic 2.44
P-value 0.02
Lower 95% 0.03
Upper 95% 0.41
In 1970
Coefficient -0.02
Standard error 0.06
t-statistic -0.31
P-value 0.76
Lower 95% -0.15
Upper 95% 0.11
o
o>T—Io00<j>
c ♦ ♦
In 1970
t-critical 2.07 5%
t-critical 1.71 -5%
F (1, 22) 4.3
The R squared, following a decade by decade analysis 
as mentioned in Chapter 7, is 0 for the decade 1970-1980 
The F statistic is not significant, while the coefficient is 
negative and not significant and therefore there is no convergence
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7- Regression 1990-1980 
Regression results period
R Square
Adjusted R Square 
Standard Error 
Observations 
Degrees of freedom 
Regression sum of s 
Sum of sq residuals 
F-statistic 
Significance F
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable 
Coefficient 
Standard error 
t-statistic 
P-value 
Lower 95%
Upper 95%
In 1980 
Coefficient 
Standard error 
t-statistic 
P-value 
Lower 95%
Upper 95%
x= In 1980; y= In 1990-1980
0.04
0.00
0.27
24.00
22.00 
0.07 
1.63 
0.95 
0.34
In 1980
-0.24
0.13 t-critical 2.07 5%
-1.78 t-critical 1.717 -5%
0.09 F (1 ,2 2 ) 4.3
-0.52 
0.04
- 0.10
0.11
-0.97
0.34
-0.32
0.12
The R square is low and so is the F statistic, which is 
not significant. The coefficient on initial income is negative 
and not significant and therefore, this decade is of no 
convergence
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8- Regression 1995-1990
Regression results period
R Square 0.03
Adjusted R Square -0.02
Standard Error 0.18
Observations 24.00
Degrees of freedom 22.00
Regression sum of s 0.02
Sum of sq residuals 0.68
F-statistic 0.62
Significance F 0.44
In 1990; y= In 1995-1990
In 1089
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable
Coefficient 0.07
Standard error 0.09 t-critical 2.07 5%
t-statistic 0.79 t-critical 1.717 -5%
P-value 0.44 F (1 ,22 ) 4.3
Lower 95% -0.12
Upper 95% 0.26
In 1989
Coefficient -0.05
Standard error 0.07
t-statistic -0.78
P-value 0.44
Lower 95% -0.19
Upper 95% 0.09
The F statistic is not significant, and the coefficient of 
correlation is very low. The coeffiient on initial income is negative 
though not significant. The subperiod is of no convergence. 
When comparing to regression 5 it can be seen that the 
inclusion (or exclusion) of one year can make a significant 
difference for convergence.
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9- Regression 1995-1970 
Regression results period
R Square 
Adjusted R Square 
Standard Error 
Observations 
Degrees of freedom 
Regression sum of s 
Sum of sq residuals 
F-statistic 
Significance F
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable 
Coefficient 
Standard error 
t-statistic 
P-value 
Lower 95%
Upper 95%
In 1970 
Coefficient 
Standard error 
t-statistic 
P-value 
Lower 95%
Upper 95%
x= In 1970; y= In 1995-1970
0.06
0.02
0.33
24.00
22.00 
0.16
2.46
1.47 
0.24
0.04
0.20
0.20
0.84
-0.37
0.45
-0.16
0.13
- 1.21
0.24
-0.44
0.11
inatat
-OS-
In 1970
t-critical 
t-critical 
F (1, 22)
2.07
1.717
4.3
5%
-5%
A  regression for the subperiod 1970-1995 shows that the R squared is low 
the F statistic is not significant and the coefficient, though negative, is not 
significant. This subperiod is then of no convergence.
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10- Regression 1995-1961 and education (1947)
x1= In 1961; x2= education 1947; y In 1995 - In 1961
Regression results period
R Square 0.13
Adjusted R Square 0.05
Standard Error 0.38
Observations 24.00
Degrees of freedom 21.00
Regression sum of s 0.48
Sum of sq residuals 3.11
F-statistic 1.64
Significance F 0.22
11- Regression 1995-1961 with education (1960)
x1= In 1961; x2= education 1960; y In 1995 - In 1961
Regression results period
R Square 0.19
Adjusted R Square 0.11
Standard Error 0.37
Observations 24.00
Degrees of freedom 21.00
Regression sum of s 0.69
Sum of sq residuals 2.91
F-statistic 2.48
Significance F 0.11
Coefficient Results Coefficient Results
Constant Variable Constant Variable
Coefficient -0.27 Coefficient -3.72
Standard error 0.95 Standard error 3.00
t-statistic -0.29 t-statistic -1.24
P-value 0.78 P-value 0.23
Lower 95% -2.25 Lower 95% -9.96
Upper 95% 1.70 Upper 95% 2.53
In 1961 In 1961
Coefficient -0.28 Coefficient -0.39
Standard error 0.16 Standard error 0.18
t-statistic -1.76 t-statistic -2.22
P-value 0.09 P-value 0.04
Lower 95% -0.62 Lower 95% -0.76
Upper 95% 0.05 Upper 95% -0.03
Education (1947) Education (1960)
Coefficient 0.00 Coefficient 0.04
Standard error 0.01 Standard error 0.03
t-statistic 0.36 t-statistic 1.26
P-value 0.72 P-value 0.22
Lower 95% -0.02 Lower 95% -0.03
Upper 95% 0.02 Upper 95% 0.10
t-critical 1.721 10%
t-critical 2.08 5
F(2,21) 3.47
The regression with education rates from 1947 reveals that 
the adjusted R squared is lower that that in regression 1.
The fit of the regression has therefore not improved by the 
additional variable. The F statistic is not significant 
While the coefficient on In 1961 is negative and significant 
only at the 10% level; that for education is not significant, though 
it is positive
R squared - and adjusted R squared- are 
higher than for the unconditional case 
(regression 1). The F statistic is lower and still not 
significant. The coefficient on initial income 
is negative and significant at both 5 and 10% (in regr 1 
the coefficient is only significant at 10%). The fit of the 
regression has then improved. When looking at the 
coefficient on education, this is of the expected (+) sign 
though not significant. The positive correlation between 
education and growth indicates that those provinces 
with higher education levels grow - on average - 
more than those with lower education.
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12- Regression with agriculture and industry
x1= agriculture 1970, x2= industry; y= In 1995- In 1961
Regression results period
R Square 0.25
Adjusted R Square 0.14
Standard Error 0.37
Observations 24.00
Degrees of freedom 20.00
Regression sum of s 0.91
Sum of sq residuals 2.68
F-statistic 2.25
Significance F 0.11
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable
Coefficient 0.34
Standard error 0.28
t-statistic 1.18
P-value 0.25
Lower 95% -0.26
Upper 95% 0.93
In 1961
Coefficient -0.34
Standard error 0.15
t-statistic -2.20
P-value 0.04
Lower 95% -0.66
Upper 95% -0.02
Agriculture
Coefficient -0.01
Standard error 0.01
t-statistic -1.26
P-value 0.22
Lower 95% -0.03
Upper 95% 0.01
Industry
Coefficient -0.01
Standard error 0.01
t-statistic -1.57
P-value 0.13
Lower 95% -0.03
Upper 95% 0.00
t-critical 1.725 10%
t-critical 2.09 5%
F(3,20) 3.10
The R squared in this regression appears to have increased 
considerably, though when accounting for the degrees of freedom 
it can be seen that the increase is not that much and when 
compared to the R squared of regression 1 it can be seen 
that the fit of the regression has not improved significantly 
The F statistic is still not significant.
The coefficient on initial income is negative and significant 
while the coefficents for agriculture and industry are negative 
but not significant
13- Regression 1995-1961 (educ, ind and agr)
x1= agr, x2= ind, x3= educ; y= In 1995- In 1961
Regression results period
R Square 0.32
Adjusted R Square 0.18
Standard Error 0.36
Observations 24.00
Degrees of freedom 19.00
Regression sum of s 1.15
Sum of sq residuals 2.44
F-statistic 2.24
Significance F 0.10
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable
Coefficient -3.66
Standard error 2.92
t-statistic -1.25
P-value 0.23
Lower 95% -9.76
Upper 95% 2.45
In 1961
Coefficient -0.47
Standard error 0.18
t-statistic -2.63
P-value 0.02
Lower 95% -0.85
Upper 95% -0.10
Agriculture
Coefficient -0.01
Standard error 0.01
t-statistic -1.17
P-value 0.25
Lower 95% -0.03
Upper 95% 0.01
Industry
Coefficient -0.01
Standard error 0.01
t-statistic -1.73
P-value 0.10
Lower 95% -0.03
Upper 95% 0.00
Education
Coefficient 0.04
Standard error 0.03
t-statistic 1.38
P-value 0,19
Lower 95% -0.02
Upper 95% 0.10
t-critical 2.09 10%
t-critical 1.73 5%
F(4,19) 2.90
In this regression, the R squared is higher 
and when looking at the adjusted R square 
the regression has a better fit that regression 1 
and regressions 10,11 and 12. The F statistic, 
however, is still not significant. The coeff on 
In 1961 is negative and significant at both 
levels of confidence. Agriculture and industry 
both display negative coefficients and while it 
is not significant for agriculture it is for industry 
though marginally. The coefficient on education 
is positive and not significant.
356
14. Dummy variables, whole period
Dummy; Tierra del Fuego =1; 0 otherwise 
Regression results period
R Square 0.17
Adjusted R Square 0.09
Standard Error 0.38
Observations 24.00
Degrees of freedom 21.00
Regression sum of s 0.59
Sum of sq residuals 3.00
F-statistic 2.08
Significance F 0.15
15. Dummy variables 1961-1973 Tierra del Fuego
Regression results period
R Square 0.34
Adjusted R Square 0.28
Standard Error 0.19
Observations 24.00
Degrees of freedom 21.00
Regression sum of s 0.37
Sum of sq residuals 0.73
F-statistic 5.36
Significance F 0.01
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable 
Coefficient 
Standard error 
t-statistic 
P-value 
Lower 95%
Upper 95%
Dummy T.Fuego 
Coefficient 
Standard error 
t-statistic 
P-value 
Lower 95%
Upper 95%
In 1961 
Coefficient 
Standard error 
t-statistic 
P-value 
Lower 95%
Upper 95%
0.22
0.30
0.73
0.47
-0.40
0.83
-0.43
0.46
-0.95
0.35
-1.38
0.52
-0.17
0.17
- 1.02
0.32
-0.53
0.18
t-critical 5% 
t-critical 10% 
F(2,21)
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable 
Coefficient 
Standard error 
t-statistic 
P-value 
Lower 95%
Upper 95%
Dummy T.Fuego 
Coefficient 
Standard error 
t-statistic 
P-value 
Lower 95%
Upper 95%
In 1961 
Coefficient 
Standard error 
t-statistic 
P-value 
Lower 95%
Upper 95%
0.44
0.12
3.67
0.00
0.19
0.69
0.08
0.08
0.94
0.36
- 0.10
0.25
-0.67
0.20
-3.27
0.00
-1.09
-0.24
2.08
1.72
3.47
The analysis of the dummy variables for the whole period 
shows a not significant F statistic and although the coefficient is 
negative it is still not significant. The coefficient on the dummy 
(Tierra del Fuego) is negative and not significant.
For the whole period there is no convergence when considering 
the dummy variable for Tierra del Fuego
The subperiod 1961-1973 has a higher R squared than 
regression 14 (and 2) indicatong a better fit. This can 
also be seen by the highly significant F statistic 
Regarding the coefficients, for the In 1961, the 
coefficient is negative and significant and that for the 
dummy variable is positive though not significant 
This regresssion therefore indicates a much better fit 
and stronger convergence and, although the dummy 
variable is not significant, it shows a positive correlation 
between Tierra del Fuego and convergence in the perioc
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16. Dummy variables 1983-1973 Tierra del Fuego 
Regression results period
R Square 0.50
Adjusted R Square 0.46
Standard Error 0.16
Observations 24.00
Degrees of freedom 21.00
Regression sum of s 0.58
Sum of sq residuals 0.57
F-statistic 10.66
Significance F 0.00
17. Dummy variables 1983-1990 Tierra del Fuego 
Regression results period
R Square
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable 
Coefficient 
Standard error 
t-statistic 
P-value 
Lower 95%
Upper 95%
Dummy T.Fuego 
Coefficient 
Standard error 
t-statistic 
P-value 
Lower 95%
Upper 95%
In 1973 
Coefficient 
Standard error 
t-statistic 
P-value 
Lower 95%
Upper 95%
0.28
0.09
3.07
0.01
0.09
0.47
0.45
0.20
2.29
0.03
0.04
0.86
0.15
0.07
2.25
0.04
0.01
0.29
Adjusted R Square 
Standard Error 
Observations 
Degrees of freedom 
Regression sum of s 
Sum of sq residuals 
F-statistic 
Significance F
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable 
Coefficient 
Standard error 
t-statistic 
P-value 
Lower 95%
Upper 95%
Dummy T.Fuego 
Coefficient 
Standard error 
t-statistic 
P-value 
Lower 95%
Upper 95%
In 1983 
Coefficient 
Standard error 
t-statistic 
P-value 
Lower 95%
Upper 95%
0.15
0.07
0.26
24.00
21.00 
0.24 
1.38 
1.82 
0.19
0.16
0.14
1.13
0.27
-0.13
0.45
-0.04
0.32
-0.13
0.90
-0.70
0.62
0.16
0.10
1.65
0.11
-0.04
0.37
t-critical 5% 
t-critical 10% 
F(2,21)
2.08
1.72
3.47
For this subperiod, the R squared (and the adjusted) are much 
higher than in previous regressions. The F statistic is also higher 
and significant, indicating a much better fit. The coefficient on 
initial income is positive and significant, pointing out at a 
divergence in the subperiod. The coefficient on the dummy variable 
for Tierra del Fuego is positive and also significant. It can be 
concluded that this subperiod is one of divergence among the 
Argentine provinces and that this effect can be associated to the 
behaviour of the province of Tierra del Fuego (as seen in the sigma 
analysis in Chapter 7, figures 7.10,7.13 and 7.18)
This subperiod has a similar R and adjusted R squared 
than regression 14. The F statistic is not significant. 
The coefficient for initial income is positive and not 
significant while that for the dummy variable is negative 
and not significant. This subperiod seems to indicate 
that there is no convergence. However, the negative 
sign for the dummy variable indicates a reversal in the 
relationship
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18. Dummy variables 1995-1990 Tierra del Fuego
Regression results period
R Square 0.74
Adjusted R Square 0.71
Standard Error 0.13
Observations 24.00
Degrees of freedom 21.00
Regression sum of s 0.98
Sum of sq residuals 0.35 t-critical 5% 2.08
F-statistic 29.48 t-critical 10% 1.72
Significance F 0.00 F(2,21) 3.47
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable
Coefficient 0.14
Standard error 0.07
t-statistic 2.19
P-value 0.04
Lower 95% 0.01
Upper 95% 0.28
Dummy T.Fuego
Coefficient -1.01
Standard error 0.14
t-statistic -7.38
P-value 0.00
Lower 95% -1.30
Upper 95% -0.73
In 1990
Coefficient 0.00
Standard error 0.05
t-statistic 0.05
P-value 0.96
Lower 95% -0.10
Upper 95% 0.11
The R squared is significantly higher, even higher than that of 
regression 16. The F statistic is also highly significant, indicating this 
is the best fit so far.
The coefficient on initial income (In 1990) is negligible and not significant 
while the dummy variable is negative and highly significant, capturing all 
the effect of the convergence in this subperiod.
It is interesting to compare these results to those of regression 8, for the 
same period but without allowing for the dummy variable. When including 
the province of Tierra del Fuego, it can be seen that there was strong convergence 
in the period where it seemed from Regression 8 there was no convergence
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19. Macroeconomic Variables 
Regression (19a) - low inflation 1961/1974 
x= In 1961; y = In 1974- In 1961 
Regression results period
R Square 0.16
Adjusted R Square 0.12
Standard Error 0.20
Observations 24.00
Degrees of freedom 22.00
Regression sum of s 0.17
Sum of sq residuals 0.88
F-statistic 4.13
Significance F 0.05
:*
In (1M1)
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable
Coefficient 0.13
Standard error 0.13
t-statistic 1.00
P-value 0.33
Lower 95% -0.14
Upper 95% 0.40
In 1961 t-critical 2.07 5%
Coefficient -0.16 t-critical 1.72 10%
Standard error 0.08 F (1 ,22 ) 4.30
t-statistic -2.03
P-value 0.05
Lower 95% -0.31
Upper 95% 0.00
In this subperiod the F statistic is only marginally significant 
The coefficient on In 1961 is negative and also marginally 
significant at the 5% level (though significant at 10%) 
therefore the subperiod 1961-1974 is one of weak convergence
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19. Macroeconomic Variables 
Regression (19b) - high inflation 1975-1990 
x= In 1975; y = In 1990- In 1975 
Regression results period
R Square 0.01
Adjusted R Square -0.03
Standard Error 0.28
Observations 24.00
Degrees of freedom 22.00
Regression sum of s 0.02
Sum of sq residuals 1.76
F-statistic 0.29
Significance F 0.59 In (1975)
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable
Coefficient -0.12
Standard error 0.16
t-statistic -0.76
P-value 0.46
Lower 95% -0.44
Upper 95% 0.20
In 1975 t-critical 2.07 5%
Coefficient -0.06 t-critical 1.72 10%
Standard error 0.12 F (1,22) 4.30
t-statistic -0.54
P-value 0.59
Lower 95% -0.31
Upper 95% 0.18
In this period the R squared is very low, indicating no correlation among the 
variables. The F statistic is not significant. The beta coefficient is negative 
and not significant so for this period there is no convergence
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5%
10%
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable
Coefficient 0.13
Standard error 0.16
t-statistic 0.81
P-value 0.42
Lower 95% -0.19
Upper 95% 0.45
dummy
Coefficient -0.25
Standard error 0.21
t-statistic -1.19
P-value 0.24
Lower 95% -0.67
Upper 95% 0.17
In 1974
Coefficient -0.16
Standard error 0.09
t-statistic -1.66
P-value 0.10
Lower 95% -0.34
Upper 95% 0.03
Dummy X
Coefficient 0.09
Standard error 0.14
t-statistic 0.67
P-value 0.51
Lower 95% -0.19
Upper 95% 0.37
F statistic is significant but the coefficients on the dummy and 
initial income are not significant and only marginally respectively. 
Coefficient of dummy x, which shows by how much the coefficient x 
of the second period, exceeds that of the first, and since this is not 
significant we cannot reject the hypothesis that the extent of the 
convergence is the same for both subperiods
19c- Using dummy variables 
2 regressions (a) low inflation 1961-1974; (b) high inflation 1975-1990 
Dummy=0 for the first subperiod and is 1 for the second subperiod 
Regression results period
R Square 0.47
Adjusted R Square 0.43
Standard Error 0.25
Observations 48.00
Degrees of freedom 47
Regression sum of s 2.31 t-critical 2.02
Sum of sq residuals 2.65 t-critical 1.68
F-statistic 12.79 F (3 ,44 ) 2.84
Significance F 0.00
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20- Political Variables
Regression (20a) - military government 1966-1972 
x= In 1966; y = In 1972- In 1966 
Regression results period
R Square
Adjusted R Square 
Standard Error 
Observations 
Degrees of freedom 
Regression sum of s 
Sum of sq residuals 
F-statistic 
Significance F
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable 
Coefficient 
Standard error 
t-statistic 
P-value 
Lower 95%
Upper 95%
In 1966 
Coefficient 
Standard error 
t-statistic 
P-value 
Lower 95%
Upper 95%
0.05
0.01
0.22
24.00
22.00 
0.06 
1.05 
1.22 
0.28
0.07
0.14
0.48
0.63
- 0.22
0.35
-0.09
0.08
- 1.11
0.28
-0.27
0.08
♦ ♦
In (1966)
t-critical 
t-critical 
F (1. 22)
2.07
1.72
4.30
5%
10%
The subperiod 1966-1972 the R squared is very low and the 
F statistic is not significant. The coefficient on In 1966 is 
negative and not significant at either 5 or 10% and therefore 
there is no convergence for this period
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Regression (20b) - military government 1976-1982
x= In 1976; y = In 1982- In 1976 
Regression results period
R Square 0.12
Adjusted R Square 0.08
Standard Error 0.17
Observations 24.00
Degrees of freedom 22.00
Regression sum of s 0.08
Sum of sq residuals 0.61
F-statistic 3.01
Significance F 0.10
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable
Coefficient 0.17
Standard error 0.09
t-statistic 1.91
P-value 0.07
Lower 95% -0.02
Upper 95% 0.36
In 1976
Coefficient 0.12
Standard error 0.07
t-statistic 1.74
P-value 0.10
Lower 95% -0.02
Upper 95% 0.26
to
N
c
-0.5 "0t2~
•M-
In (1976)
t-critical 2.07 5%
t-critical 1.72 10%
F (1, 22) 4.30
In the case of the second military period, the F statistic is 
not significant, though the regression has a better fit as 
indicated by a higher R squared.
The coefficient on initial income is significant at the 10% level 
and is positive, indicating divergence- albeit weak- in this period
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Regression (20c) - democratic government 1983-1995
x= In 1983; y = In 1995- In 1983 
Regression results period
R Square 0.17
Adjusted R Square 0.13
Standard Error 0.26
Observations 24.00
Degrees of freedom 22.00
Regression sum of s 0.31
Sum of sq residuals 1.53
F-statistic 4.43
Significance F 0.05
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable
Coefficient -0.18
Standard error 0.12
t-statistic -1.46
P-value 0.16
Lower 95% -0.43
Upper 95% 0.08
In 1983
Coefficient -0.19
Standard error 0.09
t-statistic -2.10
P-value 0.05
Lower 95% -0.38
Upper 95% 0.00
£  -2 5
In (1983)
t-critical 2.07 5%
t-critical 1.72 10%
F (1, 22) 4.30
The democratic period is significant and shows a slightly higher 
R squared. The coefficient on In 1983 is significant at both 5 and 10% 
and is negative. Therefore, there was convergence in the period 
1983-1995
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20d- (a) military 1976-82; (b) democracy 1983-1995 20e- a)military 1966-1972, b)democracy 1983-95
Dummy=0 for the first subperiod and is 1 for the second subperiod 
Regression results period Regression results period
R Square 0.14 R Square 0.2
Adjusted R Square 0.08 Adjusted R Square 0.15
Standard Error 0.15 Standard Error 0.24
Observations 48.00 Observations 48
Degrees of freedom 44.00 Degrees of freedom 44
Regression sum of s 0.16 Regression sum of s 0.66
Sum of sq residuals 1.00 Sum of sq residuals 3.73
F-statistic 2.37 F-statistic 0.02
Significance F 0.08 Significance F
Coefficient Results Coefficient Results
Constant Variable Constant Variable
Coefficient 0.17 Coefficient 0.07
Standard error 0.08 Standard error 0.15
t-statistic 2.12 t-statistic 0.44
P-value 0.04 P-value 0.66
Lower 95% 0.01 Lower 95% -0.24
Upper 95% 0.34 Upper 95% 0.37
dummy dummy
Coefficient -0.26 Coefficient -0.24
Standard error 0.11 Standard error 0.19
t-statistic -2.44 t-statistic -1.29
P-value 0.02 P-value 0.20
Lower 95% -0.48 Lower 95% -0.62
Upper 95% -0.05 Upper 95% 0.13
In 1976 In 1976
Coefficient 0.12 Coefficient -0.09
Standard error 0.06 Standard error 0.09
t-statistic 1.93 t-statistic -0.99
P-value 0.06 P-value 0.32
Lower 95% -0.01 Lower 95% -0.28
Upper 95% 0.24 Upper 95% 0.09
Dummy X Dummy X
Coefficient -0.22 Coefficient -0.10
Standard error 0.08 Standard error 0.13
t-statistic -2.66 t-statistic -0.80
P-value 0.01 P-value 0.43
Lower 95% -0.38 Lower 95% -0.36
Upper 95% -0.05 Upper 95% 0.15
• t-critical 2.021 5%
t-critical 1.68 10%
F (3,44) 2.84
The F statistic is not significant. The coefficients 
are all significant and while that on initial income 
is positive, the dummy coefficients (belonging to 
the democratic period) are negative, indicating 
convergence in that period 
Therefore we reject the hypothesis that the extent of 
convergece is the same for both periods
The F statistic in this regression is significant 
though the individual coefficients are not.
The hypothesis is rejected and therefore the 
convergence for both periods is not the same
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V.e. Additional Data Argentina. Main sigma and beta results
Figure V.e.l. Sigma analysis including Escudero et al (2002)
0.70
0.65
0.60
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0.40
1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000
Source: UNLP, Escudero et al (2002) and own calculations
1b- Regression 1961-2000 (merging UNLP and OEI) 
Regression results period
R Square 
Adjusted R Square 
Standard Error 
Observations 
Degrees of freedom 
Regression sum of s 
Sum of sq residuals 
F-statistic 
Significance F
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable 
Coefficient 
Standard error 
t-statistic 
P-value 
Lower 95%
Upper 95%
In (1940)
Coefficient 
Standard error 
t-statistic 
P-value 
Lower 95%
Upper 95%
The R square is small and the F statistic is not significant
The coefficient on initial income is negative and not significant
and therefore with the additional data the period has no convergence.
When comparing this regression with regression 1, the R-squared is smaller, the F-statistic is still 
not significant but even smaller than before and the coefficient on initial income is not significant 
at either 5 or 10 significance level (while for regression 1 it was significant at 10%).
Given the inclusion of the 1996-2000 data made no difference for convergence (in fact the results 
display less significance) and the source is unknown, these data was left out of main analysis.
U.U8
0.03
0.27
24.00
22.00 
0.14 
1.65 
1.83 
0.19
-0.34
0.18
-1.93
0.07
-0.71
0.02
-2.
t-critical 2.07 5%
F (1, 22)
1.72
4.3
10%
-0.14
0.10
-1.35
0.19
-0.36
0.08
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8b- Regression 1990-2000 - with the additional data 
x= In 1990; y » In 2000-In 1990 
Regression results period
R Square
Adjusted R Square 
Standard Error 
Observations 
Degrees of freedom 
Regression sum of s 
Sum of sq residuals 
F-statistic 
Significance F
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable 
Coefficient 
Standard error 
t-statistic 
P-value 
Lower 95%
Upper 95%
In (1990)
Coefficient 
Standard error 
t-statistic 
P-value 
Lower 95%
Upper 95%
0.08
0.04
0.28
24.00
22.00 
0.16 
1.75 
2.02 
0.17
-0.65
0.15
-4.36
0.00
-0.96
-0.34
-0.15
0.11
-1.42
0.17
-0.37
0.07
0.0-0.50• 1.00•2. 0
t-critical 
t-critical 
F (1,22)
2.07
1.72
4.3
5%
10%
The F observed is smaller than the critical and thus it is not 
significant. The correlation is very low in this regression while the 
coefficient on initial income is negative but not significant at either 
significance level. No convergence, though the significance levels 
in this regression are higher than those in regression 8.
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21- Regression 1959-1998
R Square 0.42
Adjusted R Square 0.39
Standard Error 0.44
Observations 24.00
Degrees of freedom 22.00
Regression sum of s 3.08
Sum of sq residuals 4.31
F-statistic 15.72
Significance F 0.00
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable
Coefficient 5.56
Standard error 1.51
t-statistic 3.67
P-value 0.00
Lower 95% 2.42
Upper 95% 8.70
In 1961
Coefficient -0.26
Standard error 0.07
t-statistic -3.96
P-value 0.00
Lower 95% -0.40
Upper 95% -0.13
This regression has a much higher R squared than regression 1 
and F statistic is highly significant. The coefficient on initial income 
is negative (and the same as regression 1) but it is significant at either 
5 or 10% - as opposed to the former, which was only significant 
at 10%. This regression shows a strong convergence rather than 
only a weak one - as in regression 1
This shows how the choice of period might make a significant difference (see page 203)
V.f. Econometric Results -  Brazil*
1- Regression 1970-2000 
x=ln 1970 
y= In 2000-In 1970 
Regression results period
R Square 0.14
Adjusted R Square 0.10
Standard Error 0.26
Observations 26.00
Degrees of freedom 24.00
Regression sum of s 0.25
Sum of sq residuals 1.57
F-statistic 3.83
Significance F 0.06
-25.70
-25.8#-
-25.90
9.00 ♦  9.508.50 10.50 11.00
O
-26.000>
-26.10
C
-26.20i©oo_  -26.30 
~  -26.40 
_  -26.50
-26.60
-26.70
In 1970
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable t critical (10%) 1.71
Coefficient -24.38 t critical (5%) 2.06
Standard error 0.88 F(1,24) 4.26
t-statistic -27.82
P-value 0.00
Lower 95% -26.19
Upper 95% -22.57
In (1970)
Coefficient -0.17
Standard error 0.09
t-statistic -1.96
P-value 0.06
Lower 95% -0.36
Upper 95% 0.01
The R square is low and the coefficient on the In 1970 is negative, although not statistically significant at the 
5% level but it is so at 10% level. The F statistic (3.83) is lower that the F critical (4.26) and therefore the 
regression is not statistically significant.Overall, the coefficients display the right sign, but the regressor's 
significance is only marginal
* When running the regressions on this thesis, data available for Brazil was until the year 2000. However, 
more recent data on Brazil’s regions GDP became available in the last stages of preparing this thesis. I have 
perfomed regression 1 including these new data and the results were unchanged for the R-squared and 
standard error of the regression; and slightly changed for the rest of the coefficients (RSS=1.58; F-statistic= 
4.03; constant coefficient -24.24, t-statistic = -27.57; coefficient on initial income= -0.18, t-statistic=- 
2.01) and therefore the main results remain unaltered so data until 2000 will be considered for the rest of 
the analysis. The F-statistic is higher but still not significant although the coefficient on initial income is 
now statistically significant at both 5 and 10% levels.
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2-Regression 2000-1990 
x= In 1990 
y= In 2000 - In 1990 
Regression results period
R Square
Adjusted R Square 
Standard Error 
Observations 
Degrees of freedom 
Regression sum of s 
Sum of sq residuals 
F-statistic 
Significance F
Coefficient Results ’
Constant Variable 
Coefficient 
Standard error 
t-statistic 
P-value 
Lower 95%
Upper 95%
In (1990)
Coefficient 
Standard error 
t-statistic 
P-value 
Lower 95%
Upper 95%
0.01
-0.03
0.18
26.00
24.00
0.01
0.77
0.21
0.65
44r2&
♦ ♦
In 1990
-14.53
0.12
117.60 t critical (10%) 1.71
0.00 t critical (5%) 2.064
-14.78 F(1,24) 4.26
-14.27
-0.03
0.07
-0.46
0.65
-0.17
0.11
When looking at the last decade considered, it can be seen 
that the R squared is very low (lower that regression 1) and so is the 
F statistic. When looking at the coefficient of In 1990, it has 
a negative sign though this is not statistically significant at 
either 5 or 10% confidence levels. Therefore it can be concluded 
that in the decade 1990-2000 no convergence is found
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3. Regression 1990*1980 
x=ln 1980 
y= In 1990- In 1980 
Regression results period
R Square
Adjusted R Square 
Standard Error 
Observations 
Degrees of freedom 
Regression sum of s 
Sum of sq residuals 
F-statistic 
Significance F
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable 
Coefficient 
Standard error 
t-statistic 
P-value 
Lower 95%
Upper 95%
In (1980)
Coefficient 
Standard error 
t-statistic 
P-value 
Lower 95%
Upper 95%
0.11
0.07
0.14
26.00
24.00
0.06
0.49
2.95
0.10
-12.24
0.59
-20.69
0.00
-13.46
- 11.01
-0.09
0.05
-1.72
0.10
-0.19
0.02
-12.80
10.5 11.5-12.90
-13.00
-13.10
-13.20
-13.30
-13.40
-13.50
-13.60
In 1980
t critical (10%) 
t critical (5%) 
F(1,24)
1.71
2.064
4.26
In this subperiod, the R squared is much higher that the previous one and slightly 
lower than the regression for the whole period. The F statistic follows suit and 
therefore it is still not statistically significant. The coefficient for In 1980 
is again of negative sign and not significant at the 5% level but marginally 
significant at 10%. Therefore the subperiod 1990-1980 displays no 
conclusive convegent trend
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4. Regression 1980-1970 
x= In 1970 
y= In 1980- In 1970 
Regression results period
R Square
Adjusted R Square 
Standard Error 
Observations 
Degrees of freedom 
Regression sum of s 
Sum of sq residuals 
F-statistic 
Significance F
0.08 o
0.04 o>T -
0.21 co
26.00 COn
24.00 c
0.10
1.09
2.13
0.16
10 
90 
70 
50 
30 
10 
90 
70 
50
8.50 9.00 9.50 10.00 
In 1970
10.50 11.00 11.50
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable -
Coefficient
Standard error
t-statistic
P-value
Lower 95%
Upper 95%
In (1970)
Coefficient 
Standard error 
t-statistic 
P-value 
Lower 95%
Upper 95%
2.70
0.73
3.68
0.00
1.19
4.21
- 0.11
0.07
-1.46
0.16
-0.26
0.04
t critical (10%) 
t critical (5%) 
F(1,24)
1.71
2.064
4.26
The subperiod 1980-1970 has a very low R squared, and again 
the F statistic is not significant. The coefficient on In 1970 is 
again of negative sign and not significant at either 5 of 10% of 
significance level. Therefore, the period 1980-1970 displays 
no convergence.
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5. Regression 1985-1975 
x= In 1975 
y= In 1985- In 1975 
Regression results period
R Square 0.44
Adjusted R Square 0.42
Standard Error 0.22
Observations 26.00
Degrees of freedom 24.00
Regression sum of s 0.92
Sum of sq residuals 1.18
F-statistic 18.78
Significance F 0.00
2.00
1.80
1.60
1.40
1.20
1.00
0.80
0.60
0.40
0.20
0.00
12.59.5 10.5 11.5 128.5 9 10 11
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable
Coefficient 4.16
Standard error 0.71
t-statistic 5.87 t critical (10%) 1.71
P-value 0.00 t critical (5%) 2.064
Lower 95% 2.70 F(1,24) 4.26
Upper 95% 5.63
In (1975)
Coefficient -0.28
Standard error 0.07
t-statistic -4.33
P-value 0.00
Lower 95% -0.42
Upper 95% -0.15
This subperiod was chosen to replicate the break given by 
the sigma analysis. It can be seen that in this case the R square 
is the highest so far and that the F statistic is highly significant. 
When looking at the coefficient on In 1975 this is not only negative 
but it is also significant at both 5 and 10% confidence levels 
It can safely be concluded then that following the breaks given 
by the sigma analysis (see Figure 9.14 in Chapter 9) 
the subperiod 1975-1985 is one of strong convergence among 
the Brazilian states.
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6. Regression 2000-1993 
x= In 1993 
y = In 2000- In 1993 
Regression results period
R Square
Adjusted R Square 
Standard Error 
Observations 
Degrees of freedom 
Regression sum of s 
Sum of sq residuals 
F-statistic 
Significance F
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable 
Coefficient 
Standard error 
t-statistic 
P-value 
Lower 95%
Upper 95%
In (1993)
Coefficient 
Standard error 
t-statistic 
P-value 
Lower 95%
Upper 95%
0.02
- 0.02
0.14
26.00
24.00
0.01
0.49
0.58
0.45
-9.00 -8.00 -7.00-1C ,00
♦ ♦
In 1993
-7.93
0.45
■17.45 t critical (10%) 1.71
0.00 t critical (5%) 2.064
-8.86 F(1,24) 4.26
-6.99
-0.04
0.05
-0.76
0.45
-0.15
0.07
This subperiod also complements the analysis following 
the sigma breaks as described in Chapter 9. This subperiod 
displays a very low R Squared and a non significant F 
statistic. The coefficient on the dependent variable is negative 
but not significant and therefore it can be concluded 
that the period 1993-2000 is one of non convergence
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7. Regression 2000-1970 with education 
x1= In 1970 
x2= education 
y= In 2000- In 1970 
Regression results period
R Square 0.33
Adjusted R Square 0.27
Standard Error 0.23
Observations 26.00
Degrees of freedom 23.00
Regression sum of s 0.60
Sum of sq residuals 1.21
F-statistic 5.73
Significance F 0.01
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable
Coefficient -21.38
Standard error 1.40
t-statistic -15.27
P-value 0.00
Lower 95% -24.28
Upper 95% -18.48
In (1970)
Coefficient -0.59
Standard error 0.18
t-statistic -3.29 t critical (10%) 1.71
P-value 0.00 t critical (5%) 2.06
Lower 95% -0.96 F(2,23) 3.42
Upper 95% -0.22
Education
Coefficient 0.02
Standard error 0.01
t statistic 2.59
P-value 0.02
Lower 95% 0.00
Upper 95% 0.03
The conditional convergence analysis for the whole period including the enrollement 
rates give a higher R squared than the unconditional model, even when corrected by the 
degrees of freedom (adjusted R squared).
The F statistic is significant. The coefficient on In 1970 is negative and 
significant at both 5 and 10% levels of confidence. The coefficient on education displays 
the right sign (positive) and is also significant, highlighting a relationship between the 
higher the level of education and the higher the growth for a given state.
Overall the conditional regression reveals that, when allowing for the differences in 
education levels among states, there was convergence for the period under study.
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8. regression with agriculture and industry shares 
x1= In 1970
x2 = share of agriculure as % of GDP 
x3 = share of industry as % of GDP 
y = In 2000- In 1970 
Regression results period
R Square 0.33
Adjusted R Square 0.24
Standard Error 0.24
Observations 26.00
Degrees of freedom 22.00
Regression sum of s 0.59
Sum of sq residuals 1.22
F-statistic 3.57
Significance F 0.03
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable
Coefficient -23.66
Standard error 0.91
t-statistic -26.05
P-value 0.00
Lower 95% -25.55
Upper 95% -21.78
In (1970)
Coefficient -0.26
Standard error 0.09
t-statistic -2.76
P-value 0.01
Lower 95% -0.45
Upper 95% -0.06
Agriculture t critical (10%) 1.71
Coefficient 0.04 t critical (5%) 2.07
Standard error 0.02 F(3,22) 3.05
t-statistic 2.23
P-value 0.04
Lower 95% 0.00
Upper 95% 0.07
Industry
Coefficient 0.00
Standard error 0.01
t-statistic -0.41
P-value 0.69
Lower 95% -0.02
Upper 95% 0.02
The R squared in this regression is the same as the conditional case with only education 
though obviously the adjusted R is lower because of the loss of degrees of freedom).
The F statistic is also significant, though not as significant as when including only education 
Regarding the coefficients, In 1970 has a negative and significant coefficient; while agriculture 
displays a positive and also significant coefficient while industry a positive and not significant 
The coefficient in agriculture implies that there is a positive correlation between those 
states that have higher agricultural share of GDP and their rate of growth.
The regression displays convergence
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9. Regression 2000-1970 with agriculture, industry and education 
x1= In 1970 
x2 = education
x3 = share of agriculure as % of GDP 
x4 = share of industry as % of GDP 
y= In 2000- In 1970 
Regression results period
R Square 0.41
Adjusted R Square 0.29
Standard Error 0.23
Observations 26.00
Degrees of freedom 21.00
Regression sum of s 0.74
Sum of sq residuals 1.08
F-statistic 3.61
Significance F 0.02
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable
Coefficient -21.67
Standard error 1.47
t-statistic -14.73
P-value 0.00
Lower 95% -24.73
Upper 95% -18.61
In (1970)
Coefficient -0.54
Standard error 0.19
t-statistic -2.85
P-value 0.01
Lower 95% -0.93
Upper 95% -0.15
Education
Coefficient 0.01
Standard error 0.01
t-statistic 1.68
P-value 0.11
Lower 95% 0.00
Upper 95% 0.03 t critical (10%) 1.72
Agriculture t critical (5%) 2.08
Coefficient 0.02 F(3,21) 3.07
Standard error 0.02
t-statistic 1.33
P-value 0.20
Lower 95% -0.01
Upper 95% 0.06
Industry
Coefficient 0.00
Standard error 0.01
t-statistic -0.06
P-value 0.95
Lower 95% -0.02
Upper 95% 0.02
In this regression, the R squared increased, though when looking at the adjusted r squared this increase 
has not been dramatic. The F statistic is significant and the coefficient on In 1970 is negative and significant 
implying convergence. The coefficient for education is positive and not significant at either confidence level 
Both agriculture and industry have positive but not significant coefficients.
Regression (10a) - military government 1970-1985
x= In 1970; y = In 1985- In 1970
Regression results period
R Square 0.15
Adjusted R Square 0.12 ©
Standard Error 0.24 in
Observations 26.00 0>
Degrees of freedom 24.00 c
Regression sum of s 0.26
Sum of sq residuals 1.43
F-statistic 4.32
Significance F 0.05
2J0
2.40
2.00
1J0
1J0
1.00
10.50 11.00 11.60100 • 50 0.00 0.50 10.00
In (1970)
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable F(1,24)= 4.26
Coefficient 3.79 t crit (5%)* 2.06
Standard error 0.84 t crit (10%)= 1.71
t-statistic 4.53
P-value 0.00
Lower 95% 2.07
Upper 95% 5.52
In (1970)
Coefficient -0.18
Standard error 0.08
t-statistic -2.08
P-value 0.05
Lower 95% -0.35
Upper 95% 0.00
The R square in this regression is fairly similar 
to that of regression 1 (for the whole period, 
unrestricted). The F statistic, however, is 
significant in this regression. It seems as if all 
the convergence of the whole 1970-2000 
period was captured in this subperiod, 
the coefficient on initial income is negative 
and significant at both levels 
therefore, the period is one of convergence
Regression (10b) - democratic government 1986-2000
x= In 1986; y = In 2000- In 1986 
Regression results period
R Square 0.01
Adjusted R Square -0.03
Standard Error 0.20
Observations 26.00
Degrees of freedom 24.00
Regression sum of s 0.01
Sum of sq residuals 1.00
F-statistic 0.26
Significance F 0.62
Coefficient Results 
Constant Variable
Coefficient -21.18
Standard error 0.41
t-statistic -51.97
P-value 0.00
Lower 95% -22.02
Upper 95% -20.34
In (1986)
Coefficient -0.04
Standard error 0.08
t-statistic -0.51
P-value 0.62
Lower 95% -0.20
Upper 95% 0.12
♦ ♦u>*?toO)o>
c
♦  ♦
In (1986)
F(1,24)= 4.26
t crit (5%)= 2.06
t crit (10%)= 1.71
The R squared for this subperiod is very low, 
in fact it displays results similar to regression 2 
for the period 1990-2000. The F statistic in this case 
is also not significant, seeming that this regression 
captures the effect of the last decade.
Regarding the coefficient on initial income 
the coefficient is negative and not significant at 
any confidence level.
The subperiod is then one of no-convergence
10c- Using dummy variables
2 regressions (a) military 1970-85; (b) democracy 1986-2000 
Dummy=0 for the first subperiod and is 1 for the second subperiod
R Square 1.00
Adjusted R Square 1.00
Standard Error 0.22
Observations 52.00
Degrees of freedom 48.00
Regression sum of s 7145.04 F (3 ,45) 2.81
Sum of sq residuals 2.43 t-critical 5% 2.01
F-statistic 47072.73 t-critical 10% 1.68
Significance F 0.00
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable
Coefficient 3.79
Standard error 0.77
t-statistic 4.92
P-value 0.00
Lower 95% 2.24
Upper 95% 5.35
Dummy
Coefficient -24.98
Standard error 0.89
t-statistic -27.96
P-value 0.00
Lower 95% -26.77
Upper 95% -23.18
In 1970
Coefficient -0.18
Standard error 0.08
t-statistic -2.26
P-value 0.03
Lower 95% -0.33
Upper 95% -0.02
DX
Coefficient 0.14
Standard error 0.12
t-statistic 1.17
P-value 0.25
Lower 95% -0.10
Upper 95% 0.37
This regression in significant. However, the unusally high 
F statistic is explained by the massive difference in constant term. 
The coefficient on initial income is negative and significant, but the 
coefficient on dummy x is positive and not significant therfore 
we cannot reject the hypothesis that the extent of convergence is the 
same for both periods.
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11. Macroeconomic variables. Regression (11b) - low inflation (1970-86)
x= In 1970; y ■ In 1986 - In 1970 
Regression results period
R Square 0.18
Adjusted R Square 0.15
Standard Error 0.23
Observations 26.00
Degrees of freedom 24.00
Regression sum of s 0.30
Sum of sq residuals 1.31
F-statistic 5.44
Significance F 0.03
0.20-0. i0_ -0.40 •°-20 -0.10 • 
♦
0.40 a»o
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable
Coefficient -2.84
Standard error 0.80
t-statistic -3.54 F(1,24)= 4.26
P-value 0.00 t crit (5%)= 2.06
Lower 95% -4.49 t crit (10%)= 1.71
Upper 95% -1.18
In (1970)
Coefficient -0.19
Standard error 0.08
t-statistic -2.33
P-value 0.03
Lower 95% -0.36
Upper 95% -0.02
The F statistic in this regression is significant 
the coefficient on initial income is negative and 
highly significant and therefore in this subperiod 
there is convergence.
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable 
Coefficient 
Standard error 
t-statistic 
P-value 
Lower 95%
Upper 95%
In 1987 
Coefficient 
Standard error 
t-statistic 
P-value 
Lower 95%
Upper 95%
11. Macroeconomic variables. Regression (11b) - high inflation (1987-94) 
x= In 1987; y » In 1994 - In 1987 
Regression results period
R Square 0.05
Adjusted R Square 0.01
Standard Error 0.18
Observations 26.00
Degrees of freedom 24.00
Regression sum of s 0.04
Sum of sq residuals 0.79
F-statistic 1.14
Significance F 0.30
-21.18
0.34
-61.74
0.00
-21.89
-20.48
-0.07
0.07
-1.07
0.30
- 0.21
0.07
-21.20
5.50 8.004.00 4.50 5.00
-21.40
•21.50
-21.60
-21.70
-21.80
-21.00
-22.00
-22.10
F(1> 24)= 
t crit (5%)= 
t crit (10%)=
4.26
2.06
1.71
This subperiod displays a much lower R squared that 
the previous equation. The F statistic is not 
significant and the coefficient, though negative, is not 
significant. This subperiod is therefore one of no 
convergence among the states.
11.c- Macroeconomic Variables, Dummy analysis, 1970-1986 and 1987-1994
Regression results period
R Square 1.00
Adjusted R Square 1.00
Standard Error 0.31
Observations 52.00
Degrees of freedom 48.00
Regression sum of s 19164.83
Sum of sq residuals 4.48
F-statistic 68458.47
Significance F 0.00
Coefficient Results
Constant Variable
Coefficient -2.84 F (3 ,45) 2.81
Standard error 1.05 t-critical 5% 2.01
t-statistic -2.71 t-critical 10% 1.68
P-value 0.01
Lower 95% -4.94
Upper 95% -0.73
dummy
Coefficient -39.52
Standard error 1.20
t-statistic -32.93
P-value 0.00
Lower 95% -41.93
Upper 95% -37.11
In
Coefficient -0.19
Standard error 0.11
t-statistic -1.78
P-value 0.08
Lower 95% -0.40
Upper 95% 0.02
dx
Coefficient 0.04
Standard error 0.16
t-statistic 0.28
P-value 0.78
Lower 95% -0.27
Upper 95% 0.36
Both r squared and F are hugely significant. However, it is the coefficient 
on the dummy x the one we are mostly interested in. This is positive and 
not significant, so again, as in the case of political variables 
we cannot reject the hypothesis that the extent of convergence is the 
same for both periods.
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Kg. Brazil - Using 1995 as base year (instead of 1986)
As can be seen in this and the following page, the main results (R squared, F statistic, 
standard error, and coefficient of initial year) remain unaltered using 1995 as base year 
instead of 1986. The only change is that of the constant term, but that is irrelevant for our 
analysis of convergence.
Vg.1- Regression 1970-2000 Vg.2-Regression 1990-2000
x=ln 1970 x=ln 1990
y= In 2000 -In 1970 y= In 2000 -In 1990
Regression results period Regression results period
R Square 0.14 R Square 0.01
Adjusted R Square 0.10 Adjusted R Square -0.03
Standard Error 0.26 Standard Error 0.18
Observations 26.00 Observations 26.00
Degrees of freedom 24 Degrees of freedom 24.00
regression sum of s 0.25 regression sum of s 0.01
sum of sq residuals 1.57 sum of sq residuals 0.77
f statistic 3.83 f statistic 0.21
significance f 0.06 significance f 0.65
Coefficient Results Coefficient Results
Constant Constant
coefficient -20.57 coefficient -13.91
standard error 2.62 standard error 1.23
t statistic -8.01 t statistic -11.33
P-value 0.00 P-value 0.00
Lower 95% -26.37 Lower 95% -16.44
Upper 95% -15.56 Upper 95% -11.38
In (1970) In (1970)
coefficient -0.17 coefficient -0.03
standard error 0.09 standard error 0.07
t statistic -1.96 t statistic -0.46
P-value 0.06 P-value 0.65
Lower 95% -0.36 Lower 95% -0.17
Upper 95% 0.01 Upper 95% 0.11
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Vg.3- Regression 1990-1980 Vg.4-Regression 1980-1970
x=ln 1980 x=ln 1970
y= in 1990 -In 1980 y= In 1980 -In 1970
Regression results period Regression results period
R Square 0.11 R Square 0.08
Adjusted R Square 0.07 Adjusted R Square 0.40
Standard Error 0.14 Standard Error 0.21
Observations 26.00 Observations 26.00
Degrees of freedom 24 Degrees of freedom 24.00
regression sum of s 0.06 regression sum of s 0.01
sum of sq residuals 0.49 sum of sq residuals 1.09
f statistic 2.95 f statistic 2.13
significance f 0.10 significance f 0.16
Coefficient Results Coefficient Results
Constant Constant
coefficient -10.50 coefficient 4.82
standard error 1.60 standard error 2.19
t statistic -6.56 t statistic 2.20
P-value 0.00 P-value 0.04
Lower 95% -13.80 Lower 95% 0.31
Upper 95% -7.20 Upper 95% 9.34
In (1980) In (1970)
coefficient -0.09 coefficient -0.11
standard error 0.05 standard error 0.07
t statistic -1.72 t statistic -1.46
P-value 0.10 P-value 0.16
Lower 95% -0.19 Lower 95% -0.26
Upper 95% 0.02 Upper 95% 0.04
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V.h. Heteroskedasticity
As already mentioned in the methodological notes, all regressions have been tested for 
heterosckedasticity by Goldfeld -  Quandt test and the summary of the findings are the 
following.
Brazil.
The data for Brazil has been ordered and divided into two separate regressions, each with 
10 observations (the 6 observations in the middle were omitted). A ratio was then 
calculated between the sum of square residuals of each in order to test the hypothesis o 
homoscedasticity, which is tested with an F critical (in this case equals 3.44 at the 95% 
level and 6.03 at 99%). All the regressions for Brazil presented an F observed smaller 
than the F critical at 99% level and therefore homoscedasticity was not rejected. There 
were a few regressions for which homoscedasticity was rejected at the 95% level, and 
these were the regressions for 1990-2000; 1970-1980 and 1993-2000.
Argentina.
Data for Argentina was divided into 2 regressions with 8 observations each (omitting the 
middle 8 observations) and in all regressions except that for 1961-1995 with education 
levels of 1960, the hypothesis of homoscedasticity could not be rejected at 99% level. At 
95% level, however, the regressions for 1989-1995; 1970-1980; 1961-1995 with 
education levels of 1947 (and that with industry, agriculture and education); as well as 
the two equations with the data from Escudero et al (2002) for 1961-2000 and 1990- 
2000.
European Union.
For the European Union regions for the period 1960-1973 there are 37 observations and 
therefore were divided into two regressions with 13 observations each (11 were left out). 
This regression rejected the hypothesis of homoscedasticity at 95% level, though it could 
not be rejected at 99%.
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For the same period, the countries were divided into three groups of two observations 
each and the middle one was omitted. This regression did not reject the hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity. For the period 1973-1988, two regressions of 18 observations each 
were done out of a total 48 observations.
For the countries, two regressions of three observations each were calculated. Both 
regressions could not reject the hypothesis of homoscedasticity. Finally, for the period 
1988-1995, the 59 observations belonging to the regions were divided into two separate 
regressions of 10 observations each, omitting the middle 19 observations. For the 12 
countries, two separate regressions of 4 observations were constructed. In both the 
hypothesis of homoscedasticity was not rejected, at either 95 or 99% level.
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The following table shows the results for the Goldfeld-Quandt test performed for all regressions. The 
table displays the year, number o f  regression as in Appendix V, the F-observed (the ratio o f  the two 
RSS from the two independent regressions), the F critical and, where applicable, the F critical at 99%.
Regr. Brazil Fobs F crit F crit 99%
1) 1970-2000 1.93 3.44
2) 1990-2000 5.55 3.44 6.03
3) 1980-1990 0.69 3.44
4) 1970-1980 3.62 3.44
5) 1975-1985 0.33 3.44
6) 1986-2000 4.38 3.44 6.03
7) 1970-2000, ed. 1.71 3.79
8) 1970-2000,agr.ind 2.13 4.28
9) 1970-2000, agr.ind,ed 4.26 5.05
10) 1970-1985 0.77 3.44
11) 1986-2000 2.36 3.44
12) 1970-1986 0.63 3.44
13) 1987-1994 0.76 3.44
Vg.1) 1970-2000 3.23 3.44
Vg.2) 1990-2000 5.55 3.44 6.03
Vg.3) 1980-1990 0.69 3.44
Vg.4) 1970-1980 0.31 3.44
Regr. Argentina F obs F crit F crit 99%
1) 1961-1995 1.92 4.28
2) 1961-1973 1.06 4.28
3) 1973-1983 3.23 4.28
4) 1983-1989 0.31 4.28
5) 1989-1995 6.88 4.28 8.47
6) 1970-1980 8.03 4.28 8.47
7) 1980-1990 0.29 4.28
8) 1990-1995 3.35 4.28
9) 1970-1995 0.9 4.28
10) 1961-1995, ed 47 6.8 5.05 11
11) 1961-1995 ed 60 11.84 5.05 11
12) 1961-1995, agr.ind 4.7 6.39
13) 1961-1995, agr.ind,educ 4.45 6.54
19a) 1961-1974 1.38 4.28
19b) 1975-1990 1.19 4.28
20a) 1966-1972 0.73 4.28
20b) 1976-1982 2.49 4.28
20c) 1983-1995 1.78 4.28
Ve.1b) 1961-2000 4.6 4.28
Ve.9b) 1990-2000 4.51 4.28 8.47
Regr. European Union F obs F crit F crit 99%
1) 1960-1973 4.73 2.98 4.85
2) 1960-1973 84.5 161
3) 1973-1988 0.03 2.35
4) 1973-1988 0.04 161
5) 1988-1995 0.81 2.27
6) 19881995 0.23 19
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APPENDIX VI 
Chronology of Events
VLa. C hronological List o f Regional Trade Arrangem ents notified to GATT
TITLE MEMBERS YEAR
France-ltaly Interim Customs Union France, Italy 1947
South African-Southern Rhodesian 
Customs Union
South Africa, Southern Rhodesia 1948
Nicaragua and El Salvador Free Trade Area El Salvador, Nicaragua 1951
European Coal and Steel Community Belgium, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, West 
Germany
1951
European Economic Community Belgium, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, West 
Germany
Denmark, Ireland and the United 
Kingdom joined 1973 
Greece joined in 1981 
Portugal and Spain joined 1986 
Austria,Sweden,Finland in 1995
1958
Central American Free Trade Area Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras 
Nicaragua
1958
European Free Trade Association Austria, Denmark, Norway, 
Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom 
Denmark and UK left 1973 
Iceland joined in 1970 
Finland became full member 
in 1970
Portugal left in 1986
1960
Latin American Free Trade Association Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay 
Colombia, Ecuador joined in 1961
1960
Central American Common Market Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua
1960
Arab Common Market United Arab Republic 1964
Central African Economic Customs Union Central African Republic, Chad 
Congo, Gabon
1964
Canada-US Automotive Agreement Canada, United States 1965
Australia-New Zealand Free Trade 
Agreement
Australia, New Zealand 1965
United Kingdom- Ireland Free Trade 
Agreement
Ireland, United Kingdom 1965
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TITLE 1 MEMBERS 1 YEAR
Caribbean Free Trade Agreement Barbados, Guyana, Trinidad and 
Tobago
1968
Andean Pact Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Peru 
Venezuela joined in 1973 
Chile left in 1976
1969
Caribbean Community and Common 
Market
Barbados, Guyana, Trinidad and 
Tobago
Other countries joined in 1974
1973
ASEAN Preferential Trading Agreements Indonesia, Malaysia,
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand 
Brunei joined in 1988
1977
Latin American Integration Association Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, 
Venezuela
1979
Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic 
Relations Trade Agreement
Australia, New Zealand 1983
Free Trade Agreement between Israel 
and the United States
Israel, United States 1985
Single European Act Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom, 
West Germany
1986
Programme of Economic Integration 
and Cooperation
Argentina, Brazil 1986
Canada-United States Free Trade Area Canada, United States 1988
Enterprise for the Americas Initiative all American countries 1990
Treaty of Asuncion- MERCOSUR Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay 
Uruguay
Bolivia and Chile became 
associate members in 1996
1991
EFTA- EEC agreement EFTA, EEC 1991
Treaty of the European Union EEC countries 1992
North American Free Trade Area Canada, United States, Mexico 1994
Source: Campos Filho (1999)
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Vl.b
1945
1946
1949
1950
1951
1957
1960
1961
1964
1967
1971
1973
1979
1981
1985
1986
1989
1991
1995
1997
1998
2002
Main Developments in the European Union
Second World War ends
“European Reconstruction” or Marshall Plan of reconstruction aid for Europe 
Creation of the German Democratic Republic
The Schuman declaration, calling for the creation of a European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC)
The Treaty of Paris forming the ECSC
The Treaties of Rome were signed, one creating the European Economic Community 
(EEC) and the other the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom)
Organisation of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) becomes the 
Organisation for Economic Coopeation and Development (OECD)
The Stockholm Convention was signed, creating the European Free Trade Area (EFTA)
Britain, Ireland and Denmark apply for membership. President de Gaulle refuses
The Merger Treaty joined the ECSC, Euratom and the EEC
Second British attempt to join
Collapse of the Bretton-Woods system
First oil crisis
First enlargement (UK, Ireland and Denmark)
The people of Norway vote against entry to the EEC 
Launch of European Monetary System, Britain does not join 
First elections of the European Parliament 
Greece joins the EEC
Spain and Portugal join by signing the Treaty of Accession 
The Single European Act (SEA) was signed 
German reunification
Treaties of the European Union are signed at Maastricht (Dec.)
Austria, Sweden and Finland join the Union 
The Amsterdam Treaty
European Monetary Union countries are decided 
The Euro is launched
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VI.c
1536
1545
1622
1696
1767
1776
1777
1778
1808
1810
1811
1813
1816
1820
1825
1826
1828
1833
1852
1853
1854
1862
1865
1869
1870
1880
1916
1930
1932
Chronology of Events in Argentina from Colonial Times
The city of Buenos Aires is founded
Silver mines are discovered in Potosi
The Aduana Seca was established in C6rdoba
The Aduana Seca was moved from C6rdoba to Tucuman
The Jesuits were expelled from Spanish territories
The viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata is created
Aduana Seca was abolished
Free Trade was proclaimed in the port of Buenos Aires 
French invasion of Spain
Formation of the first independent government, of a provisional nature (Primera Junta)
A Triunvirate government replaces the Junta 
Ley de vientres, slavery is abolished 
Independence is declared in Tucuman
Battle of Cepeda, Buenos Aires is defeated and the Constitution of 1819 is eliminated 
Argentina and Brazil go to war for the Provincia Cisplatina (nowadays Uruguay)
Unitary Constitution
The independence of the Provincia Cisplatina is declared
Rosas dictatorship begins
Rosas is defeated in the Battle of Caseros
National Constitution promulgated
The construction of the first railway began
Mitre is elected president
Triple Alliance is established between Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay against Paraguay
First national census
The war against Paraguay ends
Roca becomes president, following a successful campaign to extend the south frontier, 
Campana del Desierto
Hipolito Yrigoyen becomes the first elected president of Argentina by universal and
compulsory suffrage
Military coup, Uriburu takes power
The war of Chaco begins between Bolivia and Paraguay
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1933
1940
1943
1946
1951
1952
1955
1958
1962
1963
1966
1969
1970
1972
1973
1974
1979
1981
1982
1983
1985
1990
1992
1995
1996
1999
2000
2001
2003
Roca-Runciman Treaty
Ramon Castillo becomes president following the death of Ortiz
Military Coup
Peron becomes president
Peron is elected president again
Evita Per6n dies
Revolution Libertadora, Military coup takes over, Per6n goes into exile 
Arturo Frondizi becomes president
The military overthrow Frondizi and put Jose Maria Guido in charge of the presidency 
Arturo Illia is elected president
General Ongania tales over the presidency, Revolution Argentina 
El Cordobazo, workers and students’ demonstration 
Ongania deposed and replaced by Levingston and then Lanusse 
Per6n returns to Argentina after 17 years of exile 
The formula Per6n-Per6n is elected
Following the death of Per6n, his wife assumes the presidency
Military coup leaded by Videla, initiating the “process of national reorganization”, an
unprecedented violent period
Conflict over the Beagle Channel with Chile
Viola takes power and later that year was removed and replaced by Galtieri
Falklands War against the United Kingdom
End of military government and Alfonsin is elected president
The government launches the Plan Austral to curb inflation
Hyperinflation, Alfonsin leaves the government before its time and is replaced by the 
newly elected president Menem
Inflation is curbed following the Plan Convertibilidad, designed by minister Cavallo 
Menem is elected for a second term
Finance Minister Domingo Cavallo is dismissed. General strike in September 
De la Rua wins the presidency 
Strikes and fuel tax protests
Crisis deepens, changes and resignations in the cabinet. President De la Rua resigns in 
December and Duhalde appointed as caretaker president 
Nestor Kirchner sworn in as president
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Vl.d  Chronology of Events in Brazil from Colonial Times
1500 Cabral’s expedition arrives in Brazil
1525 Sebastian Caboto disembarks in Brazil
1530 The system of hereditary captaincies is implemented by Dom Joao HI 
1538 The first African slaves arrive in Brazil
1549 Tome de Sousa becomes the first governor general of Brazil
Salvador is founded
1559 The ‘carta regia’ facilitates the imports of slaves for sugar plantation owners
1624 Dutch invasions of Bahia
1625 The Dutch leave Bahia
1630 Invasion of Pernambuco by the Dutch
1654 The Dutch are finally defeated
1750 Treaty of Madrid, recognising Portuguese rights over the territories west from the
meridien of Tordesillas 
1759 The Jesuits are expelled from Brazil
Heredetary captaincies are abolished and the territory belongs to the Crown 
1763 Rio de Janeiro becomess the capital of the viceroyalty 
1808 Napoleon invades Portugal
The Portuguese court arrives in Brazil 
Free trade in all ports of Brazil is established 
1818 The prince regent becomes king with the title of Dom Joao VI, following the death of 
Queen Dona Maria I in 1816
1821 Dom Joao VI returns to Portugal
1822 The prince regent Dom Pedro refuses to leave Brazil (dia do fico) and proclaims the
independence of Brazil
1824 First Constitution
The United States recognises the independence of Brazil
1825 Argentina and Brazil go to war for the Provincia Cisplatina (present Uruguay)
Portugal recognises the independence of Brazil
1826 Dom Pedro becomes king of Portugal and abdicates in favour of his daughter Dona Maria 
da Gloria
1828 The independence of the Provincia Cisplatina is declared
1831 Dom Pedro I abdicates
Provisional Triunvirate Regency is established followed by a permanent Triunvirate
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1838
1840
1854
1865
1870
1871
1877
1888
1889
1891
1908
1930
1934
1937
1940
1942
1945
1946
1951
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1959
1960
1964
1965
The Marques de Olinda is elected as regent of the Empire 
Dom Pedro II becomes the second emperor of Brazil 
Electricity and gas are installed in Rio de Janeiro
Triple Alliance is established between Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay against Paraguay 
The war against Paraguay ends
Lei do Ventre Livre is issued, whereby children of slaves are bom free
Drought in the northeast
End of slavery in Brazil (Lei Aurea)
The Republic of Brazil is proclaimed 
First Constitution of the Republic is proclaimed 
First wave of Japanese immigrants arrives in Brazil 
Getulio Vargas comes to power 
New Constitution is proclaimed
The Congress appoints Vargas as elected president of the Republic
Following a coup, Vargas closes the Congress, issues a new Constitution and bans
political parties
A minimum wage is established
Brazil joins the Second World War, following a German attack on Brazilian ships
Vargas resigns under increasing military pressure
National elections, Dutra is elected president
Assambleia Nacional Constituinte issues the new Constitution
Vargas assumes the Presidency again, following his electoral victory
Petrobras is created
Vargas imposes more restrictions on foreign capital and suggests the creation of 
Electrobras
Militars issue a manifesto in which they demand that the president resigns 
Vargas commits suicide and Cafe Filho assumes the presidency 
Kubitschek is elected president
The economic plan Cinquenta anos en cinco (fifty years in five) is launched 
Construction of Brasilia begins 
The project for Sudene is approved 
Brasilia is inaugurated
Military coup, Castelo Branco assumes the presidency 
Monetary reform, the cruzeiro novo is launched
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1967
1970
1972
1973
1979
1980
1982
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1997
1998
2001
2002
Costa e Silva becomes the new president
Opposition to government becomes more evident with guerrilla movements in the cities 
The Transamazonica Highway is inaugurated
President Medici signs an agreement with the Paraguayan dictator Stroessner to
commence the building of the hidroelectrical power plant in Itaipu
Amnesty laws are passed and hundreds of exiles return to Brazil
Economic crisis worsens, followed by strikes and demonstrations
Itaipu is inaugurated
External Debt Crisis, Brazil admits that cannot meet the debt services
Electoral Congress appoints Tancredo Neves as president, who dies before assuming the
presidency
Samey assumes the presidency
Plano Cruzado to curb inflation and stabilise the economy is launched 
Elections for an Assembleia Constituinte 
Extremely high inflation rates, the crisis worsens 
New Constitution
Collor de Melo becomes the first president elected by direct vote since 1960
New economic plan, new currency and freeze of bank deposits for 18 months
Treaty of free trade with Argentina is signed
Inflation increases again and crisis worsens
Under corruption allegations, Collor is replaced by Itamar Franco
A new currency, the cruzeiro real is launched in an attempt to curb inflation
Cardoso elected president
Constitutional changes to allow for a presidential re-election 
Cardoso is re-elected
The president abolishes 2 development agencies for the amazon and the north east under 
allegations of stealing funds
Currency hits all-time low. Lula da Silva is elected president.
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Map of Colonial Brazil
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Map of Railways Brazil (by 1930)
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